Search results for 'Assumption' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  19
    Ruth Ben-Yashar (2014). The Generalized Homogeneity Assumption and the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Theory and Decision 77 (2):237-241.
    The Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) is based on the assumption of homogeneous voters who imperfectly know the correct policy. We reassess the validity of the CJT when voters are homogeneous and each knows the correct decision with an average probability of more than a half.
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  2.  6
    Steve Fuller (1994). What is an Assumption? Informal Logic 16 (2).
    The concept of an 'assumption' is discussed, and it is suggested that the psychological model implied by normal usage is misleading. A new model is proposed which distinguishes between 'assumptions', as constraints upon the thinking process, and 'postulates', as corresponding potential or actual propositional vocalizations. Some evidence for this model is provided, and its implications, particularly for the process of assumption identification, are discussed. It is suggested that assumption identification requires lateral thinking, and needs to be separated (...)
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  3. Eric Swanson (2012). Conditional Excluded Middle Without the Limit Assumption. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):301-321.
  4.  8
    Andrés Mejía D. (2009). In Just What Sense Should I Be Critical? An Exploration Into the Notion of ‘Assumption’ and Some Implications for Assessment. Studies in Philosophy and Education 28 (4):351-367.
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  5.  3
    Eli Saltz & Slater E. Newman (1959). The von Restorff Isolation Effect: Test of the Intralist Association Assumption. Journal of Experimental Psychology 58 (6):445.
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  6. Fred Frankel, Marvin Levine & David Karpf (1970). Human Discrimination Learning: A Test of the Blank-Trials Assumption. Journal of Experimental Psychology 85 (3):342-348.
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  7. Paul Franceschi, The Simulation Argument and the Self-Indication Assumption.
    I present in this paper a line of refutation of the Simulation Argument. I recall first Bostrom's Simulation Argument. I draw then a comparison between the Emerald Case and the core analogy underlying the Simulation Argument. I also discuss the justification of the Self-Indication Assumption and its relationship with the Simulation Argument. I show lastly that the Simulation Argument is a disguised reformulation of an application of an extended form of the Self-Indication Assumption to the situation related to (...)
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  8.  4
    Peter Spirtes & Jiji Zhang, A Uniformly Consistent Estimator of Causal Effects Under the K-Triangle-Faithfulness Assumption.
    Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines [Causation, Prediction, and Search Springer] described a pointwise consistent estimator of the Markov equivalence class of any causal structure that can be represented by a directed acyclic graph for any parametric family with a uniformly consistent test of conditional independence, under the Causal Markov and Causal Faithfulness assumptions. Robins et al. [Biometrika 90 491–515], however, proved that there are no uniformly consistent estimators of Markov equivalence classes of causal structures under those assumptions. Subsequently, Kalisch and B¨uhlmann (...)
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  9.  29
    Paul B. de Laat (2010). How Can Contributors to Open-Source Communities Be Trusted? On the Assumption, Inference, and Substitution of Trust. Ethics and Information Technology 12 (4):327-341.
    Open-source communities that focus on content rely squarely on the contributions of invisible strangers in cyberspace. How do such communities handle the problem of trusting that strangers have good intentions and adequate competence? This question is explored in relation to communities in which such trust is a vital issue: peer production of software (FreeBSD and Mozilla in particular) and encyclopaedia entries (Wikipedia in particular). In the context of open-source software, it is argued that trust was inferred from an underlying ‘hacker (...)
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  10. D. Teira (2013). Blinding and the Non-Interference Assumption in Medical and Social Trials. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (3):358-372.
    This paper discusses the so-called non-interference assumption (NIA) grounding causal inference in trials in both medicine and the social sciences. It states that for each participant in the experiment, the value of the potential outcome depends only upon whether she or he gets the treatment. Drawing on methodological discussion in clinical trials and laboratory experiments in economics, I defend the necessity of partial forms of blinding as a warrant of the NIA, to control the participants’ expectations and their strategic (...)
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  11.  20
    Kathryn Tabb (2015). Psychiatric Progress and the Assumption of Diagnostic Discrimination. Philosophy of Science 82 (5):1047-1058.
    Psychiatry’s failure to validate its diagnostic constructs is often attributed to the prioritizing of reliability over validity in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. I argue that a more powerful way in which the DSM has retarded biomedical progress is by encouraging unwarranted optimism about diagnostic discrimination: the assumption that our diagnostic tests group patients together in ways that allow for relevant facts about mental disorder to be discovered. I argue that the Research Domain Criteria framework, a (...)
