Results for 'sleeping beauty'

1000+ found
Order:
See also
  1. Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas.Jacob Ross - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (4):411-447.
    Currently, the most popular views about how to update de se or self-locating beliefs entail the one-third solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem.2 Another widely held view is that an agent‘s credences should be countably additive.3 In what follows, I will argue that there is a deep tension between these two positions. For the assumptions that underlie the one-third solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem entail a more general principle, which I call the Generalized Thirder Principle, (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  2. Sleeping Beauty and the Dynamics of de Se Beliefs.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):245-269.
    This paper examines three accounts of the sleeping beauty case: an account proposed by Adam Elga, an account proposed by David Lewis, and a third account defended in this paper. It provides two reasons for preferring the third account. First, this account does a good job of capturing the temporal continuity of our beliefs, while the accounts favored by Elga and Lewis do not. Second, Elga’s and Lewis’ treatments of the sleeping beauty case lead to highly (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   71 citations  
  3. Sleeping Beauty: Exploring a Neglected Solution.Laureano Luna - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (3):1069-1092.
    The strong law of large numbers and considerations concerning additional information strongly suggest that Beauty upon awakening has probability 1/3 to be in a heads-awakening but should still believe the probability that the coin landed heads in the Sunday toss to be 1/2. The problem is that she is in a heads-awakening if and only if the coin landed heads. So, how can she rationally assign different probabilities or credences to propositions she knows imply each other? This is the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  4. Sleeping Beauty: A Simple Solution.Ruth Weintraub - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):8–10.
    I defend the suggestion that the rational probability in the Sleeping Beauty paradox is one third. The reasoning in its favour is familiar: for every heads-waking, there are two tails-wakings. To complete the defense, I rebut the reasoning which purports to justify the competing suggestion – that the correct probability is half – by undermining its premise, that no new information has been received.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  5. Sleeping Beauty and the Forgetful Bayesian.Bradley Monton - 2002 - Analysis 62 (1):47–53.
    Adam Elga takes the Sleeping Beauty example to provide a counter-example to Reflection, since on Sunday Beauty assigns probability 1/2 to H, and she is certain that on Monday she will assign probability 1/3. I will show that there is a natural way for Bas van Fraassen to defend Reflection in the case of Sleeping Beauty, building on van Fraassen’s treatment of forgetting. This will allow me to identify a lacuna in Elga’s argument for 1/3. (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  6. Sleeping Beauty and Self-Location: A Hybrid Model.Nick Bostrom - 2007 - Synthese 157 (1):59-78.
    The Sleeping Beauty problem is test stone for theories about self-locating belief, i.e. theories about how we should reasons when data or theories contain indexical information. Opinion on this problem is split between two camps, those who defend the "1/2 view" and those who advocate the "1/3 view". I argue that both these positions are mistaken. Instead, I propose a new "hybrid" model, which avoids the faults of the standard views while retaining their attractive properties. This model _appears_ (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  7. Sleeping Beauty: In Defence of Elga.Cian Dorr - 2002 - Analysis 62 (4):292–296.
    Argues for the "thirder" solution to the Sleeping Beauty puzzle. The argument turns on an analogy with a variant case, in which a coin-toss on Monday night determines whether one's memories of Monday are permanently erased, or merely suspended in such a way that they will return some time after one wakes up on Tuesday.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   70 citations  
  8. Sleeping Beauty: A Note on Dorr's Argument for 1/3.Darren Bradley - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):266–268.
    Cian Dorr (2002) gives an argument for the 1/3 position in Sleeping Beauty. I argue this is based on a mistake about Sleeping Beauty's epistemic position.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  9. Quantum Sleeping Beauty.Peter J. Lewis - 2006 - Analysis 67 (1):59-65.
    The Sleeping Beauty paradox in epistemology and the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics both raise problems concerning subjective probability assignments. Furthermore, there are striking parallels between the two cases; in both cases personal experience has a branching structure, and in both cases the agent loses herself among the branches. However, the treatment of probability is very different in the two cases, for no good reason that I can see. Suppose, then, that we adopt the same treatment of probability (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  10. Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga.David Lewis - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):171–76.
  11.  27
    Sleeping Beauty’s Credences.Jessi Cisewski, Joseph B. Kadane, Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld & Rafael Stern - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (3):324-347.
