Repeatedly and successfully, the celebrated Harvard philosopher Robert Nozick has reached out to a broad audience beyond the confines of his discipline, addressing ethical and social problems that matter to every thoughtful person. Here Nozick continues his search for the connections between philosophy and "ordinary" experience. In the lively and accessible style that his readers have come to expect, he offers a bold theory of rationality, the one characteristic deemed to fix humanity's "specialness." What are principles for? asks Nozick. (...) We could act simply on whim, or maximize our self-interest and recommend that others do the same. As Nozick explores rationality of decision and rationality of belief, he shows how principles actually function in our day-to-day thinking and in our efforts to live peacefully and productively with each other. Throughout, the book combines daring speculations with detailed investigations to portray the nature and status of rationality and the essential role that imagination plays in this singular human aptitude. (shrink)

The purpose of the present study is that of examining what I call Robert Nozick’s “evolutionist turn” in ethics. More specifically, my aim is to provide an answer to the following question: what type of ethical theory does Robert Nozick sketch in his last book, Invariances? My first objective will be that of delineating the philosophical framework which will accommodate my future discussion, highlighting the distinction between the metaphysical and scientific approaches to ethics as proposed by Ken Binmore, (...) but also Emanuel Socaciu's taxonomy of ethical theories, which stems from the particular way in which moral philosophers tackle the nature of ethical norms and moral motivation. I then set forth to show that, in the philosophical framework previously described, Robert Nozick's approach from Anarchy, State, and Utopia should be seen as a metaphysical one. The last and most important part of my study aims to show how Nozick's “evolutionist turn” took place and developed, from his perspective on rationality in The Nature of Rationality, to his ethical theory advanced in Invariances. (shrink)

Robert Nozick argues that the problem of the meaning of life is caused by limitations, especially death. Consequently, attaining meaning in one’s life requires connecting to something larger than oneself. Since anything can be conceived of as meaningless from a wide enough perspective, meaning will ultimately depend on connecting to “the unlimited.” Although initially plausible, this theory of meaning is vulnerable to a number of objections. One is that “the unlimited” is an incoherent notion due to the necessity that (...) it include ideas that are contradictory to each other, and another is that the meaning of life ought to include internal goods, which Nozick ignores. I will defend Nozick’s theory against these two objections by bringing in elements of the thought of Aristotle and St. Thomas. (shrink)

Nozick argues, in “Anarchy, State, and Utopia”, correctly I think, that we can go from an equal distribution of wealth to an unequal one through just means. Nozick then asks: If people voluntarily move from a just distribution of wealth, D1, to a different distribution, D2, “isn’t D2 also just?” While Nozick thinks the new distribution of wealth, D2, is just, I think that it is at least possible to go from a just state of affairs to an un-just state (...) of affairs by just means. I then argue that any unequal distribution of wealth can not maximize the good derived from wealth. Therefore, on the basis of plausible utilitarian ideas, any distribution of wealth that isn’t at least roughly equal is un-just, even it was arrived at by just means from aa equal and just distribution of wealth. (shrink)

Austrian economics - the school of thought associated with Carl Menger, Frederick von Weiser, Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk, and in this century, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, Murray N. Rothbard, and Israel Kirzner - is based on a framework of methodological principles and assumptions much at variance with those of traditional or 'orthodox' economists. Robert Nozick, in his 'On Austrian Methodology', focuses attention on the most fundamental features of this framework, and subjects them to a thoroughgoing and scathing analysis. Singled (...) out for detailed and critical review are: (1) the praxeological concepts of methodological individualism; (2) the claim that economics is an a priori science of human action; (3) the nature of preference and its relation to choice and action; and (4) the assumptions of time-preference theory. Although Nozick does not consider Austrian views on business cycles, market process analysis, the coordinative and informational effects of the price system, competition, and several other fundamental aspects of praxeology, his criticism strikes at the very root of the praxeological school. This paper attempts to refute each criticism made of the praxeological school by Nozick on a point-by-point basis. It thus follows the same pattern as the original paper, and scrutinizes in detail the arguments made by its author. (shrink)

Excerpts from Robert Nozick's "Invariances" Necessary truths are invariant across all possible worlds, contingent ones across only some.

