This first analysis of the Religious Fundamentalism Scale in Iran further examined findings that conservative religious commitments have positive adjustment implications outside the West. Religious Fundamentalism in a sample of 385 Iranian university students displayed direct relationships with Muslim religiosity and spirituality and correlated positively with the Transcendence and negatively with the Symbolism Post-Critical Beliefs factors. Religious Fundamentalism, and conservative religiosity more generally, predicted better mental health in relationship with variables related to self-regulation, narcissism, and splitting. PCB factors defined a (...) fundamentalist attitude of Literal Affirmation that also displayed some linkages with more adaptive psychological functioning. Iranians who self-identified as “both religious and spiritual” were more conservative religiously and more adjusted psychologically than three other religious-spiritual types. Conservative religiosity did predict the maladjustment of Exploitable Dependency. These data further suggested that conservative religiosity can have largely, though not wholly, positive mental health implications outside the West. (shrink)

In his new book "The Importance of Being Rational", Errol Lord aims to give a real definition of the property of rationality in terms of normative reasons. If he can do so, his work is an important step towards a defense of ‘reasons fundamentalism’ – the thesis that all complex normative properties can be analyzed in terms of normative reasons. I focus on his analysis of epistemic rationality, which says that your doxastic attitudes are rational just in case they are (...) correct responses to the objective normative reasons you possess. For some fact to be an objective normative reason to do something that you possess, you have to be in a position to know this fact and be able to competently use it as a reason to do that thing. Lord’s view is thus a knowledge-first view about possessing normative reasons. Throughout the book, Lord conceptualizes belief in the traditional tripartite way – if you take any attitude at all towards a proposition, then you either believe it, or disbelieve it, or you suspend judgment about it. Lord doesn’t discuss cases in which we’re uncertain. Yet, those cases are ubiquitous. I explore how his view can be extended to them. I first discuss whether his strategy for vindicating coherence requirements in terms of normative reasons can be applied to credences. I then ask how Lord can conceive of the doxastic attitudes that encode uncertainty . (shrink)

In this essay, I critically examine Habermas’ approach to fundamentalism, a question that explicitly and implicitly alike bears influence on the formation of his postsecular thesis. The overview of his theory is followed by a combined analysis, depending on Torkel Brekke’s sociological study on fundamentalism, on the one hand, and a joint study by Adam Seligman and others in the field of anthropology and social theory. In this regard, questions of sincerity and authenticity are in the focus of my examination, (...) underlying that philosophical relevance of the question. On the basis of this combined analysis I argue that fundamentalism can be best analysed as an essential though specific element of modernity. I state that despite its critical attitude towards many developments of modernity, fundamentalism is not only reactively but, in its attitudinal core, a proactively modern phenomenon, and needs be interpreted accordingly as part of the evolving postsecular scenario. (shrink)

The surge of religious fundamentalism is a present reality. This way of reasoning breeds ideologies that are both religious and political in nature and mount themselves against a perceived threat or enemy in order to protect their identities. These ideologies elevate certain fundamentals of a particular religion or life- and worldview to absolutes and interlace their ideas and methods around these absolutes. With a strong reactionary attitude, fundamentalist ideologies and religions easily resort to extremism, militancy, abuses of human (...) rights and even violence. Religious fundamentalist movements share certain characteristics, although they also express features that are particular to the religious tradition from which they emerged. They have many characteristics in common, and this fact points to the possibility that fundamentalist movements emerge under the impact of rather similar processes of social transformation. The purpose of this article is to identify, by way of a comparative literary study, the most outstanding characteristics of religious fundamentalism as it appear in its most prominent manifestations in today’s world. (shrink)

There are two basic positions where tolerance as political strategy and moral viewpoint is rejected or made redundant. We are hostile to tolerance when we hold that we are defending an objective truth—religious or secular—which should also be defended and maintained by means of political and legal power. And tolerance become superfluous also when the affirmation of plurality becomes total, and tolerance identical to a vive la difference. As recent developments in my own country—the Netherlands—have demonstrated, the political outcome of (...) this last position is remarkably enough not necessarily an all-inclusive relativistic tolerance. It may just as well be one of intolerance towards ‘believers’ of all kinds, in short: tolerance becomes polemical and belligerent. Turning to religious fundamentalism or ultra-orthodoxy could then become a possible reaction to this relativistic and subjectivist position, as demonstrated in Isaac Bashevis Singer’s novel The Penitent. Between these two positions of hostility or indifference towards tolerance, we can situate that democratic attitude which may rightly be called ‘tolerance’. As ethical position, the tolerant citizen accepts the democratic disjunction between my truth and the symmetrical justice between citizens. As political strategy, a tolerant democratic regime is based upon a political act of exclusion of what I will here call ‘political fundamentalism’. (shrink)

Paul Merkley draws on the published literature of the World Council of Churches, the Middle East Council of Churches, the Roman Catholic Church, and other Christian organizations that have an interest in the question of Israel's past, present, and future, and on interviews with numerous key figures within the government of Israel, spokesmen for the Palestine Authority, and leaders of all the major pro and anti-Zionist Christian organizations to demonstrate that Christian attitudes towards Israel remain remarkably polarized. To most evangelical (...) and fundamentalist Christians, loyalty to Israel is a kind of second patriotism, nurtured by the conviction that Israel's restoration is a part of God's plan for history. However mainstream Protestantism champions "Palestinian nationalism" and, drawing on the rhetoric of the Middle East Council of Churches, does not hesitate to portray Israel as an Aoppressor." Merkley concludes that Christian attitudes towards Israel reflect fundamental theological attitudes that must be studied against the long historical background of Christian attitudes towards Judaism and Islam. (shrink)

In our paper we will try to connect the dynamics of community decline to individual responses. We will operate on two levels of reality. At the first level we will discuss the circumstances surrounding the recent decline of small communities in North Dakota. At the second level we will discuss how this decline affects small town residents' attitudes toward economic development. In the first level analysis we examine the thesis that the natural environment of community growth is economic exploitation; therefore, (...) the decline of resource-based communities is natural and inevitable. We discuss the circumstances surrounding the recent decline of small communities in North Dakota. At the second level analysis, we operate at the level at which life circumstances and environments are shaped by political-economic institutions that in turn shape the behavior and mentality of communities, families, and individuals. We hypothesize that residents of declining small towns deny their powerlessness and adapt to their situation through intense dedication to economic growth. We develop a series of hypotheses to test this thesis using data from the North Dakota Rural Life Poll. In our conclusion, we discuss implications for rural development practitioners working in declining small towns where this intense dedication to economic development in prevalent. (shrink)

Resumo O fundamentalismo é um fenômeno relativamente recente, pelo menos como posição articulada e autoconsciente. O presente artigo apresenta, de início, uma reflexão sobre o surgimento do termo fundamentalismo, em breve resgate histórico. A seguir, identifica e analisa as características principais dessa atitude, tanto na sua configuração psicológica (subjetivismo fechado), como na sua teoria epistemológica implícita (fideísmo radical, fé ou submissão a uma autoridade religiosa como fonte exclusiva ou predominante de certeza epistemológica), na sua hermenêutica (liberalismo na interpretação de escrituras) (...) e na sua maneira de priorizar um ativismo radical, na perspectiva pragmática (tendência a medidas radicais, à militância e até ao terrorismo no prosseguimento efetivo dos seus fins). Aplicando essa análise, mostra que os debates atuais entre cristãos e "neoateus" parecem frequentemente fundamentalistas, mas não apenas do lado religioso da disputa. Talvez o nome de fundamentalista possa ser reivindicado por alguns que ficariam bem surpresos pela nova titulação. A última parte do artigo discute a religião "usada" e "abusada". Palavras-chave: Ateísmo; Fundamentalismo; Filosofia da religião.Fundamentalism is a relatively recent phenomenon, at least as an articulated and self-conscious position. The present article begins by reflecting on the origin of the term fundamentalism in a brief historical review. Then the principal characteristics of this attitude are identified and analyzed, both in its psychological configuration (a closed subjectivity), as well as in its implicit epistemological theory (radical fideism, faith or submission to a religiou authority as exclusive or predominant source of epistemological certitude), its hermeneutics (literalism in the interpretation of scriptures) and its manner of prioritizing radical activisim in its pragmatic perspective (tendency to radical means, to militancy and even terrorism in the effective persecution of its ends). Applying this analysis, current debates between Christians and "neo-atheists" appear frequently fundamentalist, but not only on the religious side of the dispute. Perhaps the name fundamentalist can be claimed even by some who would be quite surprised by the new christening. The last part of the article discusses "used" and "abused" religion. Key words : Atheism; fundamentalism; philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Traditionally, an adequate strategy to deal with the tension between liberty and security has been toleration, for the latter allows the maximization of individual liberty without endangering security, since it embraces the limits set by the harm principle and the principle of self-defense of the liberal order. The area outside the boundary clearly requires repressive measures to protect the security and the rights of all. In this paper, we focus on the balance of liberty and security afforded by toleration, analyzing (...) how this strategy works in highly conflictual contexts and sorting out the different sets of reason that might motivate individual to assume a tolerant attitude. We contend that toleration represents a reliable political solution to conflicts potentially threatening social security when it is coupled with social tolerance. Hence, we examine the reasons the agents may have for endorsing toleration despite disagreement and disapproval. In the range of these reasons, we argue that the right reasons are those preserving the moral and epistemic integrity of the agent. The right reasons are however not accessible to everyone, as for example is the case with (non-violent) religious fundamentalists. Only prudential reasons for toleration seem to be available to them. And yet, we argue that an open and inclusive democracy should in principle be hospitable towards prudential and pragmatic reasons as well, which may potentially lay the grounds for future cooperation. We conclude therefore that the tolerant society has room for the fundamentalists, granted that they do not resort to violence. (shrink)

The ’microcausality’ condition in quantum field theory is typically presented and justified on the basis of general principles of physical causality. I explore in detail a number of alternative causal interpretations of this condition. I conclude that none is fully satisfactory, independent of further and controversial assumptions about the object and scope of quantum field theories. In particular the stronger causalreadings require a fully reductionist and fundamentalist attitude to quantum field theory. I argue, in a deflationary spirit, for (...) a reading of the ‘microcausality’ condition as merely a boundary condition, inspired by Relativity, that different possible formulations of quantum field theory must obey. (shrink)

The idea for this article was developed in ecumenical discussion regarding the worrisome developments in some neo-Pentecostal ministries where stories of snake-eating, petrol-drinking, false prophecies and so on were being alleged. A burning question during the discussion was: what is it with the hermeneutic of experience that makes it possible for such stories to arise? Furthermore, how can this situation be remedied? The researchers set to answer this question by conducting a literature study on the subject of hermeneutics of African (...) Indigenous Churches, neo-Pentecostalism and Mission Pentecostalism. The inclusion of AICs and Mission Pentecostalism follows the scholarly consensus led by Allan Anderson in which all three together constitute African Pentecostalism. This article offers a critical reflection on the corrosive role of fundamentalist-inspired exclusivism, judgementalism and pride, which feed ignorance of the basic oneness of African Pentecostal Christianity. It concludes that abuse abounds in the divisions and maintenance of the above-mentioned fundamentalist attitudes and raises the necessity of creating awareness of belonging to one community. This community’s historical experience of the activity of the Spirit and Scripture may serve as critical input into its hermeneutic, hopefully lessening if not eradicating abuse. (shrink)

