A major contribution to the social scientific understanding of how people make sense of their lives, Ideological Dilemmas presents an illuminating new approach to the study of everyday thinking. Contradictory strands abound within both ideology and common sense. In contrast to many modern theorists, the authors see these dilemmas of ideology as enabling, rather than inhibiting: thinking about them helps people to think meaningfully about themselves and the world. The dilemmas within ideology and their effects on thinking are explored through (...) the analysis of what people say in specific key situations: education, medical care, race and gender. The authors identify common ideological themes running through the common-sense discourses they analyse. They highlight the tensions between themes of equality and authority, freedom and necessity, individuality and collectivity. Time and again, the contradictions between these ideological themes crop up as respondents argue and puzzle over their social worlds. Written with refreshing clarity, the discussion cuts across the boundary which often separates sociology from social psychology. Sociologists are reminded that the reproduction of ideology involves individual processes of thinking; social psychologists are urged to recognize the ideological nature of thought. (shrink)

This article presents the position for a Psychoanalytic Discursive Psychology. This position combines two elements: an action-theory of language, derived from Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, and a revised Freudian concept of repression. According to Wittgenstein and most contemporary discursive psychologists, language is to be understood as action, rather than being assumed to be an outward expression of inner, unobservable cognitive processes. However, a critical approach demands more than an interactional analysis of language acts: it requires an analysis of ideology. Because what (...) is left unsaid can be as ideologically important as what is said, there is a need to investigate socially reproduced unconsciousness. This means taking the notion of repression seriously. Whereas Freud imagined repression to be an inner psychic process, it can, by contrast, be seen as an activity that is constituted within everyday language. In this respect, language is fundamentally both expressive and repressive. The social and psychological significance of a Psychoanalytic Discursive Psychology are discussed. (shrink)

This article critically examines the relations between Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory and more conventional psychological ideas. It does so by concentrating on Lacan’s notion of the ‘mirror stage’. Lacan and some of his followers have suggested that psychoanalytic theory is ‘beyond psychology’. It is argued that Freud believed that psychoanalytic theory was beyond conventional psychology in a synthetic rather than rejectionist way. Lacan cited the work of orthodox psychologists such as Wolfgang Köhler, James Mark Baldwin and Charlotte Bühler as providing evidential (...) basis for his ideas about the mirror stage. The rhetoric of these citations is examined in detail. It is suggested that Lacan makes a distinction between the ‘facts’ of psychology and the interpretation of the facts. However, close rhetorical examination shows inaccuracies in his citations about the behaviour of children and chimpanzees in reaction to mirror images. Moreover, the evidential basis that he cites is neither supported by contemporary psychology, nor, more seriously, did it suggest what Lacan was claiming at the time of his writing. (shrink)

This article suggests that there are intrinsic links between humour and embarrassment and that both are crucial for the maintenance of social life. Goffman and others have claimed that embarrassment plays a key role in the maintenance of social order. However, it is argued that Goffman overlooked the role of ridicule in embarrassment. In consequence, he formulated a `nice-guy' theory of embarrassment, suggesting that onlookers empathize with the embarrassment of others and seek to diminish that embarrassment. By contrast, it is (...) suggested that the embarrassment of others is often a matter of laughter and enjoyment. Such a link between embarrassment and humour is crucial for the socialization of embarrassment, which depends on the possibility of ridicule. This is illustrated by an incident in Freud's classic case-history of Little Hans. The transformation of embarrassing incidents into humorous narrations is also discussed. It is suggested that the link between humour and embarrassment is theoretically significant, pointing the way to a reconstituted Freudian view for understanding the relations between the individual and social order. (shrink)

This paper seeks to develop the rhetorical approach to the study of social psychology, by looking at the rhetorical aspects of British attitudes towards the monarchy. The rhetorical approach stresses that attitudes are stances in public controversy and, as such, must be understood in their wider historical and argumentative context. Changes in this context can lead to changes in attitudinal expression, such as the phenomenon of Taking the Side of the Other, which should be distinguished from the sort of attitudinal (...) changes normally described by social psychological theories of attitudes. One needs to assume that attitudinal stances contain both explicit and implicit aspects, and also that these may be contrary to each other. The change in James Gillray's cartoons from anti-monarchical themes in 1792 to pro-monarchical themes in 1793 is discussed as an example of Taking the Side of the Other in response to changing historical contexts. Contemporary monarchical attitudes are also examined to show the rhetorical nature of implicit criticisms and justifications, as well as the rhetorical complexity of these attitudes. General implications for the rhetorical study of implicit and explicit aspects of attitudes are discussed. (shrink)

