In mainstream educational trends and in particular in public debate, one might perceive a rather superfi cial/uncritical handling of the concept of ‘subject matter’, a handling which infl uences political decisions considerably. This article sets out to analyze the concept of ‘subject matter’ and makes the point that it is both intimately connected to a one dimensional idea of utility and that it as concept marginalizes teaching’s nature of encounter and dialogue, and hereby narrows ‘school’ to ‘learning’ and to some (...) few basic subjects. Furthermore the argument is made that by comparing this narrow utility-like concept to the aesthetics the concept of subject matter can be qualifi ed as closely bound to a form-content side and this in turn opens up to the aspect of character formation. (shrink)

Episodic representations can be entertained either as “remembered” or “imagined”—as outcomes of experience or as simulations of such experience. Here, we argue that this feature is the product of a dedicated cognitive function: the metacognitive capacity to determine the mnemicity of mental event simulations. We argue that mnemicity attribution should be distinguished from other metacognitive operations (such as reality monitoring) and propose that this attribution is a “cognitive gadget”—a distinctively human ability made possible by cultural learning. Cultural learning is a (...) type of social learning in which traits are inherited through social interaction. In the case of mnemicity, one culturally learns to discriminate metacognitive “feelings of remembering” from other perceptual, emotional, action-related, and metacognitive feelings; to interpret feelings of remembering as indicators of memory rather than imagination; and to broadcast the interpreted feelings in culture- and context-specific ways, such as “I was there” or “I witnessed it myself.” We review evidence from the literature on memory development and scaffolding, metacognitive learning and teaching, as well as cross-cultural psychology in support of this view before pointing out various open questions about the nature and development of mnemicity highlighted by our account. (shrink)

Trolley cases are widely considered central to the ethics of autonomous vehicles. We caution against this by identifying four problems. Trolley cases, given technical limitations, rest on assumptions that are in tension with one another. Furthermore, trolley cases illuminate only a limited range of ethical issues insofar as they cohere with a certain design framework. Furthermore, trolley cases seem to demand a moral answer when a political answer is called for. Finally, trolley cases might be epistemically problematic in several ways. (...) To put forward a positive proposal, we illustrate how ethical challenges arise from mundane driving situations. We argue that mundane situations are relevant because of the specificity they require and the scale they exhibit. We then illustrate some of the ethical challenges arising from optimizing for safety, balancing safety with other values such as mobility, and adjusting to incentives of legal frameworks. (shrink)

The advent of intelligent artificial systems has sparked a dispute about the question of who is responsible when such a system causes a harmful outcome. This paper champions the idea that this dispute should be approached as a conceptual engineering problem. Towards this claim, the paper first argues that the dispute about the responsibility gap problem is in part a conceptual dispute about the content of responsibility and related concepts. The paper then argues that the way forward is to evaluate (...) the conceptual choices we have, in the light of a systematic understanding of why the concept is important in the first place—in short, the way forward is to engage in conceptual engineering. The paper then illustrates what approaching the responsibility gap problem as a conceptual engineering problem looks like. It outlines argumentative pathways out of the responsibility gap problem and relates these to existing contributions to the dispute. (shrink)

Modularity is a key concept in building and evaluating complex simulation models. My main claim is that in simulation modeling modularity degenerates for systematic methodological reasons. Consequently, it is hard, if not impossible, to accessing how representational structure and dynamical properties of a model are related. The resulting problem for validating models is one of holism. The argument will proceed by analyzing the techniques of parameterization, tuning, and kludging. They are – to a certain extent – inevitable when building complex (...) simulation models, but corrode modularity. As a result, the common account of validating simulations faces a major problem and testing the dynamical behavior of simulation models becomes all the more important. Finally, I will ask in what circumstances this might be sufficient for model validation. (shrink)

Anhand einer klinischen Vignette wird ausgeführt, dass das psychoanalytische Geschehen sich in mehreren Dimensionen entfaltet. Drei solcher Dimensionen – als Bedeutung (Erkenntnis), Berührung (Kontakt) und Bewegung (Ereignis) bezeichnet – werden beschrieben und deren dimensionale Charakteristik auf die Sinnesqualitäten des Sehens, des Berührungssinnes und des Hörens bezogen. Es wird gezeigt, dass sie Raum und Zeit auf je eigene Weise konstituieren und somit einander inkommensurable, durch keine logische oder dialektische Operation in eine Einheit überführbare Aprioritäten darstellen. Mit deren Unvereinbarkeit ist auch auf (...) Grenzen theoretisch-begrifflicher Bemächtigung verwiesen, womit die Frage nach der Reichweite metapsychologischer Begriffe, etwa des Begriffs des Unbewussten, aufgeworfen ist. Von hier aus wird in einem Ausblick nach der Begegnung als organisierendem Phantasma der analytischen Situation gefragt und – auf dem Weg einer Erörterung des Begegnungsbegriffs bei Martin Buber – versucht, Begegnung dimensional näher zu bestimmen. (shrink)