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  12. Nils Kürbis (2012). How Fundamental is the Fundamental Assumption? Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):5-19.
    The fundamental assumption of Dummett’s and Prawitz’ proof-theoretic justification of deduction is that ‘if we have a valid argument for a complex statement, we can construct a valid argument for it which finishes with an application of one of the introduction rules governing its principal operator’. I argue that the assumption is flawed in this general version, but should be restricted, not to apply to arguments in general, but only to proofs. I also argue that Dummett’s and Prawitz’ (...)
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  13.  32
    Nick Bostrom & Milan M. Cirković (2003). The Doomsday Argument and the Self–Indication Assumption: Reply to Olum. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):83–91.
    In a recent paper in this journal, Ken Olum attempts to refute the Doomsday argument by appealing to the self-indication assumption (SIA), the idea that your very existence gives you reason to think that there are many observers. In contrast to earlier refutation attempts that use this strategy, Olum confronts and try to counter some of the objections that have been made against SIA. We argue that his defense of SIA is unsuccessful. This does not, however, mean that one (...)
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  14.  14
    Richard Dub (forthcoming). The Rationality Assumption. In Carlos Muñoz-Suárez & Felipe De Brigard (eds.), Content and Consciousness Revisited. With Replies by Daniel Dennett. Springer 93-110.
    Dennett has long maintained that one of the keystones of Intentional Systems Theory is an assumption of rationality. To deploy the Intentional Stance is to presume from the outset that the target of interpretation is rational. This paper examines the history of rationality constraints on mental state ascription. I argue that the reasons that Dennett and his philosophical brethren present for positing rationality constraints are not convincing. If humans are found to be rational, this will not be because a (...)
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  15.  63
    K. Mitch Hodge (2008). Descartes Mistake: How Afterlife Beliefs Challenge the Assumption That Humans Are Intuitive Cartesian Dualists. Journal of Cognition and Culture 8 (3-4):387-415.
    This article presents arguments and evidence that run counter to the widespread assumption among scholars that humans are intuitive Cartesian substance dualists. With regard to afterlife beliefs, the hypothesis of Cartesian substance dualism as the intuitive folk position fails to have the explanatory power with which its proponents endow it. It is argued that the embedded corollary assumptions of the intuitive Cartesian substance dualist position (that the mind and body are different substances, that the mind and soul are intensionally (...)
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  16.  26
    Daniel Kahneman (1997). New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption. Legal Theory 3 (2):105-124.
    In contrast to logical criteria of rationality, which can be assessed entirely by reference to the system of preferences, substantive criteria of rational choice refer to an independent evaluation of the outcomes of decisions. One of these substantive criteria is the experienced hedonic utility of outcomes. Research indicates that people are myopic in their decisions, may lack skill in predicting their future tastes, and can be led to erroneous choices by fallible memory and incorrect evaluation of past experiences. Theoretical and (...)
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  17. Aaron Ben-Zeev (1984). The Passivity Assumption of the Sensation-Perception Distinction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (December):327-343.
    The sensation-perception distinction did not appear before the seventeenth century, but since then various formulations of it have gained wide acceptance. This is not an historical accident and the article suggests an explanation for its appearance. Section 1 describes a basic assumption underlying the sensation-perception distinction, to wit, the postulation of a pure sensory stage--viz. sensation--devoid of active influence of the agent's cognitive, emotional, and evaluative frameworks. These frameworks are passive in that stage. I call this postulation the passivity (...)
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  18.  23
    Adam Fforde (2005). Persuasion: Reflections on Economics, Data, and the 'Homogeneity Assumption'. Journal of Economic Methodology 12 (1):63-91.
    This paper discusses issues to do with the empirical basis of modern economics and points towards the need to look more closely at the ?homogeneity assumption? that underpins much economic theory. It argues that severe problems currently prevent economics from becoming more persuasive to both students of economics and those outside the discipline. The issue involves the management of disciplinary boundaries, and excessive use of the ?homogeneity assumption.? Three areas of concern are explored. First is the literature on (...)
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  19.  49
    Erik Myin (2001). Color and the Duplication Assumption. Synthese 129 (1):61-77.
