When the likelihood ratio approach is employed for evidential reasoning in law, it is often necessary to employ subjective probabilities, which are probabilities derived from the opinions and judgement of a human. At least three concerns arise from the use of subjective probabilities in legal applications. Firstly, human beliefs concerning probabilities can be vague, ambiguous and inaccurate. Secondly, the impact of this vagueness, ambiguity and inaccuracy on the outcome of a probabilistic analysis is not necessarily fully understood. Thirdly, the (...) provenance of subjective probabilities and the associated potential sources of vagueness, ambiguity and inaccuracy tend to be poorly understood, making it difficult for the outcome of probabilistic reasoning to be explained and validated, which is crucial in legal applications. The former two concerns have been addressed by a wide body of research in AI. The latter, however, has received little attention. This paper presents a novel approach to employ argumentation to reason about probability distributions in probabilistic models. It introduces a range of argumentation schemes and corresponding sets of critical questions for the construction and validation of argument models that define sets of probability distributions. By means of an extended example, the paper demonstrates how the approach, argumentation schemes and critical questions can be employed for the development of models and their validation in legal applications of the likelihood ratio approach to evidential reasoning. (shrink)

Although norms of premarital sex vary cross-culturally, the sexuality of adolescent girls has been consistently more restricted than that of adolescent boys. Three major theories that attempt to explain restrictions on female premarital sex (FPS) concern male, female, and parental control. These competing theories have not been tested against each other cross-culturally. In this study, we do this using a sample of 128 nonindustrial societies and socioecological predictors capturing extramarital sex, paternal care, female status, sex ratio, parental control over (...) a daughter’s mate choice, residence, and marriage transactions, while also controlling for phylogenetic non-independence across societies. We found that multiple parties benefit from restrictions on FPS. Specifically, FPS is more restricted in societies intolerant of extramarital sex and where men transfer property to their children (male control), as well as where marriages are arranged by parents (parental control). Both paternity uncertainty (partitioned among marital fidelity and paternal investment) and parent–offspring conflict (prompting parents to control their daughter’s sexuality) were identified as possible mechanisms of FPS restrictions. The evidence for female control is ambiguous, mainly because it can be equally well interpreted as both male control and parental control, and because fathers, rather than mothers, are often the primary decision makers about a daughter’s mate choice. Our results also emphasize the importance of social roles, rather than stereotyped sex roles, as a more useful approach to understanding the evolution of FPS restrictions. (shrink)

There is a broadly held view that neonatologists are ethically obligated to act to override parental nontreatment decisions for imperiled premature newborns when there is a reasonable chance of a good outcome. It is argued here that three types of uncertainty undercut any such general obligation: (1) the vagueness of the boundary at which an infant’s deficits become so intolerable that death could be reasonably preferred; (2) the uncertainty about whether aggressive treatment will result in the survival of (...) a reasonably healthy child or, alternatively, the survival of a child with intolerable deficits; and (3) the inability to determine an acceptable ratio between the likelihoods of those two outcomes. It is argued that the broadly held view accords insufficient weight to the fact that newborn intensive care increases the likelihood of harm to the child by effecting survival with intolerable deficits. Though treatment may offer a reasonable chance of a good outcome, it is argued that there are situations in which neonatologists should nonetheless defer to parental nontreatment decisions. (shrink)

This essay is, primarily, a discussion of four results about the principle of maximizing entropy (MAXENT) and its connections with Bayesian theory. Result 1 provides a restricted equivalence between the two: where the Bayesian model for MAXENT inference uses an "a priori" probability that is uniform, and where all MAXENT constraints are limited to 0-1 expectations for simple indicator-variables. The other three results report on an inability to extend the equivalence beyond these specialized constraints. Result 2 established a sensitivity of (...) MAXENT inference to the choice of the algebra of possibilities even though all empirical constraints imposed on the MAXENT solution are satisfied in each measure space considered. The resulting MAXENT distribution is not invariant over the choice of measure space. Thus, old and familiar problems with the Laplacian principle of Insufficient Reason also plague MAXENT theory. Result 3 builds upon the findings of Friedman and Shimony (1971; 1973) and demonstrates the absence of an exchangeable, Bayesian model for predictive MAXENT distributions when the MAXENT constraints are interpreted according to Jaynes's (1978) prescription for his (1963) Brandeis Dice problem. Lastly, Result 4 generalizes the Friedman and Shimony objection to cross-entropy (Kullback-information) shifts subject to a constraint of a new odds-ratio for two disjoint events. (shrink)