The ’microcausality’ condition in quantum field theory is typically presented and justified on the basis of general principles of physical causality. I explore in detail a number of alternative causal interpretations of this condition. I conclude that none is fully satisfactory, independent of further and controversial assumptions about the object and scope of quantum field theories. In particular the stronger causalreadings require a fully reductionist and fundamentalist attitude to quantum field theory. I argue, in a deflationary spirit, for (...) a reading of the ‘microcausality’ condition as merely a boundary condition, inspired by Relativity, that different possible formulations of quantum field theory must obey. (shrink)

I argue that all reasons for actions and attitudes consist in reasons for preferences; call this view RP. According to RP, reasons for A to believe that p just consist in reasons for A to prefer their believing that p to their not believing that p, and reasons for A to have a pro-attitude or perform an action just consist in reasons for A to prefer that she has that attitude/performs that action. I argue that we have strong (...) reason to accept RP because we can explain a correlation between reasons for prefer- ences and other reasons only if we accept RP. I argue that no objections undermine RP and that RP has interesting implications for the reasons for attitudes there are and for reasons fundamentalism. (shrink)

This book has argued that problems of religious luck, especially when operationalized into concerns about doxastic risk and responsibility, can be of shared interest to theologians, philosophers, and psychologists. We have pointed out counter-inductive thinking as a key feature of fideistic models of faith, and examined the implications of this point both for the social scientific study of fundamentalism, and for philosophers’ and theologians’ normative concerns with the reasonableness of a) exclusivist attitudes to religious multiplicity, and b) theologically-cast but bias-mirroring (...) trait-ascriptions to religious insiders and outsiders. It is important to keep the descriptive/explanatory and normative concerns properly separated, but philosophy of luck and risk are relevant to both. More specifically, inductive risky theological strategies,we have argued, are a relevant concern both descriptively and normatively. The descriptive/explanatory relevance of measures of high inductive risk connects it with cognitive and social psychology of religion, while its normative relevance connects with critical concerns with epistemology of testimony, the epistemology of disagreement, and the ethics of belief. A research program to examine fideistic orientation and its relation to epistemically risky doxastic strategies is one of potentially numerous research programs on which philosophers and psychologists might work collaboratively. So this concluding chapter of our study culminates with the outline of a proposed research program at the intersection of shared concerns. I term this research program CICI, because it examines what lies at the intersection of CSR’s standing interest in the appeal of counter-intuitive ideas, and our own study’s focus on the fideistic penchant for counter-inductive thinking. Religious Studies scholars typically focus on particular traditions and teachings, while CSR scholars tend to eschew such content-focused approaches in favor of a study of evolutionary and hence generic or trans-religious functions and processes. I argue that CICI has the added benefit of effectively mediating this generic-specific contrast between CSR and Religious Studies, allowing CSR research to be more closely connected with and relevant to comparative fundamentalism. (shrink)

This chapter sharpens the book’s criticism of exclusivist responsible to religious multiplicity, firstly through close critical attention to arguments which religious exclusivists provide, and secondly through the introduction of several new, formal arguments / dilemmas. Self-described ‘post-liberals’ like Paul Griffiths bid philosophers to accept exclusivist attitudes and beliefs as just one among other aspects of religious identity. They bid us to normalize the discourse Griffiths refers to as “polemical apologetics,” and to view its acceptance as the only viable form of (...) pluralism. This reasoning may seem initially plausible, but on closer examination his and other’s defence of the reasonableness of exclusivist responses to religious multiplicity fall apart. Informed by our study of luck-leaning theological explanations of religious difference and the counter-inductive thinking they exemplify, I argue that exclusivist responses to religious multiplicity are best explained by personal and group bias, and that a discourse between exclusivist authors or sects is beyond the pale of reasonable disagreement. Our study of descriptive (psychological) and prescriptive (religious) fideism in the first sections of Chapter Five suggests that we turn back to formal features of doxastic methods (i.e., of how people process), features that may be straightforwardly tested for in studies utilizing scales of religious orientation. These formal features allow us to better recognize not only the multiplicity of models of faith that religious adherents adhere to, but also that the relationship between forms of fideism is scalar: there is a spectrum of views running from rationalism to fideism, and at the fideistic end from moderate to strong forms of religious fideism. I further explain why developing tests and markers for a high degree of fideistic orientation is important to all those who study religion. The second half of the chapter turns to criticism or censure of exclusivist attitudes to religious multiplicity, in contrast to apologetic defenses of exclusivism. While we have examined the close connections between fideism and fundamentalism, and again between fundamentalism and exclusivism in earlier chapters, a sharper focus reveals an important but little-recognized distinction reflected in the literature: the distinction between religion-specific (or particularist) and mutualist exclusivism. The mutualist doesn’t talk just about the right of adherents of one specific religion to assert exclusivism, but the adherents of any and all “home” religions. I argue that some previously unrecognized problems for the reasonableness of exclusivist responses to religious multiplicity are brought to light when we make the distinction between the two basic ways to understand the claim that exclusivists are making. I put particularist (Barth, Lindbeck, Plantinga) and mutualist (Griffiths, Gellman, Margalit, D’Costa) defenses of exclusivism on the horns of a dilemma, and argue that despite the popularity it presently enjoys among post-liberal theologians, a close examination reveals that the very conceptual coherence of mutualist exclusivism is in serious doubt. (shrink)

This article presents at first a reflection on fundamentalism and threats in Jesus’ followers’ lives, especially in a society where the immediacy and the "globalization of indifference" has raged. Then identifies and analyzes some features of the acting of Jesus that reveal in their own attitudes the true values of life, true "blessedness" of man, from the encounter with the other, a dialogic movement that generates mutual understanding space, welcoming and listening. Applying this analysis, it shows there are great risks (...) among Christians, Jesus followers, to live their faith, creating a fundamentalist building, sustained not by a solid hermeneutic of human realities, but by a rigid doctrinal system that opposes the message conveyed by Jesus: mercy, which generates dialogue and welcoming space. (shrink)

T echnocrati c fundamentalis m (neocons ) an d theocrati c fundamentalis m (teocons) ar e t w o manifestation s o f politica l though t v e r y restrict i v e o f democra c y . Th e f irst on e ha s a highe r incidenc e i n th e f iel d o f econo m y an d th e secon d on e i n tha t o f the (...) religion , bu t bot h imp l y a stron g challeng e fo r th e democrati c State . Thi s a r ticl e deals wit h th e mor e o r les s fo r ma l conjunctio n bet w ee n bot h kind s o f fundamentalism , that appear s an d acts , e v e n a t a globa l l e v el , a s a v e r y conse r v at i v e reactio n agains t the mai n demand s o f c i vi c laicis m an d o f pr o g ress i v e policies . Th e autho r maintain s that th e an s w e r t o thes e n e w fundamentalisms , li k e t o th e ol d d o gmatisms , i s no t a t all th e relat i vism , bu t th e critica l an d aut o critica l thought . Th e poin t i s t o ad v ance , with thi s critica l attitude , i n th e const r uctio n o f n e w democrati c fo r mulations , pr o vided wit h a mor e stron g fundamen t i n te r m s o f ethica l l e gitima c y an d socia l l e gitimation. (shrink)

Icon of modern-day fundamentalist movements, firebrand religious purist, tireless polemicist against the intellectual schools of his time-the Ibn Taymiyya we know is a thinker we often associate with hard attitudes and dogmatic stances. Yet there is another Ibn Taymiyya that stands out from the pages of his work, the thinker who fashions himself as a master of the via media and as a defender of the harmony between human reason and the religious faith. The aim of this book is (...) to shed fresh light on Ibn Taymiyya's intellectual identity by a close investigation of his ethical thought. Earlier Muslim thinkers debating ethical value had been exercised by a number of core questions. What makes actions right or wrong? How do human beings know it? And what is God's relationship to the evaluative standards discerned by the human mind? An investigation of Ibn Taymiyya's engagement with such questions has much to teach us about his intellectual program and particularly about the role of reason and the linchpin concept of human nature within this program. It also has much to teach us about Ibn Taymiyya's relationship to the intellectual landscape of his time, bringing us up against a rich tapestry of ethical discussions unfolding within theology, philosophy and legal theory in the classical period. At the same time, a close reading of Ibn Taymiyya's ethics invites us to confront not only the content of his thought but its form, and more particularly those features of his writing that fracture our efforts to unify his thought. (shrink)

It can be creepy to notice that something human-looking is not real. But can sensitivity to this phenomenon, known as the uncanny valley, be predicted from superficially unrelated traits? Based on results from at least 489 participants, this study examines the relation between nine theoretically motivated trait indices and uncanny valley sensitivity, operationalized as increased eerie ratings and decreased warmth ratings for androids presented in videos. Animal Reminder Sensitivity, Neuroticism, its Anxiety facet, and Religious Fundamentalism significantly predicted uncanny valley sensitivity. (...) In addition, Concern over Mistakes and Personal Distress significantly predicted android eerie ratings but not warmth. The structural equation model indicated that Religious Fundamentalism operates indirectly, through robot-related attitudes, to heighten uncanny valley sensitivity, while Animal Reminder Sensitivity increases eerie ratings directly. These results suggest that the uncanny valley phenomenon may operate through both sociocultural constructions and biological adaptations for threat avoidance, such as the fear and disgust systems. Trait indices that predict uncanny valley sensitivity warrant investigation by experimental methods to explicate the processes underlying the uncanny valley phenomenon. (shrink)

There is strong theoretical support for a relationship between various characteristics of religiousness and attitudes towards business ethics. This paper examines three frequently- studied dimensions of religiousness (fundamentalism, conservatism, and intrinsic religiousness) and their ability to predict students' willingness to behave unethically. Because prior research indicated a possible relationship between the religious affiliation of an institution and its members' ethical orientation, we studied students at universities with three different types of religious affiliation: evangelical, Catholic, and none.Results of the study lend (...) support to a negative relationship between the above-mentioned dimensions of religiousness and willingness to behave unethically. In addition, students at the Evangelical university were far less willing to engage in unethical behavior than were students at either the Catholic or the unaffiliated institutions. (shrink)

