This paper examines the impact of corporate crime on the stock market in South Korea. Specifically, we examine the effect of crime type, industry type, business group affiliation, and corporate governance on the relationship between corporate crime announcement and stock market reaction. We find negative reactions to stock prices around the announcements of corporate crimes but no significant difference in reactions between announcements of individual and organizational crimes. Individual white-collar crimes have a stronger negative impact on stock prices than do (...) individual street crimes on average, while financial crimes have a significantly greater negative impact than do operational crimes in organizations. Moreover, financial sector firms are impacted more significantly by the announcement of corporate crimes than are non-financial firms. In addition, the stock prices of chaebol-affiliated firms decrease less than do those of non-chaebol-affiliated firms, and those with a higher board committee subindex seem to be influenced less by news of corporate crimes if the size control variable is excluded. Multivariate cross-sectional analyses show consistent findings after controlling for firm-specific factors, crime-type effect, and industry and year effects. The results of this study provide valuable insights because it covers several types of corporate crime, including those committed by individuals and those perpetrated by firms. (shrink)

1. Tonga ilbo 1920-1929-yŏn -- 2. Tonga ilbo 1930-1940-yŏn -- 3. Chosŏn ilbo 1920-1929-yŏn -- 4. Chosŏn ilbo 1930-1940-yŏn -- 5. Kit'a sinmun 1920-1940-yŏn (Maeil sinbo, Chosŏn chungang ilbo, Chungoe ilbo, Sidae ilbo) -- 6. Chapchi (Kat'ollik ch'ŏngnyŏn, Kaebyŏk, Kongdo, Taejung kongnon, Taehan Hakhoe wŏlbo, Tonggwang, Pyŏlgŏngon, Pulgyo, Pulgyo Chinhŭnghoe wŏlbo, Pip'an) -- 7. Chapchi (Samch'ŏlli, Sŏbuk Hakhoe wŏlbo, Sin'gyedan, Sindonga, Sinmun'gye, Sinmin kongnon, Sinsaeng, Sinsaenghwal, Sinch'ŏnji, Sinhŭng) -- 8. Chapchi (Sinhŭng, Yŏsi, Yŏnhŭi, Yudo, Inmun P'yŏngnon, Irwŏl sibo) -- 9. (...) Chapchi (Irwŏl sibo, Chogwang, Chosŏn chigwang, Ch'ŏndogyohoe wŏlbo, Ch'ŏrhak) -- 10. Chapchi (Ch'ŏrhak, Ch'ŏngnyŏn, Ch'ŏngsaekchi, Ch'ŏngch'un, Ch'unch'u, Ch'wisan porim, Haktŭng, Hakchigwang, Hyŏndae p'yŏngnon) -- 11. Kŭndae Han'guk ch'ŏrhak hyŏngsŏng ŭi p'unggyŏng kwa chihyŏngdo, Ilche kangjŏmgi 'sinmun' chosa rŭl t'onghaesŏ -- 12. Kŭndae Han'guk ch'ŏrhak hyŏngsŏng ŭi ŏnsŏl konggan, Ilche kangjŏmgi 'chapchi' chosa rŭl t'onghaesŏ -- 13. Ilche kangjŏmgi Han'guk ch'ŏrhakcha chuyo inmul haesŏl (purok, Ilche kangjŏmgi sinmun, chapchi surok ch'ŏrhak kwallyŏn kisa ch'ongmongnok). (shrink)

Het is bijna niet voor te stellen hoeveel Foucaults studie Surveiller et punir in het verleden betekend heeft voor mij en een belangrijk deel van mijn generatie. Vanwege mijn Franse achtergrond – ik promoveerde in Straatsburg op een proefschrift over Albert Camus – kende ik Foucault en zijn werk al goed. Je kon met name in de zomer van 1967 gewoon niet om hem heen. In alle parken en cafés rond de universiteit zaten toen in Straatsburg studenten zijn dikke boek (...) Les mots et les choses ostentatief te etaleren. Ze hadden het met de titelpagina naar boven naast of voor zich liggen, of hielden hun kostbare schat, met weer de titel goed zichtbaar in de hand. Het kwam zelden voor dat ze erin lazen. Als buitenlander begreep ik er niets van. Mijn Franse vrienden legden het mij uit. (shrink)