What kind of education is needed for democracy? How can education respond to the challenges that current democracies face? This unprecedented Handbook offers a comprehensive overview of the most important ideas, issues, and thinkers within democratic education. Its thirty chapters are written by leading experts in the field in an accessible format. Its breadth of purpose and depth of analysis will appeal to both researchers and practitioners in education and politics. The Handbook addresses not only the historical roots and philosophical (...) foundations of democratic education, but also engages with contemporary political issues and key challenges to the project of democratic education. (shrink)

Several promising approaches have been developed to represent conscious experience in terms of mathematical spaces and structures. What is missing, however, is an explicit definition of what a ‘mathematical structure of conscious experience’ is. Here, we propose such a definition. This definition provides a link between the abstract formal entities of mathematics and the concreta of conscious experience; it complements recent approaches that study quality spaces, qualia spaces, or phenomenal spaces; and it provides a general method to identify and investigate (...) structures of conscious experience. We hope that ultimately this work provides a basis for developing a common formal language to study consciousness. (shrink)

Vorgestellt wird der Versuch, »Jenseits des Lustprinzips« als Dokument einer Diskontinuität zu lesen. Als Vorarbeit hierzu entfaltet der Autor verschiedene Dimensionen, in und zwischen denen sich der Text bewegt, und arbeitet in ihnen aufkommende Disparitäten sowie Fragen heraus, die der Text stellt, indem er sie verhüllt. Leithypothese der Interpretation ist, dass der Text als ganzer Ausdruck, aber auch beginnende Auslegung und Entstellung eines undenkbaren »Gedankens« (des »Todesgedankens«) ist, auf den er zuläuft und vor dem er ausweicht, und dass das Todestriebkonzept (...) bereits eine defensive Ausarbeitung dieses »Gedankens« darstellt. (shrink)

This paper argues against the call to democratize artificial intelligence (AI). Several authors demand to reap purported benefits that rest in direct and broad participation: In the governance of AI, more people should be more involved in more decisions about AI—from development and design to deployment. This paper opposes this call. The paper presents five objections against broadening and deepening public participation in the governance of AI. The paper begins by reviewing the literature and carving out a set of claims (...) that are associated with the call to “democratize AI”. It then argues that such a democratization of AI (1) rests on weak grounds, because it does not answer to a demand of legitimization, (2) is redundant in that it overlaps with existing governance structures, (3) is resource intensive, which leads to injustices, (4) is morally myopic and thereby creates popular oversights and moral problems of its own, and finally, (5) is neither theoretically nor practically the right kind of response to the injustices that animate the call. The paper concludes by suggesting that AI should be democratized not by broadening and deepening participation but by increasing the democratic quality of the administrative and executive elements of collective decision making. In a slogan: The question is not so much whether AI should be democratized but how. (shrink)

Psychology and philosophy have long reflected on the role of perspective in vision. Since the dawn of modern vision science—roughly, since Helmholtz in the late 1800s—scientific explanations in vision have focused on understanding the computations that transform the sensed retinal image into percepts of the three-dimensional environment. The standard view in the science is that distal properties—viewpoint-independent properties of the environment (object shape) and viewpoint-dependent relational properties (3D orientation relative to the viewer)–are perceptually represented and that properties of the proximal (...) stimulus (in vision, the retinal image) are not. This view is woven into the nature of scientific explanation in perceptual psychology, and has guided impressive advances over the past 150 years. A recently published article suggests that in shape-perception, the standard view must be revised. It argues, on the basis of new empirical data, that a new entity—perspectival shape—should be introduced into scientific explanations of shape perception. Specifically, the article’s centrally advertised claim is that, in addition to distal shape, perspectival shape is perceived. We argue that this claim rests on a series of mistakes. Problems in experimental design entail that the article provides no empirical support for any claims regarding either perspective or the perception of shape. There are further problems in scientific reasoning and conceptual development. Detailing these criticisms and explaining how science treats these issues is meant to clarify method and theory, and to improve exchanges between the science and philosophy of perception. (shrink)

The thesis addresses the nature of causation. It is argued that causation exists and is as local as its causes and effects. As a consequence, the position advocated is contrary to the as yet prevailing view that no 'causal tie' between cause and effect exists. Moreover, it is suggested that this tie can be perceived. The essay attempts to elucidate the nature of causes, effects, and causal mechanisms. It is argued that they are facts rather than particulars or universals. Furthermore (...) it is suggested that these facts can be conceived of as tropes. Finally, in the light of this thesis a few traditional issues are discussed: what is the relation between causation and explanation? How should we conceive of causal laws? Does the idea of mechanisms with different degrees of reliability further our understanding of the determinism/indeterminism issue? (shrink)

