Results for 'normativism'

308 found
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  1. Anti-Normativism Evaluated.Ulf Hlobil - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):376-395.
    I argue that recent attempts to show that meaning and content are not normative fail. The two most important arguments anti-normativists have presented are what I call the ‘argument from constitution’ and the ‘argument from guidance’. Both of these arguments suffer from the same basic problem: they overlook the possibility of focusing on assessability by norms, rather than compliance with norms or guidance by norms. Moreover, I argue that the anti-normativists arguments fail even if we ignore this basic problem. Thus, (...)
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  2. Modal Normativism and De Re Modality.Tom Donaldson & Jennifer Wang - 2022 - Argumenta 7 (2):293-307.
    In the middle of the last century, it was common to explain the notion of necessity in linguistic terms. A necessary truth, it was said, is a sentence whose truth is guaranteed by linguistic rules. Quine famously argued that, on this view, de re modal claims do not make sense. “Porcupettes are porcupines” is necessarily true, but it would be a mistake to say of a particular porcupette that it is necessarily a porcupine, or that it is possibly purple. Linguistic (...)
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  3. Normativism and Doxastic Deliberation.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):447-465.
  4. Modal Normativism on Semantic Rules.Rohan Sud - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    According to Amie Thomasson’s modal normativism, the function of modal discourse is to convey semantic rules. But what is a "semantic rule"? I raise three worries according to which there is no conception of a semantic rule that can serve the needs of a modal normativist. The first worry focuses on de re and a posteriori necessities. The second worry concerns Thomasson's inferential specification of the meaning of modal terms. The third worry asks about the normative status of semantic (...)
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  5. Factualism, Normativism and the Bounds of Normativity.Thomas M. Besch - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (2):347-365.
    The paper argues that applications of the principle that “ought” implies “can” (OIC) depend on normative considerations even if the link between “ought” and “can” is logical in nature. Thus, we should reject a common, “factualist” conception of OIC and endorse weak “normativism”. Even if we use OIC as the rule ““cannot” therefore “not ought””, applying OIC is not a mere matter of facts and logic, as factualists claim, but often draws on “proto-ideals” of moral agency.
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  6. Resisting normativism in psychology.Georges Rey - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    “Intentional content,” as I understand it, is whatever serves as the object of “propositional” attitude verbs, such as “think,” “judge,” “represent,” “prefer” (whether or not these objects are “propositions”). These verbs are standardly used to pick out the intentional states invoked to explain the states and behavior of people and many animals. I shall take the “normativity of the intentional,” or “Normativism,” to be the claim that any adequate theory of intentional states involves considerations of value not essentially involved (...)
     
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  7. De Minimis Normativism: a New Theory of Full Aptness.J. Adam Carter - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):16-36.
    Full aptness is the most important concept in performance-based virtue epistemology. The structure of full aptness, in epistemology and elsewhere, is bi-levelled. At the first level, we evaluate beliefs, like performances, on the basis of whether they are successful, competent, and apt – viz., successful because competent. But the fact that aptness itself can be fragile – as it is when an apt performance could easily have been inapt – points to a higher zone of quality beyond mere aptness. To (...)
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  8.  28
    Modal Normativism and Metasemantics.Theodore D. Locke - 2023 - In Miguel Garcia-Godinez (ed.), Thomasson on Ontology. Springer Verlag. pp. 109-136.
    I argue that we can accept modal normativism—a view that the function of modal claims is to express semantic rules—while also accepting possible worlds semantics. I argue that by keeping the metaphysical insights of normativism at the level of metasemantics—i.e., at the level of accounts of what metaphysically explains facts about the meaning of modal claims—it is open to the normativist to wholeheartedly accept possible worlds semantics.
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  9. Beyond Naturalism and Normativism: Reconceiving the 'Disease' Debate.Jeremy Simon - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (3):343-370.
