The study discusses the philosophy of Finnish philosopher J.V. Snellman (1806–81). The focus is on Snellman's so-called philosophy of personality, which he presented in his work "Essay on the speculative Development of the Idea of Personality" (Tübingen, 1841). Besides this work he addressed his philosophy of personality in his other works and in his public lectures. -/- In his philosophy of personality Snellman develops the concept of personality within the framework of G.W.F. Hegel's (1770–1831) philosophy. The concept (...) of personality serves as a basis for Hegel's philosophy of right, and it plays an important role also in other parts of Hegel's system. However, he never provided a comprehensive definition of this concept. The essence of personality was debated among Hegelians after Hegel's death in 1831. In the course of the debate the Hegelian school split into two groups. At the time of publication of "The Idea of Personality" there was a serious rift between the Right- and the Left-Hegelians. -/- The study analyzes Snellman's philosophy of personality in respect of Hegel's philosophy and in respect of the views of other Hegelians – mainly D.F. Strauss (1808–74), L. Feuerbach (1804–72) and C.F. Göschel (1781–1861). I also attend to some contemporaries outside the Hegelian School like F.W.J. Schelling (1775–1854) and I.H. Fichte (1796–1879). -/- The study is divided into six sections (A–F). The first comprises an introduction and an outline of the structure of the study. The second section (B) discusses the historical context of Snellman's philosophy. The first subsection focuses on the Central European debate on Hegel's legacy. The second subsection deals with Snellman's life and his work on philosophy. The systematic part of the study comprises three sections (C–E), which consider the dialectic of Snellman's work of 1841. This dialectic follows the outline of Hegel's philosophy of subjective spirit and culminates in the definition of personality. Snellman, however, exceeds the realm of the philosophy of subjective spirit, as he discusses e.g. the philosophy of religion. He also comments on the debate among Hegelians. According to Snellman, neither Right- nor Left-Hegelians are true to Hegel's philosophy. In effect, his own standpoint in the debate, as I will argue, comes close to that of the Left-Hegelians. The study concludes with a summary (F). (shrink)

The paper discusses J.V. Snellman's (1806–81) reading of F.W.J. Schelling's (1775–1854) philosophy. The reading was presented in his book "Essay on the speculative Development of the Idea of Personality" (1841). Snellman, the most remarkable Finnish Hegelian, focused on Schelling's text "Philosophical investigations into the essence of human freedom" (1809). In Snellman's view Schelling is a forerunner to Hegel. He was not familiar with the details of Schelling's later critic towards Hegel. -/- Snellman became interested in Schelling, (...) because the latter highlights the importance of personality. The essence of evil is further linked with the essence of personality. One asks, for example, that if human personality is seen as dependent on the personality of God, is it reasonable to say that human person is responsible for evil acts? Snellman's main concern is to argue against the positivity of evil. He agrees with Schelling that evil exists only as evil action. (shrink)

Artikkeli käsittelee J. V. Snellmanin (1806–81) varhaisvaiheen filosofiaa ja sen suhdetta hänen 1840-luvun alun filosofiseen pääteokseensa "Persoonallisuuden idean spekulatiivisen kehittelyn yritys" (Versuch einer speculativen Entwicklung der Idee der Persönlichkeit). Varhaisvaiheen filosofia viittaa Snellmanin julkaistuihin kirjoituksiin vuosina 1835–40 sekä luentokäsikirjoituksiin ja muihin muistiinpanoihin. -/- Artikkelin keskiössä on Snellmanin varhainen luenta G. W. F. Hegelin (1770–1831) filosofiasta. Snellmanin filosofian on yleensä katsottu seuraavan Hegelin esikuvaa uskollisesti. Tämä pitää pääasiassa paikkansa, mutta toisaalta Snellman ei missään vaiheessa uraansa epäröinyt poiketa Hegelin viitoittamalta tieltä. (...) Hän ei tosin juuri korostanut eroja itsensä ja saksalaisen esikuvansa välillä. Snellman esitti varhaisfilosofiassaan muun muassa omaperäisen tulkinnan Hegelin subjektiivisen hengen filosofiasta. Hän pyrki myös yhdistämään Hegelin kaksi logiikan pääesitystä yhdeksi kokonaisuudeksi. Snellman myös täydensi joiltain osin Hegelin systeemiä. Hegel ei esimerkiksi koskaan vastannut yksiselitteisesti kysymykseen siitä, tarvitseeko hänen systeeminsä itsenäisen johdannon. Snellman katsoi johdannon tarpeelliseksi ja esitti varhaisfilosofiassaan oman versionsa johdannosta. Snellmanin johdanto keskittyi itsetietoisuuden käsitteeseen, joka oli keskeisessä roolissa myös hänen vuonna 1841 julkaisemassaan teoksessa "Persoonallisuuden idean spekulatiivisen kehittelyn yritys". (shrink)