BackgroundUncertainty intolerance (IU), the tendency to think or react negatively toward uncertain events may have implication on individuals’ mental health and psychological wellbeing. The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale-12 (IU-12) is commonly used across the globe to measure IU, however, its’ psychometric properties are yet to be evaluated in Iran with a Persian-speaking population. Therefore, the purpose of this research was to translate and validate the IU-12 among Iranian undergraduate students.Materials and MethodsThe multi-stage cluster random sampling was employed to recruit (...) 410 Iranian undergraduate students (260 females) from the Azad University to complete the IU-12, the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale-2, and the Penn State Worry Questionnaire in a cross-sectional design. In this study, face validity, content validity, construct validity, and concurrent validity were measured and Construct Reliability (CR) and Cronbach’s alpha were used to measure reliability.ResultsThe impact score of the translated IU-12 indicated acceptable face validity (value of impact score was greater than 1.5). The value of Content Validity Index (CVI) and the value of Content Validity Ratio (CVR) were above 0.7 and 0.78, respectively. The values of CVI and CVR indicated the items had acceptable content validity and were deemed essential to the measure. The measurement model analysis showed the measure with two subscales had good fit indices (CMIN/df = 2.75, p < 0.01, RMSEA = 0.07, TLI = 0.94, CFI = 0.95, GFI = 0.94). A Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) indicated the scale was composed of the two subscales found in the English-version of the scale (prospective anxiety and inhibitory anxiety), and no items were removed from the scale. The values of CR (0.86) and Cronbach’s alphas (0.89) showed the measure had appropriate internal consistency.ConclusionThe findings support the psychometric properties of the Persian version of the IU-12. This scale could be used to reliably and accurately measure uncertainty intolerance among undergraduate students in Iran. (shrink)

Non-compensatory aggregation rules are applied in a variety of problems such as voting theory, multi-criteria analysis, composite indicators, web ranking algorithms and so on. A major open problem is the fact that non-compensability implies the analytical cost of loosing all available information about intensity of preference, i.e. if some variables are measured on interval or ratio scales, they have to be treated as measured on an ordinal scale. Here this problem has been tackled in its most general formulation, that (...) is when mixed measurement scales (interval, ratio and ordinal) are used and both stochastic and fuzzy uncertainties are present. Objectives of this article are first to present a comprehensive review of useful solutions already proposed in the literature and second to advance the state of the art mainly in the theoretical guarantee that weights have the meaning of importance coefficients and they can be summarized in a voting matrix. This is a key result for using non-compensatory Condorcet consistent rules. A proof on the probability of existence of ties in the voting matrix is also developed. (shrink)

Calling the quantity; 2ΔAΔB/|<[A, B]>|, with non-zero denominator, the uncertainty product ratio or UPR for the pair of observables, (A, B), it is shown that any non-zero correlation coefficient between two observables raises, above unity, the lower bound of the UPR for each member of an infinite collection of pairs of incompatible observables. Conversely, any UPR is subject to lower bounds above unity determined by each of an infinite collection of correlation coefficients. This result generalizes the well known (...) Schroedinger strengthening of the Robertson uncertainty relations (with the former expressed in terms of the correlation coefficient rather than the anticommutator) where the UPR and the correlation coefficient both involve the same pair of observables. Two, independent, derivations of the result are presented to clarify its’ origins and some examples of its’ use are examined. (shrink)

RESUMEN: La agresión terrorista ha supuesto, a nivel nacional y internacional, el problema de la creación de un sistema penal de reacción a tal fenómeno. Sin embargo, la necesidad de una contestación urgente ha tenido como consecuencia una incertidumbre general que lleva en sí misma el riesgo de la negación del Estado de derecho para adoptar la lógica del derecho penal del enemigo. Este escrito -a través el análisis de la teoría de Gunther Jakobs, teórico del derecho penal del enemigo- (...) describe las repercusiones, parafraseando a Ferrajoli, de una falta de “asimetría entre Estados de derecho y violencia extra legal”. ABSTRACT: The fear of terrorism has created, at national and international level, a criminal law system to react to this phenomenon. The need for a rapid answer to the problem has led to legal uncertainty that carries with it the risk of the negation of the legal state to adopt the logic of the enemy's criminal law. This writing, through the analysis of the theory by Gunther Jakobs, theorist of the enemy's criminal law, describes which are the negative repercussions of a lack of "asymmetry between legal state and extra legal violence” mentioning Luigi Ferrajoli. PALABRAS CLAVE: ciudadano,enemigo,pena,derecho penal,Estado de derecho. KEYWORDS: Citizen, enemy, punishment, criminal law, legal state. (shrink)

It is not unusual in real-life that one has to choose among finitely many alternatives when the merit of each alternative is not perfectly known. Instead of observing the actual utilities of the alternatives at hand, one typically observes more or less precise signals that are positively correlated with these utilities. In addition, the decision-maker may, at some cost or disutility of effort, choose to increase the precision of these signals, for example by way of a careful study or the (...) hiring of expertise. We here develop a model of such decision problems. We begin by showing that a version of the monotone likelihood-ratio property is sufficient, and also essentially necessary, for the optimality of the heuristic decision rule to always choose the alternative with the highest signal. Second, we show that it is not always advantageous to face alternatives with higher utilities, a non-monotonicity result that holds even if the decision-maker optimally chooses the signal precision. We finally establish an operational first-order condition for the optimal precision level in a canonical class of decision-problems, and we show that the optimal precision level may be discontinuous in the precision cost. (shrink)

This paper tries to develop an epistemological analysis on the notion of responsibility. After pointing out a peculiar kind of uncertainties concerning the notion of responsibility, I focus upon the issue of criminal responsibility, taking the case of mentally disordered offenders into account, and propose the distinction of the phases between sentence and practice with applying Slobogin's idea of integrationism. Finally, I propose a probabilistic approach to the problem of responsibility through considering the idea of relevance ratio, leading to (...) my final proposal concerning the concept of the degrees of responsibility. (shrink)

