The complex chaotic dynamics and multistability of financial system are some important problems in micro- and macroeconomic fields. In this paper, we study the influence of two-delay feedback on the nonlinear dynamics behavior of financial system, considering the linear stability of equilibrium point under the condition of single delay and two delays. The system undergoes Hopf bifurcation near the equilibrium point. The stability and bifurcation directions of Hopf bifurcation are studied by using the normal form method and central manifold theory. (...) The theoretical results are verified by numerical simulation. Furthermore, one feature of the proposed financial chaotic system is that its multistability depends extremely on the memristor initial condition and the system parameters. It is shown that the nonlinear dynamics of financial chaotic system can be significantly changed by changing the values of time delays. (shrink)

Die sekundäre Forschungsnutzung von Behandlungsdaten hat großes Potenzial, biomedizinisches Wissen zu erweitern und die Patientenversorgung zu verbessern. Gleichzeitig sind für eine bessere Ausschöpfung dieses Potenzials diverse Herausforderungen zu bewältigen. Dies gilt insbesondere in Deutschland, wo im Vergleich zu anderen Ländern, wie z.B. Dänemark oder Finnland, die sekundäre Forschungsnutzung von Behandlungsdaten unterentwickelt ist. Die Intensivierung der Nutzung der Daten aus Diagnose und Therapie von Patienten und die Entwicklung der dafür notwendigen Strukturen in Deutschland ist ethisch und politisch geboten: für die Verbesserung (...) der Gesundheitsversorgung durch neue Erkenntnisse, Therapien und Qualitätssicherung. Aus diesem Grund fordern die Autor:innen alle Akteure des Gesundheitssystems, von der Bundes- und den Landesregierungen über die Krankenkassen, Kliniken, Ärzt:innen und Patient:innen dazu auf, einen Beitrag dazu leisten, eine Kultur der sekundären Forschungsnutzung von Behandlungsdaten zu etablieren. Basierend auf den Ergebnissen eines dreijährigen Verbundprojekts beantworten die Autor:innen aus den Bereichen Medizin, Rechtswissenschaften, Ethik und Sozialwissenschaften die Frage was notwendig ist, damit in Deutschland die Daten von Patient:innen systematisch für medizinische Forschung und die Analyse der klinischen Versorgungsqualität verwendet werden können und wirklich auch verwendet werden. Sie nennen zehn zentrale Forderungen und legen eine Liste von 23 Empfehlungen mit konkreten Maßnahmen vor, welche von den genannten Akteuren umgesetzt werden sollten. (shrink)

La philosophie de la religion de Wittgenstein et des philosophes analytiques qui l’ont suivi est-elle ou non un fidéisme ? Le livre est né d’une rencontre tardive entre deux penseurs qui ont engagé le débat, indépendamment l’un de l’autre, au milieu des années soixante. Au terme d’une douzaine de chapitres composés en alternance, à l’écriture toujours serrée et au ton parfois vif, les auteurs n’abandonnent pas leurs positions initiales, même si elles se sont nuancées avec les années. Il revie..

