This book is dedicated to clarify ambiguous concepts from the world of creativity and innovation. One of the initial triggers for the development of the book was the perceived ambiguity of the binomials Design vs. Design Thinking and Innovation vs. Invention. Frequently, designers and innovation consultants are questioned by their clients about the relationships between these kind of concepts. Has the second emerged through the first, or vice-verse? Is one part of the other? Where are the similarities and which are (...) the differences? This conceptual incomprehension makes itself noticeable between many ambiguous concepts in the world of innovation and creativity. What is the difference between Radical and Disruptive Innovation? Or is Social Innovation the same as Social Intervention? And regarding Creativity, are Creativity and Creative Thinking the same? In this book the reader will find answers to these kinds of questions and doubts. 28 authors from 10 different countries and cultural backgrounds are questioning current definitions and perceptions, by comparing different sources and ideas, or simply by giving their personal opinions. Some of the authors have an academic background, others a practical one, being either entrepreneurs, working with innovation in companies, or being innovation/design consultants. (shrink)

RESUMEN La educación médica superior tiene la responsabilidad social de formar educandos autónomos, independientes y autorregulados. Por ello las estrategias de aprendizaje permiten la adquisición de información y el establecimiento de relaciones a partir del conocimiento previo; son procesos de toma de decisiones, consciente e intencional. Objetivo: Exponer las necesidades del desarrollo de estrategias de aprendizaje en los estudiantes de primer año de Estomatología. Método: Se realizó una investigación descriptiva transversal. El universo estuvo constituido por los estudiantes de 1er año (...) de la carrera de Estomatología, del que fueron seleccionados 120 educandos que conformaron la muestra y a los que se les aplicó la Escala de Estrategias de Aprendizaje ACRA-Abreviada para alumnos universitarios. Los datos fueron procesados utilizando la estadística descriptiva. Resultados: Las estrategias que más utilizan son las que los llevan a un aprendizaje memorístico y reproductivo, las estrategias de apoyo al aprendizaje son utilizadas por el 47.79% de los educandos y existen inadecuados hábitos de estudios. Discusión: El estudio permitió corroborar que las insuficiencias que presentan los estudiantes en cuanto al uso de estrategias de aprendizaje son similares a las descritas por los autores consultados. ABSTRACT The high medical education has the social responsibility of forming autonomous, independent and auto-regulated pupils. For it the learning strategies allow the acquisition of information and the relations establishment from the previous knowledge; there are processes of decision making, conscious and intentional. Objective: To exhibit the needs for the development of strategies of learning in the students of the first year of Stomatology. Method: A transverse descriptive investigation was carried out. The universe was constituted by the students of 1st year of the career of Dentistry, of which there were selected 120 pupils who shaped the sample and to whom there was applied the Scale of Strategies of Learning ACRA-Abbreviated for university pupils. The information was processed using the descriptive statistics. Results: The strategies that they use more are those which take them to memory and reproductive learning, the support strategies to learning are used by 47.79 % of the pupils and inadequate studies habits exist. Discussion: The study allowed to corroborate that the insufficiencies that the students present as for the use of strategies of learning are similar to the described ones by the consulted authors. (shrink)

El artículo reflexiona sobre las políticas de la memoria que deberían desarrollarse en sociedades donde han ocurrido masivas violaciones de derechos humanos, y cuyos procesos se guían por los principios normativos de la justicia transicional. Se analizan primero los conceptos de memoria e historia, y la forma como el Holocausto transformó sus tareas en el siglo xx; luego se examinan dos modelos de responsabilidad propuestos por Iris Marion Young, y se propone cómo usarlos en la justicia transicional. Finalmente, se explican (...) las tareas de la política de la memoria en estos contextos. (shrink)

The Lewis-Sider argument from vagueness is one of the most powerful objections against restricted composition. Many have resisted the argument by rejecting its key premise, namely that existence is not vague. In this paper, I argue that this strategy is ineffective as a response to vagueness-based objections against restricted composition. To that end, I formulate a new argument against restricted composition: the argument from determinate vagueness. Unlike the Lewis-Sider argument, my argument doesn’t require accepting that existence is not vague, but (...) only that it is not vague in a specific way, which, I argue, is entailed by restricted composition. I show that the rejection of this species of vague existence follows from assumptions even friends of vague existence should be happy to accept. (shrink)

