Laura Nader is a towering figure as anthropologist, teacher, and public intellectual. Her letters give a glimpse of academic life mostly unseen by academics and by the general public. The collection includes letters from academic colleagues, but it also contains correspondence from lawyers, politicians, citizens, people on death row, Peace Corps workers, members of the military, scientists, and more.

Naked Science is about contested domains and includes different science cultures: physics, molecular biology, primatology, immunology, ecology, medical environmental, mathematical and navigational domains. While the volume rests on the assumption that science is not autonomous, the book is distinguished by its global perspective. Examining knowledge systems within a planetary frame forces thinking about boundaries that silence or affect knowledge-building. Consideration of ethnoscience and technoscience research within a common framework is overdue for raising questions about deeply held beliefs and assumptions we (...) all carry about scientific knowledge. We need a perspective on how to regard different science traditions because public controversies should not be about a glorified science or a despicable science. Contributors are: Ward Goodenough, Eloisa and Brent Berlin, Colin Scott, Jean Lave, Emily Martin, Troy Duster, Hugh Gusterson, Charles Schwartz, Joan Fujimura, Sharon Traweek, Estellie Smith, Ellen Bielawaski, David Jacobon, Charles Ziegler, Pamela Asquith. (shrink)

This paper expands Rami Ali’s dissolution of the gamer’s dilemma (Ethics Inf Technol 17:267-274, 2015). Morgan Luck’s gamer’s dilemma (Ethics Inf Technol 11(1):31-36, 2009) rests on our having diverging intuition when considering virtual murder and virtual child molestation in video games. Virtual murder is seemingly permissible, when virtual child molestation is not and there is no obvious morally relevant difference between the two. Ali argues that virtual murder and virtual child molestation are equally permissible/impermissible when considered under different modes of (...) engagement. To this end, Ali distinguishes between story-telling gameplay and simulation games, discussing both in depth. I build on the dissolution by looking into competitive gameplay in order to consider what the morally relevant difference between virtual murder and virtual child molestation might be when competing in a video game. I argue that when competitors consent to participate in a competition, the rules of the competition supersede everyday moral intuitions. As such, virtual competitions ought to represent such consent from virtual characters. Virtual children cannot be represented as giving consent to be molested because (1) children cannot be represented as giving sexual consent, and (2) consent to be possibly molested cannot be given. This creates a morally relevant difference between murder and molestation. By fully addressing competitive gameplay, I answer Luck’s worry that Ali’s dissolution is incomplete (Ethics Inf Technol 20:157-162, 2018). (shrink)

I argue that from a very weak recombination principle and plausible assumptions about the nature of parthood and location it follows that it's possible that the mereological structure of the material world and that of spacetime fail to correspond to one another in very radical ways. I defend, moreover, that rejecting the possibility of such failures of correspondence leaves us with a choice of equally radical alternatives. I also discuss a few ways in which their possibility is relevant to various (...) debates in metaphysics. (shrink)

The idea that logic is in some sense normative for thought and reasoning is a familiar one. Some of the most prominent figures in the history of philosophy including Kant and Frege have been among its defenders. The most natural way of spelling out this idea is to formulate wide-scope deductive requirements on belief which rule out certain states as irrational. But what can account for the truth of such deductive requirements of rationality? By far, the most prominent responses draw (...) in one way or another on the idea that belief aims at the truth. In this paper, I consider two ways of making this line of thought more precise and I argue that they both fail. In particular, I examine a recent attempt by Epistemic Utility Theory to give a veritist account of deductive coherence requirements. I argue that despite its proponents’ best efforts, Epistemic Utility Theory cannot vindicate such requirements. (shrink)

In this paper, I will argue that Kant provides us with a plausible account of morality. To show that, I will first offer a major criticism of Kantian moral theory, by explaining Bernard Williams’ charge against it. I will explore his understanding of the Kantian theory, and then explain what he finds objectionable about it. This criticism will make up the first part of the paper. In the second part, I will attempt to defend the Kantian theory by appealing to (...) Christine Korsgaard’s alternative reading. This reading, I will argue, accommodates Williams’ worries and avoids the charge altogether. Finally, I will attempt to show that in avoiding Williams’ charge, this alternative reading does not lose sight of the greater task it claims to undertake, namely being a plausible account of morality. (shrink)