    The Sleeping Beauty problem has spawned a debate between “thirders” and “halfers” who draw conflicting conclusions about Sleeping Beauty's credence that a coin lands heads. Our analysis is based on a probability model for what Sleeping Beauty knows at each time during the experiment. We show that conflicting conclusions result from different modeling assumptions that each group makes. Our analysis uses a standard “Bayesian” account of rational belief with conditioning. No special handling is used (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  12.  84
    Sleeping Beauty Should Be Imprecise.Daniel Jeremy Singer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3159-3172.
    The traditional solutions to the Sleeping Beauty problem say that Beauty should have either a sharp 1/3 or sharp 1/2 credence that the coin flip was heads when she wakes. But Beauty’s evidence is incomplete so that it doesn’t warrant a precise credence, I claim. Instead, Beauty ought to have a properly imprecise credence when she wakes. In particular, her representor ought to assign \(R(H\!eads)=[0,1/2]\) . I show, perhaps surprisingly, that this solution can account for (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  13. Sleeping Beauty, Evidential Support and Indexical Knowledge: Reply to Horgan.Joel Pust - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1489-1501.
    Terence Horgan defends the thirder position on the Sleeping Beauty problem, claiming that Beauty can, upon awakening during the experiment, engage in “synchronic Bayesian updating” on her knowledge that she is awake now in order to justify a 1/3 credence in heads. In a previous paper, I objected that epistemic probabilities are equivalent to rational degrees of belief given a possible epistemic situation and so the probability of Beauty’s indexical knowledge that she is awake now is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  14. Sleeping Beauty and the Absent-Minded Driver.Jean Baratgin & Bernard Walliser - 2010 - Theory and Decision 69 (3):489-496.
    The Sleeping Beauty problem is presented in a formalized framework which summarizes the underlying probability structure. The two rival solutions proposed by Elga and Lewis differ by a single parameter concerning her prior probability. They can be supported by considering, respectively, that Sleeping Beauty is “fuzzy-minded” and “blank-minded”, the first interpretation being more natural than the second. The traditional absent -minded driver problem is reinterpreted in this framework and sustains Elga’s solution.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  15.  50
    Sleeping Beauty: A Simple Solution.R. Weintraub - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):8-10.
    I defend the suggestion that the rational probability in the Sleeping Beauty paradox is one third. The reasoning in its favour is familiar: for every heads-waking, there are two tails-wakings. To complete the defense, I rebut the reasoning which purports to justify the competing suggestion – that the correct probability is half – by undermining its premise, that no new information has been received.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  16. Sleeping Beauty and Shifted Jeffrey Conditionalization.Namjoong Kim - 2009 - Synthese 168 (2):295-312.
    In this paper, I argue for a view largely favorable to the Thirder view: when Sleeping Beauty wakes up on Monday, her credence in the coin’s landing heads is less than 1/2. Let’s call this “the Lesser view.” For my argument, I (i) criticize Strict Conditionalization as the rule for changing de se credences; (ii) develop a new rule; and (iii) defend it by Gaifman’s Expert Principle. Finally, I defend the Lesser view by making use of this new (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  17. Sleeping Beauty and Direct Inference.Joel Pust - 2011 - Analysis 71 (2):290-293.
    One argument for the thirder position on the Sleeping Beauty problem rests on direct inference from objective probabilities. In this paper, I consider a particularly clear version of this argument by John Pollock and his colleagues (The Oscar Seminar 2008). I argue that such a direct inference is defeated by the fact that Beauty has an equally good reason to conclude on the basis of direct inference that the probability of heads is 1/2. Hence, neither thirders nor (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  18. Sleeping Beauty Meets Monday.Karl Karlander & Levi Spectre - 2010 - Synthese 174 (3):397-412.
    The Sleeping Beauty problem—first presented by A. Elga in a philosophical context—has captured much attention. The problem, we contend, is more aptly regarded as a paradox: apparently, there are cases where one ought to change one’s credence in an event’s taking place even though one gains no new information or evidence, or alternatively, one ought to have a credence other than 1/2 in the outcome of a future coin toss even though one knows that the coin is fair. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  19. Sleeping Beauty Awakened: New Odds at the Dawn of the New Day.Terry Horgan - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):10–21.
  20.  40
    Sleeping Beauty’s Credences.Jessica Cisewski, Joseph B. Kadane, Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld & Rafael Stern - unknown
    The Sleeping Beauty problem has spawned a debate between “Thirders” and “Halfers” who draw conflicting conclusions about Sleeping Beauty’s credence that a coin lands Heads. Our analysis is based on a probability model for what Sleeping Beauty knows at each time during the Experiment. We show that conflicting conclusions result from different modeling assumptions that each group makes. Our analysis uses a standard “Bayesian” account of rational belief with conditioning. No special handling is used (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  21. Sleeping Beauty Reconsidered: Conditioning and Reflection in Asynchronous Systems.Joseph Halpern - 2004 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Proceedings of the Twentieth Conference on Uncertainty in Ai. Oxford University Press. pp. 111-142.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  22. Diachronic Dutch Books and Sleeping Beauty.Kai Draper & Joel Pust - 2008 - Synthese 164 (2):281 - 287.