To speak of being religious lucky certainly sounds odd. But then, so does “My faith holds value in God’s plan, while yours does not.” This book argues that these two concerns — with the concept of religious luck and with asymmetric or sharply differential ascriptions of religious value — are inextricably connected. It argues that religious luck attributions can profitably be studied from a number of directions, not just theological, but also social scientific and philosophical. There is a strong tendency (...) among adherents of different faith traditions to invoke asymmetric explanations of the religious value or salvific status of the home religion vis-à-vis all others. Attributions of good/bad religious luck and exclusivist dismissal of the significance of religious disagreement are the central phenomena that the book studies. Part I lays out a taxonomy of kinds of religious luck, a taxonomy that draws upon but extends work on moral and epistemic luck. It asks: What is going on when persons, theologies, or purported revelations ascribe various kinds of religiously-relevant traits to insiders and outsiders of a faith tradition in sharply asymmetric fashion? “I am saved but you are lost”; “My religion is holy but yours is idolatrous”; “My faith tradition is true, and valued by God, but yours is false and valueless.” Part II further develops the theory introduced in Part I, pushing forward both the descriptive/explanatory and normative sides of what the author terms his inductive risk account. Firstly, the concept of inductive risk is shown to contribute to the needed field of comparative fundamentalism by suggesting new psychological markers of fundamentalist orientation. The second side of what is termed an inductive risk account is concerned with the epistemology of religious belief, but more especially with an account of the limits of reasonable religious disagreement. Problems of inductively risky modes of belief-formation problematize claims to religion-specific knowledge. But the inductive risk account does not aim to set religion apart, or to challenge the reasonableness of religious belief tout court. Rather the burden of the argument is to challenge the reasonableness of attitudes of religious exclusivism, and to demotivate the “polemical apologetics” that exclusivists practice and hope to normalize. Lexington Books Pages: 290 978-1-4985-5017-8 • Hardback • December 2018 • $95.00 • (£65.00) 978-1-4985-5018-5 • eBook • December 2018 • $90.00 • (£60.00) ISBN 978-1-4985-5018-5 (pbk: alk. paper) (coming 2020) [Download the 30% personal use Discount Order Form I uploaded for hardcover or e-book, and please ask your library to purchase a copy for their collection.]. (shrink)

This book offers a systematic look at current challenges in moral epistemology through the lens of research on higher-order evidence. Fueled by recent advances in empirical research, higher-order evidence has generated a wealth of insights about the genealogy of moral beliefs. Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology explores how these insights have an impact on the epistemic status of moral beliefs. The essays are divided into four thematic sections. Part I addresses the normative significance of higher-order evidence for moral epistemology. Part (...) II covers the sources of higher-order evidence in moral epistemology, such as disagreement and moral testimony, for both individuals and groups. The essays in Part III discuss permissible epistemic attitudes regarding a body of moral evidence, including the question of how to determine the permissibility of such attitudes. Finally, Part IV examines the relevance of higher-order evidence for phenomena of practical concern, such as fundamentalist views about moral matters. This volume is the first to explicitly address the implications of higher-order evidence in moral epistemology. It will be of interest to researchers and advanced graduate students working in epistemology and metaethics. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis is a critical discussion and proposed refinement of the inspiring account of the successes and failures of economic modelling sketched in Dani Rodrik’s Economics Rules. The refinements make use of a systematic framework of the structure of scientific modelling. The issues include distinguishing the discipline of economics from the behaviour and attitudes of economists as targets of normative assessment; nature and sources of success and failure in modelling; the key role of model commentary; model transparency; purposes and audiences of (...) modelling; the nature of critical assumptions; negligibility, applicability, and tractability in modelling; the possibility of generally applicable models; and economics fundamentalism. The proposed refinements submit sharper formulations for some of Rodrik’s ideas and supplement others, but they also reveal tensions and relieve some – not yet all – of these. (shrink)

This article is focused on some conditions in today’s world of globalized media, which are producing either an uncritical acquiescence or fright in Muslim societies as a result of the interaction between these societies and the contemporary Western powers that represent modernity and postmodernity on the global stage. The rise of fundamentalism, a tendency toward returning to the roots and stringently insisting upon some pure and literal interpretation of them, in almost all the religions of the world is a manifestation (...) of this fright. The central concern of this article is to suggest that fundamentalism is neither the only nor the most reasonable response for Muslim societies in the face of contemporary modernity. Muslims need to adopt an independent and critical attitude toward modernity and reshape their societies in the light of the ethics of the Qur’an, keeping in view the historical link between Islam and science in as much as Islamic culture paved the way for emergence of modern science during European Renaissance. The necessity of a pluralistic or contextualized modernization of Muslim societies is discussed along with the need for the removal of cultural duplicity in the role of the West in relation to Muslim societies. All this leads to an overall proposal for modernization which is given towards the end. (shrink)

The Socio-Cultural pluralism and its fabrics in our society have been under the threat of religious fundamentalism and ideological extremism, which firmly believe that there can only one way of true expression and all other forms, are either substandard or false. This attitude has torn away the world into different isolated islands of human settlements. This state of affair is the outcome of multidimensional causes and one among them, no doubt, is related to one of the central issues of (...) Philosophy, i.e., the relation between ‘one and many’. The ontological dimension of the problem of ‘one and many’ cannot be solved withouthaving the proper understanding of epistemological solutions. The epistemic tools of the Advaita Vedanta are powerful enough to suggest pragmatic solutions to the good old problem of ‘one and many’ that attains new relevance in the era of Globalization. The logic of identity in difference and the logic of difference are the two types of logical systems, which are instrumental for the formulation of various types of claims to know of the western tradition. The logic of identity in difference has been clearly designed and defined by the classical logic or the Aristotelian logic. The symbolic logic encarves the various nuances of the logic of difference. The Advaita System has envisaged a new logic i.e., the logic of identity, which is implicit in the Upanisdic mahavakyya ‘Ayam Āthmam Brahma’. The paper intents to explore the possibility of application of the logic of identity in socio-cultural issues of the present day world. (shrink)

Religion has a considerable influence over the public’s attitudes towards science and technologies. The objective of the paper is to understand the ethical and religious problems concerning the use of embryo for research in assisting conception for infertile couples from the perspective of Catholic Christians. This paper seeks to explain our preliminary reflections on how religious communities particularly the Catholic Christian communities respond to and assess the ethics of reproductive technologies and embryo research. Christianity as a whole lacks a unified (...) and definitive statement on when an embryo becomes a person, although fundamentalist Christians tend to be opposed to embryo experimentation. Roman Catholics tend to believe that the embryo should be treated as human life from the moment of conception or fertilisation. As opposed to this preconception I have tried to point out that a foetus is a clump of cells and lacks individuality as a conscientious human being and thus can be used for research for therapeutic reason. The paper concluded that the Church accepts techniques on embryo that respect their life. So they would allow procedures that are akin with healing and improvement of life without involving undue risks. The Church feels children should arise out of act of love between man and his wife in co-operation with God. In this regard, it may be pointed out though the creation of a child through a conjugal act in a wed lock is the preferred method since it is the most natural, least expensive one. But that does not mean, it should be the only acceptable means to conception. To state a child born using ARTs would be less perfect compared to a child born through conjugal act of husband and wife is absurd one to be mentioned. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy by John DeweyCharles A. HobbsJohn Dewey. Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 2012, 351 pp., index.John Dewey’s latest publication marks a watershed moment for scholarship in American philosophy, and, in addition to Dewey himself, we have editor Phillip Deen to thank for discovering it (among the Dewey papers in Special Collections at Morris Library of Southern Illinois (...) University) and editing it. We see Dewey late in life (early 1940s) engaged mainly in a critique of the modern, ancient, and (fragmentarily) medieval philosophical periods, which Dewey argues, are eras not nearly as distinct as traditional understanding admits. In the Introduction, Deen helpfully explains how we are now bequeathed incomplete but in most [End Page 122] cases quite robust chapter drafts that amount to another substantial work by Dewey. While published by Southern Illinois University Press, this volume is not itself part of The Collected Works of John Dewey. Still, the careful editing (of what are actually a number of manuscripts) is comparable in its excellence. There is also a well-done Index.The scope is twofold: retrospective and prospective. Chapters one through seven trace the development of so-called modern philosophy along with its central epistemological problem, with the aim being to demonstrate how thoroughly “unmodern” such philosophy has been. Then, chapters eight through fourteen constitute a genuinely modern approach that naturalistically and functionally undercuts the epistemic problem of subject/object and points to a revolution in the process of knowing.We turn to the retrospective, beginning in the first chapter with the acknowledgement that Dewey comes to philosophy itself as a kind of anthropologist, something we note as consistent with the influence of Franz Boas on Dewey (with whom Dewey was a colleague and intellectual ally at Columbia for about thirty-five years). This is further underscored by a lengthy quotation of anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski on the meaning of culture (p. 290). The ongoing history of philosophy is itself a cultural activity. Indeed, citing James, Dewey declares that “The sickliest way in which a student of philosophy can approach his subject-matter is that of a search for ultimate impersonal revelation of truth.” (p. 16) Rather, let the philosopher have the pragmatic attitude of openness “... to truth from whatever source it comes” (ibid).With that, Dewey once again turns to the Greeks, who initiated “The Discovery of Rational Discourse” (Ch. III) as underscored by the Socratic means of cooperative discourse, with the dialogues—not lectures—being evidence of the Athenian philosophical revolution in turning “from discussing nature and giving an account of it to the examination of the nature and procedure of discussion and report” (p. 38). Yet this project, despite its initial promise, failed for lack of a genuine logic of experimentation or inquiry. Then philosophy focused on going beyond the natural, beginning with the medieval “Search for Salvation” (Ch. IV, a significantly less developed and unified chapter draft). “Modern” philosophers then rightly replaced grand cosmic schemes with a focus on human nature (Ch. V), but they went too far with their introspective methods, gradually resulting in the same consequence supernaturalism had produced: a dualism of mind and nature, as if human nature is somehow not a part of nature. As we recall from Human Nature and Conduct (1922), human nature is not independent of but rather interdependent (or, using Dewey’s later term, transactional) with the rest of nature. The key is to avoid hypostatizing mind and better to talk of culture as nature. [End Page 123]With the Renaissance onward, humans have been “Wandering between Two Worlds” (Ch. VI), and endless arguments between “rationalists” and “empiricists” overlook what these camps share, namely a psychology assuming a fundamental split between subjective/objective and assumptions about certainty as founded upon various first principles or substances. The result is the stagnation of philosophy while science flourishes. Dewey cites Bertrand Russell as an example of continued insistence on such a priori principles (p. 106).We find ourselves in an epoch split between scientism and moral and religious fundamentalism, the result of a lingering tenacious investment in bad elements from ancient and medieval... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:TAKING OTHER RELIGIONS SERIOUSLY: SOME IRONIES IN THE CURRENT DEBATE ON A CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY OF RELIGJ:ONS * 1GAvIN D'CosTA West London Institute of Higher E'ducation Isleworth, Middlese111 HE QUESTION oi Christian attitudes to the world eligions is becoming increasingly important. An lnterpretatwn of Religion is emblematic of a growing trend, which runs across 1denominational lines, that attempts fo take other,religions seriously. John Hick.argues that for most of its ihistory (...) Christianity has hrud a rpolitioaUy and theologicrully imperialist attitude towards the ireligions of the world. Superiority :and uninformed arrogance have generally prev:ailed with the accompanying attitude that the religions of the world 1aire 1 generally sinful and incapable of being 1 salvific. The 1 time has come foT a change of a;ttitude: the wol"ld reHgions must be taken seriously :and this means ·affil"ming them as alternative paths to salvation, possibly neither worse nor better than·Christianity. This Hick cru1ls a "pluralistic" outlook. The agenda is irrudical and Hick's Vioice is not solitary. Hick'1 s hook!is a ma;gisteri:al 4rn paiges and is ibrused on his Giffol'ld Lectmes of 1986-87. It contains cons!i.derruble indological, philosophicail and theological material, hut in what follows I shall,be dea1ing with one aspect oll!ly, his argument for p1uiialism. Hick is acknowledged :as a leading irepresentative of this pluralistic approach. Initially he began as a conservative,and exclusivist Christian,and has over the years enoompassed a wide!l.'ange of thoofogica1 positions now,culminating *John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). 519 520 GAVIN D'COSTA in this p11esent rbook.1 In :this review discussion I propose that many o[ the most mdical strategies in the theology of re1ligions in 'Spite 0£ their wish to take other rreligions seriously have an il'!Onic tendency to do just the opposite! In attempting to be genuinely accommodating to the 11eligions 0£ the world, Hick, I will argue, unwittingly ends up in danger of accommodating none, including Christianity. This tendency, which iI believe to 1be clearly illustrated in Hick's rrecent rbook, is shared in various degrees hy numerous theologians pursuing a, pluralist p111oject similar to that of Hick's.2 It would he foolish to assume they are " all the 'Saime," hut they certainly share common theological and philosophical tendencies which I wish to isolate and comment on. I should 1state dearly that iby such a critique I do not intend to discount the possibility that 1 a:ll religions ma,y lead fo God, but that the stmtegies often employed to a111g111e.for this are deepJy problematic. ~o put Hiok"s new rbook into :perspective it will he helpful to wace its genesis 1briefly. In 1973, using an astronomical analogy, Hick suggested a Copernican revolution in the Christian theoology of rreligions whereby Christians should "shift from the 1 He began, in his own words, as a "strongly evangelical and indeed fundamentalist " Christian: see God Has Many Names (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 2. See also my analysis of his entire pilgrimage in John Hick's Theology of Religions (London/New York: University Press of America, 1987). 2 For some of those on Hick's trajectory, see A. Race, Olllristians and Religious Pluralism (London: SCM, 1983); Paul Knitter, No Other Name'! (New York: Orbis, 1985); Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (New York: Harper & Row, 1978); R. Ruether, Pluralism and Ohristology; the latter three and other influential co-contributors (including Hick) are to be found in The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Towards a Pluralistio Theology of Religions, ed. J. Hick and P. Knitter (New York: Orbis, 1987). More recently, we can see the extremely thin line between pluralists and essentialist "inclusivists" in E. Hillman, Many Paths·: A Oatholic Approach to Religious Pluralism (New York: Orbis, 1989), who marries K. Rahner and W. C. Smith, divorces faith from history and tradition, and thereby provides an essentialist analysis. See the pertinent comments of K. Surin on Smith's essentialist project in "An Examination of the Discourse of John Hick and Wilfred Cantwell Smith", in Religious Pluralism and Unbelief, ed. I. Hamnett (London, Routledge... (shrink)

