Among his later works, Peter Lamborn Wilson—known to many as Hakim Bey—began performing ritual art pieces in Upstate New York, which he referred to as acts of “Endarkenment.” This paper explores Endarkenment from the beginning of its organic growth in the fertile soil of The Temporary Autonomous Zone, to its blossoming as fully‐realized ritual art, nourished by Bey's intention of returning enchantment back to the land. Through parallels in the works of antiquity, Surrealism, Georges Bataille, Giordano Bruno, Djuna Barnes, (...) and others, an adumbration of the body of Endarkenment comes into view at the very moment of its disappearance into Nature, giving an idea of what Endarkenment could be as a fully realized form of internal transformation. (shrink)

(1999). Ontological anarchy, the temporary autonomous zone, and the politics of cyberculture a critique of hakim bey. Angelaki: Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 115-128.

Contemporary post-aesthetic art implies an expanded concept of the work of art that also includes political functions. Beuys’s concept of social sculpture and Marcuse’s idea of society as a work of art can be complemented by Abreu’s project of a musical orchestra as a social ideal and the Neue Slowenische Kunst transnational state formed from the core of art. These concepts are close to the views of Hakim Bey, with D’Annunzio also touching upon them with his State of Fiume, (...) for which he wrote the constitution and defined music as its central governing principle. Although the art state is a utopian project, art can serve a variety of emancipatory functions even in the dystopian present to intervene in and change the political. In this article, we also discuss the case of art activism in Slovenia, where culture has become a central part of civil society oriented towards social change. Art activism contributes to an expanded concept of the political, which includes new subjects and new forms of antagonisms. Likewise, such repurposing of art emphasises its role in research. (shrink)

continent. 2.2 (2012): 152–154 Levi R. Bryant. The Democracy of Objects . Ann Arbor, MI: Open Humanities Press. 2011. 316 pp. | ISBN 9781607852049. | $23.99 For two decades post-anarchism has adopted an epistemological point of departure for its critique of the representative ontologies of classical anarchism. This critique focused on the classical anarchist conceptualization of power as a unitary phenomenon that operated unidirectionally to repress an otherwise creative and benign human essence. Andrew Koch may have inaugurated this trend in (...) 1993 when he wrote his influential paper entitled “Post-structuralism and the Epistemological Basis of Anarchism.” Koch’s paper certainly laid some of the important groundwork for post-anarchism’s continual subsumption of ontology beneath the a priori of an epistemological orientation, and his work continues to be cited as an early and important venture into post-anarchist philosophy. The problem is that Koch could not conceive of an anti-essentialist and autonomous ontological system, one not subject to regulation or representation by the human mind. Consequently, he was forced to assert a subjectivist claims-making ego as the foundation of a post-structuralist anarchist politics. Saul Newman was indebted to this heritage insofar as he also posited the ego (extrapolated from the writings of Max Stirner) and the subject (extrapolated from Jacques Lacan’s oeuvre ) as the paradoxical ‘outside’ to power and representation. Todd May fell into a similar trap in his book The Political Philosophy of Post-structuralist Anarchism when he wrote that “[m]etaphysics [...] partakes of the normativity inhabiting the epistemology that provides its foundations.” 1 Whereas Newman’s approach did not necessarily foreclose the possibility of metaphysics—at least to the extent that he began with the subject of the Lacanian tradition (wherein the subject is believed to be radically split between thinking and being)—May completely foreclosed the possibility of any escape from the reign of the epistemological. There laid the impasse of yesterday’s post-anarchism. This impasse at the heart of the project of post-anarchism has forced Koch, Newman, May, and many others, to come to similar conclusions about the place of ontology in post-anarchist scholarship. The post-anarchists have all formulated a response strikingly similar to Koch’s argument that any representative ontology ought to be dismantled and dethroned in favour of “a conceptualization of knowledge that is contingent on a plurality of internally consistent episteme .” 2 By dismissing all ontologies as suspiciously representative and as incessantly harbouring a dangerous form of essentialism, post-anarchists have overlooked the privilege that they have placed on the human subject, language, and discourse, at the expense of the democracy that the human subject shares with other animals, objects, and beings in the world. This epistemological characterization of post-anarchism has held sway for far too long. It is not by chance that post-anarchism, as a concept, was first formulated by Hakim Bey as an “ontological anarchism,” 3 and subsequently repressed by the canon of post-anarchist authors. Perhaps Bey’s ontological anarchism also lacked the ‘rigour’ required of today’s scholarly audience and for these two reasons (at least) he has received very little credit for his inaugurating efforts into post-anarchism. In any case, I want to challenge this reluctance and revive the roots of post-anarchism. Levi Bryant gives us a reason to believe that we can achieve the promise of Bey’s ontological anarchism without sacrificing the scholarly standard of rigour. Levi Bryant’s newest open-access book, The Democracy of Objects , is a tour de force . His book challenges post-anarchists to take their radical critique of representation a step further by questioning the “hegemony that epistemology currently enjoys in philosophy.” Bryant maintains that post-structuralism, and radical anti-humanisms, only appear to reject the subject as the locus of political agency. Their rejection is actually more of a disavowal, a replacement of the human subject with the equally human order of language or discourse. What post-structuralism attempts to elucidate is the manner in which the subject is colonized by the Other of language, discourse and social relations. What here appears as a movement away from the determining subject of humanism and existentialism is only replaced with the determining apparatuses of structures as they are conceived by astute analysts of political culture. Post-structuralism thus re-enters the anthropocentric discourse to the extent that the cultural analyst believes himself capable of conceiving the determinative structures of society. In contradistinction to the claims of post-structuralism and post-anarchism, the role of the ontologist is not to suture the gap between epistemology and the real but to de-suture it, as Bryant puts it: “[o]ntology does not tell us what objects exist, but that objects exist, that they are generative mechanisms.” Above all else, the role of ontology, for post-anarchists, ought to be a real de-centering of the subject in relation to other objects in the non-human world such that the subject becomes conceived as one object among others within a living democracy of equality. This inevitably leads to the conclusion that objects exist whether or not the subject or analyst is there to represent them: they represent themselves and are autonomous from our dictation, just as each object finds its autonomy in relation to other objects. Ontology must now be distinguished from representation. We must shift the terms of the debate and interrogate the hegemony that epistemology has been afforded within post-anarchist philosophy. At least two possibilities are now permitted. On the one hand, one could intervene into the reigning mode of philosophy, namely epistemology, by latching onto concepts from meta-ethical philosophy. Meta-ethics allows one to easily separate the ontological from the epistemological and to answer very particular questions about each in order to formulate an overarching meta-ethical position. 4 Post-anarchism is particularly adept at this task because of its resounding ability to frame itself as an ethical political philosophy in relation to the strategic political philosophy of classical Marxism. On the other hand, Bryant argues that “[p]erhaps the best way to defeat [the privilege currently held by epistemology] is to shift the terms of debate.” Shifting the terms of debate is also something that post-anarchists have been very good at doing. Thus, instead of asking the question ‘how do representative ontological systems harbour concealed epistemological orientations toward the political?’ one might ask ‘ do epistemological orientations toward the political always harbour representative and subject-centred ontological systems?” The genius of Bryant’s book rests in its ability to convincingly argue for the radical autonomy of being and of objects. This claim speaks to some of the most compelling theories of the political in anarchist and marxist political philosophy (for instance, hegemony, representation, democracy, and so on) and it re-stages the political drama of our times across a much wider terrain. The fallacy of strategic political philosophy in the Marxist tradition, as Todd May quite correctly points out, is that it remains committed to a concept of power that is unitary in its analysis, unidirectional in its influence, and utterly repressive in its effect. Similarly, Bryant’s ontology allows one to argue that there is a fallacy that occurs “whenever one type of entity is treated as the ground or explains all other entities.” Whereas May’s post-structuralist anarchism moved away from the fallacy of the unitary analysis of power, whereby subjects are constituted by the influence of a single site of power, it nonetheless remained committed to a tactical political philosophy which is monarchical in the final analysis . It remains monarchical to the extent that the human world, the world of epistemology, is treated as the yardstick of democracy. Bryant’s argument is quite instructive: “[w]hat we thus get is not a democracy of objects or actants where all objects are on equal ontological footing [...] but instead a monarchy of the human in relation to all other beings.” The real fallacy is thus not against strategic political philosophy but philosophy itself and the way it has played out over so many centuries. “The epistemic fallacy,” writes Bryant, “consists in the thesis that proper ontological questions can be fully transposed into epistemological questions.” The point that Bryant is making relates to the way ontology is today always reduced to an epistemology and thereby loses its significance as a philosophical question. This book should be applauded for its novelty and its thesis ought to be taken seriously by post-anarchists today. Because of this book, and the attendant post-continental movement that is being called ‘speculative realism,’ we can now distinguish three stages in the life of post-anarchism. First, we can deduce what Süreyya Evren has described as its ‘introductory period.’ The introductory period of post-anarchism is defined by its inability to side-step the ontological problem in the literature of classical anarchism. During this period, post-anarchism needed to distinguish itself from classical anarchism while nonetheless remaining committed to its ethical project. The second period overcomes the problem of the separation of post-anarchism from classical anarchism by re-reading the classical tradition as essentially post-anarchistic. Some of the critiques of post-anarchism—especially that from Cohn & Wilbur 5 —are included into this period insofar as post-anarchism, for them, was always already anarchism. Whereas the first and second phases have included only explicitly anarchist literature under their rubric of worthwhile investigation, in the third period this no longer holds true. To be certain, the second period permitted the incorporation of post-structuralist literature into post-anarchist discussions (but always with a certain amount of reservation). This third period, the one that is to come—the one that is already here if only we would heed its call—will not take such care with attempts at identification or canonization. Indeed, post-anarchism is already here, like a seed beneath the snow, waiting to be discovered. Levi Bryant teaches us that the third period is already here: and yet where is it? NOTES 1) Todd May. The Political Philosophy of Post-Structuralist Anarchism . University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. 1997. 2. 2) Andrew Koch. “Post-structuralism and the Epistemological Basis of Anarchism” [1993] in Post-Anarchism: A Reader . Eds. Duane Rousselle & Sureyyya Evren. London: Pluto Press. 2011. pp. 23-40. 3) Bey, Hakim. “ Post-Anarchism Anarchy .” 1987. 4) I have attempted to do this in my paper on Bataille’s post-anarchism; see Duane Rousselle. “Georges Bataille’s Post-anarchism.” Journal of Political Ideologies . 17(3): in press. 5) Jesse Cohn & Shawn Wilbur. “ What’s Wrong with Post-anarchism? ” 2010. (shrink)