The author argues that simple constructive dilemma is a valuable argument form for reasoning under relative conditions of uncertainty. When applied to legal argument this value of simple constructive dilemma is shown in its political, strategic, rhetorical, and especially economic, uses by lawyers and judges. After considering some examples of the use of the form by trial lawyers, the author gives examples of the more interesting use of the form by appellate courts. Research into the use of simple constructive (...) dilemma by appellate courts helps us to understand how those courts distribute judicial resources. It also helps us to understand the political role of the appellate courts with respect to the doctrine of the separation of powers. Given some of the specific examples of legal reasoning used by the appellate courts presented in this article, and given the discussion of the doctrine of precedent, the article’s focus is on common law legal systems of the Anglo-American-type. (shrink)

According to the Everett interpretation, branching structure and ratios of norms of branch amplitudes are the objective correlates of chance events and chances; that is, 'chance' and 'chancing', like 'red' and 'colour', pick out objective features of reality, albeit not what they seemed. Once properly identified, questions about how and in what sense chances can be observed can be treated as straightforward dynamical questions. On that basis, given the unitary dynamics of quantum theory, it follows that relative and never absolute (...) chances can be observed; that only on repetition of a large numbers of similar trials can relative probabilities be measured; and so on. The epistemology of objective chances can in this way be worked out from the dynamics. its curious features are thus explained. But one aspect of chance set-ups seems to resist this subsuming of chancing to branching: how is it that chance involves uncertainty? And if that is not possible, on Everettian lines, then the whole project is doomed. I argue that in fact there is no difficulty in making sense of uncertainty in the face of branching. Contrary to initial impressions, the unitary formalism is consistent with a well-defined notion of self-locating uncertainty. It is also consistent without: the mathematics under-determines the metaphysics in these respects. (shrink)

What is the exact nature of the consumption function? Can this term be defined so that it will be consistent with empirical evidence and a valid instrument in the hands of future economic researchers and policy makers? In this volume a distinguished American economist presents a new theory of the consumption function, tests it against extensive statistical J material and suggests some of its significant implications.Central to the new theory is its sharp distinction between two concepts of income, measured income, (...) or that which is recorded for a particular period, and permanent income, a longer-period concept in terms of which consumers decide how much to spend and how much to save. Milton Friedman suggests that the total amount spent on consumption is on the average the same fraction of permanent income, regardless of the size of permanent income. The magnitude of the fraction depends on variables such as interest rate, degree of uncertainty relating to occupation, ratio of wealth to income, family size, and so on.The hypothesis is shown to be consistent with budget studies and time series data, and some of its far-reaching implications are explored in the final chapter. (shrink)

Scientific Models. On the most primitive level of scientific popularization, common sense analogies are omnipresent, and are indispensable to layman and popularizer alike. Reichenbach's discussion of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle--in terms of a police car's inevitable effect on the speed of traffic--is a nice example. "In our intercourse with electrons we cannot don civilian clothes; when we watch them we always disturb their traffic." In this or any other such use of metaphor, however, the purpose is merely illustrative, and in (...) an extremely naive or vague sense at that. The structural form A:B::C:D is clearly present, but the repeated ratios are of such a superficial, inexact and limited nature that no further inferences can be drawn from the one side of the proportion to the other. Only a familiarizing picture, helpful to the layman but fairly useless to the scientist, has been introduced. Still, it is also important to realize that the difference between the metaphorical popularization of science and the creative use of metaphor by scientists themselves is a difference in degree only, not of kind. (shrink)

The term probability can be used in two main senses. In the frequency interpretation it is a limiting ratio in a sequence of repeatable events. In the Bayesian view, probability is a mental construct representing uncertainty. This 2002 book is about these two types of probability and investigates how, despite being adopted by scientists and statisticians in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Bayesianism was discredited as a theory of scientific inference during the 1920s and 1930s. Through the examination (...) of a dispute between two British scientists, the author argues that a choice between the two interpretations is not forced by pure logic or the mathematics of the situation, but depends on the experiences and aims of the individuals involved. The book should be of interest to students and scientists interested in statistics and probability theories and to general readers with an interest in the history, sociology and philosophy of science. (shrink)

Medical necessity (claiming that a medical intervention or care is – at minimum – reasonable, appropriate and acceptable) depends on empirical evidence and on the interpretation of that evidence. Evidence and its interpretation define the standard of care. This commentary argues that both the evidence base and its interpretation are currently weak gatekeepers. Empirical meta-research suggests that very few medical interventions have high quality evidence in support of their effectiveness and very few of them also have relatively thorough assessments of (...) their potential harms. Therefore, evidence on the risk-benefit ratios carries almost always very large uncertainty. Arbitration about medical necessity is thus left to the interpretation process. Professional guidelines are notoriously unreliable and biased in this regard. Regulatory approval ends up being the key arbitrator, but over the years the regulatory process has been subverted. Regulatory approval currently does not mean that an intervention has a favourable risk-benefit ratio, but simply that it can be marketed, sold and made profit from. The process leads to a tragedy of commons where the final victim is society at large: medical necessity is invoked as an alibi for medicine to absorb societal resources. (shrink)