This paper investigates the semantics of implicit comparatives (Alice is tall compared to Bob) and its connections to the semantics of explicit comparatives (Alice is taller than Bob) and sentences with adjectives in plain positive form (Alice is tall). We consider evidence from two experiments that tested judgments about these three kinds of sentence, and provide a semantics for implicit comparatives from the perspective of degree semantics.

We provide two programmatic frameworks for integrating philosophical research on understanding with complementary work in computer science, psychology, and neuroscience. First, philosophical theories of understanding have consequences about how agents should reason if they are to understand that can then be evaluated empirically by their concordance with findings in scientific studies of reasoning. Second, these studies use a multitude of explanations, and a philosophical theory of understanding is well suited to integrating these explanations in illuminating ways.

Apresentação do n.1 da Revista Filosfia e Educação, dedicado à temática Educação e epistemologias. A organização deste número temático contou com a colaboração do Prof. Dr. Marcelo Donizete da Silva da |Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto. A seleção de trabalhos inclui nove artigos diretamente relacionados com a temática proposta e que compõem a seção do dossiê e seis artigos da seção de fluxo contínuo da revista Filosofia e Educação.

La "posición original" es un aspecto fundamental de la teoría de la justicia de John Rawls, así como el concepto del "velo de ignorancia". El análisis se divide en tres momentos: en el primero, se expone la posición original de Rawls, en el segundo se contrasta la teoría de la razonabilidad de Scanlon con el papel que tiene la razonabilidad en la teoría de Rawls y en el tercero se exploran los señalamientos de Habermas y Benhabib al velo de ignorancia.

Para Ockham, todo animal posee un alma sensitiva, en virtud de la cual, puede tener deseos sensitivos, cogniciones intuitivas sensitivas y cogniciones abstractivas sensitivas. Entre estas últimas, tenemos representaciones sensibles, actos del sentido común y recuerdos. El objetivo de este artículo es el de reconstruir la teoría de Ockham sobre la cognición animal sensitiva. Esta reconstrucción muestra que Ockham adscribe a los animales, en general, una capacidad de representar diferentes propiedades de las cosas singulares, una memoria episódica, una memoria procedimental (...) y cierto tipo de ilusiones. Debido a que ciertas representaciones sensibles son equivalentes a proposiciones mentales, según Ockham, los animales no-humanos pueden juzgar y formar silogismos. (shrink)

Balanço da produção científica em Educação Física em Estados do Nordeste, visando a identificar tendências, perspectivas e desafios que se apresentam à consolidação dessa produção. O estudo integra a pesquisa matricial do grupo LEPEL/UFBA.

Much of the boom that the emotions have experienced at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries may be due to the informative literature from the 1990s that proclaimed the concept of “emotional intelligence.” New developments in this field cannot ignore this fact, but it is necessary to specify that the terms emotional intelligence and intelligence of emotions are not synonymous.

A presente edição de Filosofia e Educação, a primeira de 2018, apresenta algumas novidades com relação às anteriores. A primeira delas é a mudança de datas na organização dos três números que correspondem a 2018, mantendo sua periodização quadrimestral. Esta edição que na sequência anterior correspondia aos meses de outubro-janeiro sofre um ajuste neste 1º número do décimo volume. Assim, a atual edição corresponde aos quatro primeiros meses de 2018. Na sequência, a 2ª edição deve corresponder aos meses de maio-agosto (...) e a 3ª aos meses de setembro-dezembro. (shrink)