In this paper, I will analyze and critically evaluate 20th century American philosopher Robert Nozick’s position regarding utilitarianism; how he refutes utilitarianism with reference to two new concepts called “Experience Machine” and “Utility Monster”. I will argue that if we were given the option of entering into an experience machine as Nozick presented in his book Anarchy State and Utopia, in which we can create a new better life for ourselves, then it would be irrational to refuse the option. (...) I will then reply to Nozick’s objection regarding utilitarianism within his concept of utility monster, where he argued that accepting the theory of utilitarianism causes the necessary acceptance of a utility monster, that is, the condition that some people would use this doctrine to justify the exploitation of others. I will argue here that giving “happy units” to weak utility monsters can bring about wonderful result. All my arguments are formed within utilitarian consequentialist framework. Philosophy and Progress, Vol#61-62; No#1-2; Jan-Dec 2017 P 165-176. (shrink)

This volume, which illustrates the originality, force, and scope of his work, also displays Nozick's trademark blending of extraordinary analytical rigor with ...

This study offers a ckomprehensive new interpretation of one of Plato's dialogues, the _Cratylus_. Throughout, the book combines analysis of Plato's arguments with attentiveness to his philosophical method.

An article in Norway's philosophyical journal on how the later works (espec. from 1989 onwards) of Robert Nozick is misread. He gradually turned away from his former extreme libertarianism (Anarchy, State, and Utropia 1974) towards a focus on "social ties" (1993) etc.

Presents Robert Nozick's Wilt Chamberlain argument in premise-conclusion form.

Robert Nozick’s oft-quoted review of Tom Regan’s The Case for Animal Rights levels a range of challenges to Regan’s philosophy. Many commentators have focussed on Nozick’s putative defence of speciesism, but this has led to them overlooking other aspects of the critique. In this paper, I draw attention to two. First is Nozick’s criticism of Regan’s political theory, which is best understood relative to Nozick’s libertarianism. Nozick’s challenge invites the possibility of a libertarian account of animal rights – which (...) is not as oxymoronic as it may first sound. Second is Nozick’s criticism of Regan’s axiological theory, which is best understood relative to Nozick’s own axiological inegalitarianism. While Nozick’s axiology has distasteful consequences, it should not be dismissed out-of-hand. Nozick’s challenges to Regan – and Nozick’s wider animal ethics – are rich and original, warranting attention from contemporary theorists for reasons beyond mere historical interest. (shrink)

Although best known for the hugely influential Anarchy, State and Utopia, Robert Nozick eschewed the label 'political philosopher' because the vast majority of his writings and attention have focused on other areas. Indeed the breadth of Nozick's work is perhaps greater than that of any other contemporary philosopher. This book is the first to give full and proper discussion of Nozick's philosophy as a whole, including his influential work on the theory of knowledge, his notion of 'tracking the truth', (...) his metaphysical writings on personal identity and free will, his evolutionary account of rationality, his varying treatments of Newcomb's paradox and his ideas on the meaning of life. Illuminating and informative, the book will be welcomed as an authoritative guide to Nozick's philosophical thinking. (shrink)

This paper argues against common views that at least in many cases Robert Nozick is not forced to deny common closure principles. More importantly, Nozick does not – despite first (and second) appearances and despite his own words – deny closure. On the contrary, he is defending a more sophisticated and complex principle of closure. This principle does remarkably well though it is not without problems. It is surprising how rarely Nozick’s principle of closure has been discussed. He should (...) be seen not so much as a denier of closure than as someone who’s proposing an alternative, more complex principle of closure. (shrink)

Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia is in large measure an ingenious elaboration of an argument for capitalism adumbrated by Plekhanov. The capitalism Nozick advocates is more pure than the one we know today. It lacks taxation for social welfare, and it permits degrees of inequality far greater than most apologists for contemporary bourgeois society would countenance. The present paper paper is only indirectly a critique of Nozick's defense of capitalism. Its immediate aim is to refute Nozick's major argument (...) against a rival of capitalism, socialism. The refutation vindicates socialism against that argument, but no one opposed to socialism on other grounds should expect to be converted by this paper. (shrink)

