This study investigated the developmental trajectory of inattention symptoms as a predictor of later depressive symptoms in adolescence, and examined potential mediating role of peer relationships in this process. Participants were adolescents who were part of the large longitudinal panel study on Korean Youths, Korean Children & Youth Panel Survey 2010 of the National Youth Policy Institute. Specifically, data were drawn from two cohorts of KCYPS that differed in participant age. We analyzed data collected from 2010 to 2016 when children (...) in panel 1 were 6–7 to 12–13 years old, and children in panel 2 were 9–10 to 15–16 years old. Results of latent growth modeling were as follows. In Panel 1, the inattention symptoms increased from 9–10 to 12–13 years. Otherwise, the inattention symptoms decreased from 11–12 to 15–16 years in panel 2. Additionally, in both panels, initial status and slope of inattention significantly predicted later levels of depressive symptoms, and peer relationships partly mediated the association between inattention trajectory and depressive symptoms. The findings are discussed with respect to considering the growth of inattention and the quality of peer relationships as promising targets for early identification and intervention of depression in adolescents. (shrink)

Although context-processing deficits may be core features of schizophrenia, context remains a poorly defined concept. To test Phillips & Silverstein's model, we need to operationalize context more precisely. We offer several useful ways of framing context and discuss enhancing or facilitating schizophrenic patients' performance under different contextual situations. Furthermore, creativity may be a byproduct of cognitive uncoordination.

The etiology of visual hallucinations is largely undetermined in schizophrenia. Collerton et al.'s PAD model partly concurs with what we know about neurocognition in schizophrenia, but we need to specify the types of perceptual and attentional abnormalities that are implicated in recurrent complex visual hallucinations (RCVH). Available data suggest that abnormal attentional control and top-down processing play a larger role than the ventral stream deficits.

We argue that autism and psychosis spectrum disorders cannot be conceptualized as polar extremes of mentalizing ability. We raise two main objections: (1) the autistic-psychotic continuum, as conceptualized by the authors, excludes defining features of schizophrenia spectrum: negative symptoms, which correlate more strongly with mentalizing impairments; and (2) little evidence exists for a relationship between mentalizing ability and positive symptoms.

This study described the relationships between academic class and student moral sensitivity and reasoning and between curriculum design components for ethics education and student moral sensitivity and reasoning. The data were collected from freshman (n = 506) and senior students (n = 440) in eight baccalaureate nursing programs in South Korea by survey; the survey consisted of the Korean Moral Sensitivity Questionnaire and the Korean Defining Issues Test. The results showed that moral sensitivity scores in patient-oriented care and conflict were (...) higher in senior students than in freshman students. Furthermore, more hours of ethics content were associated with higher principled thinking scores of senior students. Nursing education in South Korea may have an impact on developing student moral sensitivity. Planned ethics content in nursing curricula is necessary to improve moral sensitivity and moral reasoning of students. (shrink)

A historical investigation of the exclusion of Africa and Asia from modern histories of philosophy.

Socializing students to Academic Integrity in the face of great cultural, linguistic and socioeconomic diversity in the student population in higher education calls for innovative strategies that are aligned with equity, diversity and inclusion principles. Through a mixed method of quantitative analysis of learner engagement data from the Learning Management System and analysis of anonymous evaluation survey, along with thematic analysis of students’ open-ended responses in the evaluation survey, the authors explored how students responded to AI Socialization during a 4-week (...) non-credit, online co-curricular program called ‘Reading and Writing Excellence’. Nine groups of undergraduate students from 34 disciplines in different global locations during the COVID-19 pandemic were introduced to a curated set of AI online resources. Through a learner-driven, instructor-facilitated approach the AI Socialization also engaged students in language development and empowered them to communicate about their disciplinary course topics through written journal entries, receiving instructor feedback that increased their cultural and linguistic capital for further academic writing. This approach led to a high volume of written output. Nonparametric ANOVA was used to establish that low-proficiency students were able to produce as much written output as their more proficient peers. Survey results for various aspects important to academic integrity show students’ self-perception of readiness for academic writing: paraphrasing and summarizing ; organization of ideas ; critical thinking ; logic/argument. Insights gained about educative engagement, language development and learner empowerment that can help students from diverse backgrounds to avoid Academic Integrity Violations and gain transformative access and success in higher education are incorporated into a set of recommendations that are applicable to a wide range of teaching contexts. (shrink)