    Susan Hurley has attacked the ''Duplication Assumption'', the assumption thatcreatures with exactly the same internal states could function exactly alike inenvironments that are systematically distorted. She argues that the dynamicalinterdependence of action and perception is highly problematic for the DuplicationAssumption when it involves spatial states and capacities, whereas no such problemsarise when it involves color states and capacities. I will try to establish that theDuplication Assumption makes even less sense for lightness than for some ofthe (...)
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  20.  55
    Franck Lihoreau (2012). Personal Taste Ascriptions and the Sententiality Assumption. The Reasoner 6 (9).
    I defend the assumption that an expression like “for Anna,” as it occurs in a sentence like “Whale meat is tasty for Anna,” is a sentential operator, against two related, albeit opposite worries. The first is that in some cases the putative operator might not be selective enough. The second is that in other cases it might on the contrary be too selective. I argue that these worries have no tendency to cast doubt on the assumption of sententiality (...)
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  21.  35
    Chong Un Choe Smith (2014). Confronting Ethical Permissibility in Animal Research: Rejecting a Common Assumption and Extending a Principle of Justice. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 35 (2):175-185.
    A common assumption in the selection of nonhuman animal subjects for research and the approval of research is that, if the risks of a procedure are too great for humans, and if there is a so-called scientific necessity, then it is permissible to use nonhuman animal subjects. I reject the common assumption as neglecting the central ethical issue of the permissibility of using nonhuman animal subjects and as being inconsistent with the principle of justice used in human subjects (...)
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  22.  36
    Vasco Guerra & Rodrigo de Abreu (2006). On the Consistency Between the Assumption of a Special System of Reference and Special Relativity. Foundations of Physics 36 (12):1826-1845.
    In a previous work, we have shown that the null result of the Michelson–Morley experiment in vacuum is deeply connected with the notion of time. The same is true for the postulate of constancy of the two-way speed of light in vacuum in all frames independently of the state of motion of the emitting body. The argumentation formerly given is very general and has to be true not only within Special Relativity and its “equivalence” of all inertial frames, but as (...)
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  23.  1
    Paul B. Laat (2010). How Can Contributors to Open-Source Communities Be Trusted? On the Assumption, Inference, and Substitution of Trust. Ethics and Information Technology 12 (4):327-341.
    Open-source communities that focus on content rely squarely on the contributions of invisible strangers in cyberspace. How do such communities handle the problem of trusting that strangers have good intentions and adequate competence? This question is explored in relation to communities in which such trust is a vital issue: peer production of software (FreeBSD and Mozilla in particular) and encyclopaedia entries (Wikipedia in particular). In the context of open-source software, it is argued that trust was inferred from an underlying ‘hacker (...)
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  24.  2
    Nick Bostrom & Milan M. Cirković (2003). The Doomsday Argument and the Self–Indication Assumption: Reply to Olum. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):83-91.
    In a recent paper in this journal, Ken Olum attempts to refute the doomsday argument by appealing to the self–indication assumption (SIA) that your very existence gives you reason to think that there are many observers. Unlike earlier users of this strategy, Olum tries to counter objections that have been made against (SIA). We argue that his defence of (SIA) is unsuccessful. This does not, however, mean that one has to accept the doomsday argument (or the other counter–intuitive results (...)
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  25. Jay Joseph (1998). The Equal Environment Assumption of the Classical Twin Method: A Criticalanalysis. Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (3):325-358.
    This paper analyzes a key theoretical assumption of the "classical twin method": the so-called "equal environment assumption" . The purpose of the discussion is to determine whether this assumption, which states that identical and fraternal twins experience similar environments, is valid. Following a brief discussion of the origins of the twin method and the views of its main critics, the arguments of its principal contemporary defenders are examined in detail. This discussion is followed by a critique of (...)
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  26.  61
    Gregg Caruso (2005). Sensory States, Consciousness, and the Cartesian Assumption. In Nathan Smith and Jason Taylor (ed.), Descartes and Cartesianism. Cambridge Scholars Press
    One of the central assumptions made in much of contemporary philosophy of mind is that there is no appearance-reality distinction when it comes to sensory states. On this assumption, sensory states simply are as they seem: consciousness is an intrinsic property of sensory states—that is, all sensory states are conscious—and the consciousness of one’s own sensory states is never inaccurate. For a sensation to be felt as pain, for example, is for it to be pain. This assumption, which (...)
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  27.  19
    Kelly McCormick (2015). Companions in Innocence: Defending a New Methodological Assumption for Theorizing About Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 172 (2):515-533.