El presente escrito tiene dos propósitos. En primer lugar, busca recapitular algunos temas abordados en los últimos años por el filósofo alemán Jürgen Habermas, como representante del liberalismo: a) la noción de sociedad post-secular, sus condiciones y desafíos; b) la tolerancia y el multiculturalismo; y c) la traducción como actividad mediadora que remedie la dificultad de comprensión entre el pensamiento secular de Occidente y las diferentes cosmovisiones religiosas tradicionales, de variadas procedencias. En segundo lugar, pretende ampliar el panorama de Habermas (...) con el apoyo de dos autores provenientes de otras tradiciones de pensamiento, y que permiten complementar y matizar algunas de las propuestas habermasianas: Michael Walzer, como representante del comunitarismo, y Peter Lamborn Wilson, alias Hakim Bey, como representante del postanarquismo. Esto para construir las bases de una forma más radical de pensar el fenómeno del pluralismo. (shrink)

continent. 1.3 (2011): 149-155. The world is teeming. Anything can happen. John Cage, “Silence” 1 Autonomy means that although something is part of something else, or related to it in some way, it has its own “law” or “tendency” (Greek, nomos ). In their book on life sciences, Medawar and Medawar state, “Organs and tissues…are composed of cells which…have a high measure of autonomy.”2 Autonomy also has ethical and political valences. De Grazia writes, “In Kant's enormously influential moral philosophy, autonomy (...) , or freedom from the causal determinism of nature, became prominent in justifying the human use of animals.”3 One of the oldest uses of autonomy in English is a description of the French civil war from the late sixteenth century: “Others of the…rebellion entred in counsell, whether they ought to admit the King vpon reasonable conditions, specially hauing their autonomy.”4 Life, and in particular human life, and in particular human politics, is well served by the usages of autonomy . What about the rest of reality, however? Should it be thought of, if it's even considered real and mind-independent, as pure stuff for the manipulation or decorative tastes of truly autonomous beings? We tend to think of things such as paperweights and iPhones as mere tools of human design and human use. To use them is to cause them to exist as fully and properly as they can. But according to Martin Heidegger, when a tool such as a paperweight is used, it disappears, or withdraws ( Entzug ). We are preoccupied with copying the page that the paperweight is holding down. We are concerned with an essay deadline, and the paperweight simply disappears into this general project. If the paperweight slips, or if the iPhone freezes, we might notice it. All of a sudden it becomes vorhanden (present-at-hand) rather than zuhanden (ready-to-hand).5 Yet Heidegger is unable to draw a meaningful distinction between what happens to a paperweight when it slips from the book I'm copying from and what happens to the paperweight when it presses on the still resilient pages of the thick paperback itself. Further still and related to this point, even when I am using the paperweight as part of some general task, I am not using the entirety of the paperweight as such. My project itself selects a thin slice of paperweight-being for the purposes of holding down a book. Even when it is zuhanden the paperweight is withdrawn. Graham Harman is the architect of this way of thinking.6 Harman discovered a gigantic coral reef of withdrawn entities beneath the Heideggerian submarine of Da-sein, which itself is operating at an ontological depth way below the choppy surface of philosophy, beset by the winds of epistemology, and infested with the sharks of materialism, idealism, empiricism and most of the other isms that have defined what is and what isn't for the last several hundred years. At a moment when the term ontology was left alone like a piece of well chewed old chewing gum that no one wants to have anything to do with, object-oriented ontology (OOO) has put it back on the table. The coral reef isn't going anywhere and once you have discovered it, you can't un-discover it. And it seems to be teeming with strange facts. The first fact is that the entities in the reef—we call them “objects” somewhat provocatively—constitute all there is: from doughnuts to dogfish to the Dog Star to Dobermans to Snoop Dogg. People, plastic clothes pegs, piranhas and particles are all objects. And they are all pretty much the same, at this depth. There is not much of a distinction between life and non-life (as there isn't in contemporary life science). And there is not much of a distinction between intelligence and non-intelligence (as there is in contemporary artificial intelligence theory). A lot of these distinctions are made by humans, for humans (anthropocentrism). And the concept autonomy has come into play in policing such distinctions. In this essay I shall to try to liberate autonomy for the sake of nonhumans. I shall do so by parsing carefully the title, which is taken from Hakim Bey's work The Temporary Autonomous Zone .8 First we shall explore the term autonomous . Then we shall explore what the full meaning of zone is. Finally, we shall investigate what temporary means. Each of these terms is of great value. An object withdraws from access. This means that its very own parts can't access it. Since an object's parts can't fully express the object, the object is not reducible to its parts. OOO is anti-reductionist. But OOO is also anti-holist. An object can't be reduced to its “whole” either, “reduced upwards” as it were. The whole is not greater than the sum of its parts. So we have a strange irreductionist situation in which an object is reducible neither to its parts nor to its whole. A coral reef is made of coral, fish, seaweed, plankton and so on. But one of these things on its own doesn't embody part of a reef. Yet the reef just is an assemblage of these particular parts. You can't find a coral reef in a parking lot. In this way, the vibrant realness of a reef is kept safe both from its parts and from its whole. Moreover, the reef is safe from being mistaken for a parking lot. Objects can't be reduced to tiny Lego bricks such as atoms that can be reused in other things. Nor can be reduced upwards into instantiations of a global process. A coral reef is an expression of the biosphere or of evolution, yes; but so is this sentence, and we ought to be able to distinguish between coral reefs and sentences in English. The preceding facts go under the heading of undermining . Any attempt to undermine an object—in thought, or with a gun, or with heat, or with the ravages of time or global warming—will not get at the withdrawn essence of the object. By essence is meant something very different from essentialism . This is because essentialism depends upon some aspect of an object that OOO holds to be a mere appearance of that object, an appearance-for some object. This reduction to appearance holds even if that object for which the appearance occurs is the object itself! Even a coral reef can't grasp its essential coral reefness. In essentialism, a superficial appearance is taken for the essence of a thing, or of things in general. In thinking essentialism we may be able to discern another way of avoiding OOO. This is what Harman has christened overmining .? The overminer decides that some things are more real than others: say for example human perception. Then the overminer decides that other things are only granted realness status by somehow coming into the purview of the more real entity. When I measure a photon, when I see a coral reef, it becomes what it is. But when I measure a photon, I never measure the actual photon. Indeed, since at the quantum scale to measure means “to hit with a photon or an electron beam” (or whatever), measurement, perception ( aisthesis ), and doing become the same. What I “see” are deflections, tracks in a diffusion cloud chamber or interference patterns. Far from underwriting a world of pure illusion where the mind is king, quantum theory is one of the very first truly rigorous realisms, thinking its objects as irreducibly resistant to full comprehension, by anything.9 So far we have made objects safe from being swallowed up by larger objects and broken down into smaller objects—undermining. And so far we have made objects safe from being mere projections or reflections of some supervenient entity—overmining. That's quite a degree of autonomy. Everything in the coral reef, from the fish to a single coral lifeform to a tiny plankton, is autonomous. But so is the coral reef itself. So are the heads of the coral, a community of tiny polyps. So is each individual head. Each object is like one of Leibniz's monads, in that each one contains a potentially infinite regress of other objects; and around each object, there is a potentially infinite progress of objects, as numerous multiverse theories are now also arguing. But the infinity, the uncountability, is more radical than Leibniz, since there is nothing stopping a group of objects from being an object, just as a coral reef is something like a society of corals. Each object is “a little world made cunningly” (John Donne).10 We are indeed approaching something like the political valance of autonomy . The existence of an object is irreducibly a matter of coexistence. Objects contain other objects, and are contained “in” other objects. Let us, however, explore further the ramifications of the autonomy of objects. We will see that this mereological approach (based on the study of parts) only gets at part of the astonishing autonomy of things. Yet there are some more things to be said about mereology before we move on. Consider the fact that since objects can't be undermined or overmined, it means that there is strictly no bottom object . There is no object to which all other objects can be reduced, so that we can say everything we want to say about them, hypothetically at least, based on the behavior of the bottom object. The idea that we could is roughly E.O Wilson's theory of consilience .11 Likewise, there is no object from which all things can be produced, no top object . Objects are not emanations from some primordial One or from a prime mover. There might be a god, or gods. Suppose there were. In an OOO universe even a god would not know the essential ins and outs of a piece of coral. Unlike even some forms of atheism, the existence of god (or nonexistence) doesn't matter very much for OOO. If you really want to be an atheist, you might consider giving OOO a spin. If there is no top object and no bottom object, neither is there a middle object . That is, there is no such thing as a space, or time, “in” which objects float. There is no environment distinct from objects. There is no Nature (I capitalize the word to reinforce a sense of its deceptive artificiality). There is no world, if by world we mean a kind of “rope” that connects things together.12 All such connections must be emergent properties of objects themselves. And this of course is well in line with post-Einsteinian physics, in which spacetime just is the product of objects, and which may even be an emergent property of a certain scale of object larger than 10?