The problem of unconceived alternatives can be undermined, regardless of whether the possibility space of alternatives is bounded or unbounded. If it is bounded, pessimists need to justify their assumption that the probability that scientists have not yet eliminated enough false alternatives is higher than the probability that scientists have already eliminated enough false alternatives. If it is unbounded, pessimists need to justify their assumption that the probability that scientists have not yet moved from the possibility space of false alternatives (...) to the possibility space of true alternatives is higher than the probability that scientists have already moved from the former to the latter space. (shrink)

This book provides philosophers of science with new theoretical resources for making their own contributions to the scientific realism debate. Readers will encounter old and new arguments for and against scientific realism. They will also be given useful tips for how to provide influential formulations of scientific realism and antirealism. Finally, they will see how scientific realism relates to scientific progress, scientific understanding, mathematical realism, and scientific practice.

The epistemic account and the noetic account hold that the essence of scientific progress is the increase in knowledge and understanding, respectively. Dellsén (2018) criticizes the epistemic account (Park, 2017a) and defends the noetic account (Dellsén, 2016). I argue that Dellsén’s criticisms against the epistemic account fail, and that his notion of understanding, which he claims requires neither belief nor justification, cannot explain scientific progress, although it can explain fictional progress in science-fiction.

Extensional scientific realism is the view that each believable scientific theory is supported by the unique first-order evidence for it and that if we want to believe that it is true, we should rely on its unique first-order evidence. In contrast, intensional scientific realism is the view that all believable scientific theories have a common feature and that we should rely on it to determine whether a theory is believable or not. Fitzpatrick argues that extensional realism is immune, while intensional (...) realism is not, to the pessimistic induction. I reply that if extensional realism overcomes the pessimistic induction at all, that is because it implicitly relies on the theoretical resource of intensional realism. I also argue that extensional realism, by nature, cannot embed a criterion for distinguishing between believable and unbelievable theories. (shrink)

Nanay (2017) argues for unconscious mental imagery, inter alia based on the assumption that successful performance in imagery tasks requires the manipulation of mental imagery. I challenge this assumption with the help of results presented in Shepard and Metzler (1971), Zeman et al. (2010), and Keogh and Pearson (2018). The studies suggest that imagery tasks can be successfully performed by means of cognitive/propositional strategies which do not rely on imagery.

Van Fraassen contends that there is no argument that rationally compels us to disbelieve a successful theory, T. I object that this contention places upon him the burden of showing that scientific antirealists’ favorite arguments, such as the pessimistic induction, do not rationally compel us to disbelieve T. Van Fraassen uses the English view of rationality to rationally disbelieve T. I argue that realists can use it to rationally believe T, despite scientific antirealists’ favorite arguments against T.

Scientific realists claim that the best of successful rival theories is (approximately) true. Relative realists object that we cannot make the absolute judgment that a theory is successful, and that we can only make the relative judgment that it is more successful than its competitor. I argue that this objection is undermined by the cases in which empirical equivalents are successful. Relative realists invoke the argument from a bad lot to undermine scientific realism and to support relative realism. In response, (...) I construct the argument from double spaces. It is similar to the argument from a bad lot, but threatens many philosophical inferences, including relative realists’ inference from comparative success to comparative truth. (shrink)

Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, shortages of scarce healthcare resources consistently presented significant moral and practical challenges. While the importance of vaccines as a key pharmaceutical intervention to stem pandemic scarcity was widely publicized, a sizable proportion of the population chose not to vaccinate. In response, some have defended the use of vaccination status as a criterion for the allocation of scarce medical resources. In this paper, we critically interpret this burgeoning literature, and describe a framework for thinking about vaccine-sensitive resource (...) allocation using the values of responsibility, reciprocity, and justice. Although our aim here is not to defend a single view of vaccine-sensitive resource allocation, we believe that attending critically with the diversity of arguments in favor (and against) vaccine-sensitivity reveals a number of questions that a vaccine-sensitive approach to allocation should answer in future pandemics. (shrink)

Healey (2019a) makes four comments on my (Park, 2019a) objections to van Fraassen’s positions. The four comments concern the issues of whether ‘disbelief’ is appropriate or inappropriate to characterize van Fraassen’s position, what the relationship between a theory and models is for van Fraassen, whether he believes or not that a theory is empirically adequate, and whether destructive empiricism is tenable or not. I reply to those comments in this paper.