Modalists think that knowledge requires forming your belief in a “modally stable” way: using a method that wouldn't easily go wrong, or using a method that wouldn't have given you this belief had it been false. Recent Modalist projects from Justin Clarke-Doane and Dan Baras defend a principle they call “Modal Security,” roughly: if evidence undermines your belief, then it must give you a reason to doubt the safety or sensitivity of your belief. Another recent Modalist project from Carlotta Pavese (...) and Bob Beddor defends “Modal Virtue Epistemology”: knowledge is a belief that is maximally modally robust across “normal” worlds. We'll offer new objections to these recent Modalist projects. We will then argue for a rival view, Explanationism: knowing something is believing it because it's true. We will show how Explanationism offers a better account of undermining defeaters than Modalism, and a better account of knowledge. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that our ordinary English words man and woman are “gender terms,” and gender is distinct from biological sex. That is, they believe womanhood and manhood are not defined even partly by biological sex. This sex/gender distinction is one of the most influential ideas of the twentieth century on the broader culture, both popular and academic. Less well known are the reasons to think it’s true. My interest in this paper is to show that, upon investigation, the arguments (...) for the sex/gender distinction have feet of clay. In fact, they all fail. We will survey the literature and tour arguments in favor of the sex/gender distinction, and then we’ll critically evaluate those arguments. We’ll consider the argument from resisting biological determinism, the argument from biologically intersex people and vagueness, the argument from the normativity of gender, and some arguments from thought experiments. We’ll see that these arguments are not up to the task of supporting the sex/gender distinction; they simply don’t work. So, philosophers should either develop stronger arguments for the sex/gender distinction, or cultivate a variety of feminism that’s consistent with the traditional, biologically-based definitions of woman and man. (shrink)

Many contemporary epistemologists hold that a subject S’s true belief that p counts as knowledge only if S’s belief that p is also, in some important sense, safe. I describe accounts of this safety condition from John Hawthorne, Duncan Pritchard, and Ernest Sosa. There have been three counterexamples to safety proposed in the recent literature, from Comesaña, Neta and Rohrbaugh, and Kelp. I explain why all three proposals fail: each moves fallaciously from the fact that S was at epistemic risk (...) just before forming her belief to the conclusion that S’s belief was formed unsafely. In light of lessons from their failure, I provide a new and successful counterexample to the safety condition on knowledge. It follows, then, that knowledge need not be safe. Safety at a time depends counterfactually on what would likely happen at that time or soon after in a way that knowledge does not. I close by considering one objection concerning higher-order safety. (shrink)

Do the facts of evolution generate an epistemic challenge to moral realism? Some think so, and many “evolutionary debunking arguments” have been discussed in the recent literature. But they are all murky right where it counts most: exactly which epistemic principle is meant to take us from evolutionary considerations to the skeptical conclusion? Here, I will identify several distinct species of evolutionary debunking argument in the literature, each one of which relies on a distinct epistemic principle. Drawing on recent work (...) in epistemology, I will show that most of these initially plausible principles are false, spoiling the arguments that rely on them. And we will see that each argument threatens only one popular view of moral psychology: a “Representationalist” view on which our moral judgments rely crucially on a mental intermediary—e.g. a sentiment, gut reaction, or affect-laden intuition—delivered by our evolved moral faculty. In the end, only one evolutionary debunking argument remains a menace: an “ Argument from Symmetry ” that I will introduce to the literature. But we will see that it should worry only all naturalists, pressuring them into a trilemma: give up moral realism, accept a rationalism that is incongruous with naturalism, or give up naturalism. Non-naturalists are free and clear. (shrink)

Feminism has long grappled with its own demarcation problem—exactly what is it to be a woman?—and the rise of trans-inclusive feminism has made this problem more urgent. I will first consider Sally Haslanger’s “social and hierarchical” account of woman, resulting from “Ameliorative Inquiry”: she balances ordinary use of the term against the instrumental value of novel definitions in advancing the cause of feminism. Then, I will turn to Katharine Jenkins’ charge that Haslanger’s view suffers from an “Inclusion Problem”: it fails (...) to class many trans women as women. Jenkins offers a novel norm-relevancy account of woman to avoid the Inclusion Problem. Unfortunately, Jenkins’ account has serious internal problems, i.e. problems by Jenkins’ own lights: it is unintelligible, or it suffers from an Inclusion Problem of its own. After that, I will develop novel arguments for the conclusion that the project of Ameliorative Inquiry is both incoherent and also impossible to complete—at least, impossible to complete in a trans-inclusive way. Trans-inclusive feminism, therefore, would do well to move beyond Ameliorative Inquiry. Insofar as that’s not possible, trans-inclusive feminism inherits the incoherence of Ameliorative Inquiry. (shrink)