The past three decades have seen a decline in traditional industries in the United Kingdom and there has been a relative decline in the value of physical assets to the UK economy. At the same time, the value of intangible assets seen in intellectual property rights have increased considerably. As such, IP rights represent important assets for companies and often comprise the foundation for market dominance and continued profitability. There is a structural uncertainty in the law relating to the (...) use of IP as collateral for the purpose of raising debt finance and this may impact upon the survival of firms with high ratios of intangible to tangible assets. This article considers the proper goals for an effective credit and security regime in IP. It examines the significance of the availability of collateral to the lending decision and also considers whether the reluctance to maximise the use of IP as security reflects inherent difficulties which arise out of the nature of IP as economic assets. This has implications for the reform of English personal property security law and the development of bright line priority rules associated with Article 9 of the US Uniform Commercial Code which is often cited as a model for reform of English law. (shrink)

In the traditional system of Chinese families, individuals are embedded in the institution of the family with defined obligations to enhance family development. As a consequence of the male-biased sex ratio at birth in China since the 1980s, an increasing number of surplus rural males have been affected by a marriage squeeze becoming involuntary bachelors. Under China’s universal heterosexual marriage tradition, family development of rural involuntary bachelors has largely been ignored, but in China’s gender-imbalanced society, it is necessary to (...) adopt a family-based approach to identify and study the plight of rural involuntary bachelors. Studies on gender imbalance indicate that these men face multiple risks from the perspectives of their life course, the family life cycle, and the family ethic. To a certain extent, these risks are caused by a conflict between the individual’s family life and family ethics and are mainly reflected in problems concerning marriage, health, and old-age support. Not only do these vulnerabilities affect the individual and family development across the whole life cycle but also pose major risks to social development in the face of strong gender imbalance. In order to deal with risks faced by rural involuntary bachelors, core ethical principles, including autonomy, beneficence, and justice, need to be adopted. Through adjustments to informal support provided by the family and formal support provided by policy-makers, risk of uncertainty in family development faced by rural involuntary bachelors could be reduced. (shrink)

Systemic risks are risks produced through interconnected non-wrongful actions of individuals, in the sense that an individual's action is a negligible cause of the risk. Due to scale effects of interaction, their consequences can be serious but they are also difficult to predict and assess via a risk assessment. Since we can have good reason to engage in the interconnected activities giving rise to systemic risk, we incur a concurrent collective responsibility to ensure that the risks are fairly distributed and (...) well regulated. James argues that fairness in this context requires taking reasonably available precautions ensuring for each risk-bearer a favourable ratio of expected benefits over expected losses. In sections 2 and 3 we argue that such a conception of fairness applies but only on the condition that the systemic risks created are irreversible risks and that the general background conditions of justice are imperfectly fair. When risks are reversible, compensatory justice can correct for unfairness in risk imposition. Where risks are irreversible, compensatory justice necessarily fails, giving rise to a collective responsibility to regulate fairly ex ante. Additionally, where background conditions of justice are fully fair and the systemic risk is well understood, risk bearers can be said to have consented to the systemic risk. If they are not fair, we argue that the primary political obligation should lie in fixing the fairness of the backgrounds of justice. A related reason for addressing the general background conditions of fairness is that James’ account of fairness in systemic risk imposition encounters a baseline problem. If expected risks and benefits are calculated again an unfair historic background condition, systemic risk imposition would not be fully fair. Section 4 shows why differences in evidentiary uncertainty as to probability and levels of harm and effective responses require a normatively appropriate response in the form of additional precautions. We show that the evidentiary standards set for risk-based cost-benefit analysis have a connection with deontology because they express a postulate of equal treatment in formal terms. Systemic risks can have different possible degrees of epistemological certainty due to factors of social and natural origin, such as more available research funding or higher degrees of complexity for some systemic risks but not others. These differences have to be mitigated by taking even greater precautions in difficult-to-research systemic risks. (shrink)

Video surveillance plays a vital role in maintaining the social security although, until now, large uncertainty still exists in danger understanding and recognition, which can be partly attributed to intractable environment changes in the backgrounds. This article presents a brain-inspired computing of attention value of surrounding environment changes with a processes-based cognition model by introducing a ratio valueλof EC-implications within considered periods. Theoretical models for computation of warning level of EC-implications to the universal video recognition efficiency are further (...) established. Imbedding proposed models into the online algorithms is suggested as a future research priority towards precision security for critical applications and, furthermore, schemes for a practical implementation of such integration are also preliminarily discussed. (shrink)

Delusions are one of the most classical symptoms described in schizophrenia. However, despite delusions are often emotionally charged, they have been investigated using tasks involving non-affective material, such as the Beads task. In this study we compared 30 patients with schizophrenia experiencing delusions with 32 matched controls in their pattern of responses to two versions of the Beads task within a Bayesian framework. The two versions of the Beads task consisted of one emotional and one neutral, both with ratios of (...) beads of 60:40 and 80:20, considered, respectively, as the “difficult” and “easy” variants of the task. Results indicate that patients showed a greater deviation from the normative model, especially in the 60:40 ratio, suggesting that more inaccurate probability estimations are more likely to occur under uncertainty conditions. Additionally, both patients and controls showed a greater deviation in the emotional version of the task, providing evidence of a reasoning bias modulated by the content of the stimuli. Finally, a positive correlation between patients’ deviation and delusional symptomatology was found. Impairments in the 60:40 ratio with emotional content was related to the amount of disruption in life caused by delusions. These results contribute to the understanding of how cognitive mechanisms interact with characteristics of the task in the context of delusional thinking. These findings might be used to inform improved intervention programs in the domain of inferential reasoning. (shrink)

