Responds to the idea that humans are merely survival mechanisms for their own genes, providing the tools to advance human interests over the interests of the replicators through rational self-determination.

_Germinal Life_ is the sequel to the highly successful _Viroid Life_. Where _Viroid Life_ provided a compelling reading of Nietzsche's philosophy of the human, _Germinal Life_ is an original and groundbreaking analysis of little known and difficult theoretical aspects of the work of French philosopher Gilles Deleuze. In particular, Keith Ansell Pearson provides fresh and insightful readings of Deleuze's work on Bergson and Deleuze's most famous texts _Difference and Repetition_ and _A Thousand Plateaus_. _Germinal Life _also provides new insights (...) into Deleuze's relation to some of the most original thinkers of modernity, from Darwin to Freud and Nietzsche, and explores the connections between Deleuze and more recent thinkers such as Adorno and Merleau-Ponty. (shrink)

In the introduction to the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty states that ‘Attention, [...] as a general and formal activity, does not exist’. This paper examines the meaning and truth of this difficult and surprising statement, along with its implications for the account of perception given by theorists such as Dretske and Peacocke. In order to elucidate Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of human perception, I will present two alternative models1 of how attention might be thought to operate. The first is derived from (...) the works of the aforementioned theorists and is, I argue, based upon a largely inaccurate computational or mechanistic understanding of the mind. The second is drawn from the works of Merleau-Ponty and cognitive scientist and philosopher, Alva Noë, and takes into account recent neurological theories concerning the role of attention in human consciousness. On the basis of these models I will argue that attention is an essential, rather than incidental, characteristic of consciousness that is constitutive of both thought and perception, and which cannot be understood in terms of the independent faculty or ‘general and unconditioned power’ that Dretske et al’s account requires. I will conclude by considering two potential counterexamples to my argument, and evaluating the threat that these pose to the phenomenological model. (shrink)

(2013). Why humans are (sometimes) less rational than other animals: Cognitive complexity and the axioms of rational choice. Thinking & Reasoning: Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 1-26. doi: 10.1080/13546783.2012.713178.

In this response, we clarify several misunderstandings of the understanding/acceptance principle and defend our specific operationalization of that principle. We reiterate the importance of addressing the problem of rational task construal and we elaborate the notion of computational limitations contained in our target article. Our concept of thinking dispositions as variable intentional-level styles of epistemic and behavioral regulation is explained, as is its relation to the rationality debate. Many of the suggestions of the commentators for elaborating two-process models are easily (...) integrated into our generic dual-process account. We further explicate how we view the relation between System 1 and System 2 and evolutionary and normative rationality. We clarify our attempt to fuse the contributions of the cognitive ecologists with the insights of the original heuristics and biases researchers. (shrink)

Interpretation is the process whereby a hearer reasons to an interpretation of a speaker's discourse. The hearer normally adopts a credulous attitude to the discourse, at least for the purposes of interpreting it. That is to say the hearer tries to accommodate the truth of all the speaker's utterances in deriving an intended model. We present a nonmonotonic logical model of this process which defines unique minimal preferred models and efficiently simulates a kind of closed-world reasoning of particular interest for (...) human cognition. Byrne's “suppression” data (Byrne, 1989) are used to illustrate how variants on this logic can capture and motivate subtly different interpretative stances which different subjects adopt, thus indicating where more fine-grained empirical data are required to understand what subjects are doing in this task. We then show that this logical competence model can be implemented in spreading activation network models. A one pass process interprets the textual input by constructing a network which then computes minimal preferred models for (3-valued) valuations of the set of propositions of the text. The neural implementation distinguishes easy forward reasoning from more complex backward reasoning in a way that may be useful in explaining directionality in human reasoning. (shrink)

Interpretation is the process whereby a hearer reasons to an interpretation of a speaker's discourse. The hearer normally adopts a credulous attitude to the discourse, at least for the purposes of interpreting it. That is to say the hearer tries to accommodate the truth of all the speaker's utterances in deriving an intended model. We present a nonmonotonic logical model of this process which defines unique minimal preferred models and efficiently simulates a kind of closed-world reasoning of particular interest for (...) human cognition. Byrne's “suppression” data (Byrne, 1989) are used to illustrate how variants on this logic can capture and motivate subtly different interpretative stances which different subjects adopt, thus indicating where more fine-grained empirical data are required to understand what subjects are doing in this task. We then show that this logical competence model can be implemented in spreading activation network models. A one pass process interprets the textual input by constructing a network which then computes minimal preferred models for (3-valued) valuations of the set of propositions of the text. The neural implementation distinguishes easy forward reasoning from more complex backward reasoning in a way that may be useful in explaining directionality in human reasoning. (shrink)

Courts are increasingly obliged to adjudicate upon challenges to allocative decisions in healthcare, but their involvement continues to be regarded with unease, imperilling the legitimacy of the judicial role in this context. A central reason for this is that judges are perceived to lack sufficient expertise to determine allocative questions. This article critically appraises the claim of lack of judicial expertise through an examination of the various components of a limit-setting decision. It is argued that the inexpertise argument is weak (...) when compared with other rationales for judicial restraint, such as the procedural unsuitability and lack of constitutional competence of courts. (shrink)

Executive function has become an important concept in explanations of psychiatric disorders, but we currently lack comprehensive models of normal executive function and of its malfunctions. Here we illustrate how defeasible logical analysis can aid progress in this area. We illustrate using autism and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) as example disorders, and show how logical analysis reveals commonalities between linguistic and non-linguistic behaviours within each disorder, and how contrasting sub-components of executive function are involved across disorders. This analysis reveals (...) how logical analysis is as applicable to fast, automatic and unconscious reasoning as it is to slow deliberate cogitation. (shrink)

