The Special Composition Question asks under what conditions a plurality of objects form another, composite object. We propose a condition grounded in our scientific knowledge of physical reality, the essence of which is that objects form a composite object when and only when they are in a bound state – whence our Bound State Proposal. We provide a variety of reasons in favour of a mereological theory that accommodates our Proposal. We consider but reject another proposal, which is (...) quantum-physical in nature: the Entanglement Proposal. We close by responding to Teller’s ‘Suit Objection’. (shrink)

This paper provides the first thorough assessment of a physics-based answer, the Bound State Answer, to the Special Composition Question. According to the BSA some objects compose something if they are in a common bound state. The reasons to endorse such an answer, in particular, motivations coming from empirical adequacy and conservativeness, precision, simplicity, and parsimony, are critically addressed. I then go on to compare the BSA to other moderate answers to the SCQ and consider whether objections raised (...) against such answers can be raised against the BSA as well. I finally relate the discussion with mereological pluralism. (shrink)

The energy spectrum of the bound states of the nucleon-monopole system is determined, the monopole harmonics Yq,l,m are related to Wigner's functions D m,m′ (L) of the rotation matrix, and the scattering wave functions of the proton in the dyon source field are calculated.

The basic methods that have been used for describing bound-state quantum electrodynamics are described and critically discussed. These include the external field approximation, the quasi-potential approaches, the effective potential approach, the Bethe–Salpeter method, and the three-dimensional equations of Lepage and other workers. Other methods less frequently used but of some intrinsic interest such as applications of the Duffin–Kemmer equation are also described. A comparison of the strengths and shortcomings of these various approaches is included.

We develop here the general treatment arising from the Bethe-Salpeter equation for a two-particle bound system in which at least one of the particles is spinless. It is shown that a natural two-component formalism can be formulated for describing the propagators of scalar particles. This leads to a formulation of the Bethe-Salpeter equation in a form very reminiscent of the fermion-fermion case. It is also shown, that using this two-component formulation for spinless particles, the perturbation theory can be systematically (...) developed in a manner similar to that of fermions. Quantum electrodynamics for scalar particles is then developed in the two component formalism, and the problem of bound states, in which one of the constituent particles is spinless, is examined by means of the means of the Bethe-Salpeter equation. For this case, the Bethe-Salpeter equation is cast into a form which is convenient to perform a Foldy-Woutyhuysen transformation which we carry out, keeping the lowest-order relativistic corrections to the nonrelativistic equation. The results are compared with the corresponding fermion-fermion case. It is shown, as might have been expected, that the only spin-independent terms that occur for the fermion-fermion system which do not occur for bound scalar particle cases, is the zitterbewegung contribution. The relevance of the above considerations for systems that are essentially bound by electromagnetic interactions, such as kaonic hydrogen, is discussed. (shrink)

We derive the so-called Barbieri-Remiddi solution of the Bethe-Salpeter equation in QED in its general form and discuss its application to the bound-state energy spectrum.

We consider the Bohmian trajectories in a 2-d quantum harmonic oscillator with non commensurable frequencies whose wavefunction is of the form Ψ=aΨm1,n1+bΨm2,n2+cΨm3,n3\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\Psi =a\Psi _{m_1,n_1}+b\Psi _{m_2,n_2}+c\Psi _{m_3,n_3}$$\end{document}. We first find the trajectories of the nodal points for different combinations of the quantum numbers m, n. Then we study, in detail, a case with relatively large quantum numbers and two equal m′s\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$m's$$\end{document}. We find fixed (...) nodes independent of time and moving nodes which from time to time collide with the fixed nodes and at particular times they go to infinity. Finally, we study the trajectories of quantum particles close to the nodal points and observe, for the first time, how chaos is generated in a complex system with multiple nodes scattered on the configuration space. (shrink)

Recently, in the framework of a relativistic quantum theory with invariant evolution parameter, solutions have been found for the two-body bound state, whose mass spectrum agrees with the nonrelativistic Schrödinger energy spectrum. In this paper, we study the radiative transitions of these states in the dipole approximation and find that the selection rules are identical with those of the usual nonrelativistic theory, expressed in a manifestly covariant form. In addition to the transverse and longitudinal polarizations of the nonrelativistic (...) theory, we find a “scalar” transition, induced by the relative time coordinate, which is of the same type as the longitudinal transition, expressing the Lorentz covariance of the theory. (shrink)

A proof is given for the theorem that at least one bound state exists in a one-dimensional attractive potential however weak it may be. The proof is constructive in that it provides a method to explicitly solve the eigenvalue problem for the eigenvalues as well as the eigenfunctions. The method is well suited to precise numerical calculations.