Characterizing the genetic structure of populations is of importance to evolutionary biology, to human disease gene mapping, and to forensic science. Sewall Wright introduced a set of F-statistics to describe population structure in 1951, and he emphasized that these quantities were ratios of variances. Responding to uncertainty over the best way to estimate F-statistics, Weir and Cockerham published a method-of-moments set of estimators in 1984. This paper continues to be widely cited, with over 7,000 citations to date. Some background (...) to the publishing history of the Weir and Cockerham paper is given here, along with subsequent developments and a discussion of current uses of Wright's F-statistics. (shrink)

The United States Environmental Protection Agency has begun to encourage innovative market-based approaches to address nonpoint source water pollution. These water quality trading programs have the potential to achieve environmental standards at a lower overall cost. Two fundamental questions must be answered before these benefits can be realized: How will trades between point and nonpoint sources be monitored and enforced? and, How will nonpoint sources be included within a trading market? ;Point-nonpoint source trading can be accommodated through either a technology-based (...) or performance-based approach. The technology-based approach accommodates trading through the use of a proxy for unobservable, individual nonpoint source emission reductions. While trading ratios can effectively deal with the uncertainty associated with using a proxy for actual abatement, they are inefficient and ineffective for dealing with problems of hidden action. The alternative use of performance-based trading approaches requires the use of team contracts that provide individual incentives linked to the performance of the entire group. Such contracts must be designed to overcome both adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Performance-based approaches promise efficiency gains in terms of reducing the problems of asymmetric information, and by introducing flexibility into the choice of nonpoint source abatement technologies and practices. ;Nonpoint sources are exempted from direct regulation under the polluter-pays-principle. As a result, their participation in trading markets is voluntary, thus preventing a baseline cap on pre-trade emissions. To determine whether this arrangement should be changed, we must ask if there something that morally prohibits the direct regulation of nonpoint sources of pollution. While a morally relevant distinction can be made between point and nonpoint sources of emission based on differences in the ability to observe individual emission levels, this relevance is limited to the case of performance-based policy instruments. The moral legitimacy of applying the polluter-pays-principle to nonpoint sources of pollution must be made on a case by case basis, as it is dependent upon existing social, economic, and other practical factors. However, it can be stated that there is no general moral barrier to prohibit the application of the polluter-pays-principle to nonpoint sources of pollution. (shrink)

Certain modifications, by way of improvement, are proposed for the Feynman postulates in quantum mechanics. These modifications incorporate a criterion for the applicability of the principle of superposition. It is shown that the modified postulates, together with certain assumptions regarding the trajectory of a particle, lead to an expression for the position-momentum uncertainty relationship which is broadly in agreement with the conventional expression. The time-energy uncertainty relationship is, however, found to have a likely place only in the relativistic (...) theory. A criterion, in the form of a ratio involving the linear dimensions of the particle, is obtained for the validity of the classical mechanics approximation. The modified postulates are suggested to favor the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics over the Copenhagen interpretation. (shrink)

It is natural for humans to judge the outcome of a decision under uncertainty as a percentage of an ex-post optimal performance. We propose a robust decision-making framework based on a relative performance index. It is shown that if the decision maker’s preferences satisfy quasisupermodularity, single-crossing, and a nondecreasing log-differences property, the worst-case relative performance index can be represented as the lower envelope of two extremal performance ratios. The latter is used to characterize the agent’s optimal robust decision, which (...) has implications both computationally and for obtaining closed-form solutions. We illustrate our results in an application which compares the performance of relative robustness to solutions that optimize worst-case payoffs, maximum absolute regret, and expected payoffs under a Laplacian prior. (shrink)

Given that there is referential uncertainty (noise) when learning words, to what extent can forgetting filter some of that noise out, and be an aid to learning? Using a Cross Situational Learning model we find a U-shaped function of errors indicative of a “Goldilocks” zone of forgetting: an optimum store-loss ratio that is neither too aggressive or too weak, but just the right amount to produce better learning outcomes. Forgetting acts as a high-pass filter that actively deletes (part (...) of) the referential ambiguity noise, retains intended referents, and effectively amplifies the signal. The model achieves this performance without incorporating any specific cognitive biases of the type proposed in the constraints and principles account, and without any prescribed developmental changes in the underlying learning mechanism. Instead we interpret the model performance as more of a by-product of exposure to input, where the associative strengths in the lexicon grow as a function of linguistic experience in combination with memory limitations. The result adds a mechanistic explanation for the experimental evidence on spaced learning and, more generally, advocates integrating domain-general aspects of cognition, such as memory, in to the language acquisition process. (shrink)