In the Netherlands, the traditional and famous ‘culture of tolerance’ in the past few years surprisingly became associated with the laxity, half-heartedness, even negligence and indifference with regard to serious problems in a multi-ethnic society. For the time being, a polemical use of the term dominates: tolerance as an aspect of our western ‘superiority’ against barbaric fundamentalism. To regain some grip on the – at least in the Netherlands – apparently ‘hollow’, even politically and morally dubious concept of tolerance, the (...) author returns to the genealogical ‘founding forge’ of the term, the civil war fought in the name of religion in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe. He demonstrates that tolerance was a key-category in a tiring, centuries-old process during which a ‘Gordian knot’ – the congruence of political power and religious faith – was being abandoned. The historical case-study of the dissident preacher John Bunyan and the early Quakers in seventeenth-century England shows, that during the Age of religious Discord political, social and religious themes are inseparably intertwined, not only from the point of view of the defenders of the status quo, but also from the standpoint of the religious dissidents and their ‘illegal’ preaching. In the intellectual history one can witness the birth of the early-modern concept of a minimal, political concept of tolerance. In a negative sense, this was a departure from attempts to uphold or restore the unity of ‘true faith’ by political coercion. In a positive sense it implied the sufferance of dissident faith and religious practices by a political power ‘in order to prevent the worse from happening’. In this process, political power became more and more an autonomous institution, above society. This minimal, political concept of tolerance has been surpassed by the state-sanctioned, juridical freedom of religion. This implies the democratic disjunction of truth and justice, that is, the recognition of an equal, reciprocal right of everyone to live and articulate his or her own truth. This legislation must be supported by a civic and social culture in which tolerance as an ethical virtue is being practiced and cherished. The most exacting form of tolerance is an attitude which tries to overcome the democratic disjunction of truth and justice, in the direction of an ‘oikoumene of religions’ or a ‘fusion of horizons’. But this subtle attitude can easily slip into an ‘idolatry of difference’ and a laissez faire-tolerance, as seemed to have happened in the Netherlands. In the final parts of this introductory essay the author presents the four articles in this thematic edition of Bijdragen: studies on Cusanus, Spinoza and Leibniz regarding tolerance, and an essay on the problems of dealing with alterity. The author concludes with the contemporary dilemma of tolerance. Should the future form of tolerance be based on universalism accompanied with the political neutralization and privatization of religion, nation, culture? Or should tolerance in a globalizing world be fed from particular traditions and sources? (shrink)

The ArgumentThe development of autonomous theoretical science is often considered a “Greek miracle.” It is argued in the present paper that another “miracle,” necessary for the creation of modern science, took place for the first time in the Islamic Middle Ages, viz. the integration of theory and practice.The discussion focuses on the mathematical disciplines. It starts by investigating the plurality of traditions which were integrated into Islamic mathematics during its formation, emphasizing practitioners' “sub-scientific” traditions, and shows how these were synthesized (...) in a way virtually unknown in earlier cultures. A discussion of the sociocultural roots of this specific synthesis concludes that a major role was played in the earlier period by the combination of fundamentalist convictions characteristic of Islam – that the most humble daily activity is directly responsible to the highest ontological level, while conversely this highest level is concerned with the humblest ranks of daily existence – with the absence of an institutionalized “Church” able to monopolize the interpretation of the mutual bond of the divine and the everyday levels.As the institutions of learning crystallized around the turn of the millennium, the integrative attitude to theory and practice was fixated institutionally; the latter process is discussed, first with the example of the madrasah institution as the carrier of an arithmetical textbook tradition, and second with that of the bond between astronomy and theoretical geometry. (shrink)

This book investigates the debates around religion and science at the influential Victoria Institute. Founded in London in 1865, and largely drawn from the evangelical wing of the Church of England, it had as its prime objective the defence of 'the great truths revealed in Holy Scripture' from 'the opposition of science, falsely so called'. The conflict for them was not between science and religion directly, but rather what exactly constituted true science Chapters cover the Victoria Institute's formation, its heyday (...) in the late Nineteenth Century, and its decline in the years following the First World War. They show that at stake was more than any particular theory; rather, it was an entire worldview, combining theology, epistemology, and philosophy of science. Therefore, instead of simply offering a survey of religious responses to evolutionary theory, this study demonstrates the complex relationship between science, evangelical religion, and society in the years after Darwin's Origin of Species. It also offers some insight as to why conservative evangelicals did not display the militancy of some American fundamentalists with whom they shared so many of their intellectual commitments. Filling in a significant gap in the literature around modern attitudes to religion and science, this book will be of keen interest to scholars of Religious Studies, the History of Religion, and Science and Religion. (shrink)

Whilst significant research has been conducted on religious affiliation and on general levels of religiosity in the South African context, few studies specifically investigated the religious lives of South African university students in a comprehensive way. This is unfortunate as such research could significantly inform and support the effectiveness of youth and student ministries. As such, this article explored the religious lives of students at a university in the Gauteng province of South Africa, focusing specifically on students' self-assessed religiosity, the (...) maturity of their religious attitudes, their spiritual well-being, the religious practices in which they engage and the relationship between such practices and their spiritual well-being. Gender, racial and religious differences concerning these variables were also investigated. Data were collected from 356 undergraduate students by means of a structured survey consisting of the Spiritual Well-Being Questionnaire, the Religious Fundamentalism Scale and two other scales aimed at assessing religiosity and religious practices. Results indicated that 98.9% of participants were religious with the majority being Christian. Generally, students espoused highly fundamentalist religious attitudes but had high levels of spiritual well-being. Prayer and virtual or in-person attendance of religious gatherings such as church services were the most prevalent religious practices whereas fasting and meditation were practiced least. All practices were positively correlated with students' spiritual well-being. Based on these findings, the article concludes with several specific, practical recommendations relevant to student ministries and those working with university students in religious contexts. (shrink)

Faith healing deaths occur infrequently in Canada, but when they do they pose a considerable challenge for criminal justice. Similar to caregivers who absent-mindedly and fatally forget a child in a hot vehicle, faith healers do not intentionally harm their children. It can seem legally excessive and unjust to prosecute achingly bereaved parents. But unlike ‘hot-car’ deaths, faith healing parents are not absent minded in the deaths they cause. Rather, significant deliberation and strength of will is necessary to treat their (...) child’s ailment with faith alone. Two different Criminal Code provisions can be brought to bear upon these deaths, namely, s. 215 ‘Failing to provide the necessaries of life’ and s. 219 ‘Criminal negligence’. From a public, medical, and scientific perspective treating potentially fatal ailments with ‘faith’ and ‘prayer’ seems like reckless endangerment, giving apparent justification to the more serious criminal negligence charge. But, the fault element in the criminal negligence offence continues to be a vexing issue in Canadian jurisprudence. People accused of negligence-based offences are commonly held to the standard of what a reasonable person might predictably have done in similar circumstances. While it is unnecessary for the impartial trier of fact to conceive of faith healing as ‘reasonable’, it is an open question whether faith healers are sufficiently unreasonable to warrant serious criminal condemnation and possible incarceration when their course of action causes death. Is it justifiable to think of faith healers who cause death as criminally unreasonable? That is, do they depart markedly enough from the standard that criminal negligence is rightly attributed to them? Public attitudes toward religion, religious fundamentalism, and healthcare must be considered when trying to discern what a reasonable person does when treating an ailing child at risk of death. (shrink)

The title concepts of criticism, crisis, and wisdom are taken from the paradigm of Kantian philosophy and are characterised in the development given by the contemporary philosopher Odo Marquard. In this connection I present the relationship between wisdom and thinking in the Enlightenment usage. The call for philosophy to be self-understanding in the sense of the Enlightenment Bildung and the autonomy of science and wisdom sounds particularly strong here. I conclude that philosophy becomes stupidity when it turns into a field (...) that—because of some kind of philosophical fundamentalism—would like to become this one-sided attitude towards reality that eliminates and replaces other attitudes. (shrink)