¹?cm).13 Objects don't sit in a box of space or time. It's the other way around: space and time emanate from objects. How does this happen? OOO tries to produce an explanation from objects themselves. Indeed, the ideal situation would be to rely on just one single object. Otherwise we are stuck with a reality in which objects require other entities to function, which would result in some kind of undermining or overmining. We shall see that we have all the fuel we need “inside” one object to have time and space, and even causality. We shall discover that rather than being some kind of machinery or operating system that underlies objects, causality itself is a phenomenon that floats ontologically “in front of” them. In so doing, we will move from the notion of autonomy and begin approaching a full exploration of the notion of zone , which was promised at the outset of this essay. Since an object is withdrawn, even “from itself,” it is a self-contradictory being. It is itself and not-itself, or in a slightly more expanded version, there is a rift between essence and appearance within an object (as well as “between” them). This rift can't be the same as the clichéd split between substance and accidents , which is the default ontology. On this view, things are like somewhat boring cupcakes with somewhat less boring sugar sprinkles on them of different colors and shapes. But on the OOO view, what is called substance is just another limited slice of an object, a way of apprehending something that is ontologically fathoms deeper. What is called substance and what is called accidence are just on the side of what this essay calls appearance. The rift (Greek, chorismos ) between essence and appearance means that an object presents us with something like what in logic is known as the Liar: some version of the sentence “This sentence is false.” The sentence is true, which means that it is a lie, which means that it is false. Or the sentence is false, which means that it is telling the truth, which means that it is true. Now logic since Aristotle has tried desperately to quarantine such beasts in small backwaters and side streets so that they don't act too provocatively.14 But if OOO holds, then at least one very significant thing in the universe is both itself and not-itself: the object. An object is p ? ¬p. To cope with this fact, we shall need some kind of paraconsistent or even fully dialetheic logic, one that is not allergic to dialetheias (double-truthed things). Yet if we accept that objects are dialetheic, p ? ¬p, we can derive all kinds of things easily from objects. Consider the fact of motion. If objects only occupy one location “in” space at any “one” time, then Zeno's paradoxes will apply to trying to think how an object moves. Yet motion seems like a basic, simple fact of our world. Either everything is just an illusion and nothing really moves at all (Parmenides). Or objects are here and not-here “at the same time.”15 This latter possibility provides the basic setup for all the motion we could wish for. Objects are not “in” time and space. Rather, they “time” (a verb) and “space.” They produce time and space. It would be better to think these verbs as intransitive rather than transitive, in the manner of dance or revolt . They emanate from objects, yet they are not the object. “How can we know the dancer from the dance?” (Yeats).16 The point being, that for there to be a question, there must be a distinction—or there must not be (p ? ¬p).17 It becomes impossible to tell: “What constitutes pretense is that, in the end, you don't know whether it's pretense or not.”18 In this notion of the emergence of time and space from an object we can begin to understand the term zone . Zone can mean belt , something that winds around something else. We talk of temperate zones and war zones. A zone is a place where a certain action is taking place: the zone winds around, it radiates heat, bullets fly, armies are defeated. To speak of an autonomous zone is to speak of a place that a certain political act has carved out of some other entity. Cynically, Tibet is called TAR, the Tibetan Autonomous Region, for this very reason. In this phrase, Region tries to emulate zone : it sounds as if the place has its own rules, but of course, it is very much under the control of China. What action is taking place? “[N]ot something that just is what it is, here and now, without mystery, but something like a quest…a tone on its way calling forth echoes and responses…water seeking its liquidity in the sunlight rippling across the cypresses in the back of the garden.”19 If as suggested earlier there is no functional difference between substance and accidence; if there is no difference between perceiving and doing; if there is no real difference between sentience and non-sentience—then causality itself is a strange, ultimately nonlocal aesthetic phenomenon. A phenomenon, moreover, that emanates from objects themselves, wavering in front of them like the astonishingly beautiful real illusion conjured in this quotation of Alphonso Lingis. Lingis's sentence does what it says, casting a compelling, mysterious spell, the spell of causality, like a demonic force field. A real illusion: if we knew it was an illusion, if it were just an illusion, it would cease to waver. It would not be an illusion at all. We would be in the real of noncontradiction. Since it is like an illusion, we can never be sure: “What constitutes pretense…” A zone is what Lingis calls a level . A zone is not entirely a matter of “free will”: this concept has already beaten down most objects into abject submission. Objects are far more threateningly autonomous, and sensually autonomous, than the Kantian version of autonomy cited in the first paragraph of this essay. A zone is not studiously decided upon by an earnest committee before it goes into action. One of its predominant features is that it is already happening . We find ourselves in it, all of a sudden, in the late afternoon as the shadows lengthen around a city square, giving rise to an uncanny sensation of having been here before. Objects emit zones. Wherever I find myself a zone is already happening, an autonomous zone. It is the nonautonomous zones that are impositions on what is already the case. Or rather, these zones are autonomous zones that exclude and police. They are brittle. Every object is autonomous, but some objects try to maintain themselves through rigidity and brittleness, like (and such as) a police state. Paradoxically, the more rigidly one tries to exclude contradiction, the more virulent become the dialetheias that are possible. I can get around “This sentence is false” by imagining that there are metalanguages that explain what counts as a sentence. Then I can decide that this isn't a real sentence. This is basically Alfred Tarski's strategy, since he invented the notion of metalanguage specifically to cope with dialetheias.20 For example we might claim that sentences such as “This sentence is false” are neither true nor false. But then you can imagine a strengthened version of the Liar such as: “This sentence is not true”; or “This sentence is neither true nor false.” And we can go on adding to the strengthened Liar if the counter-attack tries to build immunity by specifying some fourth thing that a sentence can be besides true, false, and neither true nor false: “This sentence is false, or neither true nor false, or the fourth thing.” And so on.21 It seems as if language becomes more brittle the more it tries to police the Liars of this world. Why? I believe that this increasing brittleness is a symptom of a deep fact about reality. What is this deep fact? Simply that there are objects, that these objects are withdrawn, and that they are walking contradictions. This means indeed that (as Lacan put it) “there is no metalanguage,” since a metalanguage would function as a “middle object” that gave coherency and evenness to the others.22 Since there is no metalanguage, there is no rising above the disturbing illusory play of causality. This may even have political implications: no global critique is therefore possible, and attempts to smooth out or totalize are doomed to fail. To think the zone is to think the notion of temporary , which we shall now begin to discuss in greater detail. The zone is not in time: rather it “times.” But because a zone is an emanation of an object, it is based on a wavering fragility, since objects are p ? ¬p. When an object is born, that means that it has broken free of some other object. An object can be born because it and other objects are fragile. If not, no movement would be possible. Objects contain the seeds of their own destruction, a dialetheic sentence that says something like “This sentence cannot be proved.” Kurt Gödel argues that every true system of propositions contains at least one sentence that the system cannot prove. In order to be true, the system must have a minimum incoherence. To be real, it has to be fragile. Imagine a record player. Now imagine a record called I Cannot Be Played on This Record Player . When you play it on this record player, it produces sympathetic vibrations that cause the record player to shudder apart. No matter how many defense mechanisms you build in, there will always be the possibility of at least one record that destroys the record player.23 That is what being physical is. An object is inherently fragile because it is both itself and not-itself. When the rift between appearance and essence collapses, that is called destruction, ending, death. When an object breaks, several new objects are born. An opera singer sings a loud note in tune with the resonant frequency of a wine glass. (See the movie included below.) The singing is a zone, an autonomous level of intensity, opening a rift between appearance and essence. The glass ripples—for a moment it is nakedly a glass and a not-glass—almost as if it were having an orgasm, a little death. It is caught in the rift of the singing. Then its structure can't handle the coherence of the sound waves, and it breaks. It is incoherence and inconsistency that is the mark of existence, not consistency and noncontradiction. When things