Normativität hat in den Sozialwissenschaften noch immer etwas Anrüchiges, fast Abschreckendes. Es gibt eine lange Traditionslinie in den Sozialwissenschaften, die versucht, ihre Disziplin gegenüber normativen Argumenten „sauber“ zu halten. Das wird in der Regel damit begründet, dass im wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisprozess Gesinnungsmotive nicht hilfreich sind und im Extremfall Ergebnisse verzerren. Befürworter normativer Sozialwissenschaften halten dagegen, dass die fehlende Thematisierung etwa von sozialen Ungleichheits- und Herrschaftsverhältnissen die Welt, so wie sie gerade ist, einmal mehr bestätigt – und das ist eben auch nicht (...) normfrei und kann es auch nicht sein, weil, so eine zentrale These des vorliegenden Bandes, Theorien notwendig mit normativen Bezügen behaftet sind. Damit ist das Spektrum der Positionen angedeutet, die in diesem Sammelband zu finden sind. Er hat einerseits das Ziel, normative Verwicklungen auch in den sozialwissenschaftlichen Ansätzen aufzuspüren, die stärker auf die Idee einer wertfreien Wissenschaft verpflichtet sind. Andererseits werden Ansätze, die explizit herrschaftskritische Positionen vertreten, auf die Plausibilität ihrer normativen Setzungen hin überprüft. Die normativen Hintergründe sozialwissenschaftlicher Theoriebildung aufzuzeigen und eine Debatte über die normativen Bezüge der Sozialwissenschaften anzuregen ist das Anliegen dieses Bandes. (shrink)

Thoughts may have a subject — they may concern a certain topic —without having an object in the sense of being directed upon a referent. It is argued that, once this distinction is acknowledged, a third position between Meinong and Russell can be established. There will then be objectless thoughts which need not be false in view of the non-existence of their purported referents. But there will also be object-dependent thoughts which have their referents necessarily. Neither logically proper names nor (...) non-existing objects need to be introduced if we allow for cases when we are mistaken about what kind of thoughts we are considering. This result is achieved via an analysis of fictional names and a free logic which includes a nonpredicating use of general terms in sentences imitating the logical form of predications. (shrink)

This paper is about the status of collective actions. According to one view, collective actions metaphysically reduce to individual actions because sentences about collective actions are merely a shorthand for sentences about individual actions. I reconstruct an argument for this view and show via counterexamples that it is not sound. The argument relies on a paraphrase procedure to unpack alleged shorthand sentences about collective actions into sentences about individual actions. I argue that the best paraphrase procedure that has been put (...) forward so far fails to produce adequate results. (shrink)

The paper takes a look at insurance customer dishonesty as a special case of consumer ethics, understood as a way of situation handling, as a moral choice between right and wrong, such as between self-interest vs. common-interest, in other words, a “moral temptation”. After briefly raising the question if different schools, of moral philosophy would conceptualize such moral temptations differently, the paper presents ‘moral psychology’ as a frame of reference, with a focus on cognitive moral development, moral attitude and moral (...) neutralization. Conceptualization questions can’t be answered finally without thinking at the same time of empirical research design and instrument design decisions, e.g. choosing between experiment vs. questionnaire studies, designing suitable moral temptation situations as an experiment vs. questionnaires with scenario vignettes. The paper discusses then experiences from a 2004 pilot survey, with a main focus on a few insurance dishonesty scenarios with follow-up questions. The paper has an open end, i.e. outlines desirable future theoretical, empirical and practical work with insurance customer dishonesty. (shrink)

It has rarely been recognized that the Christian writers of the first millennium pursued an ambitious and exciting philosophical project alongside their engagement in the doctrinal controversies of their age. This book offers a full analysis of this Patristic philosophy until the time of John of Damascus.

In this paper, we show that reproducibility is a severe problem that concerns simulation models. The reproducibility problem challenges the concept of numerical solution and hence the conception of what a simulation actually does. We provide an expanded picture of simulation that makes visible those steps of simulation modeling that are numerically relevant, but often escape notice in accounts of simulation. Examining these steps and analyzing a number of pertinent examples, we argue that numerical solutions are importantly different from usual (...) mathematical solutions. They are do not merely approximate the latter, but introduce new problems, including issues of artificiality, stability, and well-posedness. Consequently, simulation modelling can attain reproducibility only to a certain degree because it is working with numerical solutions. (shrink)

Die Auseinandersetzung mit teleologischen Vorstellungen ist in Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft an die Diskussion des Begriffs der Zweckmäßigkeit geknüpft. Einerseits wird dort eine subjektiv zweckmäßige Spezifikation der Natur einem transzendentalen Prinzip der Urteilskraft zu Grunde gelegt. Diese Möglichkeit wird durch die Darstellbarkeit dieses Begriffes eröffnet, den die Kritik der ästhetischen Urteilskraft thematisiert: Der Begriff einer subjektiven Zweckmäßigkeit wird durch das Wirken der Einbildungskraft in der Synthesis derjenigen Naturprodukte dargestellt, die wir als schön beurteilen.