Today in Japan psychoactive drugs are widely prescribed for various psychiatric disorders including so-called ‘functional’ disorders. They are undoubtedly effective in relieving various psychological and behavioral symptoms. However, Japan has yet to address some basic questions: (1) uncertainty concerning the cause of various psychiatric functional disorders; (2) unknown factors that affect the function of psychotropic drugs in patients; (3) the difficulty in obtaining objective data concerning the effects of these medications * both on the brain and the psychological symptoms (...) (behavior); and most importantly, (4) due to both the behavioral and organic (brain and CNS) effects of psychoactive drugs, the difficulty in evaluating the risk/benefit ratio between the behavioral (primary) effect and the organic (side) effect. In addition, there are bioethical problems, since these uncertainties tend to permit too broad a range of intention and too many modes of intervention in (a) prescribing and (b) taking psychoactive drugs on the part of therapists and patients, respectively. Though the increased risk of the inappropriate use of these drugs – the non-therapeutic uses, and their over-prescription – has been indicated in other industrialized countries, it has not yet been fully recognized and adequately discussed in Japan. Moreover, it is necessary to establish a sound basis for the ‘somato-psychic’ evaluation of these effects in the context of the physician-patient relationship, including the patient's family and even the broader society. Keywords: bioethics, pharmacological treatment, primary and secondary effects, psychiatric-functional disorders, risk/benefit ratio CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

This wide ranging discourse covers many disciplines of science and the human condition in an attempt to fully understand the manifestation of time. Time's Paradigm is, at its inception, a philosophical debate between the theories of 'Presentism' and 'The Block Model', beginning with a pronounced psychological analysis of 'free will' in an environment where the past and the future already exist. It lays the foundation for the argument that time is a cyclical, contained progression, rather than a meandering voyage into (...) infinity, bringing into question the validity of a commensurate 'Big Bang'. Following, the proposal widens to encompass physics. It tackles clock rates and time dilation, acausality and the nuisance of a universal clock, and demonstrates that conscious consideration creates the present moment - time's flow - separating the solid state past and future whose reality is devoid of space. Arguments relating to Quantum Physics theory, including the Uncertainty Principle and a Superposition of States, lend credibility to key areas involving cognitive awareness. It is posited that defined points in time and space prohibit progress in linear models for progression. Thus motile paradoxes can be resolved with the absence of infinities; temporal perception, it is concluded, being the result of uncertainty. Time's Paradigm takes the bold step of asking us to consider a tangible dimension of time, representing an intimate extension of our three, known spatial dimensions. Chaos theory is briefly introduced leading to the configuration of a fractal fourth dimension of time whose assumption demands only one direction of flow. Further, it asks whether our universe is expanding or contracting. It considers the simple physics of bodies contracting in a fourth dimension of time (UC), and how that marries comfortably with standard scientific models such as Special Relativity. The rate at which matter is contracting in the universe is illustrated in a reduction factor of 1.618... coinciding with Fibonacci's Ratio and countering Time Dilation. Lastly the more complex aspects of relativistic velocities are tackled together with the conundrum of Zero Velocity and The Speed of Light being attributes of the same event in Cyclical Space-Time, and ultimately, the prospect of superluminal velocities by interaction with parallel time-zones in a multi-layered block universe. (shrink)

The concept of time discounting introduces weights on future goods to make these less valu- able. Famously, both the specic functional form of time discounting and its normative sta- tus are contested. To address these problems, this paper provides a measurement-theoretic framework of representation for time discounting. The general representation theorem char- acterises time discounting factors as ratio-scale representations of dierences in temporally extended prospects. This framework of representation is used to reconsider interpretations of time discounting factors such as (...) time preferences, uncertainty and preference change. It also allows to compare these interpretations with regards to their normative appeal, the kinds of reductionism regarding time and preference they imply and the specic functional form of time discounting they suggest. Farther, multiple-self interpretations of decision-makers become available, such that a time discounting factor represents the degree of connectedness between temporal selves in a person. (shrink)

BackgroundChildhood experiences can exert a huge impact on adult psychological conditions. Previous studies have confirmed the effects of adverse childhood experiences and benevolent childhood experiences on psychological distress separately, but few studies explored a combined effect of ACEs and BCEs on psychological distress. The aim of this study was to explore a combined effect of ACEs and BCEs on psychological distress among Chinese undergraduates.MethodsParticipants were undergraduates aged 17–24 years and completed a self-reported questionnaire. A series of regression analyses were conducted (...) to examine the association between childhood experiences and psychological distress.ResultsA total of 65.7% of undergraduates had BCEs, 27.1% of undergraduates had ACEs, and 12.9% of undergraduates had ACEs and BCEs simultaneously. Logistic regression analysis indicated that undergraduates who experienced high ACEs were more likely to have a high risk of psychological distress [odds ratio = 1.46, 1.84, and 3.15 for uncertainty stress, depressive symptoms, and suicidal ideation, respectively], while undergraduates who experienced High BCEs were less likely to have psychological distress compared with Low-Both group. The combined effect of ACEs and BCEs could also play as a protective factor in uncertainty stress and depressive symptoms.ConclusionOur findings suggested that ACEs and BCEs could not only predict the psychological distress independently, but also BCEs could counteract the negative effect of ACEs in psychological problems. There is an even greater need to identify and support the victims of ACEs and to increase BCEs in early childhood. (shrink)

We consider a confidence parametrization of binary information sources in terms of appropriate likelihood ratios. This parametrization is used for Bayesian belief updates and for the equivalent comparison of binary experiments. In contrast to the standard parametrization of a binary information source in terms of its specificity and its sensitivity, one of the two confidence parameters is sufficient for a Bayesian belief update conditional on a signal realization. We introduce a confidence-augmented receiver operating characteristic for comparisons of binary experiments for (...) a class of “balanced” decision problems, relative to which the confidence order offers a higher resolution than Blackwell’s informativeness order. Where observation is concerned, Chance favors only the prepared mind.—Louis Pasteur (1822–1895). (shrink)