break or die, they become coherent. Essence disappears into appearance. I become the memories of friends. A glass becomes a dancing wave. Instantly, there are glass fragments, new temporary autonomous zones. The fragments have broken free from the glass. They are no longer its parts, but emanate their own time and space, becoming perhaps accidental weapons as they bury themselves in my flesh. Thus Hakim Bey's instructions on creating temporary autonomous zones oscillate disturbingly between performance art and politics, circus clowning and revolution. To play with the aesthetic is to play with causality, to rip from the sensual ether emanating from things new regions, new zones. Anarchist politics is the creation of fresh objects in a reality without a top or a bottom object, or for that matter a middle object: Everything in nature is perfectly real including consciousness, there's absolutely nothing to worry about. Not only have the chains of the Law been broken, they never existed; demons never guarded the stars, the Empire never got started, Eros never grew a beard. … There is no becoming, no revolution, no struggle, no path; already you're the monarch of your own skin—your inviolable freedom waits to be completed only by the love of other monarchs: a politics of dream, urgent as the blueness of sky.24 Bey imagines that this is because chaos is a primordial “undifferentiated oneness-of-being.” A Parmenides or a Spinoza or a Laruelle would read this a certain way. Individual objects, or decisions to talk about this rather than that, are just maggot-like things crawling around on the surface of the giant cheese of oneness.25 Yet he also describes chaos as “Primordial uncarved block, sole worshipful monster, inert & spontaneous, more ultraviolet than any mythology.” This image is of an inconsistent object, not of an undifferentiated field. An object, indeed, that can be distinguished from other things. If not, then the first part of The Temporary Autonomous Zone , subtitled “The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism,” is a kind of onto-theology. Onto-theology proclaims that some things are more real than others. Bey, however, is writing poetically, and thus ambiguously. We are at liberty to read “undifferentiated oneness-of-being” as something like the irreducibility of a thing to its parts and so forth (undermining and overmining). This certainly seems closer to the language in the following paragraph: “There is no becoming … already you're the monarch of your own skin.”26 On this view, there is no difference between art and politics: “When ugliness, poor design & stupid waste are forced upon you, turn Luddite, throw your shoe in the works, retaliate.” Since Romanticism this has been the war cry of the vanguard artist.27 To say to is to fall prey to the tired axioms of the avant-garde, and we think we know how the game goes. But OOO is not simply a way to advocate “new and improved” versions of this shock-the-bourgeoisie boredom. Bey's text is certainly full enough of that. Rather, since causality as such is aesthetic, and since nonhumans are not that different from humans, the new approach would be to form aesthetic–causal alliances with nonhumans. These alliances would have to resist becoming brittle, whether that brittleness is right wing (authoritarianism) or left wing (the endless maze of critique). No “ism,” especially not the ultimate forms, nihilism and cynicism, is in any sense effective at this point. All forms of brittleness are based on the mistaken assumption that there is a metalanguage and that therefore “Anything you can do, I can do meta.” I will not be listing any approaches here, as Bey does. Such lists and manifestos belong to the vanguardism that no longer works. Why? Not because of some marvelous revolution in human consciousness, but because nonhumans have so successfully impinged upon human social, psychic and aesthetic space. It is the time after the end of the world. That happened in 1945, when a thin layer of radioactive materials was deposited in Earth's crust. Geology now calls it this era the Anthropocene . Ironically, this period, named after humans, is the moment at which even the most thick headed of us make decisive contact with nonhumans, from mercury in our blood to manta rays to magnesium. Richard Dawkins, Pat Robertson and Lady Gaga all have to deal with global warming and mass extinction, somehow. We now live in an Age of Asymmetry marked by a skewed, spiraling relationship between vast knowledge and vast nonhuman things—both become vaster and vaster because of one another and for the same reasons.28 This means that coming up with the perfect attitude or the perfect aesthetic prescription just won't work any more. Even the most hardened anthropocentrist now has to pay through the nose for basic food supplies, and has to use more sunscreen. Whether he knows it or acknowledges it, he is already acting with regard towards nonhumans. There is nothing special to think, no special critique that will get rid of the stains of coexistence. The problem won't fit into the well-established modern boxes, which is why the “mystical,” “spiritual” quality of Bey's prose is welcome. Of course, when I put it this way, you may immediately close off and decide that I am talking about perfect attitudes after all, or something outside of politics, or other ways that the radical left marshals to police its thinking of the nonhuman. Because that is what is really at stake in all this: the nonhuman in its coexistence with the human—bosons, gods, clouds, spirits, lifeforms, experiences, the sunlight rippling across the cypresses. Bey begins to get at this in a Latour litany in the second part of The Temporary Autonomous Zone , “The Assassins”: Pomegranate, mulberry, persimmon, the erotic melancholy of cypresses, membrane-pink shirazi roses, braziers of meccan aloes & benzoin, stiff shafts of ottoman tulips, carpets spread like make-believe gardens on actual lawns—a pavilion set with a mosaic of calligrammes—a willow, a stream with watercress—a fountain crystalled underneath with geometry— the metaphysical scandal of bathing odalisques, of wet brown cupbearers hide-&-seeking in the foliage—“water, greenery, beautiful faces.”29 This will be conveniently dismissed as orientalism. If we're never allowed to escape the crumbling prison of modernity for fear of imperialism there is truly no hope. In a similar way, the fear of anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism is very often staged from a place that just is anthropocentrism .30 Critique turns into ressentiment . An object radiates a zone that is aesthetic and therefore causal. Because objects “time” they are temporary. Not because they exist “in” time that eventually gets the better of them. Their very existence implies the possibility of their non-existence. Since objects are not consistent, they can cease to exist. But nothing, no one, will ever be able to insert a blade between appearance and existence, even thought there is a rift there. Now that's what I call autonomy. NOTES 1. John Cage, Silence: Lectures and Writings (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1973), 96. 2. P. B. Medawar and J. S. Medawar, The Life Science: Current Ideas in Biology (London: Wildwood House, 1977), 8. 3. David DeGrazia, Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 5. 4. Antony Colynet, A True History of the Civil Warres in France (London, 1591), 480. 5. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , tr. Joan Stambaugh (Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1996) 62–71. 6. Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (Peru, IL: Open Court, 2002). 7. Hakim Bey, The Temporary Autonomous Zone (Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 1991). 8. Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Ripley: Zero Books, 2011), 7–18. 9. This is not the place to get into an argument about quantum theory, but I have argued that quanta also do not endorse a world that I can't speak about because it is only real when measured. This world is that of the reigning Standard Model proposed by Niels Bohr and challenged by De Broglie and Bohm (and now the cosmologist Valentini, among others). See Timothy Morton, “Here Comes Everything: The Promise of Object-Oriented Ontology,” Qui Parle 19.2 (Spring–Summer, 2011), 163–190. 10. John Donne, Holy Sonnets 15, in The Major Works: Including Songs and Sonnets and Sermons , ed. John Carey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 11. Edward O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York: Knopf, 1998). 12. Martin Heidegger, What Is a Thing? (Washington: Regnery, 1968), 243. 13. Albert Einstein, Relativity: The Special and the General Theory (London: Penguin, 2006); Petr Horava, “Quantum Gravity at a Lifshitz Point,” arXiv:0901.3775v2 [hep-th]. 14. Graham Priest, In Contradiction (Oxford University Press, 2006), passim: the most notable recent quarantine officers have been Tarski, Russell, and Frege. 15. Priest, In Contradiction , 172–181. 16. William Butler Yeats, “Among School Children,” Collected Poems , ed. Richard J. Finneran (New York: Scribner, 1996). 17. Paul de Man, “Semiology and Rhetoric,” Diacritics 3.3 (Autumn, 1973), 27–33 (30). 18. Jacques Lacan, Le seminaire, Livre III: Les psychoses (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1981), 48. See Slavoj Zizek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006), 206. 19. Alphonso Lingis, The Imperative (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 29. 20. Priest, In Contradiction , 9–27. 21. See Graham Priest and Francesco Berto, “ Dialetheism ,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. 22. Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection , tr. Alan Sheridan (London: Tavistock, 1977), 311. 23. The analogy can be found at length in Douglas Hofstadter, “Contracrostipunctus,” Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 75–81. 24. Bey, “ Chaos: The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 25. This is closest to the language of François Laruelle in Philosophies of Difference: A Critical Introduction to Non-Philosophy (New York: Continuum, 2011) 179. 26. Bey, “ Chaos: The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 27. Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant Garde (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 28. For further discussion see Timothy Morton, “From Modernity to the Anthropocene: Ecology and Art in the Age of Asymmetry,” The International Social Science Journal 209 (forthcoming). 29. Bey, “ The Assassins ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 30. Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), 75–76. (shrink)