Ex interiore ipso exeas. Preface. This book reconstructs the history of a still open dialectics between several ethoi, that is, shared codes of unwritten rules, moral traditions, or self-aware attempts at reforming such codes, and ethical theories discussing the nature and justification of such codes and doctrines. Its main claim is that this history neither amounts to a triumphal march of reason dispelling the mist of myth and bigotry nor to some other one-way process heading to some pre-established goal, but (...) instead to a chain of controversies where the partners’ will to win unintentionally yields a wealth of insights on human existence that has still something to teach us. -/- 1. The Hellenic moral tradition. -/- Two different traditions of morality in vi-v century Greece are described. The birth of philosophical questioning of traditional morality and temporal and spatial variation of custom is described within the context of the v century crisis, the demise of traditional aristocratic and tyrannical rule and the birth of democracy. Two conflicting answers to the challenge are reconstructed, namely conventionalist or immoralist theories formulated by the Sophists and the eudemonist and intellectualist Socratic theory. -/- 2. Plato and the Good. -/- Plato’s own reformulation of Socrates rejoinder to the Sophists is reconstructed. His psychological views, his classification of the four cardinal virtues and his political theory are described as parts of a unitary system, culminating in an extremely realist moral ontology identifying the idea of the good with the essence of the (moral and extra-moral) world itself. -/- 3. Aristotle and practical philosophy. -/- Aristotle’s invention of practical philosophy as a field separated from first philosophy is shown to be an implication of his break with Plato moral ultra-realism. Aristotle’s agenda in his moral works is arguably dependent on a polemical intention, namely dismantling Socratic intellectualism. The semi-inductive or virtuously circular method of practical philosophy is illustrated, starting with the received opinions of the better and wiser individuals and trying dialectically to sift what is left of mistake and inconsistency in such opinions, finally trying to correct mistakes and make the overall practical science more consistent. The relationship of individual ethics, or ‘monastics’, with the art and the science of the pater families, or ‘economics’, and the science of the ruler and citizen, or politics, is illustrated. The nature of virtues, or better, excellences of character, is discussed, highlighting the basic role of hexes, or ‘dispositions’. Prudence, or better, practical wisdom, is the focus of the chapter. Its relationship with boùleusis or deliberation is discussed, and its autonomous status vis-à-vis theoretical knowledge is stressed. -/- 4. Cynics and Stoics: ethics as therapy. -/- The chapter provides an overview of Hellenistic ethics, which almost amounts to Hellenistic schools of philosophy, in so far as ‘philosophy’ became in these centuries primarily the name for a way of life. The typical character of the Cynical movement is highlighted, that of a school of life, not a school aimed at providing any kind of intellectual training was to be provided. The various phases of Stoicism are described, and the shifting place that was given to ethics in the Stoic system of idea, culminating in the paradoxical view of ethics, its impossibility in principle notwithstanding, as the only truly significant and necessary part of philosophy. The peculiar character of the Epicurean school is described, a combination of the science of well-being aiming, more than pleasure understood as in the popular view, the reduction of useless suffering, of unnecessary needs, and at a balanced selection of pleasures of the best and most durable kind. -/- 5. Roman and Imperial Moralists. -/- The chapter is dedicated to the reconstruction of a particular kind of literature, whose specific features have long been under-stressed, namely the Roman and Imperial moral literature. Cicero is treated at some length, showing how his own synthesis of various Hellenistic trends is as a truly philosophical enterprise, deserving serious consideration after one or two centuries when he was confined to the role of literate. Epictetus is given pride of place, stressing the novelty of his approach to ethics as cognitive therapy, in this case just following an already existing new wave of interest after nineteenth-century oblivion justified by alleged lack of authentic ‘philosophical’ character. -/- 6. The Hebrew moral tradition. -/- A reconstruction of basic ideas from a few books of the Hebrew Bible is provided, starting with the Prophetic tradition and the focus on God’s mercy as the source of motivation and standard for human behaviour. Then a comparative analysis is undertaken of a parallel tradition, namely the three codifications of the Torah (Law or, better, Instruction), highlighting how a core of moral ideas may be recognized as a basis and preamble of codification of civil law, cultural practice, and regulation of ritual purity. The importance of Levitic is stressed as the turning point when the stress on mercy, typical of the Prophetic tradition, starts being combined with legal tradition yielding the change in the sensibility of the Second Temple time. -/- 7. Second Temple Judaism. -/- This chapter describes the Long March leading from the post-exile Zadokite restoration to the first-century aevi vulgaris. The first topic reconstructed is the Zadokite theology of the double retribution. The second is the alternative Enochic tradition consistently rejecting the central role of the Temple, the Priesthood and worship as atonement for sins and offering as an alternative God’s unlimited mercy and preaching mercy, not sacrifice as the way of behaving requested by God. Wisdom literature, the third subject discusses, is a kind of third way, on the one hand increasingly critical towards the double retribution and ruling theology’s optimism facing the world as it is and on the other mocking at the Enochic current as a band of dreamers and visionaries. The third way consists in disenchantment facing the word as it is combined with a refusal of vain and childish hope of prizes for the righteous, suggesting instead the leading idea of right deeds for righteousness’s sake. Rabbi Hillel, Rabbi Yeshua and Philo of Alexandria are described as the three leading figures at the culminating point of such process of emergence of a new sensibility, gradually including mercy as an essential part of justice and establishing the starting point of both the Rabbinic and the Christian tradition. This starting point consists precisely in the precept of one’s neighbour’s love or of the golden rule, whose meaning is, arguably, more consistent than a long-lasting Christian tradition deriving from John and Augustine made us believe. And Christian morality, vis-à-vis allegedly legalist ‘Ancient Testament’ teachings, is less of a novelty than most early Christian writers announced. -/- 8. Talmudic moral doctrines and proto-Christian paraenesis. -/- The first three sections examine the moral doctrines of so-called 'ethical Treaties' from the Talmud, a group of treaties, among which the best known is Pirke Avot, that were left out of the six "orders" of the canon as they did not fit in any of the six groups of issues ritual or legal on which the division was based. According to Maimonides, their peculiar theme is provided by the Deot, 'opinions', i.e., mental dispositions, that is, the translation of the Greek term hexes and Arab akhlak (in turn providing in this language the name for ethics as such). The three topics I reconstruct are: i) the notion of Torah: The Torah is understood as the world order itself, or as the ‘Wisdom’ that existed even before creation and was "the tool by which the world was built"; however, the Torah is an earthly and human entity, as it was "received" by humans, and from that very moment belongs to them; ii) the relationship between love of God and love of neighbour; the treaties require us to study and practice the Torah ‘for its own sake’, that is, require us to act out of love, not out of fear or hope of reward; iii) the idea of sanctification of daily life: having disappeared with the destruction of the Temple the possibility of any conflict between liturgical service and everyday life, the latter is assumed to be in itself divine service: to give food to the poor has the same value as sacrifices in the Temple, and as an implication, the insistence become recurrent on the goodness of created things in themselves along with a polemic against ascetic currents. The conclusions drawn are: i) the moral teachings of the Talmud and those of Yeshua are, rather than similar, virtually identical; one may safely say that the precept of love and the golden rule are central ones for all Talmudic rabbis, that mercy plays an indispensable role alongside with justice, and the latter is not a different thing from one’s neighbour’s love; ii) a peculiarity of Talmud rabbis facing Yeshua is the idea of study as worship, and knowledge as a source of justice; but this is an idea of Judaism after the Temple's destruction that cannot be attributed to the Pharisees of Yeshua’s time; iii) the relation of study and practice in the Talmud parallels that between faith and deeds in Paul's epistles, that is, respectively faith or learning are a necessary and sufficient condition to be recognized as righteous, but deeds are the inevitable effect of either faith or learning. The last two sections examine first the various Christian currents and then Gnostic para-Christian or non-Christian currents as well as Manicheism. The sayings ascribed to Yeshua are examined first, yielding the conclusion that a close equivalent may be found for every saying in Talmudic literature and yet the whole is ascribed to one rabbi, with rather consistent stress on God’s mercy and unconditional forgiving as the mark of true imitation of God. Thus, Yeshua’s teaching is pure, purest Judaism. The last section describes briefly the galaxy of Gnostic currents and Manicheism, trying to sketch the profile of moral teachings resulting from an encounter of Asian spiritual traditions, Hellenistic lore and sparks of teachings from apocalyptic Jewish currents. -/- 9. Christianity as “philosophy”. -/- The chapter reconstructs the stormy story of several encounters between Christian currents and Hellenistic philosophical schools. The first one was with late Cynicism. Recent, rather controversial, literature discovered the jargon and several rhetorical topics from the Stoic and Cynical popular philosophy in a few books from the New Testament itself. This, far from proving that Rabbi Yeshua himself had been influenced by cynical preachers, is a proof of the necessity to translate the original Christian message in a Greek lexicon deeply impregnated with cynic terminology. The second was with Platonism, yielding the mild and temperate moral teaching of Clemens of Alexandria, teaching the sanctity of nature and the human body, the joy of moderate fruition of ‘natural’ kinds of pleasures, and the beauty of the marital life – in short, the opposite of the standard picture of Medieval Christianity. Ambrose of Milan brings about a different kind of synthesis, namely with Middle Platonism, where Stoic themes prevail. The most shocking case is Augustine, where early Manichean education is overcome in a former phase by a synthesis of Plotinian Neo-Platonism and Christian preaching, yielding a sustained polemic with the Manicheans and rather optimistic views on life and Creation, the body and sexuality, and Hebrew-Judaic tradition not far from Clemens of Alexandria. In a later phase, occasioned by controversy on the opposite front, with such Christian currents as the Pelagians and Donatists, Augustine comes back to heavily anti-Judaic and world-denying ascetic attitudes where is earlier Manichean upbringing seems to emerge again. The tragedy of medieval Christianity will be the later Augustine’s overwhelming influence. A final section is dedicated to the monastic tradition where a curious mixture of world-denying asceticism with an astonishingly penetrating ‘science’ of introspection emerges. -/- 10. Ethics in the Arabic-Islamic Philosophy. -/- The Qurān and the qadit, that is, collections of sayings ascribed to the prophet Muhammad contain a wealth of precepts and catalogues of virtues mirroring moral contents from the Jewish and the Christian traditions, among them the basic notion of imitation of the Deity, where mercy is assumed to be its basic trait. An important tradition within Islam, namely Sufism, stressed to the utmost degree the role of mercy, turning Islam into a mystic doctrine centred on the retreat from the world, abandonment to God’s will, and a peaceful and fraternal attitude to our fellow-beings. A secular literary tradition originating in the Sassanid Empire, the literature of advice to the Prince, had for a time a widespread influence in the newly constituted Arabic-Islamic commonwealth. In a later phase, the legacy of Hellenic philosophy made its way into the intellectual elite of the Islamic world. The first important legacy was Platonic, and the Republic became the main text for Islamic Platonism. In a second phase also Aristotelian and Stoic influence were assimilated. Miskawayh’s treatise was the masterwork at the time Arabic philosophy reached its Zenith. It is a treatment of the soul’s diseases and their remedies, combining the Aristotelian doctrine of the golden mean with the Stoic doctrine of the passions and elements of Galenic medicine. Towards the eleventh-twelve centuries, a war raged among theologians and philosophers, finally won by the former with the disappearance of philosophy as such. The newly established mainstream, yet, was no kind of intolerant fanaticism. It drew from the work of mystic theologian Al-Ghazālī, the best heir of Sufism, teaching a tolerant and peaceful attitude to our fellow-beings and a passive attitude to destiny as an expression of the Divine will. -/- 11. Ethics in the Jewish philosophy. -/- The encounter between the Talmudic tradition and Hellenic philosophy had taken place for the first time in Alexandria at the time of Philo but the two traditions had parted way again. In fact, the kind of Platonic Judaism founded by Philo survived only within Christianity, in the fourth Gospel and then in writings by Clemens of Alexandria. The Talmudic literature had absorbed too a few traits from the Hellenic Philosophy, namely an idea of ethics as care of the self and a role for the education of character as propaedeutic to theoretical knowledge. In the Arabic-Islamic world, a second round started when Jewish authors writing in Arabic undertook the task to prove the full compatibility of the tradition deriving from Tora and Platonic philosophy. The culmination of this attempt is provided by Moshe ben Maimon who tried to use Aristotelian ethics as a language into which the teaching from the Pirke Avot could be translated. -/- 12. The practical philosophy revival in Latin Europe. -/- A reconstruction is carried out of a fresh start of philosophical ethics in Latin Europe at the turn of the Millennium rescuing a Platonic and Augustinian legacy, with Anselm and Peter Abelard. In this phase remarkable innovations are introduced, including Abelard’s claim of the obliging character of erring consciousness. In a second phase, the rediscovery of Nicomachean Ethics thanks to Latin translation of Arabic versions, gives birth to a new wave of ethical studies, recovering the very idea of Aristotelian practical philosophy, with the potential implication of a full legitimization of natural morality, i.e. ethics without Revelation. -/- 13. Scholastic practical philosophy: Thomas Aquinas. -/- Aquinas’s ethics is theological ethics out of which it would be vain to try to extract self-contained philosophical ethics. His treatment of topics in philosophical ethics, yet, does not boil down to the repetition of Aristotelian arguments but is rather a creative reshaping of such arguments. For example, he introduces also in the practical philosophy a first principle parallel to the principle of non-contradiction; and he also carries out a synthesis of Aristotelianism, Stoicism, neo-Platonism. Even though it is essentially moral theology, Aquinas’s doctrine - unlike Augustine – grants full citizenship to "natural" morality, firstly by rejecting the claim that the corruption of human nature due to the original sin is so radical as to leave pure nature incapable of moral goodness. The doctrine is presented in a more sophisticated formulation in a few of the Quaestiones such as De Malo and De Veritate, in the Summa contra Gentes and in the commentaries to Aristotle than in the famous Summa Theologica, but the latter work includes the only or the largest exposition of some decisive part of the theory. Thus, the Summa Theologica should be read for what it is more than criticized for not being what it was not meant to be. It was not meant to be the brilliant synthesis of all that Reason he had been able to produce with what Revelation had added about which the Neo-Thomists used to dream, but rather a manual for the training of preachers and confessors, where theoretical claims are not too ambitious, and a few serious tensions are left. Besides a jump between the Prima Secundae and the Secunda Secundae, being the former an essay in virtue theory and the latter a handbook for confessors, the most serious tension is perhaps the one between the ethics of right reason presented in most of Prima Secundae and the eudemonistic ethics developed in quaestiones 1-5 of the same part; the alternative ethical theory which also may be found in Augustine, the Stoic view of a cosmic reason eventually coincident with the moral law, was believed by Anselm (followed by John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham) to be incompatible with eudemonism. It is questionable whether Thomas was able to solve the tension proving that it is just an apparent tension, in so far as the right reason and bliss derived from the knowledge of God tend to coincide, but this is just a conjecture. Thomas’s ethics is a virtue ethics, not a law-based one, and moral judgment focuses on the virtues, particularly charity, not on the commandments and even less on absolute prohibitions; Thomas, however, would not have considered a drastic alternative between law and the virtues such as the one which has been advanced in late twentieth-century philosophy to be justified. Nonetheless, when it discusses ‘special’ virtues, it ceases to be an ethics of virtue and becomes a disappointing and often contradictory discussion of legal and illegal acts. Such a discussion takes most of the time ‘reasonable’ middle positions on controversial issues but not the alternative approach that Aristotelianism would have made possible; even when some occasional Aristotelian claim shows up, such as money’s barrenness as a reason against usury, this seems to be made by an author who apparently ignores the Aristotelian Thomas of the Prima Secundae. It is an ethic of human autonomy which recognizes the binding character of the individual conscience and, potentially, even a duty to disobey unjust laws. It is true that what Thomas writes in his discussion of the death penalty and persecution of heretics is simply disgusting, and yet we should blame Thomas the man, not the Thomist ethical theory. Finally, Thomas’s ethics is no way an ethical ‘absolutism’, as both the traditionalist Catholic theologians and secularists tend to believe, but rather an ethic of prudential judgment on the individual case. Exceptions to this approach – or better the result of logical fallacies – are provided by the thesis of the absolute character of negative precepts and of the existence of so-called intrinsically evil acts, a thesis that would simply cease to make sense in the light of Thomas’s own distinction between human act and natural act, carrying consequences that Thomas did not live long enough to draw. -/- 14. Scholastic practical philosophy: John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. A reconstruction is carried out of the ethical doctrines by both most authoritative Franciscan doctors. Their continuity with Aquinas is vindicated against prejudice carried by centuries of polemics within the Catholic Church and tendentious disparaging of both as forerunners of execrable Reformation. Besides aspects of continuity, also the important novelties are illustrated, first John’s abandonment of Aquinas’s and Augustine’s eudemonism, asserting righteousness for righteousness’s sake, and then William’s explicit defence of the philosopher’s virtues, that is, natural morality, and his solution to the dilemma of God’s omnipotence and the universal validity of natural law extending to God himself. -/- 15. Aristotelianism interpreted by the Magistri Artium. -/- A reconstruction of the until recently forgotten ethical doctrines by the Parisian Magistri Artium, falsely depicted as ‘Averroists’ and either deprecated as heretics or mistaken for predecessors of modern secularism. In fact, they illustrate a view of ‘natural’ virtue as may be understood by human reason without the assistance by Revelation. -/- Etiamsi daremus Deum non esse. Intermediate considerations. Three considerations may be suggested by the story told in the book. The first one is that intellectual histories have been mounted in the past with the same state of mind as one may mount a war chariot. Such constructions are not very helpful as tools for understanding the past. Wars waged in the past have left the field obstructed by ruins not easy to remove even by those historians who have animated by an impartial academic motivation. They have been influenced too by consequences of past emphasis on some authors and damnatio capitis suffered by others, by stratifications left on sources by secondary literature and translations, by allotment of originally close sources to different literary genres, by the monopolization of religious texts by churches with full cooperation by secular scholars who still fear contamination. The second one is that aware or unaware ethnocentrism has carried various calamities to our comprehension of the past. Their last vestiges have surfaced again in the semi-scholarly discussion on the idea of Europe occasioned by the debate on a project of a European Constitution. Mention of Europe’s Christian roots has been the clumsiest move. Proclamations of such roots were so obvious in what they affirmed as they were totally off-path concerning what they omitted, namely that he modern European moral tradition included legacies from Middle-Eastern wisdom, Hellenic philosophy, Roman Imperial legal literature, and, besides, a Jewish legacy in turn incorporating other more ancient Middle-Eastern legacies and which has been partly conveyed by Christianity. And the Islamic-Arabic philosophy too, in so far it made the Nicomachean Ethics available to Latin Christian scholars, is one more of Europe’s roots. The third is that religious traditionalists and secularist fundamentalists have gone hand in hand for a couple of centuries in either extolling or deprecating the allegedly Modern idea of Ethics without God, first formulated by Hugo Grotius with the claim that natural law would still be valid ‘etiamsi daremus – quod sine summo scelere dari potest – Deum non esse’. The facts are, firstly, that this is not an irreligious claim and Grotius was just a pious and meek Christian and, secondly, that it is not a ‘modern’ claim but rather one more formulation of the claim that there is a natural morality, independent of divine revelation, a claim shared by Moshe ben Maimon, Aquinas and William of Ockham. -/- . (shrink)