Tämä artikkeli käsittelee J. V. Snellmanin sijoittumista hegeliläisen filosofian kentälle. Hegeliläinen koulukunta jakautui 1830-luvun kuluessa oikeisto-, vasemmisto- ja keskustahegeliläisyyteen. J. V. Snellmanin filosofian tutkimuksessa on usein nostettu esiin Carl Ludwig Michelet’n (1843, 314) luonnehdinta Snellmanista vasemman keskustan hegeliläisenä. Michelet’n käsitys on edeltävässä tutkimuksessa yleisesti hyväksytty. Sitä, mikä tekee Snellmanista nimenomaan vasemman keskustan eikä esimerkiksi oikean keskustan edustajaa ei kuitenkaan juuri ole pohdittu. Esitän seuraavassa muutamia huomioita, joiden myötä kuva Snellmanin sijoittumisesta hegeliläisten kentässä tarkentuu.

Johan Vilhelm Snellman (1806–1881) tunnetaan valtiomiehenä, sanomalehtimiehenä ja kansallisena herättäjänä, mutta hänen filosofiansa on usein jäänyt hänen yhteiskunnallisen vaikutuksensa varjoon. "Maailmanhenki Pohjolassa" piirtää yleiskuvan Snellmanin ja hänen esikuvansa G. W. F. Hegelin (1770–1831) filosofiasta. Se toimii johdantoteoksena heidän ajatteluunsa ja kertoo samalla 1800-luvun Suomen henkisen elämän kansainvälisyydestä. "Maailmanhenki Pohjolassa" selittää, miten Snellman Hegelin ajattelua käytti ja tulkitsi, ja korostaa, millaisissa asioissa Snellman teki pesäeron sekä Hegeliin että maineikkaisiin hegeliläisiin kuten Ludwig Feuerbachiin ja David Friedrich Straussiin. "Maailmanhenki Pohjolassa" (...) on perusteos suomalaisesta filosofiasta ja Suomen kulttuurihistoriasta kiinnostuneille. (shrink)

Erkenne dich selbst sei die schwierigste Zumutung, die einem Menschen gemacht worden ist – so proklamierte Finnischer Philosoph und Hegelianer J.V. Snellman (1806–81) in der Ein-leitung zum seinen ersten philosophischen Hauptwerk. In diesem Werk ("Versuch einer spekulativen Entwicklung der Idee der Persönlichkeit", Tübingen 1841) kommentierte Snellman sowohl G.W.F. Hegels (1770–1831) Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes als auch die Diskussion unter deutschen Hegelianern. Laut Snellman setzt die Durchführung der Idee der Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes eine engere Verbindung zwischen spekulativer (...) Logik und Geistesphilosophie vor. Im Vortrag stelle ich die Frage, was für eine Verbindung Snellman tatsächlich im Auge hatte. (shrink)

Der Beitrag, dessen Schwerpunkt auf metaphysischen Fragestellungen liegt, expliziert das Verhältnis zwischen Kants und Hegels Auffassungen der Person. Der Begriff der Person spielt eine wichtige Rolle in praktischer Philosophie Kants. Kant verneint dagegen die Auffassung der ontologischen Person. Nachkantischer deutscher Idealismus kann als Wiederherstellung der Personontologie erörtert werden. Persönliches Sein prägt auch Philosophie Hegels. Hegel thematisiert Person aber systematisch nur im Bereich der Philosophie des Rechts. Der Standpunkt des finnischen Hegelianers J.V. Snellman (1806–81) wird als Fortsetzung der Philosophie Hegels (...) betrachtet. Besonders sein Werk "Versuch einer spekulativen Entwicklung der Idee der Persönlichkeit" (1841) steht im Brennpunkt des Beitrags. (shrink)

This completes what I think one may state and defend on physical grounds concerning the foundations of Astrology and the coming year 1602. If those learned in matters of Physics think them worthy of consideration, and communicate to me their objections to them, for the sake of eliciting the truth, I shall, if God grants me the skill, reply to them in my prognostication for the following year. I urge all who make a serious study of philosophy to engage in (...) this contest. For it concerns our worship of God and the welfare of the human race. Meanwhile, I pray from the depths of my soul, through Christ our mediator, that for all and for each the coming year may be a very happy one. (shrink)

This dissertation seeks to contribute to research in the philosophy of social science. The study focuses upon select epistemological and ontological aspects of Hannah Arendt’s work from which methodological implications are drawn pertaining to sociology. Arendt, although critical of the sociology of her time, has become increasingly cited and influential for emerging sociological research and this study seeks to contribute to this by focusing upon the problem of novelty. The aim is to explore the philosophical and methodological implications of novelty (...) for social science by working through three case studies that are theoretically pivotal for social science—action, the ‘social’, and the self—in terms of novelty as expressed in Arendt’s writing. Arendt is critical of methodology and epistemology, aiming to draw her readers to ontological concerns outlined from her preoccupation with the 'world' and social reality. In this aim, Arendt seeks to distance herself from social sciences that she claims ignore human novelty in favour of reading social regularities, tendencies and similarities. Despite her disdain for method, Arendt suggests a anti-methodological 'method' (outlined in an overlooked footnote) for keeping trained upon and for dealing with novel, anomalous events. In the seed of this method lies a unique opportunity for social science to reassess and extend its methods, addressing this oversight and in so doing bring to light the novel social object as a legitimate subject of social research. (shrink)

The pregnant phrasefatale monstrumcomes at a crucial point in the third and longest of the three sentences of the ‘Cleopatra Ode’. Before it Cleopatra is being hissed from the stage of history with cries of disapproval; after it she is recalled to receive plaudit after plaudit for her courage and resolution. The phrase is emphasized by its position at the start of a stanza followed by a marked pause. Prima facie it is the climax of the vituperation, and has often (...) so been taken. T. E. Page, for example, comments: ‘Horace speaks of Cleopatra as not human, but a hideous and portentous creature sent by destiny to cause horror and alarm.’. (shrink)

This article aims to initiate a discussion on the demarcation of the ethics of care. This discussion is necessary because the ethics of care evolves by making use of insights from varying disciplines. As this involves the risk of contamination of the care ethical discipline, the challenge for care ethical scholars is to ensure to retain a distinct care ethical perspective. This may be supported by an open and critical debate on the criteria and boundaries of the ethics of care. (...) As a contribution, this article proposes a tentative outline of the care ethical discipline. What is characteristic of this outline is the emphasis on relational programming, situation-specific and context-bound judgments, a political–ethical perspective, and empirical groundedness. It is argued that the ethics of care is best developed further by means of an intradisciplinary approach. Two intradisciplinary examples show how within the frame of one discipline, other disciplines are absorbed, both with their body of knowledge and their research methodology. (shrink)

In Cratylus 385 b-c Plato argues that if statements () can be true or false, names (),2 as parts () of statements, are also capable of being true or false. From Aristotle onwards this view has often been challenged,3 and R. Robinson put the case against it trenchantly when he wrote:4 This argument is bad; for names have no truth-value, and the reason given for saying that they do is a fallacy of division. No one in the dialogue points out (...) that it is bad. … Nevertheless it is fairly probable that Plato saw or at least felt that it is a bad argument, quite different in quality from those he later produces against the nature-theory. (shrink)

In Cratylus 385 b-c Plato argues that if statements () can be true or false, names (),2 as parts () of statements, are also capable of being true or false. From Aristotle onwards this view has often been challenged,3 and R. Robinson put the case against it trenchantly when he wrote:4This argument is bad; for names have no truth-value, and the reason given for saying that they do is a fallacy of division. No one in the dialogue points out that (...) it is bad. … Nevertheless it is fairly probable that Plato saw or at least felt that it is a bad argument, quite different in quality from those he later produces against the nature-theory. (shrink)