Evolutionary theory coheres with its neighboring theories, such as the theory of plate tectonics, molecular biology, electromagnetic theory, and the germ theory of disease. These neighboring theories were previously unconceived, but they were later conceived, and then they cohered with evolutionary theory. Since evolutionary theory has been strengthened by its several neighboring theories that were previously unconceived, it will be strengthened by infinitely many hitherto unconceived neighboring theories. This argument for evolutionary theory echoes the problem of unconceived alternatives. Ironically, however, (...) the former recommends that we take the realist attitude toward evolutionary theory, while the latter recommends that we take the antirealist attitude toward it. (shrink)

The wider the gap between rivaling positions, the more there can be debates between rivaling interlocutors. The gap between the respective formulations of scientific realism and antirealism that invoke the Prussian conception of rationality is wider than the gap between the respective formulations of scientific realism and antirealism that invoke the English conception of rationality. Therefore, scientific realists and antirealists should choose the former over the latter as the framework of their debate.

Lyons’s (2003, 2018) axiological realism holds that science pursues true theories. I object that despite its name, it is a variant of scientific antirealism, and is susceptible to all the problems with scientific antirealism. Lyons (2003, 2018) also advances a variant of surrealism as an alternative to the realist explanation for success. I object that it does not give rise to understanding because it is an ad hoc explanans and because it gives a conditional explanation. Lyons might use axiological realism (...) to account for the success of a theory. I object that some alternative axiological explanations are better than the axiological realist explanation, and that the axiological realist explanation is teleological. Finally, I argue that Putnam’s realist position is more elegant than Lyons’s. (shrink)

This paper examines the possibility of parenting as a queer practice. Examining definitions of “queer” as resistant to presumptions and practices of reprosexuality and repro-narrativity (Michael Warner), bourgeouis norms of domestic space and family time (Judith Halberstam), and policies of reproductive futurism (Lee Edelman), I argue that queer parenting is possible. Indeed, parenting that resists practices of normalization are, in part, realized by certain types of postmodern families. However, fully actualizing the possibility of parenting queerly—and thus teaching our children the (...) values of non-normativity--requires engaging political struggles for distributive justice. These are, thus, the struggles that should be at the center of queer politics, rather than the current struggles for gay marriage and homoparental rights. (shrink)

Van Fraassen infers the truth of the contextual theory from his observation that it has passed a crucial test. Mizrahi infers the comparative truth of our best theories from his observation that they are more successful than their competitors. Their inferences require, according to the argument from double spaces, the prior belief that it is more likely that their target theories were pulled out from the T-space than from the O-space. The T-space is the logical space of unconceived theories whose (...) appearances agree with their realities; the O-space is the logical space of unconceived theories whose appearances may agree or disagree with their realities. (shrink)

We can have credences in an infinite number of propositions—that is, our opinion set can be infinite. Accuracy-first epistemologists have devoted themselves to evaluating credal states with the help of the concept of ‘accuracy’. Unfortunately, under several innocuous assumptions, infinite opinion sets yield several undesirable results, some of which are even fatal, to accuracy-first epistemology. Moreover, accuracy-first epistemologists cannot circumvent these difficulties in any standard way. In this regard, we will suggest a non-standard approach, called a relativistic approach, to accuracy-first (...) epistemology and show that such an approach can successfully circumvent undesirable results while having some advantages over the standard approach. (shrink)

An examination of the debates over the so-called 'false' memory syndrome. In this paper, I concur that memory is malleable, but interrogate notions of truth and falsity underlying standards used to evaluate the accuracy of memories of abuse. Such standards divert us, I suggest, from recognizing the truth behind widespread recollections of abuse at the hands of patriarchy.

