This paper focuses on the relations among critique, destruction and negation, on the one hand, and creation, affirmation, love, and care on the other, in Nietzsche’s writings from Daybreak to Zarathustra. In doing this, it traces a movement in Nietzsche's thought that can be understood as an integration of critique in the process of affirmation, which consolidates in Nietzsche’s project of self-overcoming. In contrast to readings that use the metaphor of art and the creativity of the artist, this paper presents (...) pregnancy as a cipher to understand Nietzsche’s project as well as the dynamics that are involved. A key issue addressed throughout the entire paper concerns the way in which Zarathustra says that he loves those who want their own downfall (Untergang) and go “zu Grunde” (or perish). To fully grasp the meaning of these rather puzzling utterances, the paper analyzes Nietzsche's engagement with Pascal (as a very particular case of “going under”). (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold. In the first instance it is an attempt to offer a new perspective from which to reflect on the meaning and philosophical presuppositions of Friedrich Schlegel’s defence and use of (romantic) irony, as well other related notions: humour, wit, and other comic devices. I propose to situate this perspective within a revaluation of pleasure and joy. To do this in a new way (although not in opposition to authors such as Manfred Frank, Elizabeth (...) Millan-Zaibert, or Gary Handwerk), I refer to one of Schlegel’s earliest texts devoted to The Aesthetic Value of Greek Comedy from 1794. In addition, this paper questions the extent to which Schlegel’s position is tenable in the aftermath of the ‘death of God’. For this, I reflect briefly on the ways in which Nietzsche’s writings and notion of life-affirmation respond to Schlegel’s vindication of romantic irony. (shrink)

The following paper presents a reflection on the violence of images understood as the “power” that certain images have in “provoking” what appear to be disproportionate responses on the part of the viewer. In particular, this paper addresses the systematic censorship of images (such as the photographs from David Jay’s work The SCAR Project) in open and highly mediatized societies that advocate and defend freedom of speech. But this requires a new understanding of the image and the working hypothesis of (...) this paper is that we can find resources for this in the work of the philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling. (shrink)

Cet article confronte la réception du sublime kantien chez Schiller et chez Schelling, ainsi que leurs analyses du tragique, en particulier du héros tragique. Ce dernier incarne pour les deux auteurs la réalisation sublime de la liberté humaine. Toutefois, malgré les similitudes qu’offrent leurs pensées, des différences majeures existent. L’article vise à faire voir ces différences et à les comprendre en faisant appel aux positions philosophiques plus larges aussi bien de Schelling que de Schiller concernant la liberté humaine. Ce faisant, (...) l’article analyse également les appropriations et réinterprétations par Schelling de certaines des pensées de Schiller sur le sublime. (shrink)

Nietzsche was a severe critic of German Idealism, but what exactly is the relation between his thought and theirs? Papers from leading specialists in Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche contribute to a clearer understanding of the differences and affinities between Nietzsche's philosophy and that of his predecessors.".

Nietzsche and Kant on Aesthetics and Anthropology is the third of a three-volume collection exploring Nietzsche’s relationship to the Kantian legacy in philosophy. This volume examines his relationship to Kant’s aesthetic and anthropological views, focusing on the traces of Kant’s third Critique and Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View that can be found in Nietzsche’s published and unpublished works. In this review, I offer a summary of each of its chapters, with some brief commentary, and underscore its major themes, (...) contributions, and omissions. In their introduction, Maria Branco and Katia Hay signal that the scope of this volume goes well beyond a strict understanding of aesthetics as the evaluation of... (shrink)

Les Cahiers philosophiques de Strasbourg 52 contains an Introduction and 9 new research articles in French & English on Friedrich Schiller's philosophy in relation to German Idealism. All fully available online on Open-Edition and as free e-book. -/- Edited and introduced by Henny Blomme, Laure Cahen-Maurel, & David W. Wood. With contributions by Frederick C. Beiser, María del Rosario Acosta López, Cody Staton, Jeremy D. Hovda, Laure Cahen-Maurel, Quentin Landenne, Katia Hay, Louis Carré, and Charlotte Morel. -/- SOMMAIRE / (...) CONTENTS -/- Introduction: Friedrich Schiller, a German Idealist? (Henny Blomme, Laure Cahen-Maurel & David W. Wood) -/- 1. Frederick C. Beiser. Schiller’s Humanism -/- 2. María del Rosario Acosta López. Une dimension esthétique de la critique : la temporalité du beau dans les lettres de Schiller Sur l’éducation esthétique -/- 3. Cody Staton. In Search of Play: Schiller’s Drive Theory as a Turn Away from Kant -/- 4. Jeremy D. Hovda. Bildung between Kant and Schiller -/- 5. Laure Cahen-Maurel. Fichte avec Schiller : La querelle des Heures à la lumière de Grâce et Dignité -/- 6. Quentin Landenne. La Bildung chez Schiller et Fichte, entre esthétique et politique -/- 7. Katia Hay. On the Tragic-Sublime and Tragic Freedom: Thinking with Schiller and Schelling -/- 8. Louis Carré. Vicissitudes de l’État organique : Kant, Hegel, Schiller -/- 9. Charlotte Morel. Conjoindre idéalisme et réalisme après Hegel : Les lectures de Schiller par Lotze et Lange -/- Résumés / Abstracts. (shrink)

The books I review are a series of three volumes of the same project, Nietzsche’s Engagements with Kant and the Kantian Legacy, edited in 2017 by Marco Brusotti, Herman Siemens, João Constâncio, Tom Bailey, Maria João Mayer Branco and Katia Hay who seek to situate Nietzsche’s work in relation to Kant and Kantianism and to interpret it from this perspective. This review consists of two parts: the first part reviews and discusses each of the works focusing on a selection (...) of prominent chapters; the second part extends their intuitions. (shrink)

Evolutionary debunking arguments start with a premise about the influence of evolutionary forces on our evaluative beliefs, and conclude that we are not justified in those beliefs. The value realist holds that there are attitude-independent evaluative truths. But the debunker argues that we have no reason to think that the evolutionary forces that shaped human evaluative attitudes would track those truths. Worse yet, we seem to have a good reason to think that they wouldn’t: evolution selects for characteristics that increase (...) genetic fitness—not ones that correlate with the evaluative truth. Plausibly, the attitudes and judgments that increase a creature’s fitness come apart from the true evaluative beliefs. My aim in this paper is to show that no plausible evolutionary debunking argument can both have force against the value realist and not collapse into a more general skeptical argument. I conclude that there is little hope for evolutionary debunking arguments. This is bad news for the debunker who hoped that the cold, hard scientific facts about our origins would debunk our evaluative beliefs. And it is good news for the realist. (shrink)

We often hear such casual accusations: you just believe that because you are a liberal, a Christian, an American, a woman… When such charges are made they are meant to sting—not just emotionally, but epistemically. But should they? It can be disturbing to learn that one's beliefs reflect the influence of such irrelevant factors. The pervasiveness of such influence has led some to worry that we are not justified in many of our beliefs. That same pervasiveness has led others to (...) doubt whether there is any worry here at all. I argue that evidence of irrelevant belief influence is sometimes, but not always, undermining. My proposal picks out ordinary, non-skeptical cases in which we get evidence of error. It says that, in those cases, evidence of irrelevant influence is epistemically significant. It shows how respecting evidence of error is compatible with the epistemic lives we see ourselves living. We are fallible creatures, yes, but we are also capable and intelligent ones. We can recognize and correct for our own error so as to improve our imperfect, yet nevertheless robust, epistemic lives. (shrink)

Evolutionary debunking arguments move from a premise about the influence of evolutionary forces on our moral beliefs to a skeptical conclusion about those beliefs. My primary aim is to clarify this empirically grounded epistemological challenge. I begin by distinguishing among importantly different sorts of epistemological attacks. I then demonstrate that instances of each appear in the literature under the ‘evolutionary debunking’ title. Distinguishing them clears up some confusions and helps us better understand the structure and potential of evolutionary debunking arguments.

It’s intuitive to think that (a) the more sure you are of something, the harder it’ll be to change your mind about it, and (b) you can’t be open-minded about something if you’re very sure about it. If these thoughts are right, then, with minimal assumptions, it follows that you can’t be in a good position to both escape echo chambers and be rationally resistant to fake news: the former requires open-mindedness, but the latter is inimical to it. I argue (...) that neither thought is true and that believing them will get us all mixed up. I show that you can be open-minded and have confidently held beliefs, and that beliefs in which you are less sure are not, thereby, more fragile. I close with some reflections on the nature of rational belief change and open-mindedness and a brief sketch about what might actually help us in the fight against misinformation and belief polarization …. [please read below the rest of the article]. (shrink)

The fact of moral disagreement when conjoined with Conciliationism, an independently attractive view about the epistemic significance disagreement, seems to entail moral skepticism. This worries those who like Conciliationism, the independently attractive view, but dislike moral skepticism. Others, equally inclined against moral skepticism, think this is a reductio of Conciliationism. I argue that they are both wrong. There is no reductio and nothing to worry about.

Should learning we disagree about p lead you to reduce confidence in p? Some who think so want to except beliefs in which you are rationally highly confident. I argue that this is wrong; we should reject accounts that rely on this intuitive thought. I then show that quite the opposite holds: factors that justify low confidence in p also make disagreement about p less significant. I examine two such factors: your antecedent expectations about your peers’ opinions and the difficulty (...) of evaluating your evidence. I close by proposing a different way of thinking about disagreement. (shrink)

We are fallible creatures, prone to making all sorts of mistakes. So, we should be open to evidence of error. But what constitutes such evidence? And what is it to rationally accommodate it? I approach these questions by considering an evolutionary debunking argument according to which (a) we have good, scientific, reason to think our moral beliefs are mistaken, and (b) rationally accommodating this requires revising our confidence in, or altogether abandoning the suspect beliefs. I present a dilemma for such (...) debunkers, which shows that either we have no reason to worry about our moral beliefs, or we do but we can self-correct. Either way, moral skepticism doesn’t follow. That the evolutionary debunking argument fails is important; also important, however, is what its failure reveals about rational belief revision. Specifically, it suggests that getting evidence of error is a non-trivial endeavor and that we cannot learn that we are likely to be mistaken about some matter from a neutral stance on that matter. (shrink)

Based on the analysis of Zhuangzi, this paper attempts to illustrate the positive aspects of Zhuangzi’s idea concerning contented acceptance of fate, whi...

Can citizens impact the broader discourse about an organization and its legitimacy? While social media have empowered citizens to publicly question firms through large volumes of online evaluations, the high heterogeneity of their evaluations dilutes their impact. Our empirical study applying a threshold vector autoregressive model (TVAR) analysis of 2.5 million tweets and 1,786 news media articles tests the condition by which the heterogeneity of online evaluations converges and influences the broader media discourse. Although social media evaluations do not initially (...) influence media legitimacy, they become influential after reaching a tipping point of refracted attention, which is created by high volume and convergence of individual evaluations around few aggregative frames. Thus, social media storms may influence the broader discourse about an organization when this discourse converges and reaches a tipping point, rather than merely through the massive participation of citizens. (shrink)

Esta pesquisa tem como objetivo discutir, com fundamentação teórica na Psicologia Analítica de C. G. Jung, as concepções de médicos e psicólogos sobre o processo saúde-doença e a formação do profissional para atuar em contexto hospitalar. A partir de uma pesquisa em campo qualitativa-descritiva, est..

In this article, I show why it is necessary to abolish the use of predictive algorithms in the US criminal justice system at sentencing. After presenting the functioning of these algorithms in their context of emergence, I offer three arguments to demonstrate why their abolition is imperative. First, I show that sentencing based on predictive algorithms induces a process of rewriting the temporality of the judged individual, flattening their life into a present inescapably doomed by its past. Second, I demonstrate (...) that recursive processes, comprising predictive algorithms and the decisions based on their predictions, systematically suppress outliers and progressively transform reality to match predictions. In my third and final argument, I show that decisions made on the basis of predictive algorithms actively perform a biopolitical understanding of justice as management and modulation of risks. In such a framework, justice becomes a means to maintain a perverse social homeostasis that systematically exposes disenfranchised Black and Brown populations to risk. (shrink)

In this article, I show why it is necessary to abolish the use of predictive algorithms in the US criminal justice system at sentencing. After presenting the functioning of these algorithms in their context of emergence, I offer three arguments to demonstrate why their abolition is imperative. First, I show that sentencing based on predictive algorithms induces a process of rewriting the temporality of the judged individual, flattening their life into a present inescapably doomed by its past. Second, I demonstrate (...) that recursive processes, comprising predictive algorithms and the decisions based on their predictions, systematically suppress outliers and progressively transform reality to match predictions. In my third and final argument, I show that decisions made on the basis of predictive algorithms actively perform a biopolitical understanding of justice as management and modulation of risks. In such a framework, justice becomes a means to maintain a perverse social homeostasis that systematically exposes disenfranchised Black and Brown populations to risk. (shrink)

The author analyzes the complex intimate relations between human rights and globalization, and the consequences of this debate in the reconfiguration of public space and in the composition of virtual space. Globalization is explained through a critical reading of the political phenomenon of the pri..

Human chromosome 11p15 comprises two imprinted domains important in the control of fetal and postnatal growth. Novel studies1-3 establish that imprinting at one of these, the IGF2-H19 domain, is epigenetically deregulated (with loss of DNA methylation) in Silver-Russell Syndrome (SRS), a congenital disease of growth retardation and asymmetry. Previously, the exact opposite epigenetic alteration (gain of DNA methylation) had been detected at the domain's ‘imprinting control region’ (ICR) in patients with Beckwith-Wiedemann Syndrome (BWS), a complex disorder of fetal overgrowth. However, (...) more frequently, BWS is caused by loss of DNA methylation at the ICR that regulates the second imprinted domain at 11p15. Interestingly, a similar epigenetic alteration (with loss of methylation) at a putative ICR on human chromosome 6q24, is involved in transient neonatal diabetes mellitus (TNDM), a congenital disease with intrauterine growth retardation and a transient lack of insulin. Thus, fetal and postnatal growth is epigenetