This article elaborates on Wolfgang Schulze’s keynote speech of the same title at the 26th LIPP Symposium in Munich in 2019. It is based on the slides from his talk and various teaching materials, of which some figures have been translated from German to English before their inclusion in this article. While this article’s foundation rests on Schulze’s theories and research, we have done our best to build upon his work; direct quotes and key concepts of his will be cited (...) throughout the text. Schulze intended to write this article himself, but after his unexpected passing in early 2020, we decided to offer this contribution on his behalf.Research on taboo is widely spread across diverse academic disciplines that each attribute slightly, yet noticeably, different meanings to the concept. This article proposes an all-encompassing definition applicable to all socio-cultural contexts. To arrive at this comprehensive understanding, we first briefly survey the history oftabooand its linguistic study. Then, we present a formal and functional typology of circumnavigating taboos, taking into account the concepts ofmanaandnoaas proposed by Schulze (2019: 13, 15, 16). While the specific social restrictions resulting from tabooed relations vary from community to community, the purpose of taboo remains the same: social stability, protection and sustainability. Linguistic taboos contribute to these social functions by restricting the use of certain linguistic signs in certain situations. Such constraints necessitate strategies for avoiding taboo, including articulation shift, lexical substitution and the emergence of special languages, detailed here. (shrink)

Many hold that theoretical reasoning aims at truth. In this paper, I ask what it is for reasoning to be thus aim-directed. Standard answers to this question explain reasoning’s aim-directedness in terms of intentions, dispositions, or rule-following. I argue that, while these views contain important insights, they are not satisfactory. As an alternative, I introduce and defend a novel account: reasoning aims at truth in virtue of being the exercise of a distinctive kind of cognitive power, one that, unlike ordinary (...) dispositions, is capable of fully explaining its own exercises. I argue that this account is able to avoid the difficulties plaguing standard accounts of the relevant sort of mental teleology. (shrink)

Someone acts in a morally worthy way when they deserve credit for doing the morally right thing. But when and why do agents deserve credit for the success involved in doing the right thing? It is tempting to seek an answer to that question by drawing an analogy with creditworthy success in other domains of human agency, especially in sports, arts, and crafts. Accordingly, some authors have recently argued that, just like creditworthy success in, say, chess, playing the piano, or (...) archery, creditworthy moral success is a matter of getting things right by way of manifesting a relevant skill. My main aim in this paper is to bring out an important structural difference between moral creditworthiness and creditworthiness in sports, arts, and craft, undermining attempts to use examples of the latter as a model for understanding the former. As an alternative, I propose an account of morally creditworthy action, according to which such action is a matter of manifesting virtue, not skill—a claim that's based on an important, but underappreciated, difference between the sorts of excellences constituting virtues and skills. The paper thus contributes to a more nuanced picture of normative achievements across different domains of human agency, highlighting largely overlooked structural dissimilarities among them. (shrink)

Many virtue epistemologists conceive of epistemic competence on the model of skill —such as archery, playing baseball, or chess. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake: epistemic competences and skills are crucially and relevantly different kinds of capacities. This, I suggest, undermines the popular attempt to understand epistemic normativity as a mere special case of the sort of normativity familiar from skilful action. In fact, as I argue further, epistemic competences resemble virtues rather than skills—a claim that (...) is based on an important, but often overlooked, difference between virtue and skill. The upshot is that virtue epistemology should indeed be based on virtue, not on skill. (shrink)

Epistemic constitutivism (EC) holds that the nature of believing is such that it gives rise to a standard of correctness and that other epistemic normative notions (e.g., reasons for belief) can be explained in terms of this standard. If defensible, this view promises an attractive and unifying account of epistemic normativity. However, EC faces a forceful objection: that constitutive standards of correctness are never enough for generating normative reasons. This paper aims to defend EC in the face of this objection. (...) I do so in two steps. First, I dispute a crucial assumption underlying the case against EC: that constitutive standards of correctness in general are ‘reason-giving’ only if and because there is also a prior reason to comply with them. Second, I outline a strategy of how EC can meet the challenge of explaining what’s special about the activity of believing such that, unlike other standard-governed activities, it is capable of generating normative reasons. (shrink)

In this carefully argued critique, Steven Horst pronounces the theory deficient.

What has the past reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic taught us? We have seen that many low and middle-income countries (LMICs) still lack access to vaccines, and it seems little progress has been made in the last few months and year. This article discusses whether the current strategies, most notably, vaccine donations by the international community and the COVID-19 global access facility COVAX, offer meaningful solutions to tackle the problem. At the centre of our analysis, we compare the concepts of (...) “donations” and “charity” with “vaccine equity” and the “empowerment” of poorer countries. We suggest that the achievement of fair global vaccine production requires that our global approach is supportive of the idea of empowerment. We, therefore, need structural reforms, which would most importantly include capacity building, to positively impact this goal and to take the interests of the global poor seriously. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to assume that the world of nature can be reduced to basic physics. Yet there are features of the mind consciousness, intentionality, normativity that do not seem to be reducible to physics or neuroscience. This explanatory gap between mind and brain has thus been a major cause of concern in recent philosophy of mind. Reductionists hold that, despite all appearances, the mind can be reduced to the brain. Eliminativists hold that it cannot, and that this (...) implies that there is something illegitimate about the mentalistic vocabulary. Dualists hold that the mental is irreducible, and that this implies either a substance or a property dualism. Mysterian non-reductive physicalists hold that the mind is uniquely irreducible, perhaps due to some limitation of our self-understanding. In this book, Steven Horst argues that this whole conversation is based on assumptions left over from an outdated philosophy of science. While reductionism was part of the philosophical orthodoxy fifty years ago, it has been decisively rejected by philosophers of science over the past thirty years, and for good reason. True reductions are in fact exceedingly rare in the sciences, and the conviction that they were there to be found was an artifact of armchair assumptions of 17th century Rationalists and 20th century Logical Empiricists. The explanatory gaps between mind and brain are far from unique. In fact, in the sciences it is gaps all the way down.And if reductions are rare in even the physical sciences, there is little reason to expect them in the case of psychology. Horst argues that this calls for a complete re-thinking of the contemporary problematic in philosophy of mind. Reductionism, dualism, eliminativism and non-reductive materialism are each severely compromised by post-reductionist philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind is in need of a new paradigm. Horst suggests that such a paradigm might be found in Cognitive Pluralism: the view that human cognitive architecture constrains us to understand the world through a plurality of partial, idealized, and pragmatically-constrained models, each employing a particular representational system optimized for its own problem domain. Such an architecture can explain the disunities of knowledge, and is plausible on evolutionary grounds. (shrink)

A commentary on “Models of Consent to Return of Incidental Findings in Genomic Research,” by Paul S. Appelbaum, Erik Parens, Cameron R. Waldman, Robert Klitzman, Abby Fyer, Josue Martinez, W. Nicholson Price II, and Wendy K. Chung, in the July‐August 2014 issue.

What has the past reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic taught us? We have seen that many low and middle-income countries (LMICs) still lack access to vaccines, and it seems little progress has been made in the last few months and year. This article discusses whether the current strategies, most notably, vaccine donations by the international community and the COVID-19 global access facility COVAX, offer meaningful solutions to tackle the problem. At the centre of our analysis, we compare the concepts of (...) “donations” and “charity” with “vaccine equity” and the “empowerment” of poorer countries. We suggest that the achievement of fair global vaccine production requires that our global approach is supportive of the idea of empowerment. We, therefore, need structural reforms, which would most importantly include capacity building, to positively impact this goal and to take the interests of the global poor seriously. (shrink)

Le Christ devant la raison entend reprendre la question du rapport entre théologie et philosophie sous l'angle inattendu de la christologie dans ses métamorphoses modernes et contemporaines. Le projet paraît ambitieux, mais ici il s'attache à un segment de temps qui correspond à une période que l'on peut qualifier de " seconde modernité ", là où la christologie comme discipline de la théologie tend à se détacher de plus en plus du domaine où l'avait confiné l'apologétique défensive, celui de la (...) preuve, pour s'épanouir en un domaine de signification jusqu'alors inédit et qui porte le nom très précis de Christozentrik : le Christ au centre d'un ordo rerum dont il est la synthèse idéale. Mais le "christocentrisme", né d'une intensification métaphysique en théologie, n'est pas sans ambivalences. Il pourrait mettre à mal la logique de la foi et le paradoxe fondamental qui la soutient et dont la christologie est précisément la forme intelligible. Les ambitions spéculatives de la christologie ecclésiale n'en demeurent pas moins intactes. (shrink)

Over the past thirty years, it is been common to hear the mind likened to a digital computer. This essay is concerned with a particular philosophical view that holds that the mind literally is a digital computer (in a specific sense of “computer” to be developed), and that thought literally is a kind of computation. This view—which will be called the “Computational Theory of Mind” (CTM)—is thus to be distinguished from other and broader attempts to connect the mind with computation, (...) including (a) various enterprises at modeling features of the mind using computational modeling techniques, and (b) employing some feature or features of production-model computers (such as the stored program concept, or the distinction between hardware and software) merely as a guiding metaphor for understanding some feature of the mind. This entry is therefore concerned solely with the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) proposed by Hilary Putnam [1961] and developed most notably for philosophers by Jerry Fodor [1975, 1980, 1987, 1993]. The senses of ‘computer’ and ‘computation’ employed here are technical; the main tasks of this entry will therefore be to elucidate: (a) the technical sense of ‘computation’ that is at issue, (b) the ways in which it is claimed to be applicable to the mind, (c) the philosophical problems this understanding of the mind is claimed to solve, and (d) the major criticisms that have accrued to this view. (shrink)

Das Buch steht im Zusammenhang des Versuches, die zentrale Rolle der Bilder für die Ausbildung der modernen Philosophie am Beispiel bedeutender Gestalten des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts zu rekonstruieren. Das Projekt begann mit der Erschließung der Staatstheorie aus der Bildpolitik des "Leviathan" von Thomas Hobbes. Mit Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz' Ideen, ein Theater der Natur und Kunst sowie einen Atlas der Einbildungskraft zu errichten, folgt nun die Rekonstruktion eines Projektes, das für das Verständnis seiner Philosophie von tiefgreifender Bedeutung sein könnte. Obwohl Leibniz diese (...) Idee so hartnäckig und ausdauernd wie kaum ein anderes Unternehmen betrieben hat, ist sie in der Forschung bislang so gut wie unbekannt geblieben. Für diesen Umstand war die zersplitterte und unvollständige Überlieferung von Leibniz' Schriften ebenso verantwortlich wie ein mächtiger Strang der Philosophiegeschichte, der die Welt des Haptischen und Visuellen immer dann favorisiert, wenn sie transzendiert wird. Die jüngsten Bände der Akademie-Ausgabe bieten jedoch erstmals die Möglichkeit, Leibniz' Wertschätzung der tastenden und zeichnenden Hand und des neugierigen und geschulten Auges im Zusammenhang zu verfolgen. Seine schier unbegreiflich vielfältigen Denkbewegungen und Aktivitäten erhalten mit dem Projekt des Theaters der Natur und Kunst daher nicht nur eine Ergänzung, sondern einen neuen Rahmen. Leibniz' Faible für das Theatrum Naturae et Artis könnte das Gesamtbild seiner Philosophie verwandeln, weil es die Kluft zwischen Kalkül und Anschauung wie auch zwischen der "Fensterlosigkeit" der Monade und der körperlichen Form ihrer Perzeptionsweisen zugleich vertieft und überbrückt. (shrink)

Over the past several decades, the philosophical community has witnessed the emergence of an important new paradigm for understanding the mind.1 The paradigm is that of machine computation, and its influence has been felt not only in philosophy, but also in all of the empirical disciplines devoted to the study of cognition. Of the several strategies for applying the resources provided by computer and cognitive science to the philosophy of mind, the one that has gained the most attention from philosophers (...) has been the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). CTM was first articulated by Hilary Putnam (1960, 1961), but finds perhaps its most consistent and enduring advocate in Jerry Fodor (1975, 1980, 1981, 1987, 1990, 1994). It is this theory, and not any broader interpretations of what it would be for the mind to be a computer, that I wish to address in this paper. What I shall argue here is that the notion of symbolic representation employed by CTM is fundamentally unsuited to providing an explanation of the intentionality of mental states (a major goal of CTM), and that this result undercuts a second major goal of CTM, sometimes refered to as the vindication of intentional psychology. This line of argument is related to the discussions of derived intentionality by Searle (1980, 1983, 1984) and Sayre (1986, 1987). But whereas those discussions seem to be concerned with the causal dependence of familiar sorts of symbolic representation upon meaning-bestowing acts, my claim is rather that there is not one but several notions of meaning to be had, and that the notions that are applicable to symbols are conceptually dependent upon the notion that is applicable to mental states in the fashion that Aristotle refered to as paronymy. That is, an analysis of the notions of meaning applicable to symbols reveals that they contain presuppositions about meaningful mental states, much as Aristotle's analysis of the sense of healthy that is applied to foods reveals that it means conducive to having a healthy body, and hence any attempt to explain mental semantics in terms of the semantics of symbols is doomed to circularity and regress. I shall argue, however, that this does not have the consequence that computationalism is bankrupt as a paradigm for cognitive science, as it is possible to reconstruct CTM in a fashion that avoids these difficulties and makes it a viable research framework for psychology, albeit at the cost of losing its claims to explain intentionality and to vindicate intentional psychology. I have argued elsewhere (Horst, 1996) that local special sciences such as psychology do not require vindication in the form of demonstrating their reducibility to more fundamental theories, and hence failure to make good on these philosophical promises need not compromise the broad range of work in empirical cognitive science motivated by the computer paradigm in ways that do not depend on these problematic treatments of symbols. (shrink)

This book introduces an account of cognitive architecture, Cognitive Pluralism, on which the basic units of understanding are models of particular content domains. Having many mental models is a good adaptive strategy for cognition, but models can be incompatible with one another, leading to paradoxes and inconsistencies of belief, and it may not be possible to integrate the understanding supplied by multiple models into a comprehensive and self-consistent "super model". The book applies the theory to explaining intuitive reasoning and cognitive (...) illusions and explores implications for epistemology, semantics, and disunity of science. (shrink)

This paper provides an analysis of U.S. farmland owners, operators, and workers by race, ethnicity, and gender. We first review the intersection between racialized and gendered capitalism and farmland ownership and farming in the United States. Then we analyze data from the 2014 Tenure and Ownership Agricultural Land survey, the 2012 Census of Agriculture, and the 2013–2014 National Agricultural Worker Survey to demonstrate that significant nation-wide disparities in farming by race, ethnicity and gender persist in the U.S. In 2012–2014, White (...) people owned 98% and operated 94% of all farmland. They generated 98% of all farm-related income from land ownership and 97% of income from farm owner-operatorship. Meanwhile, People of Color farmers were more likely to be tenants rather than owners, owned less land, and generated less farm-related wealth per person than their White counterparts. Hispanic farmers were also disproportionately farm laborers. In addition to racial and ethnic disparities, there were disparities by gender. About 63% of non-operating landowners, 86% of farm operators, and 87% of tenant farmers were male, and female farmers tended to generate less income per farmer than men. This data provides evidence of ongoing racial, ethnic and gender disparities in agriculture in the United States. We conclude with a call to address the structural drivers of the disparities and with recommendations for better data collection. (shrink)

Most contemporary philosophers of mind claim to be in search of a 'naturalistic' theory. However, when we look more closely, we find that there are a number of different and even conflicting ideas of what would count as a 'naturalization' of the mind. This article attempts to show what various naturalistic philosophies of mind have in common, and also how they differ from one another. Additionally, it explores the differences between naturalistic philosophies of mind and naturalisms found in ethics, epistemology, (...) and philosophy of science. Section 1 introduces a distinction between two types of project that have been styled 'naturalistic', which I call philosophical naturalism and empirical naturalism . Sections 2 to 6 canvass different strands of philosophical naturalism concerning the mind, followed by a much briefer discussion of attempts to provide empirical naturalizations of the mind in Section 7 . Section 8 concludes the essay with a consideration of the relations between philosophical and empirical naturalism in philosophy of mind, arguing that at least some types of philosophical naturalism are incompatible with empirical naturalism. (shrink)

Seit dem byzantinischen Bilderstreit und dem Bildersturm der Reformation ist nicht mehr in solcher Intensität über Bilder nachgedacht worden wie in den letzten Jahrzehnten. Neben der Archäologie und der Kunstgeschichte haben sich zahlreiche weitere Fächer an Fragestellungen rund um das Bild geradezu festgebissen. Angesichts dessen geht einer der bedeutendsten Kunsthistoriker der Gegenwart der Frage nach, warum Begriff und Geltung sowie Macht und Ohnmacht von Bildern so hartnäckig verfolgte Themen unserer Tage geworden sind.

Volume 19, Issue 6, June 2019, Page 42-44.

Wird Sprache gesprochen, erzwingt die Zeit eine Abfolge der Zeichen: Es wird immer nur ein bestimmtes Zeichen gleichzeitig ausgesprochen und somit ergibt sich eine eindeutige zeitliche Reihung. Diese Reihung wurde beim Aufkommen der Schrift beibehalten: Es ist möglich, die Zeichen eines Textes auf einem fortlaufenden Band aufzuschreiben. Diese lineare Ordnung wird aus verschiedenen Gründen durchbrochen, was jeweils mit Abfolgeregeln bezahlt werden muss: Die zweidimensionale Darstellung und das Buchformat erleichtern den Lesefluss; Seiten- und Zeilennummerierungen erlauben einen direkteren Zugriff auf Teile des (...) Textes; Titel sollen die Bedeutung der ihnen untergeordneten Schriftzeichen repräsentieren; im Inhaltsverzeichnis wird daher nicht nur die reine Abfolge der Schriftzeichen im Text fassbar, sondern auch in gewisser Weise die Abfolge der Bedeutungen. (shrink)

The term “innovation” or “innovative care” has recently gained attention in the context of the use of novel and not yet fully validated medical interventions and technologies. Most notably, there have been various incidences of medical activities insufficiently validated for its regular use in healthcare that fall into this category, such as stem cell treatments, genome sequencing for diagnostic purposes, or novel reproductive technologies. Latin American countries are among the places where new and non-validated medical activities take place, notably due (...) to a lack of clear regulations and the poor support of authorities of existent legal and ethical guidelines, which is driven by “hidden battles” on the moral status of certain interventions. The increasing importance of innovative care underlines the importance of developing a general framework for these practices. Therefore, the present chapter scrutinizes this nascent field of inquiry in Latin America and offers a conceptual framework for innovation as well as its ethical justification. As we will argue, an important use of the term “innovation” or “innovative care” is best interpreted as “new non-validated practice” and not as a research activity. Then, we will defend that responsible innovation understood as responsible new non-validated practice is ethically permissible and poses an acceptable medical option if done in exceptional circumstances—where no reasonable alternatives can be provided to an individual patient—and following special ethical principles. Finally, we focus on the peculiarities and specific difficulties the concept of new non-validated practice poses to the Latin American context. We will conclude the chapter by some remarks and recommendations we draw from our analysis for individual patients, doctors, and societies in Latin America. (shrink)

Shaping the Future maps out the ascetic practices of a Neitzschean way of life. Hutter argues that Nietzsche's doctrines are attempts and "temptations" that aim to provoke his free-spirited readers into changing themselves by putting philosophy into practice in their lives.

Von Natur aus ist der Mensch so frei wie wölfisch. Um sich selbst zu bändigen, muß er folglich einen künstlichen Riesen schaffen, den Staat, der als übergeordnete Instanz den permanenten Bürgerkrieg zu unterdrücken und Frieden zu schaffen vermag. Diese Essenz von Thomas Hobbes'"Leviathan" ist bis heute ebenso vehement verworfen wie bekräftigt worden. In den letzten Jahrzehnten wurden vor allem die historischen Bedingungen erschlossen, unter denen Hobbes sein epochales Werk verfaßte; aber seine bestürzende Grundthese, daß es des Schreckens bedarf, um inneren (...) Frieden zu erzeugen, ist eine Herausforderung für jedwede Staats- und Gesellschaftstheorie geblieben. Zu den Mitteln, mit denen der Leviathan die Menschen vom Unfrieden abhält, gehören Bilder, und aus diesem Grund steht dem Leviathan ein Frontispiz voran. Obwohl seit Jahrhunderten selbst entfernteste Aspekte von Hobbes' Werk ausgeleuchtet wurden, ist dieses grundlegende Element seiner Lehre bislang nicht erörtert worden. Eine systematische Untersuchung seiner Wertschätzung des Augensinnes fehlt ebenso wie eine umfassende Analyse seiner Bildmittel. Horst Bredekamp erschließt mit Abraham Bosse den Künstler des Frontispizes, stellt sämtliche Varianten dieses Urbildes des modernen Staates zusammen und versucht, die Vorgeschichte seiner politischen Ikonographie zu klären. Im Zentrum stehen die königlichen Kunstleiber von Westminster Abbey sowie optische Geräte, mit deren Hilfe Hobbes neben dem Körper und dem Raum auch eine künstliche Zeit als Wirkmittel des Leviathan zu etablieren suchte. Gegen Ende seiner prägnanten Analyse erörtert der Autor die Wiederkehr der Hobbesschen Staatsikone im neunzehnten und zwanzigsten Jahrhundert sowie die Zukunft des Staates als Bild. (shrink)

Recent initiatives in Germany illustrate how major companies have changed their attitudes towards a critical public ‐ and thereby have improved their economic and ethical performance. Prof. Dr. Horst Steinmann and Dipl.‐Kfm. Ansgar Zerfaß belong to the University of Erlangen‐Nürnberg, Germany.

Case studies in the psychophysics, modeling and localization of human vision are presented as an example of “hands-on” philosophy of the cognitive sciences. These studies also yield important results for familiar problems in philosophy of mind: the explanatory gap surrounding phenomenological feels is not closed by the kinds of investigations surveyed. However, the science is able to explain some sorts of phenomenological facts, such as why the human color space takes the form of the Munsell color solid, or why there (...) is a phenomenologically-pure yellow but not a phenomenologically-pure orange. (shrink)