    The contemporary philosophical debate on free will and moral responsibility is rife with appeal to a variety of allegedly intuitive cases and principles. As a result, some have argued that many strands of this debate end in “dialectical stalemates,” boiling down to bedrock, seemingly intractable disagreements about intuition . Here I attempt to carve out a middle ground between conventional reliance on appeal to intuition and intuitional skepticism in regards to the philosophical discussion of moral responsibility in particular. The main (...)
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  28.  8
    José Díez (2015). Counterfactuals, the Discrimination Problem and the Limit Assumption. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (1):85-110.
    The aim of this paper is to identify what I take to be the main conceptual problem in Lewis’ semantics for counterfactuals when the Limit Assumption is not satisfied, what I call the Discrimination Problem , and to present and discuss a modification of Lewis’ semantics that aims at solving DP. First, I outline Lewis’ semantics, highlighting the aspects that will be relevant for our discussion. Second, I present DP and discuss it with a heuristic example. Third, I present (...)
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  29.  26
    Piers Norris Turner (2013). Authority, Progress, and the “Assumption of Infallibility” in On Liberty. Journal of the History of Philosophy 51 (1):93-117.
    John Stuart Mill’s defense of free discussion in On Liberty includes the claim that silencing discussion implies an “assumption of infallibility.” This claim is often dismissed as absurd on the ground that a censor might attempt to silence an opinion he believes to be true but pernicious, or because rational assurance short of infallibility is obviously sufficient to justify censorship. This paper argues that Mill’s argument concerns the epistemic position one assumes with regard to future persons and circumstances as (...)
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  30.  29
    Peter Vallentyne (1989). Contractarianism and the Assumption of Mutual Unconcern. Philosophical Studies 56 (2):187 - 192.
    A contractarian moral theory states that an action (practice, social structure, etc.) is morally permissible if and only if it (or rules to which if conforms) would be agreed to by the members of society under certain circumstances. What people will agree to depends on what their desires are like. Most contractarian theories - for example those of Rawls (1971) and Gauthier (1986) - specify that parties to the agreement are mutually unconcerned (take no interest in each other's interests). Contractarian (...)
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  31.  10
    Nie Jing-bao (2005). Cultural Values Embodying Universal Norms: A Critique of a Popular Assumption About Cultures and Human Rights. Developing World Bioethics 5 (3):251–257.
    ABSTRACTIn Western and non‐Western societies, it is a widely held belief that the concept of human rights is, by and large, a Western cultural norm, often at odds with non‐Western cultures and, therefore, not applicable in non‐Western societies. The Universal Draft Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights reflects this deep‐rooted and popular assumption. By using Chinese culture as an illustration, this article points out the problems of this widespread misconception and stereotypical view of cultures and human rights. It highlights (...)
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  32.  5
    Paul Weingartner (1982). Conditions of Rationality for the Concepts Belief, Knowledge, and Assumption. Dialectica 36 (2‐3):243-263.
    SummaryIn the first part of the paper necessary conditions for the rationality of the notions of belief, knowledge, and assumption are given: Among the different conditions it is stressed that one needs two different concepts of belief, one such that if someone knows something he also believes it, the other exclusive such that if someone knows something he need not to believe it and if he believes it he does not yet know it. Another important point is that deductive (...)
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  33.  4
    Paul Weingartner (1981). A System of Rational Belief, Knowledge and Assumption. Grazer Philosophische Studien 12:143-165.
    The first part of the papaer contains desiderata for a realistic epistemic system as opposed to idealistic ones. One of the main characteristics of idealistic epistemic systems is their deductive infallibility or deductive omniscience. The system presented avoids deductive infallibility though having a strong concept of knowledge. The second part contains the theorems of the system. The system is detailed in so far as it distinguishes between two concepts of belief and one of assumption and interrelates them to the (...)
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  34.  15
    Christopher G. Framarin (2012). Hinduism and Environmental Ethics: An Analysis and Defense of a Basic Assumption. Asian Philosophy 22 (1):75-91.
    The literature on Hinduism and the environment is vast, and growing quickly. It has benefitted greatly from the work of scholars in a wide range of disciplines, such as religious studies, Asian studies, history, anthropology, political science, and so on. At the same time, much of this work fails to define key terms and make fundamental assumptions explicit. Consequently, it is at least initially difficult to engage with it philosophically. In the first section of this paper, I clarify a central, (...)