Türk ve İslam tarihinin kırılma noktalarından birisi 1040 yılında Selçuklular ile Gazneliler arasında cereyan eden Dandanakan Savaşı’dır. Savaşın ardından Selçuklular hızlı bir yükselişle özellikle Sünnî İslam coğrafyasında etkin ve belirleyici güç haline gelmiştir. Göçebe kültürden gelen ve bir oba hüviyetinde iken çok kısa bir sürede önlenemez bir şekilde hâkimiyet alanını Türkistan coğrafyasından Anadolu içlerine kadar genişleten Büyük Selçuklu Devleti, kurumsal olarak da olgunlaşmaya başlamıştır. Bu noktada hem merkezi yönetimde hem de vilayetlerde ortaya çıkan yetişmiş eleman ihtiyacını birçoğu daha önce Gazneli (...) devlet teşkilatında görev yapmış Fars asıllı devlet adamları karşılamıştır. Bu isimlerden birisi de ileride Nizâmülmülk adıyla şöhret bulacak ve namı isminin önüne geçecek olan Hasan b. Alî b. İshâk et-Tûsî’dir. Nizâmülmülk, devlet gücünün askeri alanda elde edilen zaferlere endekslendiği bir dönemde askerî, idarî, ilmî ve ekonomik alanda attığı adımlar ve aldığı tedbirlerle Büyük Selçuklu Devleti’nin kurumsallaşmasında son derece etkin bir isim olmuştur. Bu etkinlik neticesinde hem halk hem de devlet adamları nezdinde saygın bir yer edinmiştir. Bu çalışma çerçevesinde Nizâmülmülk’ün devlet bürokrasisi içerisindeki konumuna, hükümdar ve hanedan üyeleri ile olan ilişkilerine ve vezirlik sürecinde attığı adımların Selçuklu tarihine yansımalarına değinilecektir. Özet: Devlet kademesinde görev almaya Gazneliler Devleti’nin Horasan Valisi Ebü’l-Fazl Sûrî’nin yanında başlayan Nizâmülmülk, Horasan Bölgesi’nin Selçukluların kontrolüne geçmesiyle birlikte hizmetlerine Selçuklu Devleti’nde devam etmiştir. Çağrı Bey’in hizmetinde rüştünü ispat eden Nizâmülmülk, Çağrı Bey’in en güvendiği isimlerden biri haline gelmiştir. Öyle ki, Çağrı Bey ileride önce Horasan’ın sonrasında tüm Selçuklu yurdunun yönetimini üstlenecek olan oğlu Alparslan’ı Nizâmülmülk’e emanet etmiş, oğluna da Nizâmülmülk’ü bir baba olarak kabul etmesini, ona muhalefet etmemesini öğütlemiştir. Alparslan, babasının tavsiyeleri ve üvey kardeşi Süleyman ile giriştiği taht mücadelesinde gösterdiği yararlılık münasebetiyle devletin en önemli idari görevi olan vezirlik makamını Nizâmülmülk’e tevdi etmiştir. Bu dönemden itibaren vefatına kadar, yaklaşık 30 yıl kesintisiz bir süreyle Büyük Selçuklu Devleti’nin vezirliğini yapmış ve V./XI. yy.’ın ikinci yarısından itibaren Büyük Selçuklu siyasetinin en etkin figürü haline gelmiştir. Melikşah’ın tahta geçebilmesinin Nizâmülmülk ile ilişkilendirilmesi, onun döneminde elde edilen başarıların ve devlet sisteminin düzenlenmesi, şehirlerin imarı, ekonominin güçlenmesi gibi ülke içerisinde yaşanan olumlu gelişmelerin Nizâmülmülk’ün marifetiyle gerçekleştirildiğinin dillendirilmesi, Tanrı tarafından yeryüzünü yönetmek ve inşa etmek için seçildiği düşünülen bir sultan varken bir vezirin devlet için nimet olarak gösterilmesi sultanın vezirine bakışını etkilemiştir. Bu noktada üzerinde durulması gereken hususlardan birisi de Nizâmülmülk’ün kendisini nasıl gördüğü ve devlet içerisinde kendini nerede konumlandırdığıdır. Nizâmülmülk’ün Sultan Melikşah’a verdiği bir cevapta devletin geldiği noktayı ve sultanın mevcudiyetini kendi varlığıyla eşleştirmesi, tarihinin gördüğü en yetenekli vezirlerden biri olan Nizâmülmülk’ün özgüveninin son derece yüksek ve kendisini kudret sahibi olarak gördüğüne işaret etmektedir. Bu anlamlandırma halk nezdinde herhangi bir kutsiyeti bulunmayan vezirlik makamındaki bir kişinin, toplum nezdinde Allah tarafından seçildiğine inanılan kutlu kişiye meydan okutan gücü kendisinde hissetmesinin kaynağını sorgulatmaktadır. Aranan cevap Nizâmülmülk’ün vezirlik sürecinin çeşitli başlıklar altında ve bu başlıklara dair verilecek örneklerle incelenmesi neticesinde onun devletin iç işleyişine etkisinin tespitinde ve farklı kesimlerle kurduğu ilişkide saklıdır. Nizâmülmülk, Selçuklu tahtına karşı sıkı bir bağlılık göstermiştir. Bu bağlılığını lüzumu halinde savaş meydanında göğüs göğüse çarpışarak sergilemiş, gerekli olduğunda kıvrak zekâsı ile sorunları devlet için tehlikeli boyuta gelmeden çözmüş, siyasi öngörüsü ile aldığı tedbirler sayesinde devletin büyümesine katkı sağlamıştır. Onun bu sadakati ve samimiyeti, Selçuklu sultanları tarafından karşılık bırakılmamış, Alparslan vezirinin fikirlerine büyük önem verip tercihlerini bu doğrultuda şekillendirirken, aleyhine söylenen sözlerin hiçbirine kulak asmamıştır. Melikşah da, bir anlamda kendisine Selçuklu tahtını veren Nizâmülmülk’e gerekli hürmeti göstererek bütün devlet işlerinin yürütülmesini ona tevdi etmiş ve kendisini bir “baba” gibi gördüğünü ifade etmiştir. İlaveten Selçuklu tarihinde bir ilk olmak üzere Melikşah, Nizâmülmülk’e atabeg (el-emîrü’l-vâlid) unvanını vermiştir. Melikşah, Büyük Selçuklu tahtındaki ilk yıllarını, gençliğin etkisiyle, polo oynayıp, büyük av partileri düzenlemekle geçirmiş ve bundan dolayı devlet içerisinde bütün güç Nizâmülmülk’ün eline geçmiştir. Ortaya çıkan bu durum da “ülke resmen ve ismen sultanın olmakla birlikte gerçekte ‘Nizam’ına kavuştu.” ifadesiyle açıklanmıştır. Ayrıca Melikşah’ın saltanatı döneminde elde edilen askerî, siyasî ve ekonomik başarılar Nizâmülmülk’ün yeteneği ve devlet işlerinde attığı adımlara bağlanmıştır. Nizâmülmülk, hanedan ile kurduğu ilişkinin yanı sıra devlet kademesinde görev alan farklı zümrelerle de güven üzerine dayalı yakın bir ilişki biçimi geliştirmiştir. Örneğin, Nizâmülmülk’ün katıldığı askerî seferlerde bir nefer gibi askerlerin içerisinde savaşa katılması ordu içerisinde kendisine saygı duyulmasına yol açmıştır. Ayrıca, Melikşah ile Kirman Hâkimi Kavurd Bey arasındaki taht mücadelesinde Melikşah’ın safında yer almakla birlikte Kavurd Bey’i destekleyen bazı isimlerin yazdıkları destek mektuplarının ortaya çıkmasına engel olarak hem emirlerin korkularını yatıştırırmış hem de itibarını artırmıştır. Nizâmülmülk’ün yakın ilişki içerisinde olduğu bir diğer grup ilmiye sınıfı olmuştur. Bilge vezir, Tuğrul Bey döneminde Amidülmülk Kündürî tarafından takibata uğrayan ve baskılara maruz kalan ilim adamlarının yurtlarına dönebilmelerine imkân sağlamıştır. Bu ilim adamları da yurtlarına dönüşlerini sağlayan isme zihinlerinde ve gönüllerinde her zaman özel bir yer ayırmışlardır. Birçok âlimin çalışmalarını Nizâmülmülk’e ithaf etmesi, diğer saiklerle birlikte, bunun bir göstergesidir. Nizâmülmülk bir adım daha atarak, Sultan Alparslan ve Melikşah’ın müsaadeleriyle, bu ilim adamları için hâkim olunan coğrafyanın her tarafında ilimle iştigal edebilecekleri medreseler inşa etmiştir. Nizâmülmülk’ün adına nispetle Nizamiye Medreseleri olarak isimlendirilen bu medreselerde hem eğitim-öğretim kadrosuna hem de öğrenim süresi boyunca ve de mezun olduktan sonra öğrencilere sunulan imkânlar, insanların medreselere olan ilgisini arttırıyordu. Medreseler eliyle bir taraftan önceki dönemde yerlerinden edilen ve baskıya maruz kalan ilim adamlarına bir borç ödenip iade-i itibar sağlanırken diğer taraftan da Büyük Selçuklu Devleti’nin idari ve adli sisteminin ihtiyaç duyduğu yetişmiş insan gücü inşa edilmiştir. Nizâmülmülk, toplum lehine attığı adımlar ve sorunların çözümüne verdiği önem ile halkın desteğini sağlamıştır. Öyle ki insanların hayatları boyunca ona minnettar kaldığı vurgulanmıştır. Nizâmülmülk halkın sorunlarının çözümüne önem göstermiş ve onlarla yakından ilgilenmiştir. Nizâmülmülk’ün verdiği güven duygusu halkın hoşuna gitmiş ve toplum içerisinde kabul görmesine vesile olmuştur. Nizâmülmülk’ün bir diğer hasleti de fakirlere sofrasını açmasıdır. Böylece onlarla diyalog kurmuş ve gönüllerini kazanmıştır. Her yönüyle eksiksiz bir devlet adamı olan Nizâmülmülk, toplumun her türlü ihtiyacının çözümünü düşünmüş ve bu yönde adımlar atmıştır. Nizâmülmülk’ün toplumun her kesimi ile kurduğu samimi ve yakın ilişki o kadar büyük bir takdir ve beğeni toplamıştır ki bu durum Nizâmülmülk’ün toplum nezdinde sultan itibarı görmesine sebep olmuştur. İlaveten Selçuklu coğrafyasının her yerinden ve toplumun her kesiminden insanın kendisine yönelmesi hasebiyle Kâbe’ye benzetilmiştir. Nizâmülmülk, devlet kademesinde görev alan aile bireyleri, ilişki içerisinde olduğu âlimler, kendi ordusu ve emirleri ile bir güç odağı haline gelmiştir. Bunun sonucunda Nizâmülmülk, 11. yüzyılın son çeyreğinde rakipsiz bir şekilde Büyük Selçuklu siyasetinin en etkin figürü, Selçuklu yönetimini ve politikalarını belirleyen isim ve Selçuklu tarihinin en önemli olaylarında karar mercii olmuş ve sonuçta Selçuklu tarihine damga vurmuştur. İbnü’l-Esîr, Fatımî veziri Bedr el-Cemalî’nin kendisi için kullandığı sayısız lakabı kaydettikten sonra sadece Mısır’a hâkim olan bir devletin veziri bu kadar lakap kullanıyorsa Nizâmülmülk’ün “ilah”lık iddiasında bulunması gerekirdi diyerek hem Selçuklunun azametini hem de Selçuklu devletinde Nizâmülmülk’ün yerini göstermektedir. (shrink)