This essay addresses feminist approaches to medical aid in dying (MAID), considering whether it is a practice that should be supported for women and other marginalized groups. Some feminists have raised rights and justice-based arguments in support of MAID; others have taken a care-based approach to suggest that the practice violates relationships of care and only worsens distrust between marginalized groups and the medical establishment. I argue that we need to adopt both justice and care approaches to develop a robust (...) feminist account of MAID. I defend a woman’s right to choose death in cases of terminal illness or suffering but argue that relational concerns of care, trust, and trustworthiness must be addressed at the same time to ensure that MAID is justly practiced and accessible to all those who want it. (shrink)

Diese Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit dem Problem des malum. Während wir in der Regel ohne Zögern davon ausgehen, daß wir von Natur aus nach dem Guten streben, drängt sich dennoch zugleich die Frage nach dem Wesen, dem Ursprung und dem Sinn des malum unmittelbar auf. Aber die Frage nach dem malum ist ein immer noch offenes Problem. Aus diesem Grunde soll hier versucht werden, das Problem des malum im Hinblick auf die Geschichte der Philosophie zu erörtern. In Zentrum dieser Arbeit (...) soll die Lehre vom malum bei Thomas von Aquin stehen. Es wird dabei vor allem der Grund für ein sachgemäßes Verständnis des thomistischen Ansatzes gelegt, wie er in den Schriften De malo, Summa Theologiae und De veritate vorliegt. Er zeichnet sich vor allem durch eine differenzierte Analyse des malum aus, das als 'moralisch Schlechtes', 'Fehler in der Erkenntnis' und 'natürliches und technisches Fehlen' in Betracht gezogen wird. (shrink)

Surrealism holds that observables behave as if T were true, whereas scientific realism holds that T is true. Surrealism and scientific realism give different explanations of why T is empirically adequate. According to surrealism, T is empirically adequate because observables behave as if it were true. According to scientific realism, T is empirically adequate because it is true. I argue that the surrealist explanation merely clarifies the concept of empirical adequacy, whereas the realist explanation makes an inductive inference about T. (...) Therefore, the surrealist explanation is a conceptual one, whereas the realist explanation is an empirical one, and the former is not an alternative to the latter. (shrink)

Religious fictionalism holds that religious sentences are false, that religious practitioners accept rather than believe religious sentences, and that it is justifiable for them to act on religious sentences. I develop an alternative to religious fictionalism, which I call “religious practicalism.” It holds that we do not know whether religious sentences are true or false, that religious practitioners believe rather than merely accept religious sentences, and that it is justifiable for them to act on religious sentences. I argue that religious (...) practicalism has intellectual, moral, and practical advantages over religious fictionalism. (shrink)

Evidence from life science, cognitive science, and philosophy supports the hypothesis that knowledge is a central norm of the human practice of assertion. However, to date, the experimental evidence supporting this hypothesis is limited to American anglophones. If the hypothesis is correct, then such findings will not be limited to one language or culture. Instead, we should find a strong connection between knowledge and assertability across human languages and cultures. To begin testing this prediction, we conducted three experiments on Koreans (...) in Korean. In each case, the findings replicated prior results observed in Americans and were corroborated by key findings from new replication studies on Americans using materials back-translated from Korean. These findings support the theory that there is a core, cross-culturally robust human practice of assertion and that, according to the rules of this practice, assertions should express knowledge. (shrink)

Bird argues that scientific progress consists in increasing knowledge. Dellsén objects that increasing knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific progress, and argues that scientific progress rather consists in increasing understanding. Dellsén also contends that unlike Bird’s view, his view can account for the scientific practices of using idealizations and of choosing simple theories over complex ones. I argue that Dellsén’s criticisms against Bird’s view fail, and that increasing understanding cannot account for scientific progress, if acceptance, as opposed to (...) belief, is required for scientific understanding. (shrink)

Many realists argue that present scientific theories will not follow the fate of past scientific theories because the former are more successful than the latter. Critics object that realists need to show that present theories have reached the level of success that warrants their truth. I reply that the special theory of relativity has been repeatedly reinforced by unconceived scientific methods, so it will be reinforced by infinitely many unconceived scientific methods. This argument for the special theory of relativity overcomes (...) the critics’ objection, and has advantages over the no-miracle argument and the selective induction for it. (shrink)