Wang, Kai 王楷, Naturalistic Human Nature and Cultivation of the Self: The Spirit of Xunzi’s Virtue Philosophy 天然與修為—荀子道德哲學的精神. Beijing 北京: Peking University Press, 2011, 206 pages Content Type Journal Article Pages 115-118 DOI 10.1007/s11712-011-9252-z Authors Elizabeth Woo Li, Department of Philosophy, Peking University, Beijing, China Journal Dao Online ISSN 1569-7274 Print ISSN 1540-3009 Journal Volume Volume 11 Journal Issue Volume 11, Number 1.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On Substance Being the Same As Its Essence in Metaphysics Z 6: The Pale Man ArgumentNorman O. Dahlin general Aristotle’s account of substance in the Categories is clear. Primary substances, the basic constitutents of the world, are independently existing individuals, paradigm examples of which are particular living organisms. However, the later use to which Aristotle puts matter and form provides him with two new candidates for primary substance.1 A (...) reconsideration of substance is in order, and Aristotle begins it in Metaphysics Z. The status of matter soon becomes clear. It can’t be substance because it isn’t a “this” and separate (Z 3, 1029a26–28). The status of form, however, is another story. Aristotle argues in Z 6 that substances are the same as their essences. While the evidence isn’t unequivocal, Z 4, 10, 11, and 15 take essence to be form, where form is universal. Z 13, however, argues that no universal is substance. Aristotle thus appears caught in an inconsistency. Substance is universal form because it is the same as universal form; however, no universal is substance. This and other problems have led to as wide a variety of interpretations of Metaphysics Z as one will find of any philosophical text. Virtually all of them end up attributing to Aristotle one of [End Page 1] three views about substance—substances are universal forms, particular forms, or composites of matter and form.2This paper takes a first step in a project that promises to remove the above inconsistency while allowing but not requiring Aristotle to take concrete particular substances (composite substances involving both matter and form) to be substances. The project looks at the first of the three claims that lead to the above apparent inconsistency and asks whether the sameness relation in it should be understood as identity or a weaker relation that could hold between concrete particular substances and their universal essences. It is the latter possibility that promises to avoid the above contradiction. If concrete particular substances can be the same as their universal essences, then the essences of substances can be universals without necessarily turning substances into universals. Nevertheless, granting this possibility wouldn’t require Aristotle to take concrete particular substances to be substances. Forms of concrete particular substances will also be the same as their essences in this weaker sameness relation, and considerations other than those at work in Z 6 could still lead Aristotle to rule out concrete individuals as substances.1Although Aristotle has standardly been interpreted as arguing in Z 6 that substances are identical with their essences,3 two considerations allow the question of this paper to be raised. [End Page 2]The first is the variety of uses to which Aristotle puts such notions as the same (tauto) or one (hen). Aristotle’s concern in Z 6 is with whether certain things are or are not the same (tauto), one (hen), or one and the same (hen kai auto and to auto kai hen) as their essences.4 He argues that kata sumbebēkos legomena (things said to be what they are with respect to an accident) are not the same as their essences, but that kath’ hauta legomena (things said to be what they are with respect to themselves), a class of things that includes substances,5 are the same as their essences. However, when Aristotle says that one thing and another are the same or one, there is more than one kind of claim he can be making. Some of them apply to things that are identical; others do not.For example, things can be the same in number, species, and genus. A doublet and a cloak are the same in number, a man and another man are the same in species, and a man and a horse are the same in genus.6 Although a doublet and a cloak are identical, a man and another man, and a man and a horse, are not.Things can also be accidentally the same, or the same in definition, substance, or essence,7 where these two ways of being the same cut across the previous ways of being the same. For example... (shrink)

Kai-Fu Lee, który jest jednym z czołowych specjalistów od SI w Chinach, wyraził pogląd, że miłość jest tym, co istotnie odróżnia nas od SI oraz stanowi o naszym człowieczeństwie. Autor artykułu prezentuje filozoficzno-psychologiczne uzasadnienie dla tego poglądu Lee.

When surveying the scholarly literature over Wittgensteinian fideism, it is easy to get the sense that the principal interlocutors, Kai Nielsen and D.Z. Phillips, talk past one another, but finding the right words for appraising the distance between the two voices is difficult. In this paper, I seek to appreciate this intellectual distance through an exploration of the varying philosophical aims of Nielsen and Phillips, of the different intellectual imperatives that guide their respective conceptions of philosophical practice. In so doing, (...) I seek to show how a contemplative mode in philosophy may be used to appraise a philosophical dispute and the terms of disagreement. In this case, a contemplative approach to understanding the dispute would frame Nielsen’s and Phillips’ contributions against the backdrop of the ends they conceive philosophy to have. (shrink)

With a new introduction by the author In this deliciously polemical work, a giant of cultural theory immerses himself in the ideas of a giant of French thought.

In this major new work the leading philosopher Slavoj Žižek argues that philosophical materialism has failed to meet the key scientific, theoretical and political challenges of the modern world, from relativity theory and quantum physics to Freudian psychoanalysis and the failure of twentieth-century Communism. To bring materialism up to date, Žižek proposes a new foundation for dialectical materialism. He argues that dialectical materialism is the only true philosophical inheritor of what Hegel designates as the speculative approach of thought - all (...) other forms of materialism fail. In Absolute Recoil, Žižek offers a startling reformulation of the ground and possibilities of contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

Here the philosopher and physicist David Z Albert argues, among other things, that the difference between past and future can be understood as a mechanical phenomenon of nature and that quantum mechanics makes it impossible to present the entirety of what can be said about the world as a narrative of “befores” and “afters.”.