The author analyzes the conceptions of ontological nihilism in the works of S. Kierkegaard, F. Nietzsche, M. Heidegger, E. Jünger. On the basis of this analysis, violence is defined as a manifestation of nihilism, of the “will to nothingness” and hypertrophy of the self-will of man. The article demonstrates the importance of the problem of nihilism. The nihilistic thinking of modern man is expressed in the attitude toward a radical transformation of the world from the position of his “absolute” (...) righteousness. The paradox of the current situation is that there is the reverse side of this transformative activity, when there is only the appearance of action and the dilution of responsibility. Confidence in the rightness of own views and beliefs increases the risk of the violent imposition of own vision of reality. Historical and philosophical reconstruction of the conceptions of nihilism allowed to reveal the following projects of its comprehension and resolution: the project of “positing of values,” which consists in the transformation of the evaluation, which is understood as another perspective of positing values, leading to the affirmation of being; the project of overcoming nihilism from the space of temporality, carried out through the resoluteness to accept the historicity of own existence; the project of overcoming nihilism as the oblivion of being from the spatial perspective of the “line,” allowing to realize the “glimpse” of being. The author concludes that it is impossible to solve the problem of violence and its various forms of its manifestation without overcoming “ontological nihilism.” Significant role in solving the problem of ontological violence is assigned to philosophy as a critical and responsible form of thinking, which is capable to help a person to bear the burden of the world, to provide meanings and affirm being, as well as to unite people and resist the fundamentalist claims of exclusivity and rightness. (shrink)

Taking a Harder Line “The New Atheism” is the name that was attached, often pejoratively, to the series of six bestselling books by five authors that appeared in the period 2004-2008.[i] Since then many have joined the movement, with an upsurge in books, freethinker organizations, and an exponential expansion of the blogosphere spreading the word on atheism to thousands. The message of new atheism is that it is time to take a far less accommodating attitude toward religion, including moderate (...) religion, than had been exhibited in previous years by atheist authors and, in particular, non-believing scientists. Science, in the United States, is locked in a battle with conservative Christians over the teaching of evolution and creationism in the schools. While 87 percent of scientists accept evolution by unguided, purely natural processes, only 32 percent of the public does.[ii] Belief in unguided evolution among mainline Protestants and Catholics is about the same as among the general public, while only 10 percent of Evangelicals and 19 percent of Fundamentalist Protestants acknowledge this view. (shrink)