Conspiracy theories are spreading faster than ever and pose a real danger to our societies. It is natural to accuse the consumers of conspiracy theories of irrationality – that they are either not looking at or appropriately sensitive to all the available evidence. In this paper, I attempt to determine if we can make sense of this general idea. I argue that we cannot: conspiracy theories do not spread because the people who believe them are irrational – at least, not (...) necessarily so. In addition, I explore some alternative strategies for responding to the problem of the spread of conspiracy theories. I argue that in addition to confrontational strategies such as social shaming, we need more constructive programs of community activism to battle the spread of conspiracy theories. (shrink)

Page 1. Economics and Philosophy, 26 291--320 Copyright C Cambridge University Press doi: 10.1017 / S0266267110000386 TWO KINDS OF WE-REASONING RAUL HAKLI, KAARLO MILLER AND RAIMO TUOMELA University of Helsinki.

We have examined the attitude and moral perception of 228 college students towards artificial intelligence in an international university in Japan. The students were asked to select a single most significant ethical issue associated with AI in the future from a list of nine ethical issues suggested by the World Economic Forum, and to explain why they believed that their chosen issues were most important. The majority of students chose unemployment as the major ethical issue related to AI. The second (...) largest group of students were concerned with ethical issues related to emotional AI, including the impact of AI on human behavior and emotion. The paper discusses the results in detail and concludes that, while policymakers must consider how to ameliorate the impact of AI on employment, AI engineers need to consider the emotional aspects of AI in research and development, as well. (shrink)

Conspiracy theories pose a serious threat to our society these days. People often dismiss conspiracy theory believers as at best gullible, or more often unintelligent. However, there are cases in which individuals end up believing conspiracy theories out of no epistemic fault of their own. In this paper, I want to offer a diagnosis of the problem by focusing on the genealogy of the conspiracy theory beliefs. Drawing on a novel interpretation of Nietzsche’s use of genealogies, I argue that the (...) problem of belief in conspiracy theories is best understood as a broadly political one regarding the oppressive, dominating, and exploitative world in which conspiracy theory believers find themselves in. I, then, draw on the work of the feminist philosopher, María Lugones, to offer an approach to addressing the problem of belief in conspiracy theories which recommends radical humility and playfulness. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence is becoming part of our everyday experience and is expected to be ever more integrated into ordinary life for many years to come. Thus, it is important for those in product development, research, and public policy to understand how the public’s perception of AI is shaped. In this study, we conducted focus groups and an online survey to determine the knowledge of AI held by the American public, and to judge whether entertainment media is a major influence on (...) how Americans perceive AI. What we found is that the American public’s knowledge of AI is patchy: some have a good understanding of what is and what is not AI, but many do not. When it came to understanding what AI can do, most respondents believe that AI could “replace human jobs” but few thought that it could “feel emotion.” Most respondents were optimistic about the future and impact of AI, though about one third were not sure. Most respondents also did not think they could develop an emotional bond with or be comfortable being provided care by an AI. Regarding the influence of entertainment media on perceptions of AI, we found a significant relationship between people’s beliefs about AI in entertainment media and their beliefs about AI in reality. Those who believe AI is realistically depicted in entertainment media were more likely to see AIs as potential emotional partners or apocalyptic robots than to imagine AIs taking over jobs or operating as surveillance tools. (shrink)

In the past few decades, ‘postmodern philosophers’ have leveled severe and sustained criticisms against “the Tradition.” They have radically put in question and undermined our traditional conceptions of Philosophy, its tasks and goals, claims and pretensions, methods and methodologies, its public image and selfimage.In short, everything that Philosophers once held dear, and that some still hold dear today, moved as they are by a quest for Certainty and nostalgia for the Absolute. As a result, many have come to view these (...) radical, postmodern criticisms as having brought on the “End of Philosophy.” If this is so, what is to be done? Where do we go from here? What are our real options? What is there left for Philosophers to do, if anything, that is worthwhile and meaningful? Do we simply accept ‘the postmodernists’ verdict,’ and simply take up whatever they have proposed to replace Philosophy? Or do we boldly and imaginatively consider an alternative? In my essay, I sketch out a 10-points proposal for a ‘philosophy’ –after the end of Philosophy—which, I contend, can only be a new kind of CriticalTheory. (shrink)

Habermas' theory of practical rationality is a significant theoretical attempt to preserve both rationality and democracy at the level of political decision making that transcends both technocratic and decisionistic theories of rationality. Habermas' theory of rationality accords with his epistemological, sociological, psychological, and linguistic premises. His theory, however, overlooks the interactions between instrumental action and symbolic interaction, the relevance of professional knowledge of facts for the choice of ends, the conflict between the norms of efficiency and democracy, and the duality (...) of subject and object in historical formation. The rational interest in reproduction of free communication, however, can be used to reformulate Habermas' theory of rationality. (shrink)