This clear and concise book investigates the relation between materiality and the subject in Marxism, (post-)structuralism, and material semiotics. It introduces the three approaches in an accessible way and serves as an introduction to different kinds of materialism and theories of the subject. For each approach, the modalities of materiality of the respective materialism are defined and the relationship between these multiple materialities and the subject are presented as specific to the theoretical approaches discussed. Beetz argues for a non-reductionist materialism, (...) which conceives of materiality as more than matter or matter in motion. In such a materialism the subject is seen as an effect of material conditions, relations, processes, and practices. He shows how the constitution and decentering of the subject is conceptualized in the approaches presented and highlights the role of material instances in these processes. (shrink)

Einleitung Die Kantische Philosophie der Mathematik ist nach einer weitverbreiteten Meinung in ihren Grundzügen überholt. Die moderne Mathematik gilt, ganz unkantisch, als analytisches Denken. Im folgenden soll für eine partielle Verteidigung von Kants Philosophie der Mathematik argumentiert werden. Sie hat nämlich den Gegenstandsbezug der Mathematik und deren Anwendungsrelation zu ihrem zentralen Problem gemacht. Für Kant war es die Anschauung, die den gegenständlichen Bezug ermöglichen sollte und in dieser Funktion ist sie, wie von einem anwendungsorientierten Standpunkt aus argumentiert wird, keineswegs überholt. (...) Die Verteidigung ist aber nur partiell, da Kant von einem apriorisch fixierten Anschauungsbegriff ausging und es diesen durch einen „naturalisierten“ Begriff zu ersetzen gilt. (shrink)

It is a commonplace that “the map is not the territory.” The phrase goes back to Alfred Korzybski, while the insight—formulated by insisting on an apparent triviality—is surely older and has received poetical expressions from Lewis Carroll and Jorge Luis Borges among others. The difference between map and territory is a difference of categories and is at the base of the representation relation. Hence maps play a prominent role in the discourse about representation which takes place in a number of (...) disciplines and from different perspectives. Three of them are of special interest for the present paper.One influential view has been put forward by historian of art Ernst Gombrich in his classical lecture on.. (shrink)

The philosophy of Christian Wolff is regarded to represent one of the most important schools of thought of the 18th century Enlightenment. The influence of this philosophy was based on a network of followers and disciples who propagated Wolff s work in the scholarly community and defended it against critics. This book, for the first time, explores the role of Ernst Christoph von Manteuffel. As imperial count, minister in the Cabinet of Poland Saxony and an agent of the Court of (...) Vienna, he was the decisive figure who initiated this network and led it for more than one and a half decades until his death in 1749. ". (shrink)

Much of the debate on the ethics of self-driving cars has revolved around trolley scenarios. This paper instead takes up the political or institutional question of who should decide how a self-driving car drives. Specifically, this paper is on the question of whether and why passengers should be able to control how their car drives. The paper reviews existing arguments—those for passenger ethics settings and for mandatory ethics settings respectively—and argues that they fail. Although the arguments are not successful, they (...) serve as the basis to formulate desiderata that any approach to regulating the driving behavior of self-driving cars ought to fulfill. The paper then proposes one way of designing passenger ethics settings that meets these desiderata. (shrink)

In a recent opinion piece, Denis Duboule has claimed that the increasing shift towards systems biology is driving evolutionary and developmental biology apart, and that a true reunification of these two disciplines within the framework of evolutionary developmental biology may easily take another 100 years. He identifies methodological, epistemological, and social differences as causes for this supposed separation. Our article provides a contrasting view. We argue that Duboule’s prediction is based on a one-sided understanding of systems biology as a science (...) that is only interested in functional, not evolutionary, aspects of biological processes. Instead, we propose a research program for an evolutionary systems biology, which is based on local exploration of the configuration space in evolving developmental systems. We call this approach—which is based on reverse engineering, simulation, and mathematical analysis—the natural history of configuration space. We discuss a number of illustrative examples that demonstrate the past success of local exploration, as opposed to global mapping, in different biological contexts. We argue that this pragmatic mode of inquiry can be extended and applied to the mathematical analysis of the developmental repertoire and evolutionary potential of evolving developmental mechanisms and that evolutionary systems biology so conceived provides a pragmatic epistemological framework for the EvoDevo synthesis. (shrink)