In an age where issues like climate change and the unintended consequences of technological innovation are high on the ethical and political agenda, questions about the nature and extent of our responsibilities to future generations have never been more important, yet simultaneously so difficult to answer. This book takes a unique approach to the problem by drawing on diverse traditions of thinking about care (including developmental psychology, phenomenology and feminist ethics) to explore the nature and meaning of our relationship with (...) the future. Demonstrating that many influential perspectives on intergenerational ethics, including positions advanced by John Rawls, Brian Barry, and Ulrich Beck are undermined by problems relating to uncertainty, it shows that an approach based on care ethics can confront the uncertain future successfully and give a viable account of the nature and scope of future-oriented responsibilities. (shrink)

How is it that thoroughly physical material beings such as ourselves can think, dream, feel, create and understand ideas, theories and concepts? How does mere matter give rise to all these non-material mental states, including consciousness itself? An answer to this central question of our existence is emerging at the busy intersection of neuroscience, psychology, artificial intelligence, and robotics.In this groundbreaking work, philosopher and cognitive scientist Andy Clark explores exciting new theories from these fields that reveal minds like ours to (...) be prediction machines - devices that have evolved to anticipate the incoming streams of sensory stimulation before they arrive. These predictions then initiate actions that structure our worlds and alter the very things we need to engage and predict. Clark takes us on a journey in discovering the circular causal flows and the self-structuring of the environment that define "the predictive brain." What emerges is a bold, new, cutting-edge vision that reveals the brain as our driving force in the daily surf through the waves of sensory stimulation. (shrink)

In this paper, I enter the debate between those who hold that our normative uncertainty matters for what we ought to do, and those who hold that only our descriptive uncertainty matters. I argue that existing views in both camps have unacceptable implications in cases where our descriptive beliefs depend on our normative beliefs. I go on to propose a fix which is available only to those who hold that normative uncertainty matters, ultimately leaving the challenge as (...) a threat to recent skepticism about such views. (shrink)

The new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning adopts a Bayesian, or prob- abilistic, model for studying human reasoning. Contrary to the traditional binary approach based on truth functional logic, with its binary values of truth and falsity, a third value that represents uncertainty can be introduced in the new paradigm. A variety of three-valued truth table systems are available in the formal literature, including one proposed by de Finetti. We examine the descriptive adequacy of these systems for natural (...) language indicative condi- tionals and bets on conditionals. Within our framework the so-called “defective” truth table, in which participants choose a third value when the antecedent of the indicative conditional is false, becomes a coherent response. We show that only de Finetti’s system has a good descriptive fit when uncer- tainty is the third value. (shrink)

In this essay, we explore an issue of moral uncertainty: what we are permitted to do when we are unsure about which moral principles are correct. We develop a novel approach to this issue that incorporates important insights from previous work on moral uncertainty, while avoiding some of the difficulties that beset existing alternative approaches. Our approach is based on evaluating and choosing between option sets rather than particular conduct options. We show how our approach is particularly well-suited (...) to address this issue of moral uncertainty with respect to agents that have credence in moral theories that are not fully consequentialist. (shrink)

Model evaluation for long term climate predictions must be done on quantities other than the actual prediction, and a comprehensive uncertainty quantification is impossible. An ad hoc alternative is provided by coordinated model intercomparisons which typically use a “one model one vote” approach. The problem with such an approach is that it treats all models as independent and equally plausible. Reweighting all models of the ensemble for performance and dependence seems like an obvious way to improve on model democracy, (...) yet there are open questions on what constitutes a “good” model, how to define dependency, how to interpret robustness, and how to incorporate background knowledge. Under¬standing those issues has the potential to increase confidence in model predictions in modeling efforts outside of climate science where similar challenges exist. (shrink)

Defenders of deontological constraints in normative ethics face a challenge: how should an agent decide what to do when she is uncertain whether some course of action would violate a constraint? The most common response to this challenge has been to defend a threshold principle on which it is subjectively permissible to act iff the agent's credence that her action would be constraint-violating is below some threshold t. But the threshold approach seems arbitrary and unmotivated: what would possibly determine where (...) the threshold should be set, and why should there be any precise threshold at all? Threshold views also seem to violate ought agglomeration, since a pair of actions each of which is below the threshold for acceptable moral risk can, in combination, exceed that threshold. In this paper, I argue that stochastic dominance reasoning can vindicate and lend rigor to the threshold approach: given characteristically deontological assumptions about the moral value of acts, it turns out that morally safe options will stochastically dominate morally risky alternatives when and only when the likelihood that the risky option violates a moral constraint is greater than some precisely definable threshold (in the simplest case, .5). I also show how, in combination with the observation that deontological moral evaluation is relativized to particular choice situations, this approach can overcome the agglomeration problem. This allows the deontologist to give a precise and well-motivated response to the problem of uncertainty. (shrink)

This paper explores the role of moral uncertainty in explaining the morally disruptive character of new technologies. We argue that existing accounts of technomoral change do not fully explain its disruptiveness. This explanatory gap can be bridged by examining the epistemic dimensions of technomoral change, focusing on moral uncertainty and inquiry. To develop this account, we examine three historical cases: the introduction of the early pregnancy test, the contraception pill, and brain death. The resulting account highlights what we (...) call “differential disruption” and provides a resource for fields such as technology assessment, ethics of technology, and responsible innovation. (shrink)