The study of corpography (corpographèse) in J.M. Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians establishes a symptomatology of the body -linked to the experiences of torture and eroticism- that associates the illness with somnolence in the fictional text and the parasitization of the represented historical text. The tortured and undesired bodies of the protagonists undergo a process of objectification that manifests the acceleration of the fall of the Empire and the fragmentation of its discursive body as well as reinforces the secrecy and (...) illegibility of the text inscribed in the body of barbarism. This indecipherable text/body is defined by the paradox of the border labyrinth whose specularity gives rise to the illusion of control at the frontier between empire and barbarism. We will study, first of all, the writing of torture on the bodies, focusing on two organs - the eyes and the feet. Then, we will be interested in the erotic experience between the two protagonists. Finally, we will see how these vacuous bodies establish, at the border, a suspensive temporary bond with the historical and the memorial text. (shrink)

Resumen: El objetivo de este trabajo es describir la situación actual y las proyecciones de la comparación forense de la voz en Chile, a la luz de los estándares internacionales que se enfocan en la producción de evidencia confiable, que pueda ser utilizada en los tribunales de justicia. Para ello, en principio, se dan a conocer los fundamentos científicos que caracterizan esta rama de las ciencias forenses y, luego, sobre esa base se analiza y comenta la situación de Chile y (...) sus proyecciones, tanto en la práctica como en la investigación forense. Abstract: The objective of this work is to describe the current situation and the projections of forensic voice comparison in Chile, in the light of international standards that focus on the production of reliable evidence that can be used in the courts of justice. To do this, first, the scientific foundations that characterize this branch of forensic sciences are disclosed and, then, on that basis, the situation in Chile and its projections are analyzed and discussed, both in practice and in the forensic research. (shrink)

El texto se propone abordar el problema de la expresión en la filosofía de Merleau-Ponty bajo tres aspectos generales: 1. Hacia una ontología de lo sensible, 2. Expresión y diferencia corporal y 3. Cuerpo y expresión creadora. A partir de la noción de naturaleza se busca, con el primer apartado, destacar el carácter ontológico de la percepción, con el fin de comprender por qué la percepción es ya expresión. En segundo lugar, se pretende ahondar en la tesis del cuerpo como (...) expresión y de esta manera poder precisar su vínculo esencial con el lenguaje. A partir de la distinción entre el lenguaje hablante y el lenguaje hablado se precisa, finalmente, el carácter paradójico de la expresión, su sentido encarnado. (shrink)

What is a woman? The definition of this central concept of feminism has lately become especially controversial and politically charged. “Ameliorative Inquirists” have rolled up their sleeves to reengineer our ordinary concept of womanhood, with a goal of including in the definition all and only those who identify as women, both “cis” and “trans.” This has proven to be a formidable challenge. Every proposal so far has failed to draw the boundaries of womanhood in a way acceptable to the Ameliorative (...) Inquirists, since not all those who identify as women count as women on these proposals, and some who count as women on these proposals don’t identify as women. This is the Trans Inclusion Problem. Is there any solution? Can there be? Recently, Katharine Jenkins, pointing to the work of Mari Mikkola, suggests that the Trans Inclusion Problem can be “deflated” rather than solved. We will investigate this proposal, and show that, unfortunately, Jenkins is mistaken: Mikkola’s project will not help us answer the Trans Inclusion Problem. After that, we’ll look at Robin Dembroff’s suggestion that we “imitate” the linguistic practices of trans inclusive and queer communities, and we will evaluate whether this would help us solve the Trans Inclusion Problem. Unfortunately, this strategy also fails to solve the problem. By the end, we’ll have a better appreciation of the challenges faced by Ameliorative Inquirists in their project of redefining “woman,” and clearer view of why the Trans Inclusion Problem cannot, in fact, be solved. That’s primarily because, no matter what it means to be a woman, it’s one thing to be a woman, and another thing to identify as a woman. (shrink)