With his characteristic wit, Zizek addresses the burning question of how to reformulate a leftist project in an era of global capitalism and liberal-democratic ...

In celebration of the 250th anniversary of the birth of G.W.F. Hegel, Slavoj Žižek gives us a reading of a philosophical giant that changes our way of thinking about the post-human era we are entering. No ordinary study of Hegel, Hegel in a Wired Brain reveals our time as it appears through Hegel's eyes. Focusing in on the idea of the wired brain, this is a philosophical analysis of what happens when a direct link between our mental processes and a (...) digital machine emerges. Here Žižek explores the phenomenon of a wired brain affect, and the notion of singularity subsequently arising when we can share our thoughts and experiences with others. He hones in on the key question of how it affects our experience and status as free human individuals, dealing with what happens with the human spirit, our subjectivity and the very essence of being-human when a machine can read, action and disperse our thoughts. With characteristic verve and energy, Žižek connects Hegel to the world we live in and shows why he is much more fun than anyone gives him credit for, and why the 21st century might just be Hegelian. (shrink)

We suggest an approach to studying consciousness that focuses on its evolutionary origins. The proposed framework is inspired by the study of the transition from inanimate matter to life, which proved extremely useful for understanding what 'life' entails. We follow the theoretical and methodological scheme put forward by Tibor Ganti, who suggested a marker for the transition to life -- an evolved feature that is sufficient for ascribing dynamic persistence to a minimal living system and that can serve as a (...) point of departure for reconstructing it. We apply this approach to consciousness and suggest an overt behavioural trait -- unlimited associative learning -- as a candidate transition marker. We show that the enabling system of UAL instantiates the set of properties that are considered jointly sufficient for minimal consciousness, and discuss the experimental predictions and the implications of our approach for the taxonomic distribution of consciousness in the animal world. (shrink)

In the space of barely more than five years, with the publication of four pathbreaking books, Slavoj Žižek has earned the reputation of being one of the most arresting, insightful, and scandalous thinkers in recent memory. Perhaps more than any other single author, his writings have constituted the most compelling evidence available for recognizing Jacques Lacan as the preemient philosopher of our time. In _Tarrying with the Negative_, Žižek challenges the contemporary critique of ideology, and in doing so opens the (...) way for a new understanding of social conflict, particularly the recent outbursts of nationalism and ethnic struggle. Are we, Žižek asks, confined to a postmodern universe in which truth is reduced to the contingent effect of various discursive practices and where our subjectivity is dispersed through a multitude of ideological positions? _No_ is his answer, and the way out is a return to philosophy. This revisit to German Idealism allows Žižek to recast the critique of ideology as a tool for disclosing the dynamic of our society, a crucial aspect of which is the debate over nationalism, particularly as it has developed in the Balkans—Žižek's home. He brings the debate over nationalism into the sphere of contemporary cultural politics, breaking the impasse centered on nationalisms simultaneously fascistic and anticolonial aspirations. Provocatively, Žižek argues that what drives nationalistic and ethnic antagonism is a collectively driven refusal of our own enjoyment. Using examples from popular culture and high theory to illuminate each other—opera, film noir, capitalist universalism, religious and ethnic fundamentalism—this work testifies to the fact that, far more radically than the postmodern sophists, Kant and Hegel are our contemporaries. (shrink)

As a slew of recent work in epistemology has brought out, there is a range of cases where there's a strong temptation to say that prudential and (especially) moral considerations affect what we ought to believe. There are two distinct models of how this can happen. On the first, “reasons pragmatist” model, the relevant prudential and moral considerations constitute distinctively practical reasons for (or against) belief. On the second, “pragmatic encroachment” model, the relevant prudential and moral considerations affect what one (...) is epistemically justified in believing. The pragmatic encroachment model appears to have several advantages over reasons pragmatism, and this has led many recent philosophers to endorse the former. However, in this paper we argue that a version of reasons pragmatism can be (at least largely) saved from these purported disadvantages once paired with an independently plausible permissivism about epistemically justified outright belief. This hybrid view—“permissivist pragmatism”—holds that when there is more than one epistemically permitted doxastic attitude, practical (including moral) considerations can determine which epistemically permitted doxastic attitude one all-things-considered ought to have. This view avoids both the problems faced by simple versions of reasons pragmatism, and those that distinctively attend pragmatic encroachment, while preserving the advantages of each view. (shrink)

