Updated and revised, the Second Edition of _Danto and His Critics_ presents a series of essays by leading Danto scholars who offer their critical assessment of the influential works and ideas of Arthur C. Danto, the Johnsonian Professor Emeritus in the Department of Philosophy at Columbia University and long-time art critic for _The Nation_. Reflects Danto's revisions in his theory of art, reworking his views in ways that have not been systematically addressed elsewhere Features essays that critically assess the changes (...) in Danto's thoughts and locate Danto's revised theory in the larger context of his work and of aesthetics generally Speaks in original ways to the relation of Danto's philosophy of art to his theory of mind Connects and integrates Danto's ideas on the nature of knowledge, action, aesthetics, history, and mind, as well as his provocative thoughts on the philosophy of art for the reader. (shrink)

Pictorial representation is a subject of interest to both cognitive science and aesthetics. Standard theories of depiction often draw on vision science, and vision science must give an account of picture perception. I offer a critical overview of standard theories of depiction and argue that none of them is adequate. I then describe ways in which new theories of perception blend elements of representationalism with an emphasis on attention and motor control. Such theories, in effect, limit the reliance on mental (...) representation in perceptual tasks. This work provides the basis for a theory of depiction in which pictorial representation is explained in terms of both mental representations and perceptual strategies. I argue that, in the case, the mental representations are most plausibly individuated by the functional and conceptual roles, rather than by causal links to the external world. (shrink)

If it is true, as one of its founders, George Miller, tells us, that cognitive science was born in 1956, then by human aging standards it is coming upon a mid-life crisis. Crises, as Kuhn has taught us, often precipitate radical change, in science as well as in individuals. It should therefore not be surprising to find that cognitive scientists have begun to look to the future and predict, or hope, that it will include both the beautiful and the good. (...) Thus it is that the neuroscientist, Semir Zeki, has recently declared: “We are at the threshold of a great enterprise” which he calls neuroesthetics. His optimism about that enterprise has been echoed by a number of other researchers; and for the most part, their hopefulness is based on discoveries about how pictures are perceived. So, for example, V. S. Ramachandran and William Hirstein have said that by understanding the neuropsychological principles of picture perception, we may come to understand the very “essence of art”. Indeed, by identifying perceptual principles in the right way, according to David Gilden, we may discover common ground for normative disciplines of all stripes; a theory of “what is sexy, what is virtue, or what is a good buy”. (shrink)

If it is true, as one of its founders, George Miller, tells us, that cognitive science was born in 1956, then by human aging standards it is coming upon a mid-life crisis. Crises, as Kuhn has taught us, often precipitate radical change, in science as well as in individuals. It should therefore not be surprising to find that cognitive scientists have begun to look to the future and predict, or hope, that it will include both the beautiful and the good. (...) Thus it is that the neuroscientist, Semir Zeki, has recently declared: “We are at the threshold of a great enterprise” which he calls neuroesthetics. His optimism about that enterprise has been echoed by a number of other researchers; and for the most part, their hopefulness is based on discoveries about how pictures are perceived. So, for example, V. S. Ramachandran and William Hirstein have said that by understanding the neuropsychological principles of picture perception, we may come to understand the very “essence of art”. Indeed, by identifying perceptual principles in the right way, according to David Gilden, we may discover common ground for normative disciplines of all stripes; a theory of “what is sexy, what is virtue, or what is a good buy”. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Resemblance Modularity Conclusion.

In this chapter, the author considers a line of thought in Arthur Danto in that regard about the bearing of cognitive science on our construal of changes in art. For Danto, a key to the issue of how to understand change in art forms and artistic identities is found in his fundamental notion that both the meaning and the style of a work of art are historically indexed; that is, they depend on historical conditions. Danto's skepticism about facile changes in (...) world views is born out of his theory that the history of such changes has certain logic, defined over basic or fundamental forms of action and thought; a view that applies as much to science as it does to art. The author's claim has been that recent research shows that, logical deductions aside, advances in cognitive science suggest that the language of art criticism will have to change. (shrink)

The basic problem of perceptual change is how to account for both variation and constancy in perceiving the world. Is order learned? How deep does plasticity go in that respect? I argue that different kinds of perceptual plasticity have been confused in recent debates, notably between J. Fodor and P. M. Churchland. By focusing on changes in the use of concepts, the issues in the Fodor-Churchland debate can be resolved. Beyond that debate, I propose a generalized encoding approach to perception (...) as a way of accounting for a significant form of perceptual change. (shrink)

The psycho-historical account implies two ways of construing the relation of basic exposure to the artistic design stance and artistic understanding. One is empirically dubious and the other does not fit well with the account. The assumption that combining psychology with history requires identifying actual intentions is undermined by the artistic design stance.