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  35.  20
    Hartley Slater (2006). Frege's Hidden Assumption (El Supuesto Escondido de Frege). Critica 38 (113):27 - 37.
    This paper is concerned with locating the specific assumption that led Frege into Russell's Paradox. His understanding of reflexive pronouns was weak, for one thing, but also, by assimilating concepts to functions he was misled into thinking one could invariably replace a two-place relation with a one-place property. /// Este trabajo se ocupa de localizar el supuesto específico que llevó a Frege a la Paradoja de Russell. Por una parte, su comprensión de los pronombres reflexivos era débil pero, por (...)
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  36.  25
    Giacomo Bonanno (1999). How to Make Sense of the Com M on P Ri or Assumption Under Incomplete Information. International Journal of Game Theory 28 (3):409-434.
    The Common Prior Assumption (CPA) is central to the economics of information and the foundations of game theory. Recent contributions (Dekel and Gul, 1997, Gul, 1996, Lipman, 1995) have questioned its meaningfulness in situations of incomplete information where there is no ex ante stage and the primitives of the model are the individuals’ belief hierarchies. We address this conceptual issue by providing characterizations of two local versions of the CPA which are in terms of the primitives and, therefore, do (...)
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  37.  6
    Wim E. Crusio (1997). Neuropsychological Inference Using a Microphrenological Approach Does Not Need a Locality Assumption. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (3):517-518.
    Although Farah makes a convincing case against the tenability of the locality assumption, she does not propose alternative research strategies that do not rest on this assumption. It is proposed here that we may profitably exploit individual differences in neuroanatomy and behavior. In combination with the use of adequate genetic methods, this approach does not need a locality assumption.
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  38.  3
    Jérôme Lang & Pierre Marquis (2001). Removing Inconsistencies in Assumption-Based Theories Through Knowledge-Gathering Actions. Studia Logica 67 (2):179-214.
    In this paper, the problem of purifying an assumption-based theory KB, i.e., identifying the right extension of KB using knowledge-gathering actions (tests), is addressed. Assumptions are just normal defaults without prerequisite. Each assumption represents all the information conveyed by an agent, and every agent is associated with a (possibly empty) set of tests. Through the execution of tests, the epistemic status of assumptions can change from "plausible" to "certainly true", "certainly false" or "irrelevant", and the KB must be (...)
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  39.  15
    K. S. Shrader-Frechette (1982). Economics, Risk-Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Linearity Assumption. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:217 - 232.
    An offshoot of decision analysis, risk-cost-benefit analysis (RCBA) dominates US policymaking regarding science and technology. In this paper a central normative presupposition of RCBA, called "the linearity assumption" is argued against. This is that there is a linear relationship between the actual probability of fatality and the value of avoiding a social risk or the cost of a social risk. The main object of this essay is to show that the presuppositions underlying the linearity assumption are highly questionable. (...)
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  40.  8
    Kathrine Elizabeth Anker (2012). The Assumption of Agency Theory. Journal of Critical Realism 11 (4):523-528.
    The Assumption of Agency Theory Content Type Journal Article Category Review Pages 523-528 DOI 10.1558/jcr.v11i4.523 Authors Kathrine Elizabeth Anker, Planetary Collegium, Plymouth University, Drake Circus, Plymouth, Devon PL4 8AA, UK Journal Journal of Critical Realism Online ISSN 1572-5138 Print ISSN 1476-7430 Journal Volume Volume 11 Journal Issue Volume 11, Number 4 / 2012.
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  41.  5
    David J. Bryant (1995). Is Preadaptation for Language a Necessary Assumption? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (1):183-184.
    Preadaptation for language is an unnecessary assumption because intermediate stages of linguistic ability are possible and adaptive. Language could have evolved through gradual selection from structures exhibiting few features associated with modern structures. Without physical evidence pertaining to language ability in prehabilis hominids, it remains possible that selective pressures for language use preceded and necessitated modern neurolinguistic structures.
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  42.  14
    Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring (1999). How to Make Sense of the Common Prior Assumption Under Incomplete Information. International Journal of Game Theory 28 (3):409-434.
    The Common Prior Assumption (CPA) plays an important role in game theory and the economics of information. It is the basic assumption behind decision-theoretic justifications of equilibrium reasoning in games (Aumann, 1987, Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995) and no-trade results with asymmetric information (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982). Recently several authors (Dekel and Gul, 1997, Gul, 1996, Lipman, 1995) have questioned whether the CPA is meaningful in situations of incomplete information, where there is no ex ante stage and where the (...)