1. Insaeng kwa ch'ŏrhak sasang -- 2. Saram ŭi maŭm, ŭisik segye -- 3. Chŏngch'i wa ch'ŏrhak sasang -- 4. Kyŏngje chŏngch'aek kwa ch'ŏrhak sasang -- 5. Chabonjuŭi segye ch'eje wa Han'guk kyŏngje -- 6. Minjok munje wa tarŭn nara hyŏngmyŏng -- 7. Munhwa wa ch'ŏrhak sasang -- 8. Saŏp pangbŏmnon kwa sasang.

不了解日本國學，就無法了解日本社會及文化，更遑論了解日本人 日本國學產生的歷史和背景漫長且複雜， 為了對日本國學的形成、發展、特點及其影響，有較為清晰的把握， 香港城市大學人文‧社會科學學院副教授王小林 以漢字、名實觀、朱子學、疑古思潮等作為觀察對象， 多元檢視日本國學思想的要素， 為讀者提供了相對全面理解日本國學之內在精神結構的可能。 本書作者王小林以「從漢才到和魂」作為日本國學思想之形成與發展的研究、觀察視角，分別從不同議題、現象與學說主張來考察日本國學思想的發展流變。 《從漢才到和魂：日本國學思想的形成與發展》第一章與第二章主要從「漢字」與「言靈」；「名」與「言」，探討了漢字與「和魂」、「國語（日語）」之關係，以及名、言與「實事」、「體魂」之間的演繹詮釋，如何神聖化 日語同時強化日本之神國意識。第三、四、五章則以朱子學為江戶儒學之代表，將之視為日本國學之對照學問，闡述了日本國學之文論、宇宙觀與不可測度之神。第六章則從江戶儒者富永仲基之「加上說」與顧頡剛之層累說之間 的關聯，爬梳了中日兩國之「中國學」背後的日本國學之成份。最後一章的第七章，則闡明了決定近代日本資本主義的「職分」、「世間」這兩個精神關鍵概念，其宗教理論根據其實來自近世日本之國學家。 如上所述，《從漢才到和魂：日本國學思想的形成與發展》以漢字、名實觀、朱子學、疑古思潮作為「漢才」與「和魂」比較的觀察對象，多元檢視了日本國學思想的形成要素，本書所涉及之議題內容，提供了讀者數個面向以思 考形構日本國學之要素有何？同時也為讀者提供了相對全面理解日本國學之內在精神結構的可能。.

As we all know, the Silk Road, as a famous ancient transportation route, was a trade line cross-Eurasian continent in history. Its name was from the delivery of silk. However, no Chinese ancient documents mentioned the name of “Silk Road”. German F. V. Richthofen (1933-1905) firstly used the term “Silk Road” in his book China, published in 1877. Afterwards, the name of “Silk Road” has been accepted universally and used by the world widely. The Silk Road was an ancient business (...) channel, acrossing the middle of China and countries in Central Asia, gradually forming after Qian Zhang visited Western Regions twice, two thousand and one hundred years ago. The north-west land Silk Road started from Chinese ancient Capital Chang’an (now Xi’an), acrossing Central Asia, and reaching ancient Rome in Europe. It was a bridge for communication of politics, economy, and culture between ancient China and the Western. Before 11 Century, the Sino-Western silk trade mainly depended on the land transportation. During Han Dynasty, it was a competition between the Huns and the Hans for occupy the Silk road. The silk as a kind of material culture was a sort of intermediary for making people to know how to get along together.This article attempts to describe the Sino-Western silk trade conditions before and after the two missions of Qian Zhang to Western Regions (Xiyu), including archaeological evidences, kinds of silk and trade scale, transportation routes, trade participants, and so on. (shrink)

Ben shu shou ci dui ming mo qing chu zui fu sheng ming de hui zu san da han wen yi zhu jia--Wang Daiyu, Ma Zhu, Liu Zhi de zheng zhi lun li si xiang, jing ji lun li si xiang, hun yin jia ting lun li si xiang, ren xing shan e guan, dao de xiu yang guan jin xing le quan fang wei, duo jiao du de shu li, gou chen he kao cha.