‘Gender identity’ was clearly defined sixty years ago, but the dominant conceptions of gender identity today are deeply obscure. Florence Ashley’s 2023 theory of gender identity is one of the latest attempts at demystification. Although Ashley’s paper is not fully coherent, a coherent theory of gender identity can be extracted from it. That theory, we argue, is clearly false. It is psychologically very implausible, and does not support ‘first­person authority over gender’, as Ashley claims. We also discuss other errors and (...) confusions in Ashley’s paper. (shrink)

In an essay recently published in this journal (“Is Safety in Danger?”), Fernando Broncano-Berrocal defends the safety condition on knowledge from a counterexample proposed by Tomas Bogardus (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2012). In this paper, we will define the safety condition, briefly explain the proposed counterexample, and outline Broncano-Berrocal’s defense of the safety condition. We will then raise four objections to Broncano-Berrocal’s defense, four implausible implications of his central claim. In the end, we conclude that Broncano-Berrocal’s defense of the safety (...) condition is unsuccessful, and that the safety condition on knowledge should be rejected. (shrink)

Nuestro punto de partida es la concepción de Merleau-Ponty del lenguaje como "habla". Sostenemos que esta, como experiencia corporal del lenguaje -como lenguaje "en" nosotros-, permite comprender el fenómeno de la /nter-culturalidad como un fenómeno esencialmente /ntra-cultural, en el sentido de una experiencia de la cultura "desde dentro", es decir, desde la experiencia que cada quien hace del lenguaje. Este carácter endógeno e individual de pensar la cultura pone en evidencia, sin embargo, un "entre-lazamiento" recíproco originario entre lo propio y (...) lo extraño que impide de entrada privilegiar ya sea una visión universalista o totalizante o bien individualista o regionalista de la cultura. En dos momentos doy cuenta de este planteamiento: 1. Mundo de la vida y diversidad cultural y 2. El habla como lugar de acceso a las culturas. Our starting point is the conception in Merleau Ponty of language as "speech". We support this concept as corporal experience of language -as language "in" us - allows to understand the phenomenon of ¿nter-culturality as an essentially ¿ntra-cultural phenomenon, in the sense of an experience of culture "from within", that is to say; from the experience that everyone does with the language. This endogenous and individual character of thinking about culture highlights, however, a reciprocal "entanglement" originated among one's own and the strange that initially prevents to privilege, even a universal or totalizing or either an individualistic or regionalist vision of culture. Two moments I take on this approach: 1. World of life and cultural diversity. 2. Speech as an access place to the cultures. (shrink)

In this paper, I hope to solve a problem that’s as old as the hills: the problem of contingency for religious belief. Paradigmatic examples of this argument begin with a counterfactual premise: had we been born at a different time or in a difference place, we easily could have held different beliefs on religious topics. Ultimately, and perhaps by additional steps, we’re meant to reach the skeptical conclusion that very many of our religious beliefs do not amount to knowledge. I (...) survey some historical examples of this argument, and I try to fill the gap between the counterfactual premise and the skeptical conclusion as forcefully as possible. I consider the following possibilities: there are no additional steps in the argument; or there are and they concern the alleged safety condition on knowledge, or the alleged non-accidentality condition on knowledge, or the unclarity produced by disagreement. On every possibility, the argument from the counterfactual premise to the conclusion of widespread skepticism is invalid. It seems, then, that there is no serious problem of contingency for religious belief. (shrink)