As well as disagreeing about how much one should donate to charity, moral theories also disagree about where one should donate. In light of this disagreement, how should the morally uncertain philanthropist allocate her donations? In many cases, one intuitively attractive option is for the philanthropist to split her donations across all of the charities that are recommended by moral views in which she has positive credence, with each charity’s share being proportional to her credence in the moral theories that (...) recommend that particular charity. Despite the fact that something like this approach is already being used by real-world philanthropists to distribute billions of dollars of donations, it is not supported by any of the approaches to moral uncertainty that have been proposed thus-far in the philosophical literature. In this paper, we will develop a bargaining-based approach to moral uncertainty that honors the proportionality intuition in favor of splitting one’s donations. We also show how this bargaining-based approach has several further advantages over the best alternative proposals. (shrink)

How should we make decisions when we're uncertain about what we ought, morally, to do? Decision-making in the face of fundamental moral uncertainty is underexplored terrain: MacAskill, Bykvist, and Ord argue that there are distinctive norms by which it is governed, and which depend on the nature of one's moral beliefs.

We are sometimes unsure of the moral status of our relationships with other entities. Recent case studies in this uncertainty include our relationships with artificial agents (robots, assistant AI, etc.), animals, and patients with “locked-in” syndrome. Do these entities have basic moral standing? Could they count as true friends or lovers? What should we do when we do not know the answer to these questions? An influential line of reasoning suggests that, in such cases of moral uncertainty, we (...) need meta-moral decision rules that allow us to either minimize the risks of moral wrongdoing or improve the choice-worthiness of our actions. One particular argument adopted in this literature is the “risk asymmetry argument,” which claims that the risks associated with accepting or rejecting some moral facts may be sufficiently asymmetrical as to warrant favoring a particular practical resolution of this uncertainty. Focusing on the case study of artificial beings, this article argues that this is best understood as an ethical-epistemic challenge. The article argues that taking potential risk asymmetries seriously can help resolve disputes about the status of human–AI relationships, at least in practical terms (philosophical debates will, no doubt, continue); however, the resolution depends on a proper, empirically grounded assessment of the risks involved. Being skeptical about basic moral status, but more open to the possibility of meaningful relationships with such entities, may be the most sensible approach to take. (shrink)

An analysis of ms Vat. Lat. 781 reveals ratio and limppiditas as two key notions in Albert the Great's teaching on the possibility of knowing God.

In this paper we introduce the nascent literature on Moral Uncertainty Theory and explore its application to the criminal law. Moral Uncertainty Theory seeks to address the question of what we ought to do when we are uncertain about what to do because we are torn between rival moral theories. For instance, we may have some credence in one theory that tells us to do A but also in another that tells us to do B. We examine how (...) we might decide whether or not to criminalize some conduct when we are unsure as to whether or not the conduct is morally permitted, and whether or not it is permissible to criminalize the conduct. We also look at how we might make sentencing decisions under moral uncertainty. We argue that Moral Uncertainty Theory can be an illuminating way to address these questions, but find that doing so is a lot more complicated than applying Moral Uncertainty Theory to individual conduct. (shrink)

Jennifer Rose Carr’s (2020) article “Normative Uncertainty Without Theories” proposes a method to maximize expected value under normative uncertainty without Intertheoretic Value Comparison (hereafter IVC). Carr argues that this method avoids IVC because it avoids theories: the agent’s credence is distributed among normative hypotheses of a particular type, which don’t constitute theories. However, I argue that Carr’s method doesn’t avoid or help to solve what I consider as the justificatory problem of IVC, which isn’t specific to comparing theories (...) as such. This threatens the implementability of Carr’s method. Fortunately, I also show how Carr’s method can nevertheless be implemented. I identify a type of epistemic states where the justificatory problem of IVC is not a necessary obstacle to maximizing expected value. In such states, the uncertainty stems from indecisive normative intuitions, and the agent justifiably constructs each normative hypothesis on the basis of a consistent subset of her intuitions by reference to the same unit of value. This part of my argument complements not only Carr’s (2020) argument, but also some moderate defenses of IVC. The combination of Carr’s paper and mine helps to illuminate the conditions for maximizing expected value under normative uncertainty without unjustified value comparison. (shrink)

Winner of the 2000-2002 outstanding publication award of the Section on Environment and Technology of the American Sociological Association.Risk as we now know ...

Model evaluation for long-term climate predictions must be done on quantities other than the actual prediction, and a comprehensive uncertainty quantificationUncertainty quantification is impossible. An ad hoc alternative is provided by coordinated model intercomparisonsModel intercomparisons which typically use a “one model one vote” approach. The problem with such an approach is that it treats all models as independent and equally plausible. Reweighting all models of the ensemble for performance and dependence seems like an obvious way to improve on model (...) democracy, yet there are open questions on what constitutes a “good” model, how to define dependency, how to interpret robustnessRobustness, and how to incorporate background knowledgeBackground knowledge. UnderstandingUnderstanding those issues have the potential to increase confidence in model predictions in modeling efforts outside of climate scienceClimate science where similar challenges exist. (shrink)