Loneliness is one of the most neglected aspects of emotion history, despite claims that the 21st century is the loneliest ever. This article argues against the widespread belief that modern-day loneliness is inevitable, negative, and universal. Looking at its language and etymology, it suggests that loneliness needs to be understood firstly as an “emotion cluster” composed of a variety of affective states, and secondly as a relatively recent invention, dating from around 1800. Loneliness can be positive, and as much (...) a part of the body as the mind. Using a longue durée approach, I argue that we cannot understand loneliness as a “modern epidemic” without considering its history, its meanings, its practice, and its links with the body. (shrink)

A repulsive core force is derived which, assuming π mesons are the field particles, gives binding energies in good agreement with binding energies per nucleon of heavy nuclei. The physical model consists of a field of relatively short range, in which emission of a π meson by a nucleon and subsequent absorption by a neighboring nucleon is equivalent to a potential well. The binding energy at the equilibrium spacing of the nucleons is the self-energy of the π mesons, which is (...) calculated by analogy with classical electric fields. (shrink)

Harry G. Frankfurt has put the problem of volitional conflict at the center of philosophical attention. If you care fundamentally about your career and your family, but these cares conflict, this conflict undermines the coherency of your decision standard and thereby your ability to choose and act autonomously. The standard response to this problem is to argue that you can overcome volitional conflict by unifying your foundational motivational states. As Frankfurt puts it, the ‘totality of things that an agent (...) cares about’ plus his ‘ordering of how important to him they are effectively specifies his answer to the question of how to live’ (The Reasons of Love(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 23). In this paper, I critically assess the three main reasons given for such a coherency requirement: 1) we can do only one action at a time; 2) our motivational states come with normative pressure towards coherency; and 3) conflicting motivational states provide us with an incoherent decision-making framework. I conclude that these reasons do not ground a coherency requirement for practical deliberation and argue that we can autonomously express ourselves as volitionally conflicted by acting on our conflicting motivational states over the course of multiple actions. (shrink)

Contemporary versions of Bell’s argument against local hidden variable (LHV) theories are based on the Clauser Horne Shimony and Holt (CHSH) inequality, and various attempts to generalize it. The amount of violation of these inequalities cannot exceed the bound set by the Grothendieck constants. However, if we go back to the original derivation by Bell, and use the perfect anticorrelation embodied in the singlet spin state, we can go beyond these bounds. In this paper we derive two-particle Bell inequalities (...) for traceless two-outcome observables, whose violation in the singlet spin state go beyond the Grothendieck constant both for the two and three dimensional cases. Moreover, creating a higher dimensional analog of perfect correlations, and applying a recent result of Alon and his associates (Invent. Math. 163 499 (2006)) we prove that there are two-particle Bell inequalities for traceless two-outcome observables whose violation increases to in…nity as the dimension and number of measurements grow. Technically these result are possible because perfect correlations (or anti-correlations) allow us to transport the indices of the inequality from the edges of a bipartite graph to those of the complete graph. Finally, it is shown how to apply these results to mixed Werner states, provided that the noise does not exceed 20%. (shrink)

The bounded confidence model has become a popular tool for studying communities of epistemically interacting agents. The model makes the idealizing assumption that all agents always have access to all other agents’ belief states. We draw on resources from network epistemology to do away with this assumption. In the model to be proposed, we impose an explicit communication network on a community, due to which each agent has access to the beliefs of only a selection of other agents. A (...) much-discussed result from network epistemology shows that densely connected communication networks are not always preferable to sparser networks. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether there are any noteworthy network effects in a version of the bounded confidence model augmented with communication networks, and in particular whether the aforementioned result from network epistemology can be replicated in that version. (shrink)