This article aims at giving insight into Norwegian mental health service by exploring the ideologies of two diametrical philosophers, the American Robert Nozick (1938–2002) and the German Axel Honneth (1949‐). Nozick proposes as an ideal a minimal state in which citizens have a “negative right” to the absence of interference and to follow their own interests without restriction from the state. On the other side, Axel Honneth claims that there is no freedom without state interference. In his view, governmental (...) involvement is understood as a prerequisite for personal freedom. We may call this state an opposite of the minimal state; a maximal state. To get a better understanding of these opposite philosophies, we use texts written from conversations with people suffering from mental health problems, nurses and other caregivers in four Norwegian municipalities. Nozick's notion of the minimal state and Honneth's political philosophy of freedom and recognition were used as analytical tools. Among patients and helpers, there were different opinions about good care and how much caregivers should intervene. Some emphasized autonomy, independency, minimal involvement in human contact by nurses and other caregivers, similar a minimal state. Others perceived good care as bonding between helpers and service‐users. They underlined equal and personal relationships, as well as helping with practicalities, similar a maximal state. In the discussion, we focus on how people with chronic illnesses are supposed to transform themselves into self‐cared individuals, able to manage their own condition successfully with minimal help from public welfare and at a lower cost. Finally, we express concerns about who will care for disempowered patients without family and other resources in a minimal state. (shrink)

In the longstanding debate between liberals and libertarians over the morality of redistributive labor taxation, liberals such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin have consistently taken the position that such taxation is perfectly compatible with individual liberty, whereas libertarians such as Robert Nozick and Murray Rothbard have adopted the (very) contrary position that such taxation is tantamount to slavery. In this paper, I argue that the debate over redistributive labor taxation can be usefully reconstituted as a debate over the (...) incidents (or components) of self-ownership, with liberals arguing for a narrow definition of the concept and libertarians arguing for a broad one. By using what Alan Ryan has called the “language of proprietorship,” I pinpoint precisely the source of the disagreement between liberals and libertarians and assess the relative strengths of their arguments. I also show that the respective definitions of self-ownership used by liberals and libertarians are deeply problematic—though for strikingly different reasons. (shrink)

Interpreters of Robert Nozick’s political philosophy fall into two broad groups concerning his application of the ‘Lockean proviso’. Some read his argument in an undemanding way: individual instances of ownership which make people worse off than they would have been in a world without any ownership are unjust. Others read the argument in a demanding way: individual instances of ownership which make people worse off than they would have been in a world without that particular ownership are unjust. While (...) I argue that the former reading is correct as an interpretive matter, I suggest that this reading is nonetheless highly demanding. In particular, I argue that it is demanding when it is expanded to include the protection of nonhuman animals; if such beings are right bearers, as more and more academics are beginning to suggest, then there is no nonarbitrary reason to exclude them from the protection of the proviso. (shrink)

Although best known for the hugely influential Anarchy, State and Utopia, Robert Nozick eschewed the label 'political philosopher' because the vast majority of his writings and attention have focused on other areas. Indeed the breadth of Nozick's work is perhaps greater than that of any other contemporary philosopher. This book is the first to give full and proper discussion of Nozick's philosophy as a whole, including his influential work on the theory of knowledge, his notion of 'tracking the truth', (...) his metaphysical writings on personal identity and free will, his evolutionary account of rationality, his varying treatments of Newcomb's paradox and his ideas on the meaning of life. Illuminating and informative, the book will be welcomed as an authoritative guide to Nozick's philosophical thinking. (shrink)

attempt to justify the State, or at least a minimal State confined to the functions of protection. Beginning with a free-market anarchist state of nature, Nozick portrays the State as emerging, by an invisible hand process that violates no one’s rights, first as a dominant protective agency, then to an "ultra-minimal state," and then finally to a minimal state. Before embarking on a detailed critique of the various Nozickian stages, let us consider several grave fallacies in Nozick’s conception itself, each (...) of which would in itself be sufficient.. (shrink)