Resumen: Este texto introduce la primera traducción al español de los textos Schönheit [Belleza] de Hans-Georg Gadamer (trabajo escrito en los años ’70 y que vio la luz en alemán póstumamente en 2007) y Schönheit und Bürgerlichkeit [Belleza y burguesía] de Odo Marquard, publicado también en 2007 como respuesta demorada al trabajo del filósofo de Marburgo. Gadamer explora el desarrollo histórico del concepto de belleza en los siglos XIX y XX, poniendo énfasis en que la belleza siguió y seguirá siendo (...) no sólo un concepto estético sino un concepto normativo. Por su lado, Marquard contextualiza las ideas de Gadamer en su marco de producción original y realiza un análisis crítico de las mismas a partir de sus propias tempranas contribuciones a una teoría de las “ya no bellas artes”.// Abstract: This text introduces the first Spanish translation of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Schönheit [Beauty] (work written in the 1970s and posthumously published in German in 2007) and Odo Marquard’s Schönheit und Bürgerlichkeit [Beauty and Bourgeoisie], published also in 2007 as a delayed response to Gadamer’s views. Gadamer explores the historical development of the concept of beauty in the 19th and 20th centuries, emphasizing that beauty continued and will continue to be not only an aesthetic concept but also a normative concept. For his part, Marquard contextualizes Gadamer’s ideas in their original production framework and performs a critical analysis of them based on his own early contributions to a theory of the “no longer beautiful arts”. (shrink)