Book synopsis: In this combative major new work, philosophical sharpshooter Slavoj Zizek looks for the kernel of truth in the totalitarian politics of the past. Examining Heidegger's seduction by fascism and Foucault's flirtation with the Iranian Revolution, he suggests that these were the 'right steps in the wrong direction.' On the revolutionary terror of Robespierre, Mao and the bolsheviks, Zizek argues that while these struggles ended in historic failure and horror, there was a valuable core of idealism lost beneath the (...) bloodshed. A redemptive vision has been obscured by the soft, decentralized politics of the liberal-democratic consensus. Faced with the coming ecological crisis, Zizekk argues the case for revolutionary terror and the dictatorship of the proletariat. A return to past ideals is needed despite the risks. In the words of Samuel Beckett: 'Try again. Fail again. Fail better.'. (shrink)

© 2019 The Author. Background: The phenomenon of being 'with woman' is fundamental to midwifery as it underpins its philosophy, relationships and practices. There is an identified gap in knowledge around the 'with woman' phenomenon from the perspective of midwives providing care in a variety of contexts. As such, the aim of this study was to explore the experiences of being 'with woman' during labour and birth from the perspective of midwives' working in a model where care is provided by (...) a known midwife. Methods: A descriptive phenomenological design was employed with ten midwives working in a 'known midwife' model who described their experiences of being 'with woman' during labour and birth. The method was informed by Husserlian philosophy which seeks to explore the same phenomenon through rich descriptions by individuals revealing commonalities of the experience. Results: Five themes emerged 1) Building relationships; 2) Woman centred care; 3) Impact on the midwife; 4) Impact on the woman; and 5) Challenges in the Known Midwife model. Midwives emphasised the importance of trusting relationships while being 'with woman', confirming that this relationship extends beyond the woman - midwife relationship to include the woman's support people and family. Being 'with woman' during labour and birth in the context of the relationship facilitates woman-centred care. Being 'with woman' influences midwives, and, it is noted, the women that midwives are working with. Finally, challenges that impact being 'with woman' in the known midwife model are shared by midwives. Conclusions: Findings offer valuable insight into midwives' experiences of being 'with woman' in the context of models that provide care by a known midwife. In this model, the trusting relationship is the conduit for being 'with woman' which influences the midwife, the profession of midwifery, as well as women and their families. Descriptions of challenges to being 'with woman' provide opportunities for professional development and service review. Rich descriptions from the unique voice of midwives, provided insight into the applied practices of being 'with woman' in a known midwife model which adds important knowledge concerning a phenomenon so deeply embedded in the philosophy and practices of the profession of midwifery. (shrink)

Straipsnyje apžvelgiama mokslinė konferencija „(Post)tiesa ir žinojimas filosofiniu, sociologiniu ir komunikaciniu požiūriu“, įvykusi Lietuvos mokslų akademijoje. Kon­ ferencijoje nagrinėtos temos: tiesa ir posttiesa Rusijoje, žmogaus tapatumas medijo­ se, tiesos problema Martino Heideggerio filosofijoje, techninės posttiesos galimybės sąlygos, pedagogika (post)tiesos sąlygomis, nesutarimo etika ir diplomatija bei racio­ nalumų įvairovė, politinis veikimas posttiesos sąlygomis, politinis ethos, posttiesos apraiškos medijose ir propagandoje, sąmokslo teorijos ir posttiesos santykis, taip pat analizuota posttiesos būklė per žaidimo fenomenologijos prizmę ir kt. Straipsnyje ap­ tariamos pagrindinės konferencijos pranešėjų (...) mintys, su kai kuriomis jų polemizuoja­ ma, apžvelgiami svarbesni diskusijų momentai. (shrink)

