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  1. Erin Frykholm (2015). A Humean Particularist Virtue Ethic. Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2171-2191.
    Virtue ethical theories typically follow a neo-Aristotelian or quasi-Aristotelian model, making use of various combinations of key features of the Aristotelian model including eudaimonism, perfectionism, an account of practical wisdom, and the thesis of the unity of the virtues. In this paper I motivate what I call a Humean virtue ethic, which is a deeply particularist account of virtue that rejects all of these central tenets, at least in their traditional forms. Focusing on three factors by which Hume determines (...)
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  2. Lorenzo Greco (2013). Toward a Humean Virtue Ethics. In Julia Peters (ed.), Aristotelian Ethics in Contemporary Perspective. Routledge 210-223.
  3. Lorenzo Greco (2012). Hume e l'etica della virtù. Iride 25 (67):603-615.
    In this paper I present some reasons in favour of an interpretation of Hume’s moral philosophy as a brand new form of «virtue ethics». By discussing some specific issues within the secondary literature in favour and against this kind of reading, I argue that Hume offers better philosophical tools to redefine the basic notion of virtue ethics than the neo-Aristotelian alternative. In particular, I maintain that the strength of Hume’s proposal lies in its pointing toward the unity of character instead (...)
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  4. Rosalind Hursthouse (1999). Virtue Ethics and Human Nature. Hume Studies 25 (1/2):67-82.
    Hume's disjunctive (useful or agreeable, etc.) account of the grounds of moral approbation of the virtues is wildly--and disastrously--different from the conjunctive account implied by the Aristotelian and Epicurean tradition. It seems that Hume often inclines towards the latter and, thereby, its reliance on the distinctions between the truly useful and agreeable and the merely apparently so, which, in that tradition, are discernible only by the _phronimos<D>. We may regard being the 'good critic' in morals (and, less plausibly, taking up (...)
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  5. Jason Kawall (2002). Virtue Theory and Ideal Observers. Philosophical Studies 109 (3):197 - 222.
    Virtue theorists in ethics often embrace the following characterizationof right action: An action is right iff a virtuous agent would performthat action in like circumstances. Zagzebski offers a parallel virtue-basedaccount of epistemically justified belief. Such proposals are severely flawedbecause virtuous agents in adverse circumstances, or through lack ofknowledge can perform poorly. I propose an alternative virtue-based accountaccording to which an action is right (a belief is justified) for an agentin a given situation iff an unimpaired, fully-informed virtuous observerwould deem the (...)
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  6. Alice MacLachlan (2010). Mirrors to One Another: Emotions and Moral Value in Jane Austen and David Hume, E. M. Dadlez. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (2).
  7. Alejandra Mancilla, The Bridge of Benevolence: Hutcheson and Mencius. [REVIEW] Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy.
    The Scottish sentimentalist Francis Hutcheson and the Chinese Confucianist Mencius give benevolence (ren) a key place in their respectivemoral theories, as the first and foundational virtue. Leaving aside differences in style and method, my purpose in this essay is to underline this similarity by focusing on four common features: first, benevolence springs from compassion, an innate and universal feeling shared by all human beings; second, its objects are not only human beings but also animals; third, it is sensitive to proximity; (...)
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  8. Paul Russell (1991). Book Review:Virtue by Consensus: The Moral Philosophy of Hutcheson, Hume and Adam Smith. V. M. Hope. [REVIEW] Ethics 101 (4):873-.
  9. Karen Stohr (2002). Virtue Ethics and Kant's Cold-Hearted Benefactor. Journal of Value Inquiry 32 (2-3):187-204.
  10. Lei Zhong (forthcoming). A Confucian Virtue Theory of Supererogation. Philosophy East and West 66.
    Contemporary virtue ethicists have attempted to offer a virtue-based account of right action. However, such an account is faced by a daunting challenge, the ‘supererogation problem’ as I call it. Since what a virtuous person would characteristically do is often beyond the scope of moral duty, virtue ethics seems to have difficulty in accommodating the distinction between obligation and supererogation. In the paper, I aim to meet this challenge by recommending a Confucian virtue theory of supererogation.
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