Conceptual metaphor theory is among the challenging theories that the cognitive linguistics has presented to the field of metaphor in recent years. By leaving aside the relationship of species-genus, transmission and similarity, a new metaphor mechanism is introduced by this theory. Moreover, this theory reveals that metaphors belong to concepts based on experience, not to words. The Conceptual Metaphor Theory, which made a remarkable contribution to metaphor studies, has also attracted the attention of those who are interested in the Qur'an (...) studies. As a result, literature dealing with the metaphors in the Qur'an through the lens of this theory has emerged. This theory is implemented to analyse metaphors existing in everyday language and does not aim to offer an approach to the analysis of metaphors in sacred texts. Despite this, the number of studies examining the Qur'an through the lens of theory is increasing day by day. By focusing on this paticular literature, this study discusses the method followed by researchers, how they apply the theory, its contribution to the Qur'anic studies, and the existing deficiencies in the literature. This study questions the extent to which the theory contributes to the field of Qur’anic studies, the problems it has created in the field and whether it could be resolved. (shrink)

In this article, we will attempt to answer the following question: What is the state of 21 years of scientific production regarding spiritual leadership (SL) in its relationship with organizational commitment (OC)? To accomplish this objective, we used a rigorous bibliometric approach employing two scientific databases: Scopus and Web of Science. Eighty-two articles were identified for the period between 2000 and 2021, but only 52 articles have been appropriate for the analysis. Two software were used for the data analysis: IRAMUTEQ (...) and VOSviewer. This systematic literature review was performed to shed more light on our current understanding and to identify patterns and gaps in previous studies of SL as it relates to OC. The results assert that the literature on the relationship between SL and OC has an important role for individuals and organizations. Theoretically, it highlights grey areas that need to be exploited to enrich the scientific literature, including constructs that will moderate or mediate the relationship between SL and OC. Practically, the research perspectives indicate the significant role that the SL can play in paying attention to the spiritual needs of employees and its positive effects on the organization. The findings have implications for both the employees and the organization. (shrink)

Kant’s accounts of moral education, appraisal respect and gratitude each depend on the assumption that human beings see and judge each other’s actions to be morally good. This assumption appears to stand in tension with the Opacity Thesis, Kant’s claim that we can never know if an action is morally good. This paper examines Kant’s discussion of moral illusion to relieve this tension. It is argued that we are required to uphold moral illusion, i.e. to represent others’ actions to be (...) morally good (while knowing that we may be mistaken), due to the duty of beneficence for others’ moral well-being. (shrink)

El presente artículo está dedicado al trabajo de Hans-Georg Gadamer titulado “Prometeo y Pandora”, publicado originalmente en español en 1949 en el volumen Goethe. 1749 - 28 de agosto – 1949, editado por la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad de Cuyo, Argentina. En primer lugar, se ofrece una introducción en la que se presenta el contexto original histórico-intelectual de su edición, traducción y publicación, los antecedentes filosóficos del texto dentro de la obra de Gadamer (conferencias y artículos (...) previos sobre el tema), una presentación breve de las fuentes y de los temas que trata el texto, así como una serie de aclaraciones sobre las correcciones que se realizaron para esta edición crítica. En segundo lugar, se ofrece una nueva edición de “Prometeo y Pandora”. Este ensayo es uno de los dos primeros trabajos de Gadamer que fueron traducidos al castellano y, a su vez, una de las primeras traducciones de las producciones de Gadamer a una lengua extranjera. //--// The following investigation focuses on the article of Hans-Georg Gadamer entitled “Prometheus and Pandora”, originally published in Spanish in 1949, in the book: "Goethe. 1749 – 28th August – 1949", edited by the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of the University of Cuyo, Argentina. Firstly, an introduction is offered in which is presented the original historical-intellectual context of its edition, translation and publication, the philosophical background of the text within Gadamer’s work (conferences and previous articles on the subject), a brief description of the sources and topics encompassed in the text, as well as a series of clarifications on the corrections made for the current critical edition. This essay is one of the first two works by Gadamer that were translated into Spanish and, in turn, one of the first translations of Gadamer's productions into a foreign language. (shrink)

Abdel-Hakim Ourghi's Reform of Islam is an open indictment of prevailing conservative Islam which insists on the absolute subjugation of the body and mind of all Muslims. The author seeks a humanist understanding of Islam and aims to interpret Islam in today's terms. He argues against the historical alienation and transfiguration that still shape the collective consciousness of Muslims in the 21st Century. Using critical analysis and logic, the author aims to reveal the true core of Islam. His 40 (...) Theses include: The freedom of the individual to interpret the Qur'an No scholars as mediators between God and man Islam does not claim to possess the absolute truth Only a reformed and open Islam is a religion of peace The Qur'an as the basis of a contemporary humanist ethics. (shrink)

Dramaturge guinéen, Hakim Bah revient dans cet entretien sur l’écriture de deux de ses pièces récentes traitant des migrations : Convulsions, qui est une réécriture du Thyeste de Sénèque, et À bout de sueurs. Les mythes méditerranéens côtoient les coupures de presse et les faits divers dans ces textes à l’oralité et à la poésie très marquées.

In this paper, we examine Maduabuchi Dukor’s article titled “Divination: A Science or An Art?”, where he endeavours to demonstrate the character and nature of African science as well as explores the issue whether some practices in Africa can be accorded a scientific status. These tasks to explore and demonstrate the scientific nature of African practices led Maduabuchi Dukor to focus on divination as his working example; and specifically identified Ifa divination. In sum, Maduabuchi Dukor argues that African (Ifa) divination (...) is or can be made a science through formalization and quantification. The main thrust of his argument is that with the aid of formalization and quantification, divination as practiced in Africa can qualify as a science. Our contention as regards this exercise by Maduabuchi Dukor runs from the beginning of the article through to the end of it. That is, our critique of the article concerns some suppositions employed to build up the argument that supports the claim that (Ifa) divination is a scientific enterprise. In other words, the premises and the conclusion so provided, we argue, are full of contestations; and it is these contestations that we showcased in this paper. It is important to make it clear that our contention has nothing to do with the thinking of Maduabuchi Dukor that Ifa divination is a science or can be made to be so; rather, our contention is the suppositions that he deployed to articulate his thought. (shrink)

_The Routledge Companion to Reinventing Management Education_ retraces the many external crises that have increasingly confronted business schools in recent years. With greater emphasis being placed on ranking and research output at the detriment of teaching, learning and education, this companion will work as a handbook, guiding teachers on how to integrate the humanities and social sciences into their course design and classroom practice. Arranged in five sections covering Histories, Philosophies, Concepts, Classrooms and Programmes, this volume presents and examines the (...) rich debates that have arisen on the practices within management education. With contributions from leading and international scholars in the field, this volume seeks to engage in the conversation over what is taught in business schools and how learning in them takes place, concluding that it is time to reinvent management education by positioning the humanities and social sciences in the discussion. The Routledge Companion to Reinventing Management Education is a timely volume that will interest students and researchers alike. It is particularly well place for the current zeitgeist of subjecting business and management to wider and deeper scrutiny from a range of different perspectives. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to provide a philosophical conceptual framework to understand the theoretical roots and political implications of the interpretations of Plato’s work in Jaeger’s Third Humanism and Krieck’s völkisch-racist pedagogy and anthropology. This article will seek to characterize, as figures of localitas, their conceptions of the individual, community, corporeality, identity, and the State that both authors developed departing from Platonic political philosophy. My main hypothesis is that Jaeger’s and Krieck’s interpretations of Platonic paideía shared several core-elements (...) based on a modern conception of State sovereignty and human will, whose fundamental ground is the subjectivist-technical metaphysics. The “production” of a human type (spiritual and/or racial) and a unitary State political community appears in both authors mediated by a theory of political education, that I define as «State typohumanism», that sought its sustenance in Plato’s political philosophy, mainly by means of a distorted understanding of the notions of týpos and ē̂thos, and that, I argue, played a key role in the intellectual legitimization of völkisch-racism. This would be broadly translated into a programmatic and literal understanding of the Platonic Republic which assumes that the inherent function of any State is to produce subjectivities based on national identities grounded on homogeneous characteristics. In these varied characterizations similar appropriations of humanitas have been expressed both in Jaeger and in Krieck. (shrink)

Martin y Fritz Heidegger, Correspondencia. 1930-1949. Edición de Bruno Pieger. Traducción de Raúl Gabás. Barcelona: Herder, 2018, 172 pp.