In this paper, findings from research in neuroscience of morality will be reviewed to consider the purposes of moral education. Particularly, I will focus on two main themes in neuroscience, novel neuroimaging and experimental investigations, and Bayesian learning mechanism. First, I will examine how neuroimaging and experimental studies contributed to our understanding of psychological mechanisms associated with moral functioning while addressing methodological concerns. Second, Bayesian learning mechanism will be introduced to acquire insights about how moral learning occurs in human brains. (...) Based on the reviewed neuroscientific research on morality, I will examine how evidence can support the model of moral education proposed by virtue ethics, Neo-Aristotelian moral philosophy in particular. Particularly, two main aims of virtue ethics-based moral education, the habituation of virtues and the cultivation of phronesis, will be discussed as the important purposes of moral education based on neuroscientific evidence. (shrink)

Plakias has recently argued that there is nothing wrong with publishing defences of philosophical claims which we don't believe and also nothing wrong with concealing our lack of belief, because an author's lack of belief is irrelevant to the merit of a published work. Fleisher has refined this account by limiting the permissibility of publishing without belief to what he calls ‘advocacy role cases’. I argue that such lack of belief is irrelevant only if it is the result of an (...) inexplicable incredulity or the result of a metaphilosophical or epistemic stance that is unrelated to the specific claim. However, in many real-life cases, including Fleisher's advocacy role cases, our doubts regarding the claims we defend arise from reasons that have something to do with the insufficiency of the philosophical evidence supporting the claim, and publishing an unconditional defence of a claim without revealing our doubts is impermissible as it involves withholding philosophically relevant reasons. Plakias has also argued that discouraging philosophers from publishing claims they don't believe would be unfair to junior philosophers with unsettled views. I propose that we should change our academic practices that pressure philosophers to publish articles that pretend to be defences of settled views. (shrink)

The present study aimed to develop effective moral educational interventions based on social psychology by using stories of moral exemplars. We tested whether motivation to engage in voluntary service as a form of moral behavior was better promoted by attainable and relevant exemplars or by unattainable and irrelevant exemplars. First, experiment 1, conducted in a lab, showed that stories of attainable exemplars more effectively promoted voluntary service activity engagement among undergraduate students compared with stories of unattainable exemplars and non-moral stories. (...) Second, experiment 2, a middle school classroom-level experiment with a quasi-experimental design, demonstrated that peer exemplars, who are perceived to be attainable and relevant to students, better promoted service engagement compared with historic figures in moral education classes. (shrink)

Pure representationalism or intentionalism for phenomenal experience is the theory that all introspectible qualitative aspects of a conscious experience can be analyzed as qualities that the experience non-conceptually represents the world to have. Some philosophers have argued that experiences such as afterimages, phosphenes and double vision are counterexamples to the representationalist theory, claiming that they are non- representational states or have non-representational aspects, and they are better explained in a qualia-theoretical framework. I argue that these states are fully representational states (...) of a certain kind, which I call “automatically non-endorsed representations”, experiential states the veridicality of which we are almost never committed to, and which do not trigger explicit belief or disbelief in the mind of the subject. By investigating descriptive accounts of afterimages by two qualia theorists, I speculate that the mistaken claims of some anti-representationalists might be rooted in confusing two senses of the term “seeming”. (shrink)