Although the Libertarian Party has gained traction as the third biggest political party in the United States, the philosophical grounding of the party, which is exemplified by Robert Nozick’s entitlement theory is inherently flawed. Libertarianism’s emphasis on a free market leads to gross inequalities since it has no regard for sacred rights other than one’s right to freedom from interference from the government beyond what is essential for societal functioning. I argue that Nozick’s entitlement theory leads to indirect injustice (...) and is therefore an unfitting philosophical theory, which means that the Libertarian Party’s platform is flawed. (shrink)

Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) is recognised as a classic of modern political philosophy. Along with John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971), it is widely credited with breathing new life into the discipline in the second half of the twentieth century. This Companion presents a balanced and comprehensive assessment of Nozick's contribution to political philosophy. In engaging and accessible chapters, the contributors analyse Nozick's ideas from a variety of perspectives and explore neglected areas of the work (...) such as his discussion of anarchism and his theory of utopia. Their detailed and illuminating picture of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, its impact and its enduring influence will be invaluable to students and scholars in both political philosophy and political theory. (shrink)

When I first came across Robert Nozick′s Philosophical Explanations I was struck by the purity of his justification of punishment. Most latter-day retributivists are crypto-utilitarians, claiming to find some sort of benefit in penalties, even if it is only symbolic. Nozick too sees punishment as symbolic, but not as having any necessary utility. Paradoxically, perhaps, he is one of the few retributivists who insists that it matters what the offender makes of his penalty. Even more interesting is the importance (...) he attaches to the analogy between retribution and revenge. Most retributivists are at pains to distance themselves from vengeance: but not Nozick. (shrink)

A virtual reality translation of Robert Nozick's "Experience Machine" thought experiment from his "Anarchy, State, and Utopia" (1974). These modules are free to download and use in the classroom and for research/x-phi purposes. NPCs are randomized for gender during startup of each run. *Requires an Oculus Rift or HTC Vive and VR capable computer. To open the files, uncompress the downloaded .zip folder and run the executable (.exe) file. -/- V1.2 Fixed missing projector video footage during experience machine sales (...) pitch. (shrink)

We set out a variety of material from Nozick’s work after -Anarchy, State, and Utopia- that tends to show that, despite his protestations of fidelity to libertarianism in-Invariances- and interviews before his death, his thought took directions inconsistent with the version of libertarianism in that book, in which only negative rights can be coercively enforced by the State. We explore one interpretive possibility, taking a second look at a footnote in ASU that acknowledges a moral permission to violate the ethic (...) of respect under circumstances of ‘catastrophic moral horror.’. (shrink)

The author first looks at how the basic tenets of libertarianism, as presented in the opening chapters of Nozick?s?Anarchy, State and Utopia?, are connected with the idea of community. In the second section Nozick?s own conception of utopia and voluntary associations is discussed. In the closing section various critiques of this libertarian conception are analyzed. Though compatible with social co-operation, Nozick?s position rests on an indeterminate concept of rights and is incapable of explaining adequately the relations of mutual connectedness, i.e. (...) community. Communities are treated as selfsufficient entities in a way that is in line with the communitarian standpoint, but incongruent with the republican model of integration. The latter objection refers especially to the conflict of loyalties to particular associations and to the?framework community?. U ovom radu autor ukazuje na vezu osnovnih postavki libertarijanizma, izlozenim u prvim poglavljima Nozickove knjige Anarhija, drzava i utopija sa idejom zajednice. U drugom delu rada razmatra se Nozickova vlastita koncepcija utopije i dobrovoljnosti udruzivanja. U poslednjem delu rada autor analizira kritike ove libertarijanske koncepcije. Mada kompatibilna sa socijalnom kooperacijom, Nozickova pozicija pociva na neodredjenom pojmu prava i nije u stanju da adekvatno objasni odnose medjusobnih povezanosti, odnosno zajednistva. Zajednice se tretiraju kao samodovoljne celine na nacin koji je saglasan sa komunitaristickom pozicijom, ali je neuskladiv sa republikanskim modelom integracije. Ovo poslednje se narocito odnosi na konflikt lojalnosti prema partikularnim zajednicama i prema okvirnoj zajednici. (shrink)

the present article aims at reconstructing Robert Nozick’s cen-tral arguments about the extreme positions held by North American li-bertarians who do not distinguish between Welfare state and totalitarian state. Despite divergences on a pivotal question, that of the state, there are some affinities between Nozick and this current of thought. Contrary to the anarchist theory, the Minimal state is preferable to the state of nature as described by John locke.