We introduce a three-tiered framework for modelling and reasoning about agents who (i) can use possibly complete reasoning systems without any restrictions but who nevertheless are (ii) bounded in the sense that they never reach infinitely many results and, finally, who (iii) perform their reasoning in time. This last aspect does not concern so much the time it takes for agents to actually carry out their reasoning, as the time which can bring about external changes in the agents’ states (...) such as arriving of new information or discarding previously available information due to bounds of the agent’s resources. These three aspects are treated with the maximal possible degree of independence from each other. The treatment of layer (iii) can be combined with arbitrary logic at level (ii) which, in turn, can be combined with arbitrary agent logic at level (i). At the level (iii), we discuss briefly the duality (or rather, complementarity) of system descriptions based on actions and transitions, on the one hand, and states and their changes, on the other. We settle for the latter and present a simple language, for describing state changes, which is parameterized by an arbitrary language for describing properties of the states. The language can be viewed as a simple fragment of step logic, admitting however various extensions by appropriate choices of the underlying logic. Alternatively, it can be seen as a very specific fragment of temporal logic (with a variant of ‘until’ or ‘chop’ operator), and is interpreted over dense linear time. The reasoning system presented here is sound, as well as strongly complete and decidable (provided that so is the parameter logic for reasoning about single states). We give the main idea of the completeness proof and suggest a wide range of possible applications, which is a simple consequence of the parametric character of both the language and the reasoning system. We address then in more detail the case of non-omniscient rational agents, (ii). Their models are syntactic structures (sets of available formulae) similar in spirit, though not in the technical formulation, to the models used in other syntax oriented approaches and in active logic. We give a new sound, complete and decidable system for reasoning about such agents. Finally, we illustrate its extensions with the internal reasoning of agents, (i), by equipping them with some example logics. (shrink)

In this paper I have two main aims. My first aim is to introduce the notion of bounded emotionality. This notion is the analogue of that of bounded rationality in behavioural economics. Bounded rationality says, roughly, that human beings are cognitively limited with respect to their processing and memory capacities. Bounded emotionality says that we are limited in our emotional capabilities, notably in the intensity, duration, and possible combinations of our emotional states. Bounded rationality is a foundational notion in (...) behavioural economics and has played an important role in various fields of philosophy as well. In particular, in epistemology bounded rationality has been thought to have implications with respect to our doxastic norms. My second aim in this paper is to suggest that bounded emotionality also has an important role to play in philosophy. As a case in point, I discuss the implications that bounded emotionality has for our doxastic norms. In particular, I argue that one is not obligated to believe something or to stop holding a belief if one could not believe/fail to believe it without having an emotional response that exceeds one's bounded emotional capacities. (shrink)

This paper presents the model of ‘bounded revision’ that is based on two-dimensional revision functions taking as arguments pairs consisting of an input sentence and a reference sentence. The key idea is that the input sentence is accepted as far as (and just a little further than) the reference sentence is ‘cotenable’ with it. Bounded revision satisfies the AGM axioms as well as the Same Beliefs Condition (SBC) saying that the set of beliefs accepted after the revision does not depend (...) on the reference sentence (although the posterior belief state does depend on it). Bounded revision satisfies the Darwiche–Pearl (DP) axioms for iterated belief change. If the reference sentence is fixed to be a tautology or a contradiction, two well-known one-dimensional revision operations result. Bounded revision thus naturally fills the space between conservative revision (also known as natural revision) and moderate revision (also known as lexicographic revision). I compare this approach to the two-dimensional model of ‘revision by comparison’ investigated by Fermé and Rott (Artif Intell 157:5–47, 2004 ) that satisfies neither the SBC nor the DP axioms. I conclude that two-dimensional revision operations add substantially to the expressive power of qualitative approaches that do not make use of numbers as measures of degrees of belief. (shrink)

There have been two major lines of research aimed at capturing resource-bounded players in game theory. The first, initiated by Rubinstein (), charges an agent for doing costly computation; the second, initiated by Neyman (), does not charge for computation, but limits the computation that agents can do, typically by modeling agents as finite automata. We review recent work on applying both approaches in the context of decision theory. For the first approach, we take the objects of choice in a (...) decision problem to be Turing machines, and charge players for the “complexity” of the Turing machine chosen (e.g., its running time). This approach can be used to explain well-known phenomena like first-impression-matters biases (i.e., people tend to put more weight on evidence they hear early on) and belief polarization (two people with different prior beliefs, hearing the same evidence, can end up with diametrically opposed conclusions) as the outcomes of quite rational decisions. For the second approach, we model people as finite automata, and provide a simple algorithm that, on a problem that captures a number of settings of interest, provably performs optimally as the number of states in the automaton increases. (shrink)