In this analysis, I address the recent debate over the functional characteristics of mental imagery, in which the question is whether the format for imagistic representation is pictorial or sentential. I offer an account of imagery and cognition as an important aspect of the theory of mental representation, one which serves as a test for prevalent views of the nature of explanation in cognitive science. ;The first chapter articulates a functionalist theory of internal states. I argue for the need to (...) individuate mental states by virtue of their formal features, but in a way which is consistent with the fact that natural representational systems are self-interpreting. To that end, I describe a basic capacity for imaging which underlies any mental representation. ;In the second chapter, I discuss recent experiments and argue that a correct interpretation of the data cannot be determined on methodological grounds. The substantive argument against mental pictures is set forth and shown to rest upon two distinct assumptions. ;The third chapter aims to show that the argument that mental pictures are inherently ambiguous fails as an argument for an exclusively sentential format. I argue further that sentential states alone are insufficient to account for all rational behavior. The conclusion is that conceptual considerations do not preclude nondiscursive images, and a view of cognition as broader than computation favors them. I propose a logical foundation for an account of access to mental images-under-descriptions. ;The fourth chapter sets forth principles governing operations in which images might occur naturally. I argue that such an account depends upon the possibility of pictorial attitudes, mental features which are theoretically important for the notion of representational competence. ;In the fifth chapter, I show the relevance of the general account described in the previous chapter by applying it to diverse contexts: animal representation, hypothesis in perception, and self-representation. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Part I: System and Method Part II: Intention and Interpretation Part III: Philosophy of Art Part IV: Historical Knowledge Part V: What Philosophy Is.

Marr's theory of vision is often said to exemplify wide psychology. The claim rests primarily on Marr's appeal to a high level theory of computational functions. I agree that Marr's theory embodies an exemplary form of wide psychology; what is exemplary about it is the appeal to perceptual tasks. But I argue that the result of invoking task considerations is that we should not adhere to Marr's own conception of proper explanatory width. There is no one conception of width that (...) has a priviledged place in explanation. (shrink)

The questions addressed in research on mental imagery have become more refined as experimental techniques have become more exact. One issue that has emerged in current work is whether, or in what ways, imaging is like perceiving. Daniel Reisberg and Deborah Chambers have devised a series of experiments that put that question to the test by asking whether images can be reinterpreted in the same ways that perceptual objects can be reinterpreted. They argue that the evidence points to a negative (...) conclusion. Other psychologists have responded, and a debate has ensued. The debate, intersects with philosophy in two ways: (i) philosophers have appropriated the empirical results in defence of their views on imagery; and (ii) psychologists on both sides have argued about the role of 'philosophical considerations' in evaluating the results. My aim is to clarify the issues at stake, to dispel certain confusions apparent in the literature, and to show that recent research does not support the claim that imaging is unlike perceiving in specific respects. (shrink)