In this paper, I examined whether evidence from the neuroscience of morality supports the standard models of phronesis, i.e., Jubilee and Aretai Centre Models. The standard models explain phronesis as a multifaceted construct based on interaction and coordination among functional components. I reviewed recent neuroscience studies focusing on brain networks associated with morality and their connectivity to examine the validity of the models. Simultaneously, I discussed whether the evidence helps the models address challenges, particularly those from the phronesis eliminativism. Neuroscientific (...) evidence supported the importance of brain networks, i.e., the default mode, salience, and central executive functioning networks, in moral functioning in general. The findings favorably supported the multifaceted and integrative nature of phronesis proposed by the standard models. Finally, I considered how the two models could explain the mechanisms of phronesis more integratively based on neuroscientific findings. At the end of this paper, with the evidence, I proposed several practical ideas to promote the cultivation of phronesis, e.g., the consideration of coordination among components for moral functioning and the use of moral exemplars. (shrink)

The present study aims to examine the relationship between the cortical midline structures (CMS), which have been regarded to be associated with selfhood, and moral decision making processes at the neural level. Traditional moral psychological studies have suggested the role of moral self as the moderator of moral cognition, so activity of moral self would present at the neural level. The present study examined the interaction between the CMS and other moral-related regions by conducting psycho-physiological interaction analysis of functional images (...) acquired while 16 subjects were solving moral dilemmas. Furthermore, we performed Granger causality analysis to demonstrate the direction of influences between activities in the regions in moral decision-making. We first demonstrate there are significant positive interactions between two central CMS seed regions—i.e., the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC)—and brain regions associated with moral functioning including the cerebellum, brainstem, midbrain, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex and anterior insula (AI); on the other hand, the posterior insula (PI) showed significant negative interaction with the seed regions. Second, several significant Granger causality was found from CMS to insula regions particularly under the moral-personal condition. Furthermore, significant dominant influence from the AI to PI was reported. Moral psychological implications of these findings are discussed. The present study demonstrated the significant interaction and influence between the CMS and morality-related regions while subject were solving moral dilemmas. Given that, activity in the CMS is significantly involved in human moral functioning. (shrink)

This study offers a new and stimulating interpretation of Theophrastus' "De sensibus, a treatise unique in content and method, as it reports and criticizes the ...

Though there is a wide and varied literature on ethical supererogation, there has been almost nothing written about its epistemic counterpart, despite an intuitive analogy between the two fields. This paper seeks to change this state of affairs. I will begin by showing that there are examples which intuitively feature epistemically supererogatory doxastic states. Next, I will present a positive theory of epistemic supererogation that can vindicate our intuitions in these examples, in an explanation that parallels a popular theory of (...) ethical supererogation. Roughly, I will argue that a specific type of epistemic virtue—the ability to creatively think up plausible hypotheses given a body of evidence—is not required of epistemic agents. Thus, certain exercises of this virtue can result in supererogatory doxastic states. In presenting this theory, I will also show how thinking about epistemic supererogation can provide us a new way forward in the debate about the uniqueness thesis for epistemic rationality. (shrink)

Do we love for reasons? It can seem as if we do, since most cases of non‐familial love seem *selective*: coming to love a non‐family‐member often begins with our being drawn to them for what they are like. I argue, however, that we can vindicate love's selectivity, even if we maintain that there are no reasons for love; indeed, that gives us a simpler, and hence better, explanation of love's selectivity. We don't, in short, come to love *for* reasons. That (...) which seemed like evidence for thinking that there are reasons for love, then, turns out to militate against that view: how can these purported reasons be reasons for love, if they don't engender (in virtue of rationalizing) it? (shrink)

ABSTRACT In the present study, we examined how the perceived attainability and relatability of moral exemplars predicted moral elevation and pleasantness among both adult and college student participants. Data collected from two experiments were analyzed with Bayesian multilevel modeling to explore which factors significantly predicted outcome variables at the story level. The analysis results demonstrated that the main effect of perceived relatability and the interaction effect between attainability and relatability shall be included in the best prediction model, and thus, were (...) deemed to predict the outcome variables significantly. The main effect of relatability as well as its interaction with attainability positively predicted elevation and pleasantness. We discussed educational implications of the findings in terms of how relatability may be the first point of emphasis for moral educators to focus on and attainability can then bolster the effectiveness. These relatable and attainable moral exemplars can be sources for moral elevation and pleasantness, which promote motivation to emulate moral behavior presented by the exemplars. (shrink)