We consider several puzzles of bounded rationality. These include the Allais- and Ellsberg paradox, the disjunction effect, and related puzzles. We argue that the present account of quantum cognition—taking quantum probabilities rather than classical probabilities—can give a more systematic description of these puzzles than the alternate treatments in the traditional frameworks of bounded rationality. Unfortunately, the quantum probabilistic treatment does not always provide a deeper understanding and a true explanation of these puzzles. One reason is that quantum approaches introduce additional (...) parameters which possibly can be fitted to empirical data but which do not necessarily explain them. Hence, the phenomenological research has to be augmented by responding to deeper foundational issues. In this article, we make the general distinction between foundational and phenomenological research programs, explaining the foundational issue of quantum cognition from the perspective of operational realism. This framework is motivated by assuming partial Boolean algebras. They are combined into a uniform system via a mechanism preventing the simultaneous realization of perspectives. Gleason’s theorem then automatically leads to a distinction between probabilities that are defined by pure states and probabilities arising from the statistical mixture of pure states. This formal distinction relates to the conceptual distinction between risk and ignorance. Another outcome identifies quantum aspects in dynamic macro-systems using the framework of symbolic dynamics. Finally, we discuss several ideas that are useful for justifying complementarity in cognitive systems. (shrink)

Where AR is the set of arithmetic Turing degrees, 0 (ω ) is the least member of { $\mathbf{\alpha}^{(2)}|\mathbf{a}$ is an upper bound on AR}. This situation is quite different if we examine HYP, the set of hyperarithmetic degrees. We shall prove (Corollary 1) that there is an a, an upper bound on HYP, whose hyperjump is the degree of Kleene's O. This paper generalizes this example, using an iteration of the jump operation into the transfinite which is (...) based on results of Jensen and is detailed in [3] and [4]. In $\S1$ we review the basic definitions from [3] which are needed to state the general results. (shrink)

The AGM paradigm for belief revision provides a very elegant and powerful framework for reasoning about idealized agents. The paradigm assumes that the modeled agent is a perfect reasoner with infinite memory. In this paper we propose a framework to reason about non-ideal agents that generalizes the AGM paradigm. We first introduce a structure to represent an agent's belief states that distinguishes different status of beliefs according to whether or not they are explicitly represented, whether they are currently active (...) and whether they are fully accepted or provisional. Then we define a set of basic operations that change the status of beliefs and show how these operations can be used to model agents with different capacities. We also show how different operations of belief change described in the literature can be seen as special cases of our theory. (shrink)

This paper presents proof that Buss's S22 can prove the consistency of a fragment of Cook and Urquhart's PV from which induction has been removed but substitution has been retained. This result improves Beckmann's result, which proves the consistency of such a system without substitution in bounded arithmetic S12. Our proof relies on the notion of "computation" of the terms of PV. In our work, we first prove that, in the system under consideration, if an equation is proved and either (...) its left- or right-hand side is computed, then there is a corresponding computation for its right- or left-hand side, respectively. By carefully computing the bound of the size of the computation, the proof of this theorem inside a bounded arithmetic is obtained, from which the consistency of the system is readily proven. This result apparently implies the separation of bounded arithmetic because Buss and Ignjatović stated that it is not possible to prove the consistency of a fragment of PV without induction but with substitution in Buss's S12. However, their proof actually shows that it is not possible to prove the consistency of the system, which is obtained by the addition of propositional logic and other axioms to a system such as ours. On the other hand, the system that we have considered is strictly equational, which is a property on which our proof relies. (shrink)

This paper exploits the modified simple equation and dynamical system schemes to integrate the Klein–Gordon model amid quadratic nonlinearity arising in nonlinear optics, quantum theories, and solid state physics. By implementing the modified simple equation technique, we develop some disguise adaptation of analytical solutions in terms of hyperbolic, exponential, and trigonometric functions with some special parameters. We apply the dynamical system to bifurcate the model and draw distinct phase portraits on unlike parametric constraints. Following each orbit of all phase portraits, (...) we originate bounded and unbounded solitary, periodic, and periodic rogue-type wave solutions of the KG model. These two schemes extract widespread classes of solitary, periodic, and periodic rogue-type wave solutions for the KG model jointly due to restrictions on parameters. We also analyze the effect of parameters on the obtained wave solutions and discuss why and when it changes its nature. We illustrate some dynamical features of the acquired solutions via the 3D, 2D, and contour graphics. (shrink)

Decision theory seems to offer a very attractive normative framework for individual and social choice under uncertainty. The decisionmaker should think of her choice situation, at any given moment, in terms of a set of possible outcomes, that is, specifications of the possible consequences of choice, described in light of the decisionmaker's goals; a set of possible actions; and a "state set" consisting of possible prior "states of the world." It is this framework for choice which provides the foundation (...) for expected utility theory, as demonstrated in the work of Leonard Savage. Problems arise, however, when the decisionmaker is boundedly rational: when the mental process of thinking about outcomes, actions, and states is itself expensive and time consuming. In the case of the unboundedly rational decisionmaker, decision theory enjoins her to employ maximally specific outcomes; to consider all possible actions; and to use a set of mutually exclusive and collective exhaustive states, each of which is sufficiently finely specified so that each action, together with each state, yields one and only one maximally specific outcome. In the case of the boundedly rational decisionmaker, this procedure is either infeasible or, if feasible, irrational. This paper presents the problem of bounded rationality. It surveys possible solutions, none of which are found to be attractive. And it concludes by discussing the difficulties that the problem of bounded rationality poses for the welfarist program for legal scholarship presented by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell in their book, Fairness versus Welfare. (shrink)