t. 1. Putʹ dukhovnogo obnovlenii︠a︡ ; Osnovy khristianskoĭ kulʹtury ; Krizis bezbozhii︠a︡ -- t. 2, kn. 1-2. Nashi zadachi -- t. 3. Shleĭermakher i ego "Rechi o religii" : religioznyĭ smysl filosofii : tri rechi, 1914-1923 ; I︠A︡ bgli︠a︡dyvai︠u︡sʹ v zhiznʹ : kniga razdumiĭ ; Poi︠u︡shchee serdt︠s︡e : kniga tikhakh sozert︠s︡aniĭ ; Putʹ k ochevidnosti -- t. 4. Poni︠a︡tii︠a︡ prava i sily ; Obshchee uchenie o prave i gosudarstve ; O suchnosti pravosoznanii︠a︡ ; O monarkhii i respublike -- t. 5. (...) Osnovnoe Nravstvennoe protivorechie voĭny ; O sopotivlenii zlu siloi︠u︡ ; Statʹi, Pisʹma -- t. 6, kn. 1. O li︠u︡beznosti sot︠s︡ialʹno-psikhologicheskiĭ opyt ; Osnovy khudozhestva, o sovershennom v iskusstve ; O tʹme i prosvetlenii : kniga khudozhestvennoĭ kritiki, Bunin, Remnozov, Shmelev -- t. 6, kn. 2. O Rossii ; Russkie pisateli, literatura, teatr, muzyka ; Khudozhnik i khudozhestvennostʹ -- t. 6, kn. 3. O Rossii i russkoĭ dushe ; Genii Rossii -- t. 7. O bolʹshevizme i kommunizme ; Muchenichestvo t︠s︡erkovʹ v sovetskom gosudarstve ; Sovetskiĭ soi︠u︡z ne Rossii︠a︡ ; O nat︠s︡ionalʹnom prievanii Rossii ; Tvorcheskai︠a︡ idei︠a︡ nashego budushchego -- t. 8. Bolʹshevist︠s︡kai︠a︡ politika mirovogo gospodstva ; Vzgli︠a︡d vi︠a︡alʹ ; Kniga razmyshleniĭ i upovaniĭ -- t. 9-10. Dnevnik ; Pisʹma ; Dokumenty (1903-1938) -- [t. 10.] Pisʹma ; Memuary (1939-1954) -- [t. 11. kn. 1] Perepiska dvukh Ivanov (1927-1934) -- [t. 11. kn. 2.] Perepiska dvukh Ivanov (1935-1946) -- [t. 11. kn. 3.] Perepiska dvukh Ivanov (1947-1950) godov -- [t. 12.] Stat·i, lekt︠s︡ii, vystuplenii︠a︡, ret︠s︡enzii (1906-1954) -- [t. 13.] Kto my?; O revoli︠u︡t︠s︡ii ; O religioznom krizise nashikh dneĭ -- [t. 14. kn. 1.] Filosofii︠a︡ Gegeli︠a︡ kak uchenie o konkretnosti Boga i cheloveka : uchenie o Boge -- [t. 14. kn. 2.] Filosofi Gegeli︠a︡ kak uchenie o konkretnosti Boga i cheloveka : uchenie o cheloveke -- [t. 15. kn. 1.] Aksiomy religioznogo opyta : issleovanie -- [t. 15. kn. 2.] Aksiomy religioznogo opyta issledovanie -- [t. 16. kn. 1.] Mir pered propastʹi︠u︡ -- [t. 16. kn. 2.] Mir pered propastʹi︠u︡ ; Analiticherskie zapiski i publit︠s︡istika -- [t. 17.] Gitler i Stalin. Publit︠s︡istika 1939-1945 godov -- [t. 18.] Spravedlivostʹ ili ravenstvo? ; Publit︠s︡istika 1918-1947 godov -- [t. 19.] Russkiĭ kolokol : zhurnal volevoĭ idei [No special title]. (shrink)

We study structures equipped with generic predicates and/or automorphisms, and show that in many cases we obtain simple theories. We also show that a bounded PAC field is simple. 1998 Published by Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

According to a traditional interpretation of Kierkegaard, he endorses a strong form of direct doxastic voluntarism on which we can, by brute force of will, make a “leap of faith” to believe propositions that we ourselves take to be improbable and absurd. Yet most leading Kierkegaard scholars now wholly reject this reading, instead interpreting Kierkegaard as holding that the will can affect what we believe only indirectly. This paper argues that Kierkegaard does in fact endorse a restricted, sophisticated, and plausible (...) version of direct doxastic voluntarism. On Kierkegaard’s view, when we take ourselves to be in an epistemically permissive situation, we have the ability to form outright beliefs (but not credences) at will in virtue of our ability to voluntarily 1) open or close inquiry and 2) determine our attitude towards epistemic risk. (shrink)

Vague predicates, on a paraconsistent account, admit overdetermined borderline cases. I take up a new line on the paraconsistent approach, to show that there is a close structural relationship between the breakdown of soritical progressions, and contradiction. Accordingly, a formal picture drawn from an appropriate logic shows that any cut-off point of a vague predicate is unidentifiable, in a precise sense. A paraconsistent approach predicts and explains many of the most counterintuitive aspects of vagueness, in terms of a more fundamental (...) inconsistency. (shrink)

On the dominant contemporary accounts of how practical considerations affect what we ought to believe, practical considerations either encroach on epistemic rationality by affecting whether a belief is epistemically justified, or constitute distinctively practical reasons for belief which can only affect what we ought to believe by conflicting with epistemic rationality. This paper argues that Søren Kierkegaard offers a promising alternative view on which practical considerations can affect what we ought to believe without either encroaching on or (necessarily) conflicting with (...) epistemic rationality by determining which among the epistemically permitted outright doxastic attitudes one should all‐things‐considered adopt. (shrink)

Šiame straipsnyje pirmosios pokomunistinės kartos (gim. 1991–2000) vertybių analizei 24-iose pokomunistinėse šalyse pasitelkiama Ronaldo Ingleharto materialistinių-postmaterialistinių vertybių kaitos teorija. 1990–1993 m., 1999–2004 m., 2008– 2014 m. ir 2017–2022 m. bangų Pasaulio ir Europos vertybių tyrimų duomenų analizė leidžia daryti išvadas, kad daugumoje pokomunistinių šalių postmaterialistinės vertybės pirmojoje pokomunistinėje kartoje, palyginti su vyresnėmis kartomis, sustiprėjo. Tokia tendencija ypač ryški ekonomiškai stipriose pokomunistinėse šalyse, tačiau matoma ir ekonomiškai nepasiturinčiose. Tik šešiose šalyse fiksuotas statistiškai reikšmingas ryšys tarp religijos svarbos žmogaus gyvenime ir materialistinių-postmaterialistinių (...) vertybių pirmojoje pokomunistinėje kartoje. Tyrimas taip pat atskleidė, kad šalyse, kuriose dominuoja Romos katalikų tikėjimas, postmaterialistinės vertybės yra labiau paplitusios nei stačiatikių ortodoksų ir islamo dominuojamose šalyse pirmojoje pokomunistinėje kartoje. (shrink)