Let be a uniform space with its uniformity generated by a set of pseudo-metrics Γ. Let the symbol ≃ denote the usual infinitesimal relation on *X , and define a new infinitesimal relation ≈ on *X by writing x ≈ y whenever *ϱ ≃ *ϱ for each ϱ ∈ Γ and each p ∈ X . We call an S-space if the relations ≃ and ≈ coincide on fin. S -spaces are interesting because their nonstandard hulls have representations within Nelson's (...) internal set theory . This was shown in [1], where it was also observed that the class of uniform spaces that have invariant nonstandard hulls is contained in the class of S -spaces. The question of whether there are S -spaces that do not have invariant nonstandard hulls was left open in [1]. In this note we show that when the uniformity of an S -space is given by a single pseudometric, the space has invariant nonstandard hulls. (shrink)

The study aimed to identify the knowledge management processes and their role in achieving competitive advantage at Al-Quds Open University. The study was based on the descriptive analytical method, and the study population consists of academic and administrative staff in each of the branches of Al-Quds Open University in (Tulkarm, Nablus and Jenin). The researchers selected a sample of the study population by the intentional non-probability method, the size of (70) employees. A questionnaire was prepared and supervised by a number (...) of specialists in order to obtain the results of the study. The study concluded that there is a positive direct relationship, that is, the higher the degree of application of knowledge management processes, the greater the degree of competitive advantage. Knowledge Technology came first with a score of 80.02% on all items. Competitive advantage came second with 81.74%. In the third place came "knowledge generation" where the total score on all paragraphs in this area (78.24%). In the fourth place, "knowledge transfer" (77.21%). "Developing and storing knowledge" came in fifth place (77.13%). "Acquisition of knowledge" came in sixth place (76.45%). Knowledge Organization ranked seventh (74.26%). The study recommended that the university should enable the employees to benefit from the experiences and expertise available to help generate knowledge. The University encourages the creation of knowledge through the system of incentives and open the way for creators to apply their creations and spread and invest in excellence and creativity. The university should design work performance levels based on the integration of knowledge and organize it according to policies that support freedom of research. The need for Palestinian universities to adopt a knowledge management approach. The need to adopt a system of incentives that rewards cognitive efforts, and give workers enough freedom to enable them to apply their knowledge. (shrink)

I give shape to a neglected debate in metaphysics, the debate over the ontological priority between individuality and collectivity. I distinguish the debate from more familiar ones in the recent literature and articulate what I call ontological collectivism, the view that collectivity is prior to individuality. I defend the in-principle intelligibility of the view from forceful general objections and argue that not only is it coherent but also of significant interest to the literature: it allows for overlooked alternatives on a (...) variety of central discussions. (shrink)

Various sources in the literature claim that the deduction theorem does not hold for normal modal or epistemic logic, whereas others present versions of the deduction theorem for several normal modal systems. It is shown here that the apparent problem arises from an objectionable notion of derivability from assumptions in an axiomatic system. When a traditional Hilbert-type system of axiomatic logic is generalized into a system for derivations from assumptions, the necessitation rule has to be modified in a way that (...) restricts its use to cases in which the premiss does not depend on assumptions. This restriction is entirely analogous to the restriction of the rule of universal generalization of first-order logic. A necessitation rule with this restriction permits a proof of the deduction theorem in its usual formulation. Other suggestions presented in the literature to deal with the problem are reviewed, and the present solution is argued to be preferable to the other alternatives. A contraction-and cut-free sequent calculus equivalent to the Hubert system for basic modal logic shows the standard failure argument untenable by proving the underivability of DA from A. (shrink)

This chapter argues that from a particularly weak recombination principle and plausible assumptions about the nature of parthood and location, it follows that it is possible that the mereological structure of the material world and that of space-time fail to correspond to one another in very radical ways. The chapter suggests, moreover, that rejecting the possibility of such failures of correspondence leaves us with a choice of no less unappealing alternatives. It also discusses a few ways in which their possibility (...) is relevant to various important debates in metaphysics. (shrink)