It has long been known that memory need not be a literal reproduction of the past but may be a constructive process. To say that memory is a constructive process is to say that the encoded content may differ from the retrieved content. At the same time, memory is bound by the authenticity constraint which states that the memory content must be true to the subject's original perception of reality. This paper addresses the question of how the constructive (...) nature of visual memory can be reconciled with the authenticity constraint. In what respect and to what extent may the content of a visual memory differ from the original perceptual state while still adequately reflecting the subject's original perception? (shrink)

Bodily sensations are mental states typically suitable to be reported in judgments in which a first-person indexical is used to qualify the felt body. In other words, subjects typically have a sense of bodily ownership for the body that they feel in bodily sensations. This paper puts forward, firstly, three desiderata that theories on the sense of bodily ownership should meet. Secondly, it assesses two views that account for the sense of bodily ownership in terms of the spatial content (...) of bodily sensations, appealing to a notion of a sense of boundedness, and argues that they do not meet the goals defined. (shrink)

Herbert Simon's renowned theory of bounded rationality is principally interested in cognitive constraints and environmental factors and influences which prevent people from thinking or behaving according to formal rationality. Simon's theory has been expanded in numerous directions and taken up by various disciplines with an interest in how humans think and behave. This includes philosophy, psychology, neurocognitive sciences, economics, political science, sociology, management, and organization studies. The Routledge Handbook of Bounded Rationality draws together an international team of leading experts to (...) survey the recent literature and the latest developments in these related fields. The chapters feature entries on key behavioural phenomena, including reasoning, judgement, decision making, uncertainty, risk, heuristics and biases, and fast and frugal heuristics. The text also examines current ideas such as fast and slow thinking, nudge, ecological rationality, evolutionary psychology, embodied cognition, and neurophilosophy. Overall, the volume serves to provide the most complete state-of-the-art collection on bounded rationality available. This book is essential reading for students and scholars of economics, psychology, neurocognitive sciences, political sciences, and philosophy. (shrink)

Empirical research on Rational Choice Theory has brought up two focus of the economics laws problem. On one hand, we find the authors who state that the neoclassical economics laws are explanatory and predictive on specific cases: in transparent contexts in which the standard rationality operates successfully. On the other hand, we find the authors who state that the descriptive theories of the rational choice opens up a research path in which fundamental principles of the neoclassical building could be questioned. (...) Both view points have generated an important standard Rational Choice Theory revision what has produced the so called descriptive view point. It implies understanding that most of the choices take place under risky or uncertainty conditions and, that, these choices are far more complex than the normative Rational Choice Theory supposes. This article's main goal is to expand the descriptive point of view in rational choice, theorizing how some factors, coming from the social and cultural environment, operate within the rational choice. Into space of this research essay we find the debatable question of whether these sort of proposals expands the explanation of the deviation of the rational choice normative theory, and that, of the disturbing causes of the microeconomics laws, or they call into question fundamental principles of these laws and therefore they are opening the possibility to focus some economics issues in a new different manner. (shrink)

The changes brought about in Poland and elsewhere in Europe by the fall of Communism have given rise to hopes for the establishment of a political system differing from the one which had been the fate of these countries. In place of totalitarianism, a new political system is to be created based on the democratic principles of a state under the rule of law. The transformation from totalitarianism to democracy is a process which has not yet been completed in Poland (...) and still requires many efforts to be made before this goal may be achieved. One may also enumerate various pitfalls jeopardising this process even now. The dangers cannot be avoided if their sources and nature are not identified. Attempts to pervert the law and the political system may only be counteracted by legal means if the system based on the abuse of the law has not yet succeeded in establishing itself. Resistance by means of the law only has any real chance of success provided it is directed against attempts to set up a totalitarian system. Once the powers which are hostile to the state bound by the rule of law take over the institutions of the state, such resistance is doomed to failure. (shrink)