The Socrates of Plato's Apology is typically depicted as a brilliant ironist whose behavior at his trial contributed to his conviction and sentence. Beginning with Xenophon, commentators have often characterized Socrates' speeches as adopting a prideful tone that was bound to offend even reasonable people. Some suggest that Socrates' arrogant conduct is exemplified by his own proposed sentence of meals in the Prytaneum. C. D. C. Reeve disputes this rather traditional reading of Plato's Socrates in his sensible and cogent book. (...) On his view, Socrates is fundamentally non-ironic when he claims not to have knowledge or to teach. Furthermore, Socrates mounts a plausible defense against his accusers, which can be understood only in terms of his substantive philosophical positions. Thus, Reeve has much to say about such topics as the nature of the elenchos, Socratic irony, the profession of ignorance and whether Socrates is a teacher, moral virtue and happiness, Socratic religion, and Socratic politics. Here I shall focus on the following parts of Reeve's discussion: the charges against Socrates and the religious basis of his mission, the nature of "human wisdom" and expert knowledge, and questions about Socratic eudaimonism. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Nondescriptivist views in many areas of philosophy have long been associated with the commitment that in contrast to other domains of discourse, there are no propositions in their particular domain. For example, the ‘no truth conditions’ theory of conditionals1 is understood as the view that conditionals don’t express propositions, noncognitivist expressivism in metaethics is understood as advocating the view that there are not really moral propositions,2 and expressivism about epistemic modals is thought of as the view that there is no (...) such thing as the proposition that Jack might be at home, over and above the proposition that Jack is at home.3 Of course, it is nearly always acknowledged that advocates of a nondescriptivist theory need not deny that there are conditional, moral, or modal propositions ‘at the end of the day’ – for if they also endorse a deflationary reading of talk about propositions, as famously advocated by Simon Blackburn, then they can employ such deflationary talk just as much as the rest of us. They just don’t appeal to propositions to do any of the work in their theories. Rather, they ‘earn the right’ to talk about propositions.4 It is the aim of this paper to upset this way of thinking about the proper attitude of nondescriptivists toward propositions, and to advocate a more constructive and in some ways more radical alternative on behalf of the nondescriptivist. I will begin by introducing and developing a set of problems that are faced by any nondescriptivist theory which tries to do without propositions. All of these problems are easily solved by any view which postulates propositions across the board, but none of them are solved by merely deflationary talk about propositions – their most promising solutions require propositions to do real theoretical work, and therefore the problems themselves remind us of and illustrate some of the important reasons why it is worth positing propositions in the first place.. (shrink)

It is time to bring the rich resources of these traditions into the contemporary debate about the nature of self. This volume is the first of its kind.

Seventeen years before Kant published The Critique of Pure Reason, there appeared another work designed to undercut Hume’s skepticism and the principles upon which that skepticism was based—Thomas Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense. In this ambitious work, Reid hoped to show, against Hume, that there need be no quarrel between common sense and philosophical inquiry. “Philosophy,” proclaimed Reid, “has no other roots but the principles of Common Sense; it grows out of them, and (...) draws its nourishment from them.” Reid’s self-imposed task was thus two-fold—to expose the errors in philosophical method which had inexorably culminated in Hume’s phenomenalistic atomism, and correlatively to provide a more adequate metaphysical scheme which could avoid the pitfalls of skepticism while doing justice to our ordinary beliefs about the world. (shrink)

Particularists in ethics emphasize that the normative is holistic, and invite us to infer with them that it therefore defies generalization. This has been supposed to present an obstacle to traditional moral theorizing, to have striking implications for moral epistemology and moral deliberation, and to rule out reductive theories of the normative, making it a bold and important thesis across the areas of normative theory, moral epistemology, moral psychology, and normative metaphysics. Though particularists emphasize the importance of the holism of (...) the normative, however, it is not something that they have been able to explain. In this paper I’ll show how to use a small number of simple and, I’ll argue, independently compelling assumptions in order to both predict and explain the holistic features of the normative with respect to the non-normative. The basic idea of the paper is simple. It is that normative claims are holistic because they are general, rather than because they defy generalization. (shrink)

During multiple testing, researchers often adjust their alpha level to control the familywise error rate for a statistical inference about a joint union alternative hypothesis (e.g., “H1,1 or H1,2”). However, in some cases, they do not make this inference. Instead, they make separate inferences about each of the individual hypotheses that comprise the joint hypothesis (e.g., H1,1 and H1,2). For example, a researcher might use a Bonferroni correction to adjust their alpha level from the conventional level of 0.050 to 0.025 (...) when testing H1,1 and H1,2, find a significant result for H1,1 (p < 0.025) and not for H1,2 (p > .0.025), and so claim support for H1,1 and not for H1,2. However, these separate individual inferences do not require an alpha adjustment. Only a statistical inference about the union alternative hypothesis “H1,1 or H1,2” requires an alpha adjustment because it is based on “at least one” significant result among the two tests, and so it refers to the familywise error rate. Hence, an inconsistent correction occurs when a researcher corrects their alpha level during multiple testing but does not make an inference about a union alternative hypothesis. In the present article, I discuss this inconsistent correction problem, including its reduction in statistical power for tests of individual hypotheses and its potential causes vis-à-vis error rate confusions and the alpha adjustment ritual. I also provide three illustrations of inconsistent corrections from recent psychology studies. I conclude that inconsistent corrections represent a symptom of statisticism, and I call for a more nuanced inference-based approach to multiple testing corrections. (shrink)

Animal rights and moral theories -- Arguing for one's species -- Utilitarianism and animals : Peter Singer's case for animal liberation -- Tom Regan : animal rights as natural rights -- Virtue ethics and animals -- Contractarianism and animal rights -- Animal minds.