    In considering the debate about the meaning of ‘disease’, the positions are generally presented as falling into two categories: naturalist, e.g., Boorse, and normativist, e.g., Engelhardt and many others. This division is too coarse, and obscures much of what is going on in this debate. I therefore propose that accounts of the meaning of ‘disease’ be assessed according to Hare’s (1997) taxonomy of evaluative terms. Such an analysis will allow us to better understand both individual positions and their inter-relationships. Most (...)
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  10. Normativism defended.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 85--102.
    The aim of this chapter is to defend the claim that “the intentional is normative” against a number of objections, including those that Georges Rey has presented in his contribution to this volume. First, I give a quick sketch of the principal argument that I have used to support this claim, and briefly comment on Rey’s criticisms of this argument. Next, I try to answer the main objections that have been raised against this claim. First, it may seem that the (...)
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  11.  39
    Between normativism and naturalism: Honneth on social pathology.Arvi Särkelä & Arto Laitinen - 2019 - Constellations 26 (2):286-300.
  12. Modal Normativism and the Methods of Metaphysics.Amie L. Thomasson - 2007 - Philosophical Topics 35 (1-2):135-160.
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  13.  92
    Metaphysical Explanations for Modal Normativists.Theodore Locke - 2020 - Metaphysics 3 (1):33-54.
    I expand modal normativism, a theory of metaphysical modality, to give a normativist account of metaphysical explanation. According to modal normativism, basic modal claims do not have a descriptive function, but instead have the normative function of enabling language users to express semantic rules that govern the use of ordinary non-modal vocabulary. However, a worry for modal normativism is that it doesn’t keep up with all of the important and interesting metaphysics we can do by giving and (...)
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  14.  73
    Against normativism about mental attitudes.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):295-311.
    Analytic Philosophy, Volume 62, Issue 3, Page 295-311, September 2021.
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  15.  68
    Davidson: Normativist or Anti-normativist?John Fennell - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (1):67-86.
    This paper contests the standard reading, due to Bilgrami and Glüer, that Davidson is an anti-normativist about word-meaning. Their case for his anti-normativism rests on his avowed anti-conventionalism about word-meaning. While not denying Davidson’s anti-conventionalism, I argue in the central part of the paper devoted to Bilgrami that the constitutive role that charity must play in interpretation for Davidson puts pressure on his anti-conventionalism, ultimately forcing a more tempered anti-conventionalism than Bilgrami allows. Simply put, my argument is that two (...)
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  16.  58
    Intentional Normativism Meets Normative Supervenience and the Because Constraint.Daniel Laurier - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (2):315-331.
    ABSTRACT: I explain and rebut four objections to the claim that attributions of intentional attitudes are normative judgments, all stemming, directly or indirectly, from the widespread assumption that the normative supervenes on the non-normative.
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  17.  47
    Continental Normativism and Its British Counterpart: How Different Are They?Stanley L. Paulson - 1993 - Ratio Juris 6 (3):227-244.
    The separability thesis claims that the concept of law can be explicated independently of morality, the normativity thesis, that it can be explicated independently of fact. Continental normativism, prominent above all in the work of Hans Kelsen, may be characterized in terms of the coupling of these theses. Like Kelsen, H. L. A. Hart is a proponent of the separability thesis. And–a leitmotiv–both theorists reject reductive legal positivism. They do not, however, reject it for the same reasons. Kelsen's reason, (...)
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  18.  57
    Normativism and realism within contemporary democratic constitutionalism.Valerio Fabbrizi - 2018 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 44 (6):1-21.
    The renewed interest on political realism can offer a new reading of the traditional dichotomy between normative and realist conception of constitutionalism. The purpose of this article is to analyse this renewed discussion, especially by focusing on the relationship between “political realism” and “political constitutionalism,” in the light of some theorists and authors—such as Richard Bellamy and Jeremy Waldron. After a brief introduction in which political realism will be discussed, especially through Bernard Williams’ reinterpretation, the article proposes a rereading of (...)
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  19. How to be a Normativist about the Nature of Belief.Kate Nolfi - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):181-204.