The concept of "recognition" lies at the intersection between contemporary identity politics and the philosophy of Hegel. While Hegel's philosophy is often invoked to provide normative grounding for political projects devoted to overcoming misrecognition, Hegel's analysis of recognition actually supports an immanent critique of such politics. It provides us with diagnostic tools that show how the pursuit of recognition, especially in the context of modern, state-centered politics, works both for and against the values of agency and plurality it is supposed (...) to serve. I develop this argument through readings of Hegel's Phenomenology and Philosophy of Right; Sophocles' Antigone; the history Jewish emancipation in nineteenth-century Prussia; and contemporary theorists of multiculturalism, including Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka. ;In chapter one, establishing connections between Taylor's work on Herder and language and his work on multiculturalism, I show that demands for recognition have a self-obscuring character: recognition constructs identities by seeming only to cognize them. To understand the temptations and risks of political strategies that constitutively involve misunderstanding our own activity in this way, chapters two and three turn to important recognition scenes in Sophocles' Antigone and Hegel's Phenomenology. Read through the lens of tragedy, Hegel illuminates how the pursuit of recognition, blind to its own participation in the workings of power through which identities are constructed, enacts new forms of subjection in the name of an attractive yet impossible vision of masterful agency. Chapters four and five show that, pace the later Hegel, the mediating institution of the modern state cannot salvage the ideal of recognition, because the state itself participates in struggles for recognition, demanding confirmation of its sovereignty. I trace the consequences of the state's involvement in the politics of recognition through the case of Jewish emancipation, and by analyzing contemporary debates over the supposedly divisive effects of multiculturalism as struggles for recognition in which the sovereign imperatives of multicultural states help generate essentialist articulations of identity, foreclosing democratic agency. The conclusion suggests modes of political practice and institution that might enable us to loosen our tenacious attachment to recognition, thereby negotiating its double binds more gracefully. (shrink)

A crucial socio-political challenge for our age is how to rede!ne or extend group membership in such a way that it adequately responds to phenomena related to globalization like the prevalence of migration, the transformation of family and social networks, and changes in the position of the nation state. Two centuries ago Immanuel Kant assumed that international connectedness between humans would inevitably lead to the realization of world citizen rights. Nonetheless, globalization does not just foster cosmopolitanism but simultaneously yields the (...) development of new group boundaries. Group membership is indeed a fundamental issue in political processes, for: “the primary good that we distribute to one another is membership in some human community” – it is within the political community that power is being shared and, if possible, held back from non-members. In sum, it is appropriate to consider group membership a fundamental ingredient of politics and political theory. How group boundaries are drawn is then of only secondary importance. Indeed, Schmitt famously declared that “[e]very religious, moral, economic, ethical, or other antithesis transforms into a political one if it is suffciently strong to group human beings e#ectively according to friend and enemy”. Even though Schmitt’s idea of politics as being constituted by such antithetical groupings is debatable, it is plausible to consider politics among other things as a way of handling intergroup di#erences. Obviously, some of the group-constituting factors are more easily discernable from one’s appearance than others, like race, ethnicity, or gender. As a result, factors like skin color or sexual orientation sometimes carry much political weight even though individuals would rather con!ne these to their private lives and individual identity. Given the potential tension between the political reality of particular groupmembership defnitions and the – individual and political – struggles against those definitions and corresponding attitudes, citizenship and civic behavior becomes a complex issue. As Kymlicka points out, it implies for citizens an additional obligation to non-discrimination regarding those groups: “[t]his extension of non-discrimination from government to civil society is not just a shift in the scale of liberal norms, it also involves a radical extension in the obligations of liberal citizenship”. Unfortunately, empirical research suggests that political intolerance towards other groups “may be the more natural and ‘easy’ position to hold”. Indeed, since development of a virtue of civility or decency regarding other groups is not easy, as it often runs against deeply engrained stereotypes and prejudices, political care for matters like education is justified. Separate schools, for example, may erode children’s motivation to act as citizens, erode their capacity for it and!nally diminish their opportunities to experience transcending their particular group membership and behave as decent citizens. This chapter outlines a possible explanation for such consequences. That explanation will be found to be interdisciplinary in nature, combining insights from political theory and cognitive neuroscience. In doing so, it does not focus on collective action, even though that is a usual focus for political studies. For example, results pertaining to collective political action have demonstrated that the relation between attitudes and overt voting behavior or political participation is not as direct and strong as was hoped for. Several conditions, including the individual’s experiences, self-interest, and relevant social norms, turned out to interfere in the link between his or her attitude and behavior. Important as collective action is, this chapter is concerned with direct interaction between agents and the in$uence of group membership on such interaction – in particular joint action. Although politics does include many forms of action that require no such physical interaction, such physical interaction between individuals remains fundamental to politics – this is the reason why separate schooling may eventually undermine the citizenship of its isolated pupils. This chapter will focus on joint action, de!ned as: “any form of social interaction whereby two or more individuals coordinate their actions in space and time to bring about a change in the environment”. Cognitive neuroscienti!c evidence demonstrates that for such joint action to succeed, the agents have to integrate the actions and expected actions of the other person in their own action plans at several levels of speci!city. Although neuroscienti!c research is necessarily limited to simple forms of action, this concurs with a philosophical analysis of joint action, which I will discuss below. (shrink)