Since the election of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte in 2016, extra-judicial killings have become commonplace as a result of his administration’s declaration of war on drugs. Empirical cross-national work on examining determinants behind state repression remains scant especially in understanding the phenomenon at the sub-national level. This study investigates what accounts for variations on EJKs at the level of Philippine provinces. Using monthly panel-data for 62 provinces and employing various count-model regressions, the findings indicate that Philippine provinces which have large (...) populations, stronger state capacity, and are more affluent in terms of the human development index are more likely to exhibit higher rates of EJKs. Furthermore, the vote share of the President in the 2016 elections and presidential visits to specific provinces are correlated with higher incidences of EJKs—corroborating theories on delegative democracies and penal populism. Lastly, it is found that drug-prone provinces are more likely to experience a higher share of human rights violations in terms of EJKs, compared to provinces that have lower affectation rates. The implications suggest that the Philippine war on drugs seem to promote vertical accountability as international criticism and domestic opposition mounts. (shrink)

Many hold that aesthetic appreciation is sensitive to the authenticity or genuineness of an object. In a recent body of work, Carolyn Korsmeyer has defended the claim that genuineness itself is an aesthetic property. Korsmeyer’s aim is to explain our aesthetic appreciation of objects that afford a sense of being ‘in touch with the past’. In this paper, I argue that genuineness cannot explain our appreciation of these objects. There is no aesthetic experience of the genuine.

Quietist Moral Realists accept that there are moral facts and properties, while aiming to avoid many of the explanatory burdens thought to fall on traditional moral realists. This chapter examines the forms that Quietist Moral Realism has taken and the challenges it has faced, in order to better assess its prospects. The best hope, this chapter argues, lies in a pragmatist approach that distinguishes the different functions of diverse areas of discourse. This paves the way for a form of Quietism (...) that does not simply remain quiet about the explanatory demands of metaethics, but rather is able to diagnose where they go wrong. By combining a neopragmatic analysis of the discourse with an easy approach to ontology, , we can develop a form of Quietist Moral Realism that is far stronger than critics of quietism have appreciated. (shrink)

Some objects we value because they afford a felt connection with people, events, or places connected with their past. Visiting Canterbury cathedral, you encounter the place where, in 1170, Archbishop Thomas Becket was murdered by four knights of Henry II. Knowing that you are standing in the very place where Becket’s blood was spilled gives the past event a sense of tangible reality. One feels ‘in touch with’ the past; history seems to ‘come alive’. In this paper, I propose an (...) explanation for the phenomenology of such experiences in terms of an imaginative activity that represents what an object is historically connected with as part of the object in the present. One imagines of the site of Becket’s murder Becket being murdered. According to my account, objects that embody their histories are representations in Kendall Walton’s sense: they have the function of serving as props in games of make-believe. (shrink)

The Companion begins with a section-by-section overview of Being and Time and a chapter reviewing the genesis of this seminal work. The final chapter situates Being and Time in the context of Heidegger's later work.

Where does my body begin? Where does it end? What is inside my body? What is outside? What is primary? What is secondary? What is natural? What is artificial? Science fiction has long imagined a future fusion of humanity with technology. Today, many of us—especially people with health issues such as autoimmune diseases—have functionally become hybrids connected to other machines and to other bodies. The combination of artificial intelligence with implants, transplants, prostheses, and genetic reprogramming is transforming medical research and (...) treatment, and it is now also transforming what we thought was human nature. Mark C. Taylor identifies this process as “intervolution” and explores how it is weaving together smart things and smart bodies to create new forms of life. Our wired bodies are no longer freestanding individuals, but interconnected nodes in worldwide networks. Recognizing this transformation overturns deeply entrenched distinctions and oppositions between minds and bodies. Intervolution reveals that we are already cyborgs, integral cogs in what will become a superorganism of bodies and things. (shrink)