We study whether robots can satisfy the conditions of an agent fit to be held morally responsible, with a focus on autonomy and self-control. An analogy between robots and human groups enables us to modify arguments concerning collective responsibility for studying questions of robot responsibility. We employ Mele’s history-sensitive account of autonomy and responsibility to argue that even if robots were to have all the capacities required of moral agency, their history would deprive them from autonomy in a responsibility-undermining way. (...) We will also study whether humans and technological artifacts like robots can form hybrid collective agents that could be morally responsible for their actions and give an argument against such a possibility. (shrink)

The impact of social media influencers (SMIs) on brand-related outcomes has been well researched, yet whether this influence also impacts political participation and what role the relationship between SMIs and their audiences play has not been sufficiently examined to date. Basing this study on the Balance Model, I investigated the potential of an unlikely vs. a likely source and the role of similarity with a SMI based on a shared topic interest to elicit the intention for political action in an (...) experimental study (n = 222). The perceived similarity with the SMI was examined as a mediator and the role of the shared topic interest with the SMI as a potential moderator. The results indicate that a likely source for political information generated a greater topic fit. The perceived similarity with the source depended on the shared topic interest between the source and the participants. This is a key finding, as perceived similarity with the source in turn predicted the intention to take political action, which positively activated participants who shared the topic interest of the unlikely source even if they did not indicate a topic interest in politics. Thus, a shared interest with a SMI might make even those not interested in politics more open to political participation. (shrink)

Considerando que el transhumanismo es una particular deriva de la reflexión contemporánea, que sostiene la idea de que el actual estado de la humanidad no es el definitivo sino uno simplemente transitorio, que puede y debe ser intervenido tecnocientíficamente en procura de su mejoramiento, en este artículo se examinan las implicancias bioéticas y biopolíticas de tal presupuesto. Se atiende para ello a las complejas y dilemáticas circunstancias derivadas de la perspectiva transhumana, que están vinculadas con la probable trasgresión de los (...) derechos de las personas presentes o futuras y el eventual control absoluto de la vida como el que algunos de sus detractores afirman que inevitablemente se generaría a partir de semejante tipo de intervenciones biotecnológicas. Se intentará indagar críticamente en el ideario del transhumanismo tomando como referencia para el análisis la articulación indisoluble que en la modernidad se ha establecido entre el desarrollo de las tecnologías y aquella racionalidad política que sustenta las estrategias de la gubernamentalidad neoliberal. Se espera plantear con ello una inquietud y un conjunto de interrogantes respecto de los riesgos asociados a los modos hasta hora insospechados de producción, administración y control biopolítico de la subjetividad que podrían estar ligados inadvertidamente a la idea transhumanista. (shrink)

Reductive Evidentialism seeks to explain away all structural requirements of rationality – including norms of logical coherence – in terms of substantive norms of rationality, i.e., responsiveness to evidence. While this view constitutes a novel take on the source of the normativity of logic, I argue that it faces serious difficulties. My argument, in a nutshell, is that, on the assumption that individuals with the same evidence can have different rational responses (interpersonal permissivism), the view lacks the resources to maintain (...) its central tenant that an individual’s body of evidence cannot make it rationally permissible for the individual to believe logical inconsistencies (intrapersonal non-permissivism). (shrink)

This article shows how Arab students at an Arab college in Israel, majoring in teaching of mathematics, English, and science, rely on metaphor as an important rhetorical tool for the advancement of their ideological positions and for criticism of the policies of the Israeli government, which discriminates against and disenfranchises Arab Israelis. The underlying hypothesis of the article is that the way Arab students in Israel use metaphor in their writing has unique rhetorical aspects that help to sharpen their message (...) in pursuit of the broader goal of emphasizing Arab Israelis’ suffering and changing for the better the Israeli government’s discriminatory patterns of action against them. (shrink)

Habermas' theory of practical rationality is a significant theoretical attempt to preserve both rationality and democracy at the level of political decision making that transcends both technocratic and decisionistic theories of rationality. Habermas' theory of rationality accords with his epistemological, sociological, psychological, and linguistic premises. His theory, however, overlooks the interactions between instrumental action and symbolic interaction, the relevance of professional knowledge of facts for the choice of ends, the conflict between the norms of efficiency and democracy, and the duality (...) of subject and object in historical formation. The rational interest in reproduction of free communication, however, can be used to reformulate Habermas' theory of rationality. (shrink)

