Perceptual processes differ from cognitive, this paper argues, in functioning to be causally controlled by proximal stimuli, and being modular, at least in a modest sense that excludes their being isotropic in Jerry Fodor's sense. This claim agrees with such theorists as Jacob Beck and Ben Phillips that a function of stimulus-control is needed for perceptual status. In support of this necessity claim, I argue, inter alia, that E.J. Green's recent architectural account misclassifies processes deploying knowledge of grammar as perceptual. (...) _Pace_ Beck and Phillips, however, I argue a function of stimulus-control is insufficient for perceptual as opposed to cognitive status. One consideration in favour of such insufficiency, noted but (I argue) not convincingly rebutted by these theorists, concerns perpetually grounded demonstrative thought. Two other considerations trade on the fact that a function of stimulus-control can arise not from blind nature but intentional design or social institutions, where so-functioning processes may but need not be perceptual. I offer two cases where such processes are cognitive, viz. skilful play-by-play announcing of ongoing events, and voluntary visualizing of ongoing events under the guidance of apt play-by-play announcements, dubbed announcement-driven visualizing (ADV). The cognitive status of these three diverse phenomena cannot be explained by an absence of a perception-like representational format or content (for ADV has such) or by a presence of personal-level mental states causally mediating between stimuli and outputs (for perception has such). A bettter explanation invokes, I argue, the non-modular character of the generating process. (shrink)

According to perceptualism, fluent comprehension of speech is a perceptual achievement, in as much as it is akin to such high-level perceptual states as the perception of objects as cups or trees, or of people as happy or sad. According to liberalism, grasp of meaning is partially constitutive of the phenomenology of fluent comprehension. I here defend an influential line of argument for liberal perceptualism, resting on phenomenal contrasts in our comprehension of speech, due to Susanna Siegel and Tim Bayne, (...) against objections from Casey O'Callaghan and Indrek Reiland. I concentrate on the contrast between the putative immediacy of meaning-assignment in fluent comprehension, as compared with other, less ordinary, perhaps translation-based ways of getting at the meaning of speech. I argue this putative immediacy is difficult to capture on a non-perceptual view (whether liberal or non-liberal), and that the immediacy in question has much in common with that which applies in other, less controversial cases of high-level perception. (shrink)

Many philosophers hold that the phenomenology of thinking (also known as cognitive phenomenology) reduces to the phenomenology of the speech, sensory imagery, emotions or feelings associated with it. But even if this reductionist claim is correct, there is still a properly cognitive dimension to the phenomenology of at least some thinking. Specifically, conceptual content makes a constitutive contribution to the phenomenology of at least some thought episodes, in that it constitutes what I call their thematic unity. Often, when a thought (...) episode has a phenomenal character, the various associated speech, sensory imagery, emotions or feelings are often organized around a common theme, constituted by the conceptual content of one's thinking. (shrink)

Russell’s theory of acquaintance construes perceptual awareness as at once constitutively independent of conceptual thought and yet a source of propositional knowledge. Wilfrid Sellars, John McDowell, and other conceptualists object that this is a ‘myth’: perception can be a source of knowledge only if conceptual capacities are already in play therein. Proponents of a relational view of experience, including John Campbell, meanwhile voice sympathy for Russell’s position on this point. This paper seeks to spell out, and defend, a claim that (...) offers the prospects for an attractive, unacknowledged element of common ground in this debate. The claim is that conceptual capacities, at least in a certain minimal sense implicit in McDowell’s recent work, must be operative in perceptual experience, if it is to rationalize judgement. The claim will be supported on the basis of two premises, each of which can be defended drawing, inter alia, on considerations stressed by Campbell. First, that experience rationalizes judgement only if it is attentive. Second, that attention qualifies as a conceptual capacity, in the noted, minimal sense. The conjunction of the two premises might be dubbed ‘attentional conceptualism’. (shrink)