This paper develops the ideas of rhetorical psychology by applying them to some basic Freudian concepts. In so doing, the paper considers whether there might be a ‘Dialogic Unconscious’. So far rhetorical psychology has tended to concentrate upon conscious thought rather than on the unconscious. It has suggested that thinking is modelled on argument and dialogue, and that rhetoric provides the means of opening up matters for thought and discussion. However, rhetoric may also provide the means for closing down topics (...) and, thereby, provide the means of repression. It will be suggested that language is not merely expressive but it is also repressive. Moreover, the repressive aspects of language are built into the very practices of dialogue. In learning language, we learn the codes for socially appropriate ways of speaking. These must be acquired as habits, so that we learn to repress routinely the desire to transgress the codes of appropriate speech. Thus, the routine use of language provides the resources for repression. If language is repressive, then this applies equally to the language of psycho-analysis itself. Freud's famous case histories, such as that of Dora, can be re-examined, in order to see what Freud's own theory of repression was itself repressing. (shrink)

This paper re-examines Kurt Lewin's classic leadership studies, using them as a concrete example to explore his wider legacy to social psychology. Lewin distinguished between advanced “Galileian” science, which was based on analysing particular examples, and backward “Aristotelian” science, which used statistical analyses. Close examination of the way Lewin wrote about the leadership studies reveals that he used the sort of binary, value-laden concepts that he criticised as “Aristotelian”. Such concepts, especially those of “democracy” and “autocracy”, affected the way that (...) he analysed the results and the ways that later social scientists have understood, and misunderstood, the studies. It is argued that Lewin's famous motto—“there is nothing as practical as a good theory”—is too simple to fit the tensions between the leadership studies and his own views of what counts as good theory. (shrink)

This article responds to Bell’s notion of an Interpretive Arc, by considering his reinterpretation of Babel in the light of rabbinic traditions of interpretation. It is suggested that Bell’s interpretation of Babel is not altogether different from some rabbinic interpretations. This is particularly true of the tradition which lays great emphasis on discovering the plain sense of the text. However, there is a difference between Bell’s hermeneutic method and the rabbinic tradition of interpretation. The latter insists on working with the (...) original text, not a translation of the text. By attending to the original Hebrew, one can see how translation can close down meanings. Moreover, the notion of a hermeneutic arc, especially its assumption of a final stage of appropriation, does not fit well with a tradition that has continuing rituals of reading and interpretation. This is better conceived as an interpretive helix. (shrink)

The English edition of Moscovici's classic work on the social representation of psychoanalysis enables us to reflect on the historical origins of psychoanalytic ideas and of social representation theory itself. Moscovici claimed that science was both univocal and abstract and, in these respects, it differs from the social representations of commonsense. This paper explores these notions, especially in relation to Moscovici's claim that psychoanalytic theory is to be found in Freud's first formulations. It is suggested that some of the processes, (...) which Moscovici attributes to the passage of psychoanalytic ideas to commonsense, can be found occur in the early history of psychoanalysis. This can be seen in Freud's criticisms of the way Jung used the concept of “complex”. Moreover, psychoanalytic theory could never be univocal for it incorporated the voices of patients and their representations of the world. An examination of Studies on Hysteria reveals further multivocality as Freud uses both the “action” language of ordinary life and the reified, nominalized language of science. Examples are given in relation to the first formulations of the key psychoanalytic concept of “repression”. Some comparisons are made between Freud's first formulations of “repression” and Moscovici's first formulations of “social representation”. (shrink)

This collection addresses a post-WWII shift in the hierarchy of scientific explanations, where the highest goal moves from reductionism towards some ...

In much of the current academic and public discussion, conspiracy theories are portrayed as a negative phenomenon, linked to misinformation, mistrust in experts and institutions, and political propaganda. Rather surprisingly, however, philosophers working on this topic have been reluctant to incorporate a negatively evaluative aspect when either analyzing or engineering the concept conspiracy theory. In this paper, we present empirical data on the nature of the concept conspiracy theory from five studies designed to test the existence, prevalence and exact form (...) of an evaluative dimension to the ordinary concept conspiracy theory. These results reveal that, while there is a descriptive concept of conspiracy theory, the predominant use of conspiracy theory is deeply evaluative, encoding information about epistemic deficiency and often also derogatory and disparaging information. On the basis of these results, we present a new strategy for engineering conspiracy theory to promote theoretical investigations and institutional discussions of this phenomenon. We argue for engineering conspiracy theory to encode an epistemic evaluation, and to introduce a descriptive expression—such as ‘conspiratorial explanation’—to refer to the purely descriptive concept conspiracy theory. (shrink)

Contingency is the presence of non-actualized possibility in the world. Fatalism is a view of reality on which there is no contingency. Since it is contingency that permits agency, there has traditionally been much interest in contingency. This interest has long been embarrassed by the contention that simple and plausible assumptions about the world lead to fatalism. I begin with an Aristotelian argument as presented by Richard Taylor. Appreciation of this argument has been stultified by a question pertaining to the (...) source of necessity and possibility and a closely related one regarding the nature of metaphysics itself. Answering these questions reveals the crucial issue here, to wit, necessity and possibility in a temporal world. This issue is investigated through an important later criticism of Taylor by David Foster Wallace. Wallace’s critique is significant because it brings to the fore the pivotal notion for understanding contingency in a temporal world, that of synchronic possibility, the idea that incompatible states of affairs are possible at a single moment. This notion provides the basis of distinguishing two systematic accounts of truth, modality and time: two metaphysics of contingency. On one account, Taylor’s Aristotelian argument is straightforwardly valid and compelling; on the other, it is fallacious. In closing, I present reasons why the former account, supporting the Aristotelian views of time and truth, is correct and make some comments to ameliorate this conclusion. (shrink)

The X-ray and bulk densities of PdIn alloys have been determined at ambient temperature on samples annealed at 1273 and 1373 K and quenched in water-ice mixtures. From these measurements the vacancy concentrations in this intermetallic phase have been obtained as a function of In concentration at these two temperatures. In addition, a generalized thermodynamic model is presented which considers the existence of antisite and vacancy defects on both sublattices without any dilute solution approximations. This model uses three energy parameters, (...) whose values have been obtained for PdIn using the measured vacancy concentrations and the chemical potentials of In. This model is able to describe all the available vacancy data and is suitable for calculating these values at compositions and temperatures when such data are not available. In addition, the model permits the calculation of the concentrations of the minority point defects. It is shown that dilute-solution approximations, which have invariably been used in this kind of modelling, are unsatisfactory. The present results and their analysis confirm that PdIn is a near-triple-defect type of intermetallic and not a near-Schottky type, as has been claimed recently. (shrink)

For the theorists of crisis, the revolutionary state comes into existence through violence, and due to its inability to provide an authoritative katechon (restrainer) against internal and external violence, it perpetuates violence until it self-destructs. Writing during extreme economic depression and growing social and political violence, the crisis theorists––Joseph de Maistre, Juan Donoso Cortés, and Carl Schmitt––each sought to blame the chaos of their time upon the Janus-faced postrevolutionary ideals of liberalism and socialism by urging a return to pre-revolutionary moral (...) and religious values. They are united by three counterrevolutionary principles, all of which are purported to remedy revolutionary violence: traditional constitutional fidelity, the philosophy of the decision, and opposition to bourgeois liberalism. This essay is followed by the first complete English translation and publication of Donoso’s letter of October 24, 1851, which contains Donoso’s only reference to the “discussing class,” a political entity later popularized by Schmitt in his 1922 work Political Theology. (shrink)

Reprint of paper first published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in 1984.

Early in his Essays on Intellectual Powers, Reid draws a distinction between mental power, mental operation, and mental capacity (EIP 21). To the untrained eye, these terms could probably be used interchangeably, and Reid believes this is correct, up to a point. He argues that, if we are interested in understanding exactly how the human mind works, we must use these terms with more precise meanings. This is part of his more general strategy of trying to always use the words (...) with their common meanings, as much as possible, but also pointing out that certain philosophical distinctions are needed to carry out the project of laying out the foundations of the science of the mind. This paper explains what the distinction between power, operation, and capacity is, according to Reid, with the goal of understanding why it is important to draw such a distinction, not only for the Reidian project, but for action theory, more generally. (shrink)

This volume provides a philosophical introduction to and analysis of the study of metaphor. By proceeding from the concrete analysis of complex metaphors, White is able to identify a range of features which are incompatible with standard accounts of the way words function in metaphor.

In this short text, a distinguished philosopher turns his attention to one of the oldest and most fundamental philosophical problems of all: How it is that we are able to sort and classify different things as being of the same natural class? Professor Armstrong carefully sets out six major theories—ancient, modern, and contemporary—and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of each. Recognizing that there are no final victories or defeats in metaphysics, Armstrong nonetheless defends a traditional account of universals as the (...) most satisfactory theory we have.This study is written for advanced students, but as Armstrong goes considerably beyond his earlier work on this topic, it will interest professional scholars as well. Carefully plotted and clearly written, Universals is both a paradigm of exposition and a case study on the value of careful analysis of fundamental issues in philosophy. (shrink)

In this important study D. M. Armstrong offers a comprehensive system of analytical metaphysics that synthesises but also develops his thinking over the last twenty years. Armstrong's analysis, which acknowledges the 'logical atomism' of Russell and Wittgenstein, makes facts the fundamental constituents of the world, examining properties, relations, numbers, classes, possibility and necessity, dispositions, causes and laws. All these, it is argued, find their place and can be understood inside a scheme of states of affairs. This is a comprehensive and (...) rigorously this-worldly account of the most general features of reality, argued from a distinctive philosophical perspective, and it will appeal to a wide readership in analytical philosophy. (shrink)

Bioethics has paid surprisingly little attention to the special problems faced by women and to feminist analyses of current health care issues other than ...

Arguably no concept is more fundamental to science than that of causality, for investigations into cases of existence, persistence, and change in the natural world are largely investigations into the causes of these phenomena. Yet the metaphysics and epistemology of causality remain unclear. For example, the ontological categories of the causal relata have been taken to be objects (Hume 1739), events (Davidson 1967), properties (Armstrong 1978), processes (Salmon 1984), variables (Hitchcock 1993), and facts (Mellor 1995). (For convenience, causes and effects (...) will usually be understood as events in what follows.) Complicating matters, causal relations may be singular (Socrates’s drinking hemlock caused Socrates’s death) or general (Drinking hemlock causes death); hence the relata might be tokens (e.g., instances of properties) or types (e.g., types of events) of the category in question. Other questions up for grabs are: Are singular causes metaphysically and/or epistemologically prior to general causes or vice versa (or neither)? What grounds the intuitive asymmetry of the causal relation? Are macro-causal relations reducible to micro-causal relations? And perhaps most importantly: Are causal facts (e.g., the holding of causal relations) reducible to non-causal facts (e.g., the holding of certain spatiotemporal relations)? (shrink)

This article explores the celebratory aspect of psychological theories. In particular, it examines the celebration of dialogue, argumentation, and negativity, which is contained within recent critical theories of psychology. This psychological approach is compared with cognitive psychology's celebration of monologue. The relations between dialogical/rhetorical psychology and feminist critiques are examined. Following Habermas, it is suggested that it is necessary to point to instances of unconstrained argumentation in order to show that the utopian elements in the celebration of argument are based (...) upon a realized psychology. It is suggested that one can look to the voices of women for such instances, in order to avoid incorporating patriarchal structures into the celebration. One such instance reveals the self-reflexivity of argumentation, and that the celebration of argument also involves preserving argumentation's ‘other’. Thus, the resulting argumentative psychology should not only be self-reflexive but should itself express and preserve its own sense of otherness. (shrink)