Empirical research on Rational Choice Theory has brought up two focus of the economics laws problem. On one hand, we find the authors who state that the neoclassical economics laws are explanatory and predictive on specific cases: in transparent contexts in which the standard rationality operates successfully. On the other hand, we find the authors who state that the descriptive theories of the rational choice opens up a research path in which fundamental principles of the neoclassical building could be questioned. (...) Both view points have generated an important standard Rational Choice Theory revision what has produced the so called descriptive view point . It implies understanding that most of the choices take place under risky or uncertainty conditions and, that, these choices are far more complex than the normative Rational Choice Theory supposes. This article's main goal is to expand the descriptive point of view in rational choice, theorizing how some factors, coming from the social and cultural environment, operate within the rational choice. Into space of this research essay we find the debatable question of whether these sort of proposals expands the explanation of the deviation of the rational choice normative theory, and that, of the disturbing causes of the microeconomics laws, or they call into question fundamental principles of these laws and therefore they are opening the possibility to focus some economics issues in a new different manner. (shrink)

An evidentialist can be extreme about epistemic requirements in a couple of different ways. At the reductionist end of the spectrum are those who think our epistemic obligations are fully satisfied by the mere having of evidential fit—where having implies nothing about doing. Your beliefs ought to align with your evidence, in other words, but there’s nothing you’re obligated to do in order to get yourself into the epistemically optimal position. At the expansionist end of the spectrum are those who (...) think we ought to do more—epistemically-speaking—than just bring about a state of evidential fit. We ought to get more evidence, for instance, if it’s somehow relevant to our beliefs. Rather leery of extremists, we prefer a moderate account of epistemic obligation. It’s a conjunction of three theses: (1) We never have an epistemic duty to believe any particular proposition; (2) We’re epistemically obligated to reflect on our evidence in order to produce a state of evidential fit; (3) We’re never epistemically obligated to acquire any additional evidence. Our aim is to make these plausible. (shrink)

Multiple explanatory frameworks may be required to provide an adequate account of human cognition. This paper embeds the classical account within a neural network framework, exploring the encoding of syntacticallystructured objects over the synchronicdiachronic characteristics of networks. Synchronic structure is defined in terms of temporal binding and the superposition of states. To accommodate asymmetric relations, synchronic structure is subject to the type uniqueness constraint. The nature of synchronic structure is shown to underlie Xbar theory that characterizes the phrasal structure (...) of human languages. The derivation differentiates core Xbar properties from languagespecific properties. (shrink)

Since ancient Greece’s “megalopolis,” the concept of vast cities has loomed in the urban discourse. A century ago, English planner Patrick Geddes warned about a growing imbalance between traditional society and ever-larger conurbations, an anxiety that Lewis Mumford later invoked to predict that urban hubris would inevitably collapse of its own weight. In 1961, by contrast, the geographer Jean Gottman surveyed the interconnected agglomeration stretching from Washington, D.C. up the east coast of the United States to the cities of (...) southern New England, and more optimistically highlighted this new urban form’s governance potential. Today, the question is not whether urbanism will arrive at the scale that so concerned Geddes and Mumford yet engaged Gottman—it already has. Commentators and scholars increasingly recognize that vast polycentric urban regions are displacing cities and metropolitan areas as the locus of modern growth and development. Eleven distinct urban-centered megaregions, for example, concentrate the bulk of the population and economic activity in the United States, and similar clusters are coalescing globally, from Greater Tokyo, Beijing, and the Pearl River Delta, to the arc from São Paulo to Rio de Janeiro, to the European urban spine running from London to Milan. Grappling with the phenomenon’s legal-institutional dimensions—whether and how to formalize governance to match this scale—requires more than transposing the descriptive and normative discourse on metropolitanism. Crosscurrents around fragmentation, efficiency, inequality, and democratic legitimacy refract, but there are distinct arguments for fostering governance—and equally particular concerns to anticipate—with the rise of the megalopolis. (shrink)