    Hitchcock advances a diachronic Dutch Book argument (DDB) for a 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. Bradley and Leitgeb argue that Hitchcock’s DDB argument fails. We demonstrate the following: (a) Bradley and Leitgeb’s criticism of Hitchcock is unconvincing; (b) nonetheless, there are serious reasons to worry about the success of Hitchcock’s argument; (c) however, it is possible to construct a new DDB for 1/3 about which such worries cannot be raised.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  23.  35
    Sleeping Beauty Awakened: New Odds at the Dawn of the New Day.T. Horgan - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):10-21.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  24. Horgan on Sleeping Beauty.Joel Pust - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):97 - 101.
    With the notable exception of David Lewis, most of those writing on the Sleeping Beauty problem have argued that 1/3 is the correct answer. Terence Horgan has provided the clearest account of why, contrary to Lewis, Beauty has evidence against the proposition that the coin comes up heads when she awakens on Monday. In this paper, I argue that Horgan’s proposal fails because it neglects important facts about epistemic probability.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  25. Ross on Sleeping Beauty.Brian Weatherson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):503-512.
    In two excellent recent papers, Jacob Ross has argued that the standard arguments for the ‘thirder’ answer to the Sleeping Beauty puzzle lead to violations of countable additivity. The problem is that most arguments for that answer generalise in awkward ways when he looks at the whole class of what he calls Sleeping Beauty problems. In this note I develop a new argument for the thirder answer that doesn't generalise in this way.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26.  68
    On Sleeping Beauty Controversy.Lev Vaidman & Simon Saunders - manuscript
    It is argued that Lewis's approach to Elga's Sleeping Beaty problem is untenable and, therefore, the universality of the betting approach to probability has not been breached.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  27. Judy Benjamin is a Sleeping Beauty.Luc Bovens - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):23-26.
    I argue that van Fraassen's Judy Benjamin Problem and Elga's Sleeping Beauty Problem have the same structure.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  28.  72
    Sleeping Beauty and the Dreaming Butterfly: What Did Zhuangzi Doubt About?Thomas Ming - 2012 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 11 (4):497-512.
    The moral commonly drawn from Zhuangzi’s butterfly dream is that there is no distinction between the subjectivity of the dreamer and the awake. It is, however, tenuous to incorporate this insight into an overall view of Zhuangzi, whether as a perspectival relativist, a mystic, or an anti-rationalist, just to name the more popular positions. The parable, despite its brevity and clarity, is difficult because the assertion about metaphysical distinction in the last two lines does not cohere with the preceding text (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  29. Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Terry Horgan & Anna Mahtani - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):333-351.
    We present a new argument for the claim that in the Sleeping Beauty problem, the probability that the coin comes up heads is 1/3. Our argument depends on a principle for the updating of probabilities that we call ‘generalized conditionalization’, and on a species of generalized conditionalization we call ‘synchronic conditionalization on old information’. We set forth a rationale for the legitimacy of generalized conditionalization, and we explain why our new argument for thirdism is immune to two attacks (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  30.  97
    Sleeping Beauty: A Wake-Up Call.C. S. Jenkins - 2005 - Philosophia Mathematica 13 (2):194-201.
    This note concerns a puzzle about probability which has recently caught the attention of a number of philosophers. According to the current philosophical consensus, the solution to the puzzle reveals that one can acquire new information, sufficient to change one's credences in certain events, just by having a certain experience, even though one knew all along that one would have an experience which felt exactly like this. I argue that the philosophical consensus is mistaken.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  31. Sleeping Beauty and Eternal Recurrence.Hannes Leitgeb - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):203-205.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  32.  61
    A Dutch Book Against Sleeping Beauties Who Are Evidential Decision Theorists.Vincent Conitzer - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2887-2899.
    In the context of the Sleeping Beauty problem, it has been argued that so-called “halfers” can avoid Dutch book arguments by adopting evidential decision theory. I introduce a Dutch book for a variant of the Sleeping Beauty problem and argue that evidential decision theorists fall prey to it, whether they are halfers or thirders. The argument crucially requires that an action can provide evidence for what the agent would do not only at other decision points where (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  33.  24
    Direct Inference and the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Kaila Draper - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):2253-2271.