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  43.  13
    Wojciech Sadurski, Rights and Moral Reasoning: An Unstated Assumption.
    Both the defenders and critics of judicial review assume tacitly that there is a special moral capacity needed for a correct articulation of constitutional (explicit or implied) rights, and they only disagree about who is likely to possess this moral capacity to a higher degree. In this working paper I challenge this unstated assumption. It is not the case that the reasoning oriented towards rights articulation is more moral than many non-rights-oriented authoritative public decisions in the society. Further, I (...)
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  44.  8
    Giorgio Marchetti (2000). Observation Levels and Units of Time: A Critical Analysis of the Main Assumption of the Theory of the Artificial. [REVIEW] AI and Society 14 (3-4):331-347.
    Negrotti's theory of the artificial is based on the fundamental assumption that the human being cannot select more than one observation level per unit of time. Since this assumption has important consequences for the theory of knowledge — knowledge cannot be synthesised but only further differentiated — its plausibility is tested against two aspects that characterise any theory of knowledge: knowledge production and knowledge application. The way in which the human being produces and applies knowledge is analysed, and (...)
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  45.  8
    Ruth Condray & Stuart R. Steinhauer (2002). The Residual Normality Assumption and Models of Cognition in Schizophrenia. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):753-754.
    Thomas & Karmiloff- Smith ’ argument that the Residual Normality assumption is not valid for developmental disorders has implications for models of cognition in schizophrenia, a disorder that may involve a neurodevelopmental pathogenesis. A limiting factor for such theories is the lack of understanding about the nature of the cognitive system. Moreover, it is unclear how the proposal that modularization emerges from developmental processes would change that fundamental question.
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  46.  9
    K. V. Wilkes (1991). Of Mice and Men: The Comparative Assumption in Psychology. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (1):3 – 19.
    Abstract Surprisingly, little theoretical attention has so far been paid to the ?Comparative Assumption?: the attempt to extrapolate from species to species in psychology (and particularly to the human species). This paper examines the problems and the possibilities inherent in the Comparative Assumption. Perhaps the most important conclusion of the paper is that much more work is needed on this intriguing question.
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  47.  9
    Bradford Mahon & Alfonso Caramazza (2001). The Sensory/Functional Assumption or the Data: Which Do We Keep? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):488-489.
    The HIT model explains the existence of semantic category-specific deficits by assuming that sensory knowledge is crucially important in processing living things, while functional knowledge is crucially important in processing nonliving things – the sensory/functional assumption. Here we argue that the sensory/functional assumption as implemented in HIT is neither theoretically nor empirically grounded and that, in any case, there is neuropsychological evidence which invalidates this assumption, thereby undermining the HIT model as a whole.
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  48.  7
    John Haldane (2002). Examining the Assumption. Heythrop Journal 43 (4):411–429.
    Many believe that at the end of her life Mary was assumed bodily ‘into heaven’ where she remains exalted by her divine son. This claim, magisterially entitled The Doctrine of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, strikes some as absurd. Even many traditional Christians are opposed to, or have doubts about this aspect of Catholic doctrine of the Theotokos[the one who ‘gave birth to’ God]).Typically critics regard the doctrine as being at best a sentimental piety and at worst (...)
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  49.  3
    Beatrix Vereijken & H. T. A. Whiting (2001). “The Assumption of Separate Senses”: Pervasive? Perhaps – Persuasive? Hardly! Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (2):242-243.
    We show that Stoffregen & Bardy's arguments against the assumption of separately functioning senses have more historical antecedents than they give credit for, and that multimodal functioning does not require this assumption. What is needed is evidence that biological organisms are indeed detecting and acting upon information in a multimodal (or global) array.
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  50.  1
    Philip J. Benson (1997). The Fragility of the Locality Assumption: Comparative Evidence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (3):515-516.
    The locality assumption (LA) seems rather awkward, especially when one considers centres of neuronal specialisation as defined by observed CNS activity. It is clear from electrophysiology that extra-striate functional compartmentalisation (modularity) is rather less well-defined than first thought; neuropsychological assessment attaching significance to varieties of preserved behaviour also reveals that some basic flaws must be inherent in current reasoning supporting LA.
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