RESUMEN El artículo reflexiona sobre las políticas de la memoria que deberían desarrollarse en sociedades donde han ocurrido masivas violaciones de derechos humanos, y cuyos procesos se guían por los principios normativos de la justicia transicional. Se analizan primero los conceptos de memoria e historia, y la forma como el Holocausto trans formó sus tareas en el siglo XX; luego se examinan dos modelos de responsabilidad propuestos por Iris Marion Young, y se propone cómo usarlos en la justicia transicional. Finalmente, (...) se explican las tareas de la política de la memoria en estos contextos. ABSTRACT The article carries out a reflection on the politics of memory that should be developed in societies where massive human rights violations have occurred and whose pro cesses are being guided by the normative principles of transitional justice. It starts out by analyzing the concepts of memory and history and the manner in which the Holocaust transformed their tasks in the 20th century. Ten it goes on to examine two models of responsibility proposed by Iris Marion Young, and suggests how to use them in transitional justice. Finally, the article explains the tasks of the politics of memory in these contexts. (shrink)

There is much to admire in John Pittard’s recent book on the epistemology of disagreement. But here we develop one concern about the role that rational insight plays in his project. Pittard develops and defends a view on which a party to peer disagreement can show substantial partiality to his own view, so long as he enjoys even moderate rational insight into the truth of his view or the cogency of his reasoning for his view. Pittard argues that this may (...) happen in ordinary cases of religious disagreement—cases in which it’s a live skeptical possibility that one is misdescribing his insight, or not having insight at all—and therefore one need not be strongly conciliatory even in the face of peer disagreement. Yet Pittard agrees that one should be strongly conciliatory in cases of disagreement involving, e.g., visual perception and dim rational insight, since the sort of fallible, corrigible evidence involved in such cases may be counterbalanced by symmetrical evidence on the part of one’s disagreeing peer. We worry that there’s an inconsistency here. If it’s unreasonable to show partiality to one’s visual experience (or dim rational insight) in cases like “Horse Race” and “Restaurant Check,” it’s likewise unreasonable to show partiality in religious disagreements to one’s moderate rational insight, fallible and corrigible as it is. (shrink)

Some philosophers believe that, when epistemic peers disagree, each has an obligation to accord the other’s assessment equal weight as her own. Other philosophers worry that this Equal-Weight View is vulnerable to straightforward counterexamples, and that it requires an unacceptable degree of spinelessness with respect to our most treasured philosophical, political, and religious beliefs. I think that both of these allegations are false. To show this, I carefully state the Equal-Weight View, motivate it, describe apparent counterexamples to it, and then (...) explain away the apparent counterexamples. Finally, I adapt those explanations to cases of religious disagreement. In the end, we reach the surprising conclusion that—even if the Equal-Weight View is true—in very many cases of religious disagreement between apparent epistemic peers, the parties to the disagreement need not be conciliatory. And what goes for religious beliefs goes for political and philosophical beliefs as well. This strongly suggests that the View does not demand an unacceptable degree of spinelessness. (shrink)

In the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many philosophers as true, including many non-dualists. This ‘striking’ generates prima facie justification: in the absence of defeaters, we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be, i.e. we ought to be dualists. In this paper, I examine several proposed undercutting defeaters for our dualist intuitions. I argue that each proposal fails, since each rests on a false assumption, or requires empirical evidence that it lacks, or overgenerates defeaters. By the (...) end, our prima facie justification for dualism remains undefeated. I close with one objection concerning the dialectical role of rebutting defeaters, and I argue that the prospects for a successful rebutting defeater for our dualist intuitions are dim. Since dualism emerges undefeated, we ought to believe it. (shrink)

Este texto apresenta uma síntese de um estudo realizado com base na literatura e aná-lise de conteúdo, de caráter epistemológico, que focalizou a Metodologia da Problematização com o Arco de Maguerez - como caminho de ensino e de pesquisa -, comvistas a compreender as teorias da educação e/ou concepções de conhecimento que afundamentam. São descritas três versões de explicação e de uso do Arco de Maguerez,cada qual associada a diferentes fontes teóricas e pressupostos epistemológicos. Asversões indicam um processo de renovação (...) no contexto das teorias críticas e das epistemologias da práxis. Dessa forma, a Metodologia da Problematização revela maiorsustentação teórica e epistemológica e aplicabilidade no campo do ensino e da pesquisa.Este artículo presenta una síntesis de un estudio de carácter epistemológico basado en la literatura y el análisis de contenido, centrándose en la Metodología de la Problematización con el Arco de Maguerez - como camino de enseñanza e investigación-, con vistas a comprender las teorías de la educación y/o concepciones de conocimiento que la fundamentan. Son descritas tres versiones de explicación y de uso del Arco de Maguerez, cada cual asociada a diferentes fuentes teóricas e supuestos epistemológicos. Las versiones muestran un proceso de renovación en el contexto de las teorías críticas y de las epistemologías de la práxis. De esa forma, la Metodología de la Problematización revela mayor sustentación teórica y epistemológica y aplicabilidad en el campo de la enseñanza y de la investigación. (shrink)