In Indonesia, scholars differ on how to deal with religious fundamentalism and intolerance. On the one hand, there are supporters of a militant approach, but on the other hand, there are those who prefer a moderate one. This article aims to analyze Indonesia's largest Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama/NU and its responses towards the puritanical Wahhabi ideology. The organization is renowned for its contest against fundamentalist Muslim groups in post-New Order Indonesia. Focusing on the local branch of NU in Jember, (...) East Java, this article argues that NU adopts an intolerant approach in dealing with Wahhabi groups and their Islamic da'wah activism. NU’s approach is double-barreled first still within its moderation framework, the second falling out. NU rejects Wahhabi's religious orthodoxy, anti-pluralist, and discriminatory attitude towards different faiths who are lumped together as “infidels.” Yet, its attitude towards Wahhabi right to establish Islamic educational institutions represents authoritarianism. This article analyzes the impact of the local NU’s dualism of weakening intolerance on the one hand and undermining pluralism on the other hand. (shrink)

While much of contemporary psychology preserves the legacy of behaviorism and consummatory drive-reductionism, this paper by contrast grounds itself in an "enactivist" approach to emotion and motivation, and goes on to consider the implications of this view for the psychology of inspiration, especially as applied to love and religion. Emotions are not responses to stimuli, but expressions of an active system. The tendency of complex systems is to prefer higher-energy basins of attraction rather than settle into satiation and dull comfort. (...) Given this understanding of the emotions in complex animals, there is a fundamental need for inspiration to fuel the self-initiated activation of the system; lack of this basic inspiration is depression. In sophisticated conscious beings, the need for inspiration is exacerbated by awareness of the problems of finitude; love, the arts and religion are meant to address this heightened need for inspiration. Fundamentalist approaches, however, contend with the problem of finitude in an inauthentic way-by simply denying them. This fundamentalist approach leads to corresponding distortions of ethical and political attitudes. (shrink)

To understand any genuine theism we must recognize at once that we are dealing with a problem of a different order than technical puzzles in epistemology or conundrums in modal logic. That is not to say that theism is above rational investigation, that acceptance of it presupposes some special access, or that it cannot be examined philosophically. But it cannot be discussed fruitfully unless there is some grasp of what refined religious feeling in fact is. A lot of discussion about (...) God comes from the lips of people who have never visited temple, mosque, or meeting house, and who have not tried to find out what it is like to have a religious attitude toward an object of belief for forty years without a break. They have little interest in understanding the experience of prayer or finding out what it is like to commit oneself sincerely to a religious ideal. Invariably they know little about the teachings and claims of the eleven world religions, but they surely know how to find an assortment of flaws in St. Thomas’s “Five Ways” and they are consummate experts in showing up weaknesses in Paley’s “watchmaker” argument. They have a veritable field day in ridiculing the extravagances of uncritical Fundamentalism. (shrink)

In the Netherlands, the traditional and famous ‘culture of tolerance’ in the past few years surprisingly became associated with the laxity, half-heartedness, even negligence and indifference with regard to serious problems in a multi-ethnic society. For the time being, a polemical use of the term dominates: tolerance as an aspect of our western ‘superiority’ against barbaric fundamentalism. To regain some grip on the – at least in the Netherlands – apparently ‘hollow’, even politically and morally dubious concept of tolerance, the (...) author returns to the genealogical ‘founding forge’ of the term, the civil war fought in the name of religion in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe. He demonstrates that tolerance was a key-category in a tiring, centuries-old process during which a ‘Gordian knot’ – the congruence of political power and religious faith – was being abandoned. The historical case-study of the dissident preacher John Bunyan and the early Quakers in seventeenth-century England shows, that during the Age of religious Discord political, social and religious themes are inseparably intertwined, not only from the point of view of the defenders of the status quo, but also from the standpoint of the religious dissidents and their ‘illegal’ preaching. In the intellectual history one can witness the birth of the early-modern concept of a minimal, political concept of tolerance. In a negative sense, this was a departure from attempts to uphold or restore the unity of ‘true faith’ by political coercion. In a positive sense it implied the sufferance of dissident faith and religious practices by a political power ‘in order to prevent the worse from happening’. In this process, political power became more and more an autonomous institution, above society. This minimal, political concept of tolerance has been surpassed by the state-sanctioned, juridical freedom of religion. This implies the democratic disjunction of truth and justice, that is, the recognition of an equal, reciprocal right of everyone to live and articulate his or her own truth. This legislation must be supported by a civic and social culture in which tolerance as an ethical virtue is being practiced and cherished. The most exacting form of tolerance is an attitude which tries to overcome the democratic disjunction of truth and justice, in the direction of an ‘oikoumene of religions’ or a ‘fusion of horizons’. But this subtle attitude can easily slip into an ‘idolatry of difference’ and a laissez faire-tolerance, as seemed to have happened in the Netherlands. In the final parts of this introductory essay the author presents the four articles in this thematic edition of Bijdragen: studies on Cusanus, Spinoza and Leibniz regarding tolerance, and an essay on the problems of dealing with alterity. The author concludes with the contemporary dilemma of tolerance. Should the future form of tolerance be based on universalism accompanied with the political neutralization and privatization of religion, nation, culture? Or should tolerance in a globalizing world be fed from particular traditions and sources? (shrink)

To understand any genuine theism we must recognize at once that we are dealing with a problem of a different order than technical puzzles in epistemology or conundrums in modal logic. That is not to say that theism is above rational investigation, that acceptance of it presupposes some special access, or that it cannot be examined philosophically. But it cannot be discussed fruitfully unless there is some grasp of what refined religious feeling in fact is. A lot of discussion about (...) God comes from the lips of people who have never visited temple, mosque, or meeting house, and who have not tried to find out what it is like to have a religious attitude toward an object of belief for forty years without a break. They have little interest in understanding the experience of prayer or finding out what it is like to commit oneself sincerely to a religious ideal. Invariably they know little about the teachings and claims of the eleven world religions, but they surely know how to find an assortment of flaws in St. Thomas’s “Five Ways” and they are consummate experts in showing up weaknesses in Paley’s “watchmaker” argument. They have a veritable field day in ridiculing the extravagances of uncritical Fundamentalism. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the philosophical and cultural analysis of postmodern philosophy on the basis of the Hegelian methodology, Heidegger's philosophy of language, structural psychoanalysis, deconstructionism, hermeneutics, universal ethics and philosophy of dialogue. The article substantiates the thesis that postmodernism as a model of theoretical reflection is autonomous with regard to liberalism and relativism with the concept of a "French school", which has an anti-liberal orientation and corresponds to the conservative Christian attitudes imposed by implicit ontological meanings. The medieval (...) ontological "nuclei" of postmodernism are concepts: "Real" by J. Lacan, "Archepism" by J. Derrida, "Schizoid" by J. Deleuze, "language reconfiguration" by P. Ricker. Thus, freed from the stereotypes of relativity, postmodernism appears as a third alternative in opposition to the European choice between liberalism and radicalism. The double standard extends to the attitude of liberals to radical currents in crisis processes. Initially, liberal leaders take an overwhelming majority in right-wing nationalism, using it as a tool to support the status quo of capitalism, a means of distracting the masses from real problems, and a mechanism of intimidation. When the mass is intimidated enough, it is proposed to liberalism as "a source of defacing" as the "only alternative". We can talk about the artificial situation of identifying the choice of Fa versus Antifa for the subject who is forced to choose between "purse and life" - between multiculturalism and radical nationalism The key task of structural psychoanalysis is not only the returning of the conflict to its original place, that is, the disclosure of the deep-seated class traumas of the capitalist neoliberal world itself, according to S. Zizek and other representatives of the Slovenian school, but also - the separation of the philosophy of postmodernism as a spiritual phenomenon from political projects of neoliberalism and multiculturalism, which until recently were considered an applied dimension of postmodern politics and promoted the introduction into the social practice of the vicious circle "liberalism - nationalism liberalism" - a circle that does not provide choice and which excludes from its own semiosfery any other values: ethical and dialogical, modern, conservative, religious, international, non-system Left and others. In order to realize this task, postmodernism must be considered under the other viewpoint, depriving it of the stereotypes of "relativism", "cynicism" and "enlightenment", that is, it is necessary to demonstrate that the authentic core of postmodern philosophy is far from multicultural indifference of "post-truth" and includes expressive ontological motives. The double goal of our study: to carry out a critical rethinking of postmodernism as a form of manifestation of a conservative attitude based on hereditary archetypes of the Middle Ages and Modernism, and to show that postmodernism as a philosophy is not the cause of the tragic self-denial of postmodernism as an applied measurement of multiculturalism, that multiculturalism with its vicious circles of relativity, devastation and radicalism is separate from the phenomenon of postmodernism and belongs to the "shock" project of American liberal democracy, and not to "French school" Moreover, the School of Post-Structuralism of the Sorbonne, as the basis of postmodernism, is the descendant of the Marxist school of "new left" in Frankfurt and its meaning is fundamentally anti-capitalist and anti-liberal. By combining among themselves in a single interdisciplinary field the classical philosophy of M. Heidegger's language, J. G. Derrida's "grammar", G. Lacan's structural psychoanalysis, J. Habermas's universal ethics, J. de Gaulle's schizodiscourse, and hermeneutics and the philosophy of P. Ricker's dialogue, we have shown that In the semantic field of postmodernism there are ontological kernels of conservatism, which approximate this philosophical model to medieval traditionalist thought and make the border between modern and postmodern very conditional. The return of postmodernism to the status of the philosophy of being and the liberation of the French school from the stereotypes of "lack" and "loseness" is necessary in order to protect postmodernism from accusations of cynicism, relativism and "emptiness", since these allegations are, firstly, based on the mixing of postmodernism with liberal irony, and, secondly, often serve as an excuse for the revival of various kinds of fundamentalist aspirations. We have shown that liberalism, by provoking through the irony of the identification of the "illusion", initially contributes to the development of radical movements, and then, when they emerge from the symbolic control, they remove them from the agenda as "fascist", opposing them to themselves. There is a closed vicious circle of impossibility to choose between "Fa and Antifa". Our work was an attempt to remove postmodernism from this circle. (shrink)

This paper explores Gandhi’s attitude towards diversity of religions and examines as to how he attempted to bring inter-faith harmony. Religious diversity has been a topic of serious debate in the contemporary philosophical discourse on understanding religion. Religious pluralism is one of the approaches that deal with issues concerning the diversity of religions. It is believed that no single religion can make absolute claims about the nature of divine reality, its relation to man and the world. It stands in (...) direct opposition to exclusivism, inclusivism and also to fundamentalism by denying that any one religion is the sole possession of the whole truth. Different religions seem to put forward different and incompatible interpretations about the nature of ultimate reality, about the modes of divine activity, the nature and destiny of the human race. (shrink)