    According to the normativist, it is built into the nature of belief itself that beliefs are subject to a certain set of norms. I argue here that only a normativist account can explain certain non‐normative facts about what it takes to have the capacity for belief. But this way of defending normativism places an explanatory burden on any normativist account that an account on which a truth norm is explanatorily fundamental simply cannot discharge. I develop an alternative account that (...)
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  20. Normativism or the Normative Theory of Legal Science: Some Epistemological Problems.Riccardo Guastini - 1998 - In Stanley L. Paulson & Bonnie Litschewski Paulson (eds.), Normativity and Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes. Oxford University Press. pp. 317--30.
     
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  21.  3
    Beyond Naturalism and Normativism: Reconceiving the ‘Disease’ Debate.Rachel Cooper, Chris Megone, Jeremy Simon, Anthony Wrigley, Jennifer Radden & Piers Benn - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (3):343-370.
    In considering the debate about the meaning of ‘disease’, the positions are generally presented as falling into two categories: naturalist, e.g., Boorse, and normativist, e.g., Engelhardt and many others. This division is too coarse, and obscures much of what is going on in this debate. I therefore propose that accounts of the meaning of ‘disease’ be assessed according to Hare's (1997) taxonomy of evaluative terms. Such an analysis will allow us to better understand both individual positions and their interrelationships. Most (...)
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  22.  98
    Rescuing Doxastic Normativism.Ragnar Francén Olinder - 2012 - Theoria 78 (4):293-308.
    According to doxastic normativism, part of what makes an attitude a belief rather than another type of attitude is that it is governed by a truth-norm. It has been objected that this view fails since there are true propositions such that if you believed them they would not be true, and thus the obligation to believe true propositions cannot hold for these. I argue that the solution for doxastic normativists is to find a norm that draws the right distinction (...)
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  23.  36
    Defending normativism.Steven Hrotic - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):258-259.
    Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue that evaluative normativism leads to unacceptable research biases, and should be avoided. Though it is stipulated that the particular biases they discuss are cause for concern, this argument should not be generalized. The boundary between evaluative and goal-directed norms is difficult to define, and normative assumptions are an integral part of academic progress; moreover, the biases that result may have beneficial potential.
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  24.  28
    Counterpart theory: metaphysical modal normativism by another name.Kristie Miller - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1.
    In this paper, I argue that not only is metaphysical modal normativism an attractive view but that, as a matter of fact, many of us have, all along, been metaphysical modal normativists of a particular stripe. Namely, we have been the kinds of modal normativists, in the form of counterpart theorists, who are robust realists about possibility simpliciter. Having introduced modal normativism as Thomasson does in Norms and Necessity, I go on to recast it in somewhat different terms. (...)
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  25.  71
    Counterpossibles for modal normativists.Theodore D. Locke - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1235-1257.
    Counterpossibles are counterfactuals that involve some metaphysical impossibility. Modal normativism is a non-descriptivist account of metaphysical necessity and possibility according to which modal claims, e.g. ‘necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried’, do not function as descriptive claims about the modal nature of reality but function as normative illustrations of constitutive rules and permissions that govern the use of ordinary non-modal vocabulary, e.g. ‘bachelor’. In this paper, I assume modal normativism and develop a novel account of counterpossibles and claims about (...)
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  26. Social normativism.Jaroslav Peregrin - unknown
    Normativity is one of the keywords of contemporary philosophical discussions (which partly reincarnate traditional debates about the differences between Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften ). But are the philosophers who argue for the irreducible role of normativity within accounts for human societies obliged to assume, as Stephen Turner has recently put it, the existence of a "non‐natural, non‐empirical stuff that is claimed to be necessarily, intrinsically there and to in some sense account for the actual"?
     
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  27.  30
    Normativism versus mechanism.Valerie A. Thompson - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):272-273.