We did not, as Brakel & Shevrin imply, intend to classify either System 1 or System 2 as rational or irrational. Instrumental rationality is assessed at the organismic level, not at the subpersonal level. Thus, neither System 1 nor System 2 are themselves inherently rational or irrational. Also, that genetic fitness and instrumental rationality are not to be equated was a major theme in our target article. We disagree with Bringsjord & Yang's point that the tasks used in the heuristics (...) and biases literature are easy. Bringsjord & Yang too readily conflate the ability to utilize a principle of rational choice with the disposition to do so. Thus, they undervalue tasks in the cognitive science literature that compellingly reveal difficulties with the latter. We agree with Newton & Roberts that models at the algorithmic level of analysis are crucial, but we disagree with their implication that attention to issues of rationality at the intentional level of analysis impedes work at the algorithmic level of analysis. (shrink)

This reply to Oaksford and Chater’s ’s critical discussion of our use of logic programming to model and predict patterns of conditional reasoning will frame the dispute in terms of the semantics of the conditional. We begin by outlining some common features of LP and probabilistic conditionals in knowledge-rich reasoning over long-term memory knowledge bases. For both, context determines causal strength; there are inferences from the absence of certain evidence; and both have analogues of the Ramsey test. Some current work (...) shows how a combination of counting defeaters and statistics from network monitoring can provide the information for graded responses from LP reasoning. With this much introduction, we then respond to O&C’s specific criticisms and misunderstandings. (shrink)

Several of Beller, Bender, and Medin’s (2012) issues are as relevant within cognitive science as between it and anthropology. Knowledge-rich human mental processes impose hermeneutic tasks, both on subjects and researchers. Psychology's current philosophy of science is ill suited to analyzing these: Its demand for ‘‘stimulus control’’ needs to give way to ‘‘negotiation of mutual interpretation.’’ Cognitive science has ways to address these issues, as does anthropology. An example from my own work is about how defeasible logics are mathematical models (...) of some aspects of simple hermeneutic processes. They explain processing relative to databases of knowledge and belief—that is, content. A specific example is syllogistic reasoning, which raises issues of experimenters’ interpretations of subjects’ reasoning. Science, especially since the advent of understandings of computation, does not have to be reductive. How does this approach transfer onto anthropological topics? Recent cognitive science approaches to anthropological topics have taken a reductive stance in terms of modules. We end with some speculations about a different cognitive approach to, for example, religion. (shrink)

Executive function has become an important concept in explanations of psychiatric disorders, but we currently lack comprehensive models of normal executive function and of its malfunctions. Here we illustrate how defeasible logical analysis can aid progress in this area. We illustrate using autism and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) as example disorders, and show how logical analysis reveals commonalities between linguistic and non-linguistic behaviours within each disorder, and how contrasting sub-components of executive function are involved across disorders. This analysis reveals (...) how logical analysis is as applicable to fast, automatic and unconscious reasoning as it is to slow deliberate cogitation. (shrink)

The vision of global health with justice which Larry Gostin articulates in his book Global Health Law envisages a switch to ‘upstream’ priority-setting for expenditure on health, with a focus upon social determinants and a goal of redressing health inequalities. This article explores what is meant by this proposal and offers a critical evaluation of it. It is argued that difficulties arise in respect of the ethical and evidential bases for such an approach to the setting of priorities, while significant (...) challenges may also arise in the necessary modification of structures of governance. (shrink)

A major worry in self-deception research has been the implication that people can hold a belief that something is true and false at the same time: a logical as well as a psychological impossibility. However, if beliefs are held with imperfect confidence, voluntary self-deception in the sense of seeking evidence to reject an unpleasant belief becomes entirely plausible and demonstrably real.

This study investigates the judgments made by accounting majors when confronted with selected ethical dilemmas that pertain to accounting practice. Drawing upon literature in philosophy and moral psychology, it then examines these judgments for potential gender differences. Five case studies, each involving a specific ethical dilemma that a practicing accountant might face, were administered to 151 acounting majors (males = 67; females = 84), in four sections of intermediate accounting II at a large, state university. The results suggest that although (...) the vast majority of participants wouldnot engage in unethical behavior, a reasonable opportunity exists to improve the participants' ethical awareness. The results do not, however, support the existence of gender differences in ethical judgments. (shrink)

Krueger & Funder (K&F) are right that various imbalances characterize social psychology, but I question whether they are characteristic of psychology or cognitive science as a whole. Dual-process theories, popular in the latter fields, emphasize both processing biases and the adaptiveness of human cognition in a more balanced manner.

Near the end of his target article, Baron argues that we need to address the question of how to conduct education in consequentialist decision making. However, recent trends in education have deemphasized and denigrated decentered and decontextualized thought. It is argued here that perspective decentering and decontextualized thinking are absolutely essential to the development of consequentialist reasoning.

The dissociation of fluid cognitive functions from g is implicit in the Cattell-Horn-Carroll gF-gC theory. Nevertheless, Blair is right that fluid functions are extremely important. I suggest that the key mental operation assessed by measures of gF is the ability to sustain mental simulation while keeping the relevant representations decoupled from the actual world – an ability that underlies all hypothetical thinking. (Published Online April 5 2006).

Lea & Webley's (L&W's) Drug Theory solves many puzzles surrounding money-related behavior. I explore supplementing the Drug Theory with ideas from gene-culture coevolution theory and memetic theory. (Published Online April 5 2006).

The cognitive psychology of judgment and decision making helps to elaborate Gintis's unified view of the behavioral sciences by highlighting the fact that decisions result from multiple systems in the mind. It also adds to the unified view the idea that the potential to self-critique preference structures is a unique feature of human cognition. (Published Online April 27 2007).