Nuestro punto de partida es la concepción de Merleau-Ponty del lenguaje como "habla". Sostenemos que esta, como experiencia corporal del lenguaje -como lenguaje "en" nosotros-, permite comprender el fenómeno de la /nter-culturalidad como un fenómeno esencialmente /ntra-cultural, en el sentido de una experiencia de la cultura "desde dentro", es decir, desde la experiencia que cada quien hace del lenguaje. Este carácter endógeno e individual de pensar la cultura pone en evidencia, sin embargo, un "entre-lazamiento" recíproco originario entre lo propio y (...) lo extraño que impide de entrada privilegiar ya sea una visión universalista o totalizante o bien individualista o regionalista de la cultura. En dos momentos doy cuenta de este planteamiento: 1. Mundo de la vida y diversidad cultural y 2. El habla como lugar de acceso a las culturas. Our starting point is the conception in Merleau Ponty of language as "speech". We support this concept as corporal experience of language -as language "in" us - allows to understand the phenomenon of ¿nter-culturality as an essentially ¿ntra-cultural phenomenon, in the sense of an experience of culture "from within", that is to say; from the experience that everyone does with the language. This endogenous and individual character of thinking about culture highlights, however, a reciprocal "entanglement" originated among one's own and the strange that initially prevents to privilege, even a universal or totalizing or either an individualistic or regionalist vision of culture. Two moments I take on this approach: 1. World of life and cultural diversity. 2. Speech as an access place to the cultures. (shrink)

The present article revolves around the notion of universality and its relation to freedom and temporal orientation in contemporary political thought, with a focus on Susan Buck-Morss' notion of universality. The purpose is twofold. Firstly, I discern and critique the historico-political premises of her approach. Secondly, I suggest an alternative historico-political approach to universality addressing the drawbacks of her approach. I present three objections to her approach. Drawing on Arendt's distinction between liberation and the practice of freedom, I first present (...) a critique of the conceptualisation of freedom on which Buck-Morss' approach hinges, arguing that she overemphasises the moment of liberation. Thereafter, I turn to her reflections on historical orientation. My third objection concentrates on Buck-Morss' concept of universality. As a heuristic tool to expound on my critique, I activate the distinction between fictive and ideal universality as suggested by Étienne Balibar. I contend that Arendt's distinction between liberation and the practice of freedom efficiently elucidates the questions at stake in Balibar's discussion, as well as how his distinction points to the limits of Buck-Morss' argumentation. Ultimately, I contend that these critical remarks open up for a more dialectical approach to universality as a historical-political problem. (shrink)

In the recent literature on the nature of knowledge, a rivalry has emerged between modalism and explanationism. According to modalism, knowledge requires that our beliefs track the truth across some appropriate set of possible worlds. Modalists tend to focus on two modal conditions: sensitivity and safety. According to explanationism, knowledge requires only that beliefs bear the right sort of explanatory relation to the truth. In slogan form: knowledge is believing something because it’s true. In this paper, we aim to vindicate (...) explanationism from some recent objections offered by Gualtiero Piccinini, Dario Mortini, and Kenneth Boyce and Andrew Moon. Together, these authors present five purported counterexamples to the sufficiency of the explanationist analysis for knowledge. In addition, Mortini devises a clever argument that explanationism entails the violation of a plausible closure principle on knowledge. We will argue that explanationism is innocent of all these charges against it, and we hope that the strength of the defense we offer of explanationism is evidence in its favor, and a reason to investigate explanationism further as the long-elusive truth about the nature of knowledge. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Giving without the expectation of reward is difficult to understand in organizational contexts. In opposition to a logic based on self-interest or a sense of duty, a “logic of gift” has been proposed as a way to understand the phenomenon of free, unconditional giving. However, the rationale behind, and effects of, this logic have been under-explored. This paper responds by first clarifying the three logics of action—the logic of exchange, the logic of duty, and the logic of gift—and then explains (...) how their balanced integration promises to enhance organizational life and outcomes. Having explicated the unique character and contributions of the logic of gift, the paper further suggests practical implications for management. Encouraging the logic of gift fosters more humane relationships within organizations and to enable individuals to be generous in ways that inspire trust and promote creativity. (shrink)