According to a widely held view of assertion and belief, they are each governed by a tacitly acknowledged epistemic norm, and the norm on assertion and norm on belief are so related that believing p is epistemically permissible only if asserting it is. I call it the Same Norm View. A very common type of utterance raises a puzzle for this view, viz. utterances in which we say ‘I believe p' to convey somehow guarded affirmation of the proposition that p. (...) For example, one might respond to a query for directions to the station by saying ‘I believe it is down the first street on your left.' Often, when we reply in this way, it would have been pragmatically preferable simply to assert that p, had we been epistemically warranted in doing so. One's guarded reply thus suggests one is not so warranted. Nevertheless, if one believes what one, at face value, says one believes, one believes p. Contrary to what might seem to be suggested by the Same Norm View, one does not seem to portray oneself as irrational or epistemically beyond the pale in replying in this way. The paper develops this puzzle in detail, and examines a variety of options for a resolving it consistently with the Same Norm view. The most promising of these options, I argue, is to see ‘I believe' guarded affirmations as a form merely approximately correct speech. They would, though, be a form of such speech that interestingly differs from paradigm cases of loose use or conventional hyperbole in that speakers would be comparatively unaware of engaging in approximation. I conclude ‘I believe’—guarded affirmations either show the Same Norm View to be false or must be recognised as such an interestingly distinctive form of merely approximately correct speech. (shrink)

I question Brentano's thesis that all and only mental phenomena are intentional. The common gloss on intentionality in terms of directedness does not justify the claim that intentionality is sufficient for mentality. One response to this problem is to lay down further requirements for intentionality. For example, it may be said that we have intentionality only where we have such phenomena as failure of substitution or existential presupposition. I consider a variety of such requirements for intentionality. I argue they either (...) fail to exclude all non-mental phenomena or are so demanding that they ground new, serious challenges to the claim that qualitative states of mind are intentional. (shrink)

Emotions, like actions, this paper argues, are typically embodied processes that are responsive to reasons, where these reasons connect closely with the agent’s desires, intentions, or projects. If so, why are emotions, nevertheless, typically passive in a sense in which actions are not; specifically, why are emotions not cases of doing something intentionally? This paper seeks to prepare the ground for answering this question by showing that it cannot be answered within a widely influential framework in the philosophy of action (...) that has been dubbed the Standard Conception of Action, shared by such diverse theorists as G.E.M. Anscombe, Donald Davidson, Jennifer Hornsby, Michael Smith. and Michael Thompson. The Standard Conception approaches agency via the notion of someone’s doing something intentionally, and links the latter notion closely to that of doing something for a reason, so as to imply ‘Anscombe’s Thesis’ that, if someone is doing something for a reason, they are doing it intentionally. The paper shows how emotions, as reason-responsive embodied processes, counterexemplify this claim. Qua processes, they can aptly be described in the progressive, as cases of trembling with fear, exploding with anger, etc. They are a kind of ‘doing’ something, for a reason, yet not intentionally. (shrink)

The paper addresses the phenomenology of inference. It proposes that the conscious character of conscious inferences is partly constituted by a sense of meaning; specifically, a sense of what Grice called ‘natural meaning’. In consciously drawing the (outright, categorical) conclusion that Q from a presumed fact that P, one senses the presumed fact that P as meaning that Q, where ‘meaning that’ expresses natural meaning. This sense of natural meaning is phenomenologically analogous, I suggest, to our sense of what is (...) said in fluently comprehending everyday utterances in our first language. The proposal that conscious inference involves a sense of natural meaning is compared with views according to which conscious inference involves taking the premises (i) to be good reasons for the conclusion (as defended by Thomson and Grice), (ii) to support it (as argued by Audi and, recently, Boghossian), or (iii) to imply it (as lately contended by Broome). I argue our proposal can explain certain phenomena handled by alternatives (i) and (ii), but that some further phenomena is handled by our account but not these alternatives. In relation to alternative (iii), I argue that, in so far as implicational and natural-meaning relations come apart, the latter are a better fit for what we sense or take to be so in conscious inference. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 4, May 2020, Page 25-27.

Inference has long been a concern in epistemology, as an essential means by which we extend our knowledge and test our beliefs. Inference is also a key notion in influential psychological or philosophical accounts of mental capacities, from perception via utterance comprehension to problem-solving. Consciousness, on the other hand, has arguably been the defining interest of philosophy of mind over recent decades. Comparatively little attention, however, has been devoted to the significance of consciousness for the proper understanding of the nature (...) and role of inference. It is commonly suggested that inference may be either conscious or unconscious. Yet how unified are these various supposed instances of inference? Does either enjoy explanatory priority in relation to the other? In what ways or senses, can an inference be conscious, or fail to be conscious, and how does this matter? This book brings together original essays from established scholars and emerging theorists that illustrate how several current debates in epistemology, philosophy of psychology, and philosophy of mind can benefit from reflections on these and related questions about the significance of consciousness for inference. Contributors include: Kirk Ludwig and Wade Munroe; Michael Rescorla; Federico Bongiorno and Lisa Bortolotti; Berit Brogaard; Nicholas Allott; Jake Quilty-Dunn and Eric Mandelbaum; Corine Besson; Anders Nes; David Henderson, Terry Horgan, and Matjaž Potrč; Elijah Chudnoff; and Ram Neta. (shrink)