Spanning pivotal years in the historic democratization of South Africa, this analysis provides a trenchant reflection of higher education in transition. Penned by one of South Africa’s foremost philosophers of education, the critique grapples with very real concerns in higher education policymaking and practice, including stakeholder politics, institutional cultures, and curriculum transformation and interrogation of the function of higher education institutions in modern societies. Exposing the tensions between egalitarian principles and the nature of higher knowledge, the essays raise questions to (...) which there are no simple answers. With characteristic rigor, the analysis looks into the assumptions underlying much of the thinking about these questions and concludes that a failure to sharpen thinking around higher education is a failure to recognize the epistemic value of academic practice in a developing democracy. (shrink)

Often, when we are angry, we are angry at someone who has hurt us, and our anger is a protest against our perceived mistreatment. In these cases, its function is to hold the abuser accountable for their offense. The anger involves a demand for some sort of change or response: that the hurt be acknowledged, that the relationship be repaired, that the offending party reform in some way. In this paper, I develop and defend an account of a different form (...) of anger, called "outrage anger". Outrage anger does not aim to hold an abuser accountable, nor to demand repair or reform. Drawing on the work of Maria Lugones, I argue that outrage anger is directed at the state of affairs in which a violation is unintelligible to the dominant moral community. The central function of outrage anger is a psychological boundary setting: it closes off the victim’s ability to feel empathy for their abuser. Outrage has an important role to play in the context of political injustice, but that it also comes with significant costs. (shrink)

This paper studies the role that known bounds on message transmission times in a computer network play on the evolution of the epistemic state over time. A connection to cones of causal influence analogous to, and more general than, light cones is presented. Focusing on lower bounds on message transmission times, an analysis is presented of how knowledge about when others are guaranteed to be ignorant about an event of interest can arise. This has implications in competitive settings, in which (...) knowing about another’s ignorance can provide an advantage. (shrink)

Every quantum state can be represented as a probability distribution over the outcomes of an informationally complete measurement. But not all probability distributions correspond to quantum states. Quantum state space may thus be thought of as a restricted subset of all potentially available probabilities. A recent publication (Fuchs and Schack, arXiv:0906.2187v1, 2009) advocates such a representation using symmetric informationally complete (SIC) measurements. Building upon this work we study how this subset—quantum-state space—might be characterized. Our leading characteristic is that the (...) inner products of the probabilities are bounded, a simple condition with nontrivial consequences. To get quantum-state space something more detailed about the extreme points is needed. No definitive characterization is reached, but we see several new interesting features over those in Fuchs and Schack (arXiv:0906.2187v1, 2009), and all in conformity with quantum theory. (shrink)

Goncharov and Peretyat'kin independently gave necessary and sufficient conditions for when a set of types of a complete theory is the type spectrum of some homogeneous model of. Their result can be stated as a principle of second order arithmetic, which is called the Homogeneous Model Theorem (HMT), and analyzed from the points of view of computability theory and reverse mathematics. Previous computability theoretic results by Lange suggested a close connection between HMT and the Atomic Model Theorem (AMT), which (...) class='Hi'>states that every complete atomic theory has an atomic model. The authors show that HMT and AMT are indeed equivalent in the sense of reverse mathematics, as well as in a strong computability theoretic sense and do the same for an analogous result of Peretyat'kin giving necessary and sufficient conditions for when a set of types is the type spectrum of some model. (shrink)

One of the most complex and uncertain areas of international legal doctrine concerns how to deal with the aspiration of a people to achieve self-determination through the establishment of a new state and the related claim to a specific territory over which statehood is to be exercised. Recently, when the General Assembly of the United Nations referred to the International Court of Justice the question of the legality of the declaration of independence by Kosovar Albanians, the Court was given an (...) opportunity to clarify and develop the law on external self-determination. Instead, the Court answered extremely narrowly, confining its analysis to the legality of the act of declaration without determining any consideration of international legal norms applicable to the act of secession that was being proposed. This article intends to fill the gap left by the ICJ’s decision: first by critiquing the inadequacy and tensions visible in the existing doctrine and second by examining how recent developments in international law may allow for a more normatively coherent approach to the problem. (shrink)

We exhibit a construction which produces for every Turing machine T with two halting states μ 0 and μ -1 , an algebra B(T) (finite and of finite type) with the property that the variety generated by B(T) is residually large if T halts in state μ -1 , while if T halts in state μ 0 then this variety is residually bounded by a finite cardinal.