    Using normative correctness as a diagnostic tool reduces the outcome of complex cognitive functions to a binary classification (normative or non-normative). It also focuses attention on outcomes, rather than processes, impeding the development of good cognitive theories. Given that both normative and non-normative responses may be produced by the same process, normativity is a poor indicator of underlying processes.
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  28.  62
    Normativism, Anti-Normativism and Humanist Pragmatism: Stephen P. Turner: Explaining the Normative. Polity Press, Cambridge, 2010, pbk. $24.95, hbk. $69.95, 228 pp + index.Maksymilian Del Mar - 2010 - Human Studies 33 (2-3):305-323.
    Review Essay of Stephen P. Turner, Explaining the Normative, 2010.
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  29.  89
    Normativism and the mental: A problem of language individuation.Adèle Mercier - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 72 (1):71-88.
    My aim in this paper is two?fold. I start by contrasting three versions of externalist arguments based on etiological considerations, whose differences are not often appreciated. My purpose in doing so is to isolate one of these versions of externalism as most supportive of current anti?individualist attitudes toward the mental. My second aim is to show that this version, which I call (for reasons soon to be clear) Dialectal Etiology , is marred to a greater extent than the other two (...)
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  30. The concept of health: beyond normativism and naturalism.Richard P. Hamilton - 2010 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 16 (2):323-329.
    Philosophical discussions of health and disease have traditionally been dominated by a debate between normativists, who hold that health is an inescapably value-laded concept and naturalists, such as Christopher Boorse, who believe that it is possible to derive a purely descriptive or theoretical definition of health based upon biological function. In this paper I defend a distinctive view which traces its origins in Aristotle's naturalistic ethics. An Arisotelian would agree with Boorse that health and disease are ubiquitous features of the (...)
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  31.  30
    Subtracting “ought” from “is”: Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):233-248.
    We propose a critique ofnormativism, defined as the idea that human thinking reflects a normative system against which it should be measured and judged. We analyze the methodological problems associated with normativism, proposing that it invites the controversial “is-ought” inference, much contested in the philosophical literature. This problem is triggered when there are competing normative accounts (the arbitration problem), as empirical evidence can help arbitrate between descriptive theories, but not between normative systems. Drawing on linguistics as a model, we (...)
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  32. Overselling the case against normativism.Tim Fuller & Richard Samuels - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):255-255.
    Though we are in broad agreement with much of Elqayam & Evans' (E&E's) position, we criticize two aspects of their argument. First, rejecting normativism is unlikely to yield the benefits that E&E seek. Second, their conception of rational norms is overly restrictive and, as a consequence, their arguments at most challenge a relatively restrictive version of normativism.
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  33. Why We Need a New Normativism about Collective Action.Matthew Rachar & Javier Gomez Lavin - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):478-507.
    What do we owe each other when we act together? According to normativists about collective action, necessarily something and potentially quite a bit. They contend that collective action inherently involves a special normative status amongst participants, which may, for example, involve mutual obligations to receive the concurrence of the others before leaving. We build on recent empirical work whose results lend plausibility to a normativist account by further investigating the specific package of mutual obligations associated with collective action according to (...)
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  34.  8
    The Naturalistic Moment in Normativism.Stephen Turner - 2015 - In Johannes Bakker (ed.), Rural Sociologists at Work: Candid Accounts of Theory, Method, and Practice. Routledge.
    This chapter focuses on a question about one role: the explanatory role of normativism or normativity in relation to ordinary 'scientific', meaning social scientific, explanations of actions and beliefs, especially the empirical, observable, or empirically relevant aspects of human conduct. Call this the epistemic form of the naturalistic moment problem. It call this a 'naturalistic moment', a place where normativism makes factual assertions about real processes in the natural world. This pseudo argument boils down to a series of (...)
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  35. Subtracting “ought” from “is”: Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):251-252.
    We propose a critique of normativism, defined as the idea that human thinking reflects a normative system against which it should be measured and judged. We analyze the methodological problems associated with normativism, proposing that it invites the controversial “is-ought” inference, much contested in the philosophical literature. This problem is triggered when there are competing normative accounts (the arbitration problem), as empirical evidence can help arbitrate between descriptive theories, but not between normative systems. Drawing on linguistics as a (...)