Let ( * X, * T) be the nonstandard extension of a Hausdorff space (X, T). After Wattenberg [6], the monad m(x) of a near-standard point x in * X is defined as m(x) = μ T (st(x)). Consider the relation $R_{\mathrm{ns}} = \{\langle x, y \rangle \mid x, y \in \mathrm{ns} (^\ast X) \text{and} y \in m(x)\}.$ Frank Wattenberg in [6] and [7] investigated the possibilities of extending the domain of R ns to the whole of * X. Wattenberg's (...) extensions of R ns were required to be equivalence relations, among other things. Because the nontrivial ways of constructing such extensions usually produce monadic relations, the said condition practically limits (to completely regular spaces) the class of spaces for which such extensions are possible. Since symmetry and transitivity are not, after all, characteristics of the kind of nearness that is obtained in a general topological space, it may be expected that if these two requirements are relaxed, then a monadic extension of R ns to * X should be possible in any topological space. A study of such extensions of R ns is the purpose of the present paper. We call a binary relation $W \subseteq ^\ast X \times ^\ast X$ an infinitesimal on * X if it is monadic and reflexive on * X. We prove, among other things, that the existence of an infinitesimal on * X that extends R ns is equivalent to the condition that the space (X, T) be regular. (shrink)

Epistemic justification of non-summative group beliefs is studied in this paper. Such group beliefs are understood to be voluntary acceptances, the justification of which differs from that of involuntary beliefs. It is argued that whereas epistemic evaluation of involuntary beliefs can be seen not to require reasons, justification of voluntary acceptance of a proposition as true requires that the agent, a group or an individual, can provide reasons for the accepted view. This basic idea is studied in relation to theories (...) of dialectical justification in which justification is taken to require ability to justify. Since the reasons offered can in principle always be challenged, there is no ultimate end to the dialectical chain of justification. This makes justification of acceptance, and thus group belief, social and, in a way, contextual, but this does not seem to entail strong forms of epistemic relativism. (shrink)

I will study the concept of solidarity by looking at patterns of practical reasoning leading to behaviour that can be taken to exemplify solidarity. By studying which kinds of premisses are necessary for taking the motivation to display solidarity, in contrast to altruistic or moral motivation, I try to find necessary conditions for solidarity. I will argue that practical reasoning leading to solidary behaviour is a form of we-reasoning in which some of the premisses are in first person plural form (...) and attribute actions or attitudes to a collective. If this is correct, solidarity is a group concept, and intentional solidary behaviour presupposes identification with a group where others have shared goals or interests. This distinguishes solidary motivation and behaviour from altruistic or moral motivation and behaviour. (shrink)

This article is intended to advance conceptual clarity on the topic of secularism in Muslim societies. It seeks to uncover unique historical developments that have influenced and shaped debate on this topic. In the first part, a distinction is made between the different social scientific categories of secularism, focusing on the philosophical, sociological and political dimensions of secularism. The second section provides a broad overview of the different histories of political secularism, and focuses on the two dominant models that have (...) been bequeathed to us from the Western tradition of political thought: Anglo-American secularism and French secularism (laïcité). In the final section, the political history of Muslim societies is briefly explored with the goal of providing a tentative answer to the question: historically, why did political secularism not emerge in Muslim societies? (shrink)

Endorsing the idea of group knowledge seems to entail the possibility of group belief as well, because it is usually held that knowledge entails belief. It is here studied whether it would be possible to grant that groups can have knowledge without being committed to the controversial view that groups can have beliefs. The answer is positive on the assumption that knowledge can be based on acceptance as well as belief. The distinction between belief and acceptance can be seen as (...) a refinement of the ordinary language concept of belief, and it may be useful in understanding the nature of epistemic justification and classifying various types of epistemic subjects. (shrink)

Emotions play a significant role in human relations, decision-making, and the motivation to act on those decisions. There are ongoing attempts to use artificial intelligence (AI) to read human emotions, and to predict human behavior or actions that may follow those emotions. However, a person’s emotions cannot be easily identified, measured, and evaluated by others, including automated machines and algorithms run by AI. The ethics of emotional AI is under research and this study has examined the emotional variables as well (...) as the perception of emotional AI in two large random groups of college students in an international university in Japan, with a heavy representation of Japanese, Indonesian, Korean, Chinese, Thai, Vietnamese, and other Asian nationalities. Surveys with multiple close-ended questions and an open-ended essay question regarding emotional AI were administered for quantitative and qualitative analysis, respectively. The results demonstrate how ethically questionable results may be obtained through affective computing and by searching for correlations in a variety of factors in collected data to classify individuals into certain categories and thus aggravate bias and discrimination. Nevertheless, the qualitative study of students’ essays shows a rather optimistic view over the use of emotional AI, which helps underscore the need to increase awareness about the ethical pitfalls of AI technologies in the complex field of human emotions. (shrink)