    This article is an attempt to use the insights of objective probability theory to solve the Sleeping Beauty problem. The approach is to develop a partial theory of direct inference and then apply that partial theory to the problem. One of the crucial components of the partial theory is the thesis that expected indefinite probabilities provide a reliable basis for direct inference. The article relies heavily on recent work by Paul D. Thorn to defend that thesis. The article’s (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34.  62
    Sleeping Beauty's Evidence.Kai Draper - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):61 - 70.
    The probability puzzle known as "Sleeping Beauty" raises interesting and difficult ques tions about the nature of evidence. It appears that the puzzle itself has already been solved, for there is a near consensus in the relevant philosophical literature that 1/3 is the correct answer.' Be that as it may, no new argument for that result is offered here. Instead, an at tempt is made to clarify the nature of certain problems that an answer of 1/3 raises for (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  35. Stalnaker on Sleeping Beauty.Brian Weatherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):445-456.
    The Sleeping Beauty puzzle provides a nice illustration of the approach to self-locating belief defended by Robert Stalnaker in Our Knowledge of the Internal World (Stalnaker, 2008), as well as a test of the utility of that method. The setup of the Sleeping Beauty puzzle is by now fairly familiar. On Sunday Sleeping Beauty is told the rules of the game, and a (known to be) fair coin is flipped. On Monday, Sleeping (...) is woken, and then put back to sleep. If, and only if, the coin landed tails, she is woken again on Tuesday after having her memory of the Monday awakening erased.1 On Wednesday she is woken again and the game ends. There are a few questions we can ask about Beauty’s attitudes as the game progresses. We’d like to know what her credence that the coin landed heads should be (a) Before she goes to sleep Sunday; (b) When she wakes on Monday; (c) When she wakes on Tuesday; and (d) When she wakes on Wednesday? Standard treatments of the Sleeping Beauty puzzle ignore (d), run together (b) and (c) into one (somewhat ill-formed) question, and then divide theorists into ‘halfers’ or ‘thirders’ depending on how they answer it. Following Stalnaker, I’m going to focus on (b) here, though I’ll have a little to say about (c) and (d) as well. I’ll be following orthodoxy in taking 1 2 to be the clear answer to (a), and in taking the correct answers to (b) and (c) to be independent of how the coin lands, though I’ll briefly question that assumption at the end. An answer to these four questions should respect two different kinds of constraints. The answer for day n should make sense ‘statically’. It should be a sensible answer to the question of what Beauty should do given what information she then has. And the answer should make sense ‘dynamically’. It should be a sensible answer to the question of how Beauty should have updated her credences from some earlier day, given rational credences on the earlier day. As has been fairly clear since the discussion of the problem in Elga (2000), Sleeping Beauty is puzzling because static and dynamic considerations appear to push in different directions.. (shrink)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  36. The End of Sleeping Beauty’s Nightmare.Berry Groisman - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):409-416.
    The way a rational agent changes her belief in certain propositions/hypotheses in the light of new evidence lies at the heart of Bayesian inference. The basic natural assumption, as summarized in van Fraassen's Reflection Principle, would be that in the absence of new evidence the belief should not change. Yet, there are examples that are claimed to violate this assumption. The apparent paradox presented by such examples, if not settled, would demonstrate the inconsistency and/or incompleteness of the Bayesian approach, and (...)
    Direct download (15 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  37. Sleeping Beauty: Theme and Variations.J. Finkelstein - unknown
    Six variations on the Sleeping beauty theme are presented.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  38. Reflections on Sleeping Beauty.Frank Arntzenius - 2002 - Analysis 62 (1):53–62.
  39. Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty.Alastair Wilson - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (3):axt018.
    Darren Bradley has recently appealed to observation selection effects to argue that conditionalization presents no special problem for Everettian quantum mechanics, and to defend the ‘halfer’ answer to the puzzle of Sleeping Beauty. I assess Bradley’s arguments and conclude that while he is right about confirmation in Everettian quantum mechanics, he is wrong about Sleeping Beauty. This result is doubly good news for Everettians: they can endorse Bayesian confirmation theory without qualification, but they are not thereby (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  40. Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Wilson: Figure 1.Darren Bradley - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):683-693.