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  36.  11
    On Turner’s Anti-Normativism.Pietro Salis - 2023 - In Raffaela Giovagnoli & Robert Lowe (eds.), The Logic of Social Practices II. Springer Nature Switzerland. pp. 159-176.
    Stephen Turner’s anti-normativism is based on the idea that the normative can be explained away by social science. Exploiting the idea fostered by the sociology of scientific knowledge that reasons can be understood naturalistically as the causes of the beliefs of scientists and endorsing a non-normative conception of rationality, Turner has argued that normative accounts are better understood as “Good Bad Theories” (GBT). GBT are understood as false accounts that play a role in social coordination like magical or religious (...)
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  37.  12
    Une critique normativiste du naturalisme.Charlotte Gauvry - 2020 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 108 (4):531-546.
    L’enjeu du présent article est d’examiner la critique du naturalisme menée par Charles Taylor de 1970 à 1990 et d’en interroger la portée. L’article commence par définir les thèses ontologiques et épistémologiques constitutives de ce que Taylor appelle « le naturalisme » et qu’il considère, non sans le déplorer, comme le courant philosophique hégémonique de la deuxième moitié du xx e siècle. Il analyse ensuite les différents arguments mobilisés par Taylor pour en contester la légitimité et il en identifie un (...)
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  38.  69
    Positive Economics and the Normativistic Fallacy: Bridging the Two Sides of CSR.Philipp Schreck, Dominik van Aaken & Thomas Donaldson - 2013 - Business Ethics Quarterly 23 (2):297-329.
    ABSTRACT:In response to criticism of empirical or “positive” approaches to corporate social responsibility (CSR), we defend the importance of these approaches for any CSR theory that seeks to have practical impact. Although we acknowledge limitations to positive approaches, we unpack the neglected but crucial relationships between positive knowledge on the one hand and normative knowledge on the other in the implementation of CSR principles. Using the structure of a practical syllogism, we construct a model that displays the key role of (...)
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  39.  35
    Hegel the normativist the priority of practice, self-consciousness as a social achievement and subject of normative states in chapter IV of the phenomenology of spirit.Eduardo Assalone - 2015 - Ideas Y Valores 64 (158):61-84.
    Se desarrolla la concepción normativista de la autoconciencia hegeliana, de acuerdo con los aportes de los denominados "neohegelianos de Pittsburgh", así como de otros autores anglosajones como Robert Pippin, Terry Pinkard y Paul Redding. Se presenta el recorrido de la autoconciencia en el capítulo IV de la Fenomenología del Espíritu, y se desarrollan algunos rasgos que pueden extraerse de dicha presentación, de acuerdo con la lectura normativista de los autores mencionados. The normativist conception of Hegelian self-consciousness according to the contributions (...)
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  40.  35
    A role for normativism.Igor Douven - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):252-253.
    Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue against prescriptive normativism and in favor of descriptivism. I challenge the assumption, implicit in their article, that there is a choice to be made between the two approaches. While descriptivism may be the right approach for some questions, others call for a normativist approach. To illustrate the point, I briefly discuss two questions of the latter sort.
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  41.  12
    Hans Kelsen's Normativism.Carsten Heidemann - 2022 - Cambridge University Press.
    Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law is the most prominent example of legal normativism. This text traces its origins and its genesis. In philosophy, normativism started with Hume's distinction between Is- and Ought-propositions. Kant distinguished practical from theoretical judgments, while resting even the latter on normativity. Following him, Lotze and the Baden neo-Kantians instrumentalized normativism to secure a sphere of knowledge which is not subject to the natural sciences. Even in his first major text, Kelsen claims that (...)
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  42.  76
    (A Little) Quantified Modal Logic for Normativists.Mark Povich - forthcoming - Analysis.