Quantum entanglement poses a challenge to the traditional metaphysical view that an extrinsic property of an object is determined by its intrinsic properties. So structural realists might be tempted to cite quantum entanglement as evidence for structural realism. I argue, however, that quantum entanglement undermines structural realism. If we classify two entangled electrons as a single system, we can say that their spin properties are intrinsic properties of the system, and that we can have knowledge about these intrinsic properties. Specifically, (...) we can know that the parts of the system are entangled and spatially separated from each other. In addition, the concept of supervenience neither illuminates quantum entanglement nor helps structural realism. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to examine Takada Shinji’s (1893–1975) view of the ‘Mandate of Heaven (天命 tenmei)’. Takada understood the ‘Imperial Way (皇道 kōdō)’ as one of two axes, the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ and the ‘Rectification of Names (正名 seimei)’, together they made possible a theoretical systematization of the ‘Imperial Way’ discourse as well as its concrete political embodiment. It is undeniable that the ideas of the ‘Imperial Way’ received heavy criticism after WWII. Because it was used as (...) a problematic ideology in Imperial Japan. Nonetheless, it is necessary to grasp its original meaning as understood by its theoretical founder and innovators. This paper thus turns to examine Takada’s unique understanding of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ from the belief that such an examination should precede before starting a more systematic and comprehensive discussion of the ‘Imperial Way’ discourse. (shrink)

Scientific realists argue that present theories are more successful than past theories, so present theories will not be superseded by alternatives, even though past theories were superseded by alternatives. Alai (2016) objects that although present theories are more successful than past theories, they will be replaced by future theories, just as past theories were replaced by present theories. He contends, however, that past theories were partly true, and that present theories are largely true. I argue that Alai’s discrimination between past (...) and present theories is subject to his own criticism against realists’ discriminations between past and present theories, and also subject to other criticisms that philosophers have raised against scientific realism and pessimism. (shrink)

Inhaltsverzeichnis: Einleitung. I Husserls Verständnis von Philosophie und Wissenschaft und die Kritik der neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaft. 1 Die Phänomenologie als Wiederaufnahme der antiken Idee von der Philosophie. 2 Objektivismus und natürliche Einstellung. 3 Kritik der neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaft. II Phänomenologische Wissenschaftlichkeit und Wissenschaft von der Lebenswelt. 1 Idee und Aufgabe einer phänomenologischen Wissenschaft von der Lebenswelt. 2 Phänomenologische Wissenschaftlichkeit und Methode. 3 Normalität als Grundlage phänomenologischer Wissenschaftlichkeit. III Die Systematik der Wissenschaft von der Lebenswelt und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. 1 Die Bedeutung der (...) Wissenschaft von der Lebenswelt im Übergang zur transzendentalen Phänomenologie. 2 Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Thematisierung der Lebenswelt in der transzendentalen Phänomenologie. IV Ein neuer methodischer Zugang zur Systematik der Lebensweltwissenschaft. 1 Das Programm einer Lebensweltwissenschaft und ihre Grundprobleme. 2 Zur Methodik einer Thematisierung der Lebenswelt. 3 Horizont und lebensweltliches Apriori. 4 Das lebensweltliche Apriori im Zusammenspiel von Natur und Kultur. (shrink)

Change in scientific practice and its implications for the status of scientific claims, examined through an analysis of three episodes at a synchrotron laboratory. After World War II, particle physics became a dominant research discipline in American academia. At many universities, alumni of the Manhattan Project and of Los Alamos were granted resources to start programs of high-energy physics built around the promise of a new and more powerful particle accelerator, the synchrotron. The synchrotron was also a source of very (...) intense X-rays, useful for research in solid states physics and in biology. As synchrotron X-ray science grew, the experimental practice of protein crystallography, garnered funding, prestige, and acclaim. In Velvet Revolution at the Synchrotron, Park Doing examines the change in scientific practice at a synchrotron laboratory as biology rose to dominance over physics. He draws on his own observations and experiences at the Cornell University synchrotron, and considers the implications of that change for the status of scientific claims. Velvet Revolution at the Synchrotron is one of the few recent works in the sociology of science that engages specific scientific and technical claims through participant observation--recorded evocatively and engagingly--to address issues in the philosophy of science. Doing argues that bureaucratic change in science is neither "top-down" nor "bottom-up" but rather performed in and realized through recursively related forums of technical assertion and resistance. He considers the relationship of this change to the content of science, and the implications of this relationship for the project of laboratory studies begun in the late 1970s. (shrink)