Whenever the membranes of the egg in which the foetus emerges on its way to becoming a new-born are broken, imagine for a moment that something flies off, and that one can do it with an egg as easily as with a man, namely the hommelette, or the lamella. The lamella is something extra-flat, which moves like the amoeba. It is just a little more complicated. But it goes everywhere. And as it is something - I will tell you shortly (...) why - that is related to what the sexed being loses in sexuality, it is, like the amoeba in relation to sexed beings, immortal - because it survives any division, and scissiparous intervention. And it can turn around. Well! This is not very reassuring. But suppose it comes and envelopes your face while you are quietly asleep... I can't see how we would not join battle with a being capable of these properties. But it would not be a very convenient battle. This lamella, this organ, whose characteristic is not to exist, but which is nevertheless an organ - I can give you more details as to its zoological place - is the libido. It is the libido, qua pure life instinct, that is to say, immortal life, irrepressible life, life that has need of no organ, simplified, indestructible life. It is precisely what is subtracted from the living being by virtue of the fact that it is subject to the cycle of sexed reproduction. And it is of this that all the forms of the objet a that can be enumerated are the representatives, the equivalents. Every word has a weight here, in this deceivingly poetic description of the mythic creature called by Lacan "lamella". Lacan imagines lamella as a version of what Freud called "partial object": a weird organ which is magically autonomized, surviving without a body whose organ it should have been, like a hand that wonders around alone in early Surrealist films, or like the smile in Alice in Wonderland that persists alone, even when the Cheshire cat's body is no longer present: "'All right', said the Cat; and this time it vanished quite slowly, beginning with the end of the tail, and ending with the grin, which remained some time after the rest of it had gone. 'Well! I've often seen a cat without a grin', thought Alice; 'but a grin without a cat! It's the most curious thing I ever saw in my life!'" The lamella is an entity of pure surface, without the density of a substance, an infinitely plastic object that can not only incessantly change its form, but can even transpose itself from one to another medium: imagine a "something" that is first heard as a shrilling sound, and then pops up as a monstrously distorted body. A lamella is indivisible, indestructible, and immortal - more precisely, undead in the sense this term has in horror fiction: not the sublime spiritual immortality, but the obscene immortality of the "living dead" which, after every annihilation, re-composes themselves and clumsily goes on. As Lacan puts it in his terms, lamella does not exist, it insists: it is unreal, an entity of pure semblance, a multiplicity of appearances which seem to envelop a central void - its status is purely fantasmatic. This blind indestructible insistence of the libido is what Freud called "death drive," and one should bear in mind that "death drive" is, paradoxically, the Freudian name for its very opposite, for the way immortality appears within psychoanalysis: for an uncanny excess of life, for an "undead" urge which persist beyond the cycle of life and death, of generation and corruption. This is why Freud equates death drive with the so-called "compulsion-to-repeat," an uncanny urge to repeat painful past experiences which seems to outgrow the natural limitations of the organism affected by it and to insist even beyond the organism's death - again, like the living dead in a horror film who just go on. This excess inscribes itself into the human body in the guise of a wound which makes the subject "undead," depriving him of the capacity to die : when this wound is healed, the hero can die in peace. (shrink)

Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus famously defines faith as a risky “venture” that requires “holding fast” to “objective uncertainty.” Yet puzzlingly, he emphasizes that faith requires resolute conviction and certainty. Moreover, Climacus claims that all beliefs about contingent propositions about the external world “exclude doubt” and “nullify uncertainty,” but also that uncertainty is “continually present” in these very same beliefs. This paper argues that these apparent contradictions can be resolved by interpreting Climacus as a belief‐credence dualist. That is, Climacus holds that (...) beliefs and credences (i.e., degrees of belief) are two irreducibly distinct types of mental states. Beliefs are resolutions that close inquiry, thereby excluding doubt and reflecting subjective certainty by disregarding the possibility of error. Credences, by contrast, reflect assessments of evidential probabilities, thereby encoding a recognition of “objective uncertainty” by acknowledging the possibility of error. In addition to solving a vexing interpretive puzzle and showing how Kierkegaard anticipates contemporary views about the nature of belief and credence, this paper demonstrates that Kierkegaard developed a sophisticated account of the nature of belief, doubt, and certainty that merits serious philosophical consideration. (shrink)

The experience of the Yugoslav war and the rise of "irrational" violence in contemporary societies provides the theoretical and political context of this book, ...

The need for continuing provision of beneficial experimental interventions after research is concluded remains a controversial topic in bioethics for research. Based on the principle of beneficence, justice as reciprocity, concerns about exploitation and fair benefits, participants should be able to have continuing access to benefits beyond the research period. However, there is no consensus about whether or not post-trial provision of beneficial interventions should be mandatory for participants from developing countries. This paper summarises recommendations from international and national guidelines. (...) Ethical principles and practical issues relating to post-trial provision are also discussed. In conclusion, post-trial provision is not necessary in all situations and a set of criteria are proposed to identify the situations that beneficial interventions should be provided beyond the research period. However, mandatory post-trial supply of beneficial experimental interventions should be assured for those who still need and are able to benefit from them but have no alternative access. Mandatory provision is based on universal bioethical principles such as beneficence and justice. Furthermore, difficulties associated with implementation of post-trial provision are not unmanageable. Careful advanced planning and a comprehensive partnership among relevant parties would be very helpful in solving these difficulties in practice, which therefore should not be taken as an excuse to escape post-trial responsibility. (shrink)