    Burgess (1997), building on Quine (1953), convincingly argued that claims in quantified modal logic cannot be understood as synonymous with or logically equivalent to claims about the analyticity of certain sentences. According to modal normativism, metaphysically necessary claims instead express or convey our actual semantic rules. In this paper, I show how the normativist can use Sidelle’s (1992a, 1995) neglected work on rigidity to account for two important phenomena in quantified modal logic: the necessity of identity and the substitutivity (...)
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  43.  77
    Mental disorder between naturalism and normativism.Somogy Varga - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (6):e12422.
    Worries about the potential medicalization of social and moral problems has propelled the debate on the nature of mental disorder, with normativists insisting that psychiatric classification is inherently value-laden and naturalists maintaining that a purely descriptive account of disease is possible. In recent work, some authors take a different path, accepting that the concepts of disease and mental disorder are value-laden but maintaining that this does not prevent objective truths regarding mental disorder attribution. This paper explores two such accounts and (...)
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  44.  73
    What Does Intentional Normativism Require?Daniel Laurier - forthcoming - Philosophical Explorations.
  45. Legal Empiricism, Normativism, and the Institutional Theory of Law.George Mousourakis - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (2).
    Much of contemporary British legal theory has its roots in the tradition of philosophical empiricism—the philosophical position that no theory or opinion can be accepted as valid unless verified by the test of experience. In this context normativity, both in law and morals, is understood and explained in terms of social practices observable in the world. The nineteenth-century jurist John Austin, for example, defined law in terms of a command supported by a sanction and as presupposing the habitual obedience of (...)
     
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  46.  42
    Hans Kelsen's normativist reductionism.Enrico Pattaro - 2008 - Ratio Juris 21 (2):268-280.
    Abstract. This paper discusses Kelsen's attempt at reducing the concept of subjektives Recht (what is subjectively right) to that of objektives Recht (what is objectively right). This attempt fails, it is argued, because in Kelsen's theory the concept of subjektives Recht survives concealed within the concept of individual norm (individuelle Norm), a norm that, pace Kelsen, is not a case of what is objectively right (objektives Recht) but is precisely what is subjectively right (subjektives Recht): We could call it "what (...)
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  47.  16
    Addiction from a Normativist’s Point of View.Ondřej Beran - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 28:13-17.
    The paper discusses alternatives of philosophical approach to addiction. While not denying the central position of problems of will or craving, it focuses on the broader anthropological context of addiction, using Heidegger’s existential analyses. It appears that addiction – in some cases, because an essentialist exposition is not viable here – is characterized by a defective pattern of the agent’s choice among possibilities and of temporality. The anecdotic observations can be synthesized into a treatise of addiction as a normative disorder: (...)
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  48.  2
    Confessions of a classical Normativist.Pascal Engel - 2016 - In Thomas Adajian & Tracy Lupher (eds.), Philosophy of Logic, 5 Questions. Automatic Press. pp. 53-62.
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    Recent Experimental Philosophy on Joint Action: Do We Need a New Normativism About Collective Action?Guido Löhr - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (3):754-762.
    There are two general views that social ontologists currently defend concerning the nature of joint intentional action. According to ‘non-normativists’, for a joint action to be established, we need to align certain psychological states in certain ways. ‘Normativists’ argue that joint action essentially involves normative relations that cannot be reduced to the intentional states of individuals. In two ground-breaking publications, Javier Gomez-Lavin and Matthew Rachar empirically investigate the relation between normativity and joint action in several survey studies. They argue that (...)
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    A case for limited prescriptive normativism.Emmanuel M. Pothos & Jerome R. Busemeyer - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):264-265.
    Understanding cognitive processes with a formal framework necessitates some limited, internal prescriptive normativism. This is because it is not possible to endorse the psychological relevance of some axioms in a formal framework, but reject that of others. The empirical challenge then becomes identifying the remit of different formal frameworks, an objective consistent with the descriptivism Elqayam & Evans (E&E) advocate.
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