The South African-Dutch research group responsible for this article started its activities in 2012 by looking at religious tolerance as a means of addressing the tendency for religious intolerance, extremism and fundamentalism. While tolerance seemed to be a promising way to counter religious intolerable behaviour, some shortcomings also became apparent. For example, the concept of tolerance includes an aspect of passivity towards others who adhere to another religion. The concept also does not appear to be able to respond to attitudes (...) and values such as respect, human rights and diversity. Accurate investigation of this problem, both conceptually and empirically, led to the understanding that hospitality is a concept that embodies more active adaptation to those who are different. Hospitality, therefore, seems to be a more promising concept than tolerance for reducing religious tension between individuals and groups. The inner contradiction discovered by Derrida in the notion of hospitality does not detract from the concept of being defined from a Biblical point of view. Hospitality can also be taught to young people. Although there are no formal provisions for hospitality in the national curricula, an analysis of the Dutch and South African national curricula shows that there is room for hospitality education. (shrink)

Traumatic events happen in every age, yet there is a particularly cataclysmic feeling to our own epoch that is so attractive to some and so terrifying to others. The terrible events of September 11th 2001 still resonate and the repercussions continue to this day: the desperation of immigrants fleeing terror, the uncertainty of Brexit, Donald Trump in the White House, the rise of the alt-right and hard left, increasing fundamentalism, and terror groups intent on causing destruction to the Western way (...) of life. If that were not enough, we also have to grapple with the enormity of climate change and the charge that if we do not act now, it will be too late. Is it any wonder many are left overwhelmed by the events they see on the news? Galvanised by the events outside of his consulting room, in 2015, David Morgan began The Political Mind seminars at the British Psychoanalytical Society and their successful run continues today. A series of superlative seminars, mostly presented by colleagues from the British Society plus a few select external experts, that examine a dazzling array of relevant topics to provide a psychoanalytic understanding of just what is going on in our world. This book is the first in The Political Mind series to bring these seminars to a wider audience. The Unconscious in Political and Social Life contains compelling contributions from Christopher Bollas, Michael Rustin, Jonathan Sklar, David Bell, Philip Stokoe, Roger Kennedy, David Morgan, M. Fakhry Davids, Ruth McCall, R. D. Hinshelwood, Renée Danziger, Josh Cohen, Sally Weintrobe, and Margot Waddell. They investigate so many vital issues affecting us today: the evolution of democracy, right-wing populism, prejudice, the rise of the far right, attitudes to refugees and migrants, neoliberalism, fundamentalism, terrorism, the Palestine-Israel situation, political change, feminism, austerity in the UK, financial globalisation, and climate change. This book needs to be read by all who are concerned by the state of the world today. Psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts with their awareness of what motivates human beings bring clarity and fresh insight to these matters. A deeper understanding of humanity awaits the reader of The Unconscious in Political and Social Life. (shrink)

Is a Muslim still a Muslim when he crashes airplanes into the twin towers? Any serious theory of multiculturalism has to deny that Islam could ever come to justify suicide bombing and terrorism. My thesis is that none of the contemporary multicultural theories manages to do so, or at least not without collapsing into a Kantian conception of personal autonomy and, consequently, into some standard version of liberalism. Communitarianism, trying to demonstrate that fundamentalism has nothing to do with the true (...) and authentic Islam and that it does not take into account the pluralism prevailing in Islam, has to moralize Islam. A Humean position, which takes Islamic fundamentalism to be merely a pathology, the product of resentment and western neocolonialism, eventually could come to the conclusion that good and upright Muslims today cannot help but become suicide bombers. Liberal multiculturalism, considering identity to be a matter of choice, must suppose that an active agent with self-knowledge is by definition a responsible person with a moral identity. In conclusion, multiculturalism, in its effort to make the good identities prevail over the bad and the ugly identities, risks adopting some of the same righteous attitudes towards Islam as traditional liberalism. (shrink)

In this essay I wish to discuss the notions of utopia, especially the notion of epistemological utopia as Leszek Kołakowski described it in one of his paper. Epistemological utopia is not tantamount to the conception of perfect and unalterable knowledge. On the contrary, in its realm there is also a place for scepticism, because scepticism is a kind of epistemological utopia but à rebours. Epistemological fundamentalism and scepticism are indeed two opposite attitudes but they finally belong to each other. Nevertheless, (...) no one from these attitudes satisfy our epistemological theory. Bertrand Russell described similar situation in his short essay titled On optimism: we can accept at most together pessimist and optimist, never only one of them. Therefore that situation provides to the necessity of overcoming theoretical field of these two, foundational and sceptical, conceptions. In this article I use Wittgenstein’s ideas to search for a ‘new’ epistemological attitude. (shrink)

While ethicists reflect on specific political and biomedical problems such as euthanasia, the international political context is becoming grim. A number of the articles in this issue, such as the one by Vasti Roodt, make implicit reference to this. It is quite naïve to think that ethicists can exert any influence on the prevailing interpretations of political conflicts, but at the same time it would be inappropriate to take that fact as a reason for no longer being concerned. No one (...) should be indifferent to the international context.There can be no doubt that modern industrial societies provide exceptional opportunities. Modernization creates an ideal environment for economic development whereby painful shortcomings can be eliminated and various public services, such as safe water, education and health care, can be financed. Ideally, modernization leads to greater freedom of expression, more democracy and more institutional transparency.Unfortunately, however, this link is not always in evidence, for a fundamental precondition must be fulfilled: the members of a society must be concerned about the general welfare of their state and that of the international community. A state in which the dominant mentality is “everyone for himself” will not evolve into a society where all citizens feel accepted and integrated. Both in rich western countries and in the wider international community, fault lines have emerged between groups that support liberal modernization and groups that are frustrated by it and wonder whether a strong leader, a simplified religious fundamentalism or a collectively imposed morality might offer better prospects. How has this come about?Dissatisfaction with modernization is often put down to material lack: on this view, people in difficult economic circumstances are more likely to endorse extreme political parties or protest movements. This interpretation rests on the assumption that when basic human needs cannot be met, people become frustrated; conversely, material well-being will give rise to optimism and solidarity. There are many obvious analogies to represent this: dangerous animals are docile and approachable after having eaten, and young children cease crying when they are cared for and nourished. Although these and similar analogies lend support to the assumption, they only apply to beings for whom social integration is not relevant. They do not correspond to the observed facts: the frustrations I spoke of above occur among people who lack nothing in a material sense. As an independent factor, a person’s socio-economic position has no influence on extreme voting behaviour. Let us see whether a different paradigm might be of more help.One could make the assumption that everyone lives with the idea that they lead a more or less enviable life, or at least that they are moving steadily towards such a life. This seems fundamental since everyone appears to share this idea, except for two sorts of people: in the first place, those suffering from depression. The problem they have is precisely that they do not feel their life is an enviable one; they consider themselves to be unattractive or arrogant failures, not at all amiable. I usually add that the second sort of people are philosophers, since they sometimes think that their life is a flash in eternity or an absurd mutation in an amorphous physical process. But this is misleading since even the most pessimistic philosophers would find it enviable that they are allowed to think, speak and write such things.This view differs from the model of needs satisfaction on one essential point: it requires a public if frustration is to be avoided. The current paradigm of homo economicus claims that only isolated consumers and products exist. This overlooks the fact that consumption is communication. Except in cases of extremely rudimentary urges or discomforts, it is not the fulfilment of a preference that brings us satisfaction; it is the feeling of appreciation that we experience with a purchase or a successful achievement. Appreciation is what stabilizes our desire: it gives us the feeling that we have what is essential, it liberates us from the compulsive idea that we must always aim for what is higher, more important, more intense or more outrageous. When appreciation is lacking, then people begin to suffer from what Durkheim called le mal de l'infini, the feeling that we need to have and to do more and more, the feeling that we must always climb higher.Modernization is often accompanied by the disappearance of traditional patterns of expectation. Individuals acquire more freedom to carry out their plans. But this does not alter the fact that they still depend on the people that surround them for their feelings of self-esteem. In today's meritocracy, it is primarily people who have been well educated and who have a bright future who appear to lead an enviable life. Many traditional positions and functions have lost their status and become less attractive. For this reason, modernization is experienced by many groups as humiliating and destructive. Those who are unable to succeed according to the official standards of appreciation often feel deceived and tend to move in the direction of enclaves, opting for a sort of subculture with clearly defined boundaries between 'us' and 'them', an idealization of the in group and demonization of the out group. The result of this is all too familiar.It seems obvious to use religious signifiers to draw the enclavistic boundaries between us and those in Islamic countries, which is not to say that the boundary is drawn for religious reasons. Religious psychologists came to the discovery that religion is only accompanied by intolerance when its intrinsic message remains subordinated to the external reasons for adopting a religious attitude, and when people interpret the religious message literally instead of symbolically. This agrees with the observation that, within Islam, there exists an opposition between the fundamental dimension of Islam — which urges us to give up complacency and leave ourselves behind — and the fundamentalistic extremism of political Islam.The consequences of political Islam's enclavistic ideology are terrible and the damage is causes can be compared with the fascist and communist totalitarian regimes in Europe and Russia. In such enclaves, any non-conformist behaviour is mercilessly punished and any critical reflection can be life-threatening. Human rights are trampled on and women are often humiliated and repressed. Strangely enough, the United States remained blind to these offences as long as it was not threatened by them.The construction of peace in a globalized world is impossible as long as the international political agenda remains dominated by the public opinion of groups moving in the direction of an enclave mentality. A politics driven by collective hate, such as the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, only leads to ever more misery. It is irresponsible for a head of state in a crisis situation to be led by the irrational whims of local public opinion, ignoring international commitments.Military action to curb terrorist violence is one option that might prevent even more damaging forms of extremism from developing. But much more is needed to ensure stability, peace and international security. More should be done to offset the culture shock caused in many countries by the collapse of old social structures. The decline of traditional cultures is not only a problem in non-western countries: the rise of right-wing extremism in Europe and extremist groups in the United States are symptoms of the same ill. (shrink)

In The disenchantment of the world Marcel Gauchet defined Christianity as the religion of the exodus from religion, which also functions as a paradigm for a political interpretation of religion and the understanding of modern secular politics. However, Gauchet himself asserts that he considers the primitive heteronomous religion as the standard for understanding any religion. I intend to show on the contrary that he is mainly relying on modern auto-critical and hermeneutical Christian religion as the interpretative scheme for all religion (...) and modern politics. This raises the question whether we can ever leave the auto-reflexivity of that auto-critical religion. Can there ever be any religiosity without a religion . If not, does it make sense to speak of religiosity without religion, finding its way out in the political, or do we come across the same aporias: how to define the modern political without empirical politics? I conclude that modern, empirical politics benefit from the auto-critical, self-obliging, ethical attitude of the Christian religion and that the modern constitutional state as well as the religious expression might suffer from leaving it. The alternative seems to be the loss of social cohesion as well as the rise of religious fundamentalism. (shrink)