Resumen: En el presente artículo se propone una revisión de carácter descriptivo respecto a distintos momentos en los que el llamado giro semiótico de las ciencias sociales colinda con algunas categorías epistémicas fundamentales para la construcción de un proceso consciente de acercamiento a lo social. Así, la realidad como constructo discursivo, el carácter semiótico-perceptual de la observación, los procesos de transcodificación entre doxa y episteme o el peso estructural de la disciplina, serán los ejes fundamentales planteados para esta relación. A (...) partir de este planteamiento, se proponen como criterios de integración semiótico-epistémica dos paradigmas claves en la construcción de un proceso de investigación cualitativa: la adopción de estructuras interdisciplinarias y el enfoque de la complejidad, que permiten problematizar las categorías anteriores, integrándolas como elementos fundamentales en la organización social del sentido.: The present article proposes a descriptive review of those moments in which the social sciences semiotic turn borders with some epistemic categories that results fundamental for the construction of a conscious approach to the social. Thus, the reality as a discursive construct, the semiotic character of observation, the transcoding process between doxa and episteme, or the structural wealth of discipline will be presented as fundamental axes to this relationship. Based on this approach, there are proposed as semiotic-epistemic integration judgements, two fundamental keys in the construction of a qualitative research process: the adoption of interdisciplinary structures, and the complexity perspective that allows to problematize the previous categories, integrating them as fundamental elements in the social meaning organization. (shrink)

This paper briefly examines the topic of business ethics and attempts to suggest a code of ethics for multinational firms. While most companies have basic policies on employee integrity, confidentiality and sexual harassment, relatively few have established policies regarding bribery, exploitive child labor, human rights violations and other issues they may encounter in the global market place (Drake, 1998). Until recently, very few companies had truly global operations. Consequently little attention was paid to the issue of ethical guidelines in a (...) global context. Recent changes in international markets have led to an explosion of corporations with global operations, and the need for a global code of ethics has grown commensurately. In this paper we explore the issue of global business ethics and attempt to provide a framework for future discussion. We also examine some of the unique difficulties surrounding the development of any set of global business standards. Key among these difficulties is the issue of competing ethical values in home and host countries. (shrink)

The relationship between religion and politics is a bone of political contention and a source of deep confusion across the Islam–West divide. When most western liberals cast their gaze on Muslim societies today, what they see is deeply disconcerting. From their perspective there is simply too much religion in public life in the Arab-Islamic world, which raises serious questions for them about the prospects for democracy in this part of the world. This article critically explores the relationship between religion and (...) political legitimacy with a geographical and cultural focus on the Muslim Middle East. The broad historical question that shapes this inquiry is: Why is religion a source of political legitimacy in Muslim societies today while in the West, broadly speaking, religion is a source of disagreement and illegitimacy? (shrink)

Video games fictions are interactive: some of the content is set by the game designer and some is set by the player. However, philosophers disagree over how this interaction is reflected within the fictional content of video games. First, I will show that games and playthroughs are two distinct works of fiction with their associated fictional content. Second, I argue that players engage with both fictional works when playing a video game. They imagine the fictional truths associated with the game (...) and those associated with their playthrough. Thus, I defend what I will call a Dual-Work View of our engagement with video game fictions. To do so, I show that games have accessible fictional content, that games are distinctively incomplete fictions, and that players engage with this distinctive incompleteness. My goal is to offer a clear account of the fictional content of video games. (shrink)

In this essay, I explore ethical considerations that might arise from the use of collaborative filtering algorithms on dating apps. Collaborative filtering algorithms can predict the preferences of a target user by looking at the past behavior of similar users. By recommending products through this process, they can influence the news we read, the movies we watch, and more. They are extremely powerful and effective on platforms like Amazon and Google. Recommender systems on dating apps are likely to group people (...) by race, since they exhibit similar patterns of behavior: users on dating platforms seem to segregate themselves based on race, exclude certain races from romantic and sexual consideration, and generally show a preference for white men and women. As collaborative filtering algorithms learn from these patterns to predict preferences and build recommendations, they can homogenize the behavior of dating app users and exacerbate biased sexual and romantic behavior. (shrink)