Do our lives have meaning? Should we create more people? Is death bad? Should we commit suicide? Would it be better to be immortal? Should we be optimistic or pessimistic? Since Life, Death, and Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions first appeared, David Benatar's distinctive anthology designed to introduce students to the key existential questions of philosophy has won a devoted following among users in a variety of upper-level and even introductory courses.

This is an excellent though largely uncritical introduction to, and defence of, Robert Nozick‟s Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974). It is also quite a good introduction to libertarianism. It is full of good arguments. I shall confine myself to critical remarks. My responses are mainly in the order that matters arise in the book.

O presente artigo tem por objetivo demonstrar como o Estado mínimo proposto por Robert Nozick invariavelmente tenderia a acabar, a menos que seus membros fossem coagidos pelo poder central a contribuir para sua manutenção. E, neste caso, obviamente violaria os direitos e liberdades que o mesmo Estado proposto pelo filósofo teria função de garantir. Analisaremos as falhas no modelo proposto por Nozick através de um viés econômico, demonstrando através da teoria dos jogos e da lógica da ação coletiva, como (...) uma organização provedora de bens públicos não-excludentes é vulnerável à atuação de free- riders, aumentando assim os custos de sua atuação, e diminuindo os incentivos para sua existência. (shrink)

Robert Nozick has attempted to demonstrate that a state can emerge from anarchy which will be legitimate, in that it acquires power in morally permissible (i.e., non rights violating) ways. Its monopoly on force and apparent redistribution of holdings are, according to Nozick, justified by the steps required to prevent risky behavior by the dominant agency. These steps, I argue, contravene Nozick's own entitlement principles and so, his dominant agency is not warranted in taking them. This leaves Nozick "stranded" (...) within his own state of nature, the dominant agency unable to legitimately transform itself into a night watchman state. (shrink)

In Part III of Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), Robert Nozick presents what he calls ‘the model of possible worlds’ (307) to examine the formal properties of utopia, defined as ‘the best of all possible worlds’ (298). The basic idea is that each person is given the power to create any possible world and its inhabitants by imagining them. Two definitions of stability have been proposed: (a) the non-circular definition according to which a world is stable if and only (...) if nobody can imagine a better world and (b) the circular definition according to which a world is stable if and only if nobody can imagine a better world that is also stable. In this paper, we prove four theorems (namely, the indeterminacy theorem, the stable dystopia theorem, the nobody’s utopia theorem and the redundancy theorem) that provide us with decisive reasons to reject the circular definition and opt for the non-circular definition of stability to analyse Nozick’s theory of utopia. (shrink)

A common question asked among egalitarians involves the extent to which responsibility should play a deciding factor in assessing the acceptability of inequalities. So-called luck egalitarians agree that instances of genuine choice are decisive in attributing responsibility for disadvantage, and in justifying unequal distributions of social goods. In this exciting new contribution to this literature, the author explores the correct place to locate the cut between choice and chance. In doing so, he lays out a novel approach for identifying inequalities (...) for which it is fair to hold one responsible, and those for which it is not. The argument--which builds on a thread of intellectual history that runs through Marx and Mill into more contemporary thinkers like Cohen and Rawls--provides a compelling case for rejecting a highly influential theory of strong property rights that has been inherited from Locke, and which we find in contemporary defenses of strong entitlements such as Robert Nozick's. The result is an egalitarian position which treats responsibility seriously, while maintaining our liberal commitments to impartiality and non-arbitrariness in the distribution of rights and responsibilities in contemporary society. (shrink)

Rachael Briggs and Daniel Nolan have recently proposed an improved version of Nozick’s tracking account of knowledge. I show that, despite its virtues, the new proposal suffers from three serious problems.