This study was designed to survey the extent to which private companies in Sweden take structural measures within the field of business ethics: Codes of Ethics; Ethics Committees; Ethics Officers and Ethics Training. This was done in two steps. Through a nation-wide telephone survey, a population of "active" companies were identified. These companies received a questionnaire with detailed questions regarding the design, usage and effects of these measures. The percentage of active companies were found to be a high 46%. National (...) and industry characteristics are proposed as explanatory factors. (shrink)

_Europe Thirty Years After 1989_ explores what happened in the former socialist countries during the last thirty years and the reasons behind these events. The authors examine how values, memory, and identity have been transforming these countries since the year 1989.

Tomas Abraham inicia una pesquisa filosofica y no se detiene ante las impugnaciones que dictan el buen gusto y la conveniencia (la que esconde las contradicciones para simular seriedad y rigor intelectual). Nada lo detiene. Observa, analiza, compulsa. Sus preguntas no interrogan esas zonas del discurso para las cuales se han inventado ya benevolas excusas, sino las otras, las peligrosas.Desde 1989, reflexiona Abraham, el factor economico es la clave que permite descifrar los anhelos y las frustraciones de la sociedad. Por (...) que? Porque el factor economico no se reduce a la economia, no se limita a la produccion y a la distribucion de riquezas sino que acusa la visible emergencia de nuevas formas de vida. El factor economico revela el diagrama de las mutaciones culturales. En este ensayo filosofico en el que coexisten una cantidad asombrosa de estilos y tonos, el autor analiza y discute la empresa como nuevo monumento cultural, la demonizacion del estado, las batallas etico-politicas entre intelectuales y economistas culturales, la tarea de los expertos en calidad de vida y su funcion en una nueva sociedad terapeutica. De las historias de vida de los archimillonarios al encuadre historico de la ideologia empresarial, de la puesta en sorna (con el mayor respeto) de la literatura de autoayuda a la meditacion sobre la moral y el dolor en los campos de exterminio, La empresa de vivir, como los libros anteriores del autor, traza una linea osada y firme e incorpora al pensamiento argentino una nueva manera de hacer las cosas. Una nueva manera capaz de abrir discusiones aparentemente concluidas o censuradas, de expandir los efectos de un conflicto intelectual hacia areas desprestigiadas oignoradas, de inaugurar una pasion para abolir la ironia autoindulgente y los entredichos ufan. (shrink)

ABSTRACT We exist only because we inhabit a world in common, embedded within networks of associations between humans and nonhumans. This is endlessly disclosed by our experience of the world. And yet, despite its palpability, it is clear that we have failed to mobilize a notion of the common world into something capable of guiding our modes of thought and collective forms of activity—our attitudes, our affective lives, our politics. How have we arrived here? Bruno Latour's work suggests that an (...) answer can be found in the common world's status as information—its self-evidence works to exclude it from a world of values. What, then, should be done? In his recent work on the modes of existence Latour develops a pragmatic metaphysics inspired by the speculative method of Alfred North Whitehead. Metaphysical speculation becomes a tool for moving beyond the “bifurcation of nature” through the construction of abstractions with which to interpret the pluralism of experience. Rather than thinking of the common world as either a given fact or as a totalizing universal, Latour develops a notion of a common world out of the messiness of experience and, as such, hopes to transform us into beings who would be moved to actively pursue and care for such a notion. (shrink)