Through a multiphase coding process, the researchers examined the selection, characteristics, and planned use of 111 written, visual, oral, and material sources that preservice teachers incorporated into plans for inquiry-based elementary social studies instruction. Preservice teachers identified Google as their main tool for locating potential sources, selected far more secondary than primary sources, and varied widely in how they prepared sources for elementary students. Planned use of sources focused almost entirely on identifying key details, with limited opportunities designed for students (...) to contextualize sources, examine bias, or corroborate evidence. Implications for teacher education related to source selection and analysis are discussed. (shrink)

Many assumptions believe that classical Islamic theology is no longer relevant in the contemporary era, either because its discussion tends to be theocentric and far from the progress of humanism or because it is considered no longer relevant to answer contemporary issues such as secularism, pluralism, globalization, or neo-atheism. Departing from these problems, efforts have emerged for new readings of classical theology by paying more attention to the context and needs of the times. Among these efforts is the renewal of (...) theology by highlighting its methodological aspects, as was done by a contemporary Moroccan theologian and philosopher, Ṭahā ‘Abdurraḥmān. This study attempts to describe and analyze the style of renewal of theology from the perspective of Ṭahā ‘Abdurraḥmān. This research is a character study using qualitative methods, in which the existing data is analyzed critically. This article shows that Ṭahā ‘Abdurraḥmān’s style of renewal of ‘ilm al-kalām focuses on efforts to reform the methodology of classical kalam by reforming the method of dialogue science (munaẓarah) through contemporary linguistic and logical tools, rearranging analogy patterns (qiyas), and building a logic of kalam based on the principle’s logic and morality as well as the amalgamation of theoretical aspect and practical aspect. The significance of Ṭahā ‘Abdurraḥmān’s renewal in contemporary Islamic theology lies in the theorizing of concepts in classical theology with a contemporary approach as well as the construction of the methodology of contemporary Islamic theology to answer ever-evolving theological issues. (shrink)

This article proposes that thinking of scientific instruments as playthings or philosophical toys offers a method for looking at the ways in which we learn from made things and from the act of making in investigating the world. Rather than approaching artefacts as stable ob- jects, definable and categorisable in terms of their function, this method puts forward the instability and mobility of artefacts on several levels: in terms of their movements between hands, social contexts and systems of knowledge, in (...) terms of their physical articulations and of their changing functions, and in terms of the flows and processes of materials at work within and through them. (shrink)

Tentazione di Siracusa, "Tentación de Siracusa", es el título que eligió Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) para la breve, aunque magistral, conferencia que pronunció el 18 de enero de 2001 en Ortigia, en el Palacio del Senado siracusano. Allí fue convocado por las autoridades del Collegio Siciliano di Filosofía y por el entonces intendente de la comuna sícula, Giambattista Bufardeci, quien le otorgó en tal ocasión la ciudadanía honoraria de esa antigua y culturalmente variada urbe mediterránea, una ciudad atravesada milenariamente por la (...) tensión entre filosofía y política, que vio partir por mar, reducido a esclavo, a Platón, y que se manchó con la sangre de Arquímedes, derramada por un soldado romano invasor. La lectio derridiana, que propone sin ambages una nueva figura para la relación entre filosofía y política, abordando el fenómeno de la "mundialización" así como la pregunta por el sentido contemporáneo de la ciudadanía, debió esperar casi dos décadas para ver la luz. Recién en 2018 la editorial Mimesis, sello italiano de incuestionable prestigio, la hizo accesible dentro de su colección "eterotopie", dirigida por los profesores Salvo Vaccaro (Università degli Studi di Palermo) y Pierre Dalla Vigna (Università dell'Insubria). El texto fue traducido íntegro para su publicación por Francesco Garritano y Marina Machì (ambos de la Università della Calabria), quienes ofrecieron, como adelanto de su versión, un breve fragmento por primera vez en la edición del 21 de enero de 2001 del periódico italiano Repubblica, bajo el título Il tiranno e il filosofo). (shrink)

There is a divide within political and legal theory concerning the justification of hate-crime legislation in liberal states. Opponents of Hate-Crime Legislation have recently argued that enhanced punishment for hate-motivated crimes cannot be justified within political liberal states. More specifically, Heidi Hurd argues that criminal sanction which target character dispositions unfairly target individuals for characteristics not readily under their control. She further argues that a ‘character’ based approach in criminal law is necessarily illiberal and violates the state’s commitment to political (...) neutrality. In the current paper, I attempt to show the difficulties and absurdity that follows from Hurd’s characterization of hate- rimes. I aim to show that punishment for undesirable character traits is consistent with western conceptions of criminal law. Upon doing so, I then go on to construct a positive argument for the justifiability of punishing for character traits as well as for the enhanced punishment associated with hate-motivated crimes. (shrink)

The Pleasures of Reason in Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic Hedonists se centra en la relación mutua entre las capacidades humanas de sentir placer y dolor y el carácter afectivo que las une con las facultades cognitivas de aprender, comprender, recordar, evocar, planificar y anticiparse. Para esto, Warren consagra toda su agudeza analítica a eminentes obras del pensamiento antiguo: particularmente nos referimos a los diálogos platónicos República, Protágoras y Filebo. Otro tanto hace con De Anima, De Memoria et Reminiscentia, Ética (...) a Nicómaco, Retórica y Poética de Aristóteles. Finalmente, hacia la mitad y sobre el final del libro, se dedica a poner en diálogo sus análisis sobre Platón y Aristóteles con las escuelas hedonistas clásicas del helenismo: epicúreos y cirenaicos. (shrink)

El presente artículo se centra en el análisis de la lectura de la filosofía política platónica que Hans-Georg Gadamer realiza en su conferencia Plato und die Dichter (1934). Se planteará como hipótesis propia que, en los diálogos platónicos, tanto el filosofar como el poetizar habilitan el acceso a la comprensión del carácter sagrado de la justicia, la dimensión política de la legalidad de la musa poética y la percepción de lo sagrado como necesidad humana que permanece encubierta al modo de (...) lo innecesario. Por otro lado, sobre el final se prestará atención al concepto de phrónēsis en relación a la facultad humana del juicio y como instrumento necesario para la realización práctica del devenir del ser político del hombre en el Estado. (shrink)

Globalization cannot be stopped nor denied. Sometimes it may have not only a positive impact but also a negative one, as rivalry among nations may ensue. Economic and political rivalry leads to break up of the conducive environment of political security. Unresolved territorial claims and boundary disputes may become triggering factors. Superpowers’ interference may had to the conflict. The purpose of this article is to explain the possibilities of building up trust in peaceful and democratic One Asia Community by systematically (...) and effectively introducing educational programs to enhance awareness of cultural differences, teach conflict resolution techniques, and promote an ideal of ethical responsibility and unselfishness. (shrink)

The eighteenth century occupies a crucial place in the history of tears. Not only did this period gave rise to the concept of sensibility, but it also witnessed the development of new aesthetic and moral codes founded on the exaggerated use of tears. This article, which is concerned precisely with such codes, examines the nature and significance of emotional display in the eighteenth century. It argues that throughout this era, tears were associated with moral renewal and they were intended to (...) be shared, particularly when engendered on the theatre stage. This study also shows how these collective tears were steadily devalued as a public good throughout the nineteenth century, to the point that the act of weeping became personal and intimate, valorizing the individual instead of the communal. (shrink)

The eighteenth century occupies a crucial place in the history of tears. Not only did this period gave rise to the concept of sensibility, but it also witnessed the development of new aesthetic and moral codes founded on the exaggerated use of tears. This article, which is concerned precisely with such codes, examines the nature and significance of emotional display in the eighteenth century. It argues that throughout this era, tears were associated with moral renewal and they were intended to (...) be shared, particularly when engendered on the theatre stage. This study also shows how these collective tears were steadily devalued as a public good throughout the nineteenth century, to the point that the act of weeping became personal and intimate, valorizing the individual instead of the communal. (shrink)

Contribution of Malay Muslims in science and modern world; proceedings of a seminar.