    In Bradley, I offered an analysis of Sleeping Beauty and the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics. I argued that one can avoid a kind of easy confirmation of EQM by paying attention to observation selection effects, that halfers are right about Sleeping Beauty, and that thirders cannot avoid easy confirmation for the truth of EQM. Wilson agrees with my analysis of observation selection effects in EQM, but goes on to, first, defend Elga’s thirder argument on (...) Beauty and, second, argue that the analogy I draw between Sleeping Beauty and EQM fails. I will argue that neither point succeeds. 1 Introduction2 Background3 Wilson’s Argument for ⅓ in Sleeping Beauty4 Reply: Explaining Away the Crazy5 Wilson's Argument for the Breakdown of the Analogy6 Reply: The Irrelevance of Chance7 Conclusion. (shrink)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  41.  40
    Even for Objectivists, Sleeping Beauty Isn’T so Simple.Kai Draper - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):29-37.
    Writing collectively as the Oscar Seminar in 2008, John Pollock and several colleagues advance an objectivist argument for a 1/3 solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem. In 2011, Joel Pust raises a serious objection to their argument to which Paul D. Thorn, a member of the Oscar Seminar, offers a subtle reply. I argue that the Oscar Seminar s argument for 1/3 is unsound. I do not, however, defend Pust’s objection. Rather I develop a new objection, one that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  42. Sleeping Beauty and the Problem of World Reduction.Paul Franceschi - 2005
    I describe in this paper a solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem. I begin with the consensual emerald case and discuss then Bostrom's Incubator gedanken. I address then the Sleeping Beauty problem. I argue that the root cause of the flaw in the argument for 1/3 is an erroneous assimilation with a repeated experiment. I show that the same type of analysis also applies to Elga's version of the argument for 1/3. Lastly, I show that the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  43.  32
    Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty.Alastair Wilson - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (3):573-598.
    Darren Bradley has recently appealed to observation selection effects to argue that conditionalization presents no special problem for Everettian quantum mechanics, and to defend the ‘halfer’ answer to the puzzle of Sleeping Beauty. I assess Bradley’s arguments and conclude that while he is right about confirmation in Everettian quantum mechanics, he is wrong about Sleeping Beauty. This result is doubly good news for Everettians: they can endorse Bayesian confirmation theory without qualification, but they are not thereby (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  44. The Generalized Sleeping Beauty Problem: A Challenge for Thirders.Roger White - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):114–119.
  45.  15
    Reflections on Sleeping Beauty.Frank Arntzenius - 2002 - Analysis 62 (1):53-62.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  46. Qeauty and the Books: A Response to Lewis’s Quantum Sleeping Beauty Problem.Daniel Peterson - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):367-374.
    In his 2007 paper “Quantum Sleeping Beauty”, Peter Lewis poses a problem for the supporters’ of the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics appeal to subjective probability. Lewis’s argument hinges on parallels between the traditional “sleeping beauty” problem in epistemology and a quantum variant. These two cases, Lewis argues, advocate different treatments of credences even though they share important epistemic similarities, leading to a tension between the traditional solution to the sleeping beauty problem (typically called (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  47.  49
    Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem, II.Terence Horgan - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    In “Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem,” Anna Mahtani and I offer a new argument for thirdism that relies on what we call “generalized conditionalization.” Generalized conditionalization goes beyond conventional conditionalization in two respects: first, by sometimes deploying a space of synchronic, essentially temporal, candidate-possibilities that are not “prior” possibilities; and second, by allowing for the use of preliminary probabilities that arise by first bracketing, and then conditionalizing upon, “old evidence.” In “Beauty and Conditionalization: Reply to (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  48. The Measure of Existence of a Quantum World and the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Berry Groisman, Na'ama Hallakoun & Lev Vaidman - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):695-706.
    Next SectionAn attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the solution of the Sleeping Beauty Problem in the framework of the Many-Worlds Interpretation led to a new controversy regarding the Quantum Sleeping Beauty Problem. We apply the concept of a measure of existence of a world and reach the solution known as ‘thirder’ solution which differs from Peter Lewis’s ‘halfer’ assertion. We argue that this method provides a simple and powerful tool for analysing rational decision theory problems.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  49. Ten Reasons to Care About the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1003-1017.
    The Sleeping Beauty Problem attracts so much attention because it connects to a wide variety of unresolved issues in formal epistemology, decision theory, and the philosophy of science. The problem raises unanswered questions concerning relative frequencies, objective chances, the relation between self-locating and non-self-locating information, the relation between self-location and updating, Dutch Books, accuracy arguments, memory loss, indifference principles, the existence of multiple universes, and many-worlds interpretations of quantum mechanics. After stating the problem, this article surveys its connections (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  50.  13
    The Generalized Sleeping Beauty Problem: A Challenge for Thirders.R. White - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):114-119.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000