The existence of a topological double-covering for the GL(n, R) and diffeomorphism groups is reviewed. These groups do not have finite-dimensional faithful representations. An explicit construction and the classification of all\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $$\overline {SL} $$ \end{document}(n, R), n=3,4 unitary irreducible representations is presented. Infinite-component spinorial and tensorial\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $$\overline {SL} $$ \end{document} fields, “manifields”, are introduced. Particle content of the ladder manifields, as given by (...) the\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $$\overline {SL} $$ \end{document}(3, R) “little” group, is determined. The manifields are lifted to the corresponding world spinorial and tensorial manifields by making use of generalized infinite-component frame fields. World manifields transform w.r.t. corresponding\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $$\overline {Diff} $$ \end{document} representations, which are constructed explicitly. (shrink)

It is often supposed one can draw a distinction, among the assumptions on which an inference rests, between certain background assumptions and certain more salient, or foregrounded, assumptions. Yet what may such a fore-v-background structure, or such structures, consist it? In particular, how do they relate to consciousness? According to a ‘Boring View’, such structures can be captured by specifying, for the various assumptions of the inference, whether they are phenomenally conscious, or access conscious, or else how easily available they (...) are to such consciousness. According to an ‘Interesting View’, there are fore-v-background structures over and above such classifications. The chapter gestures at reasons for thinking that an Interesting View at least merits exploration. The paper discusses some recent contributions to such a view in analytical philosophy; some remarks in Husserl on what he dubbed the horizonal dimension of acts of consciousness; and psychological work on the role of gist or schema representations in perception and memory. It is proposed that background assumptions can figure in consciousness by being as it were condensed into a consciously, though inattentively, entertained notion of their overall thematic gist, where this thematic gist gives the drift of a possible elucidation of how or why such-and-such salient grounds mean that so-and-so conclusion holds. (shrink)

Many views of utterance comprehension agree that understanding an utterance involves knowing, believing, perceiving, or, anyhow, mentally representing the utterance to mean such-and-such. They include cognitivist as well as many perceptualist views; I give them the generic label ‘representationalist’. Representationalist views have been criticized for placing an undue metasemantic demand on utterance comprehension, viz. that speakers be able to represent meaning as meaning. Critics have adverted to young speakers, say about the age of three, who do comprehend many utterances but (...) may be rather limited in their abilities to think about meaning as such, to cast doubt on this demand. This paper motivates representationalism, examines what the balance of developmental evidence and arguments shows, and identifies options for a representationalist response. Though there is some evidence that three-year-olds have limited abilities to think about meaning as such, they may yet turn out to have a concept of meaning, or at least some proto-semantic concept. Moreover, even if they lack any such concept, there is, I propose, a way of developing representationalism, drawing inspiration from Davidson’s paratactic view of indirect speech reports, on which meaning can be non-conceptually represented. Independently of developmental considerations, this paratactic-style proposal is of interest to friends of a perceptualist view of comprehension. (shrink)

Dans cet ouvrage, Bruno Deschênes met en parallèle la pensée musicale européenne et la pensée esthétique japonaise, une rencontre philosophique par laquelle il propose par transpropriation comment cette pensée venant d'Asie permettrait aux mélomanes d'approfondir leur appréciation de toute musique quelle qu'elle soit. Il présente divers aspects de l'esthétique japonaise qui sont ignorés, à tout le moins jugés périphériques, dans la pensée européenne et qui, pourtant, sont inhérents à l'écoute de toute musique. Ouvrage écrit au départ du point de vue (...) du musicien, l'auteur met en contexte le rôle de l'interprète dans son rapport à un auditeur qui est à la recherche d'un sentiment esthétique vécu dans l'instant même d'une écoute tributaire de l'exécution musicale. L'écoute musicale est, selon lui, une relation visant une expérience esthétique commune. L'auditeur va à la rencontre d'une musique et du musicien, alors que ce dernier va à la rencontre de cette même musique pour l'enchantement de ses admirateurs. Tous deux convoitent un sentiment esthétique vécu mutuellement le temps d'une rencontre que l'auteur qualifie de musicale."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Sufismus, das Innere, und saria, das Aussere des Islams stellen die beiden Grundpfeiler der Lebensweise des Menschen im Islam dar. Ob der Sufismus jedoch ein rein islamisches Phanomen ist, wurde von vielen Gelehrten diskutiert. Al-Gazali stellte in dieser Diskussion einen bedeutenden Wendepunkt dar. Er deutet den Sufismus als das Aufbauen einer liebevollen und harmonischen Beziehung zu sich selbst, seinem Umfeld und seinem Schopfer. Merdan Gunes geht in seiner Dissertation auf die Entstehung und Entwicklung des Sufismus ein, stellt dabei al-Gazalis Sufismus-Verstandnis (...) dar und erortert die Bedingungen und Gegebenheiten, die auf al-Gazali wirkten. Abschliessend hebt er dessen Einfluss auf den Sufismus im Islam, aber auch auf das Judentum und Christentum hervor, und setzt ihn in Beziehung zu den Philosophen Augustinus, Descartes, Pascal, Spinoza und Erich Fromm. (shrink)

Las paradojas socráticas y la utilidad de la filosofía en la construcción del hombre.--El clima religioso de lo espiritual en el Fedón.--La actividad de lo espiritual según el Fedón.--El papel del cuerpo en la antropología platónica.--El cuerpo del hombre según el Timeo.

Das vorliegende Werk stellt eine Einführung in die ethisch-politischen Konzepte der islamischen Theologie dar, so wie sich diese aus den religiösen Primärquellen ableiten lassen. Eine sich hieraus ergebende "islamische Politik" fusst dabei auf dem Grundsatz der sozialen Gerechtigkeit, die sich von der göttlichen Gerechtigkeit ausgehend in allen Sphären zwischenmenschlicher und sozialer Beziehungen, bis hin zur politischen Ordnung manifestieren sollte, um den Anspruch einer theologisch legitimierten Form der Politik erfüllen zu können. Dabei hat es historisch betrachtet verschiedene Ausformungen und Umsetzungen, abhängig (...) von den jeweiligen Faktoren, wie kulturelle Identität und geographische Lage gegeben. (shrink)

Considers two of the most fundamental realities of life: love and the human person. While both are ultimately related, the author treats of them individually so that we may understand them more deeply. Departing from the most evident examples -- mother and child, friends, and lovers -- the author shows that love consists essential of a will to promotion and, hopefully, to mutual promotion. Thus, love is viewed from within the person himself and from within the relationship that exists between (...) two people. Depending on the people involved, such love can range from egoism and deceit to the wholehearted giving of self to another. (shrink)

It's time to engage with human society as a society. It seems that the individualistic age in which we live has exhausted itself. It is time to take a collective mental account of the way we live, the relationship between people and society, and what social structure we need." "The importance of human society, and offers various suggestions for improving the existing social structure, while emphasizing the failures in the economy related to the existing socio-economic system, which led to the (...) recent economic crisis. The book is intended to stimulate thought on social issues. - translation from the back cover. (shrink)

Many studies have attempted to identify measures that predict reading abilities. The results of these studies may be inclined to over-identification of children considered at risk in kindergarten but who achieve parity in reading by the end of first grade. Therefore, the current study sought to analyze the specific cognitive and linguistic predictors of reading accuracy and reading speed separately. Additionally, the study examined if it is possible to use empirically validated measures to distinguish between children who are not ready (...) to learn how to read in kindergarten but manage to acquire reading skills by the end of first grade, and those who continue to exhibit difficulties. The study followed 98 kindergarteners aged 4 years 10 months to six years from three different schools, who were taught how to read in kindergarten. Multiple measures of general cognitive skills, linguistic abilities, and reading abilities were measured at three different points in time: the beginning of kindergarten, the end of kindergarten, and the end of first grade. The study found that most of the children with good literacy and cognitive abilities learned how to read by the end of kindergarten. The analysis revealed a significant difference in cognitive abilities, such as executive functions and memory, which distinguished between the ability to acquire fluent reading and accurate reading. The study was able to successfully distinguish between “children with difficulties” and “un-ready” children. These results have various implications, especially in regard to the identification of and intervention with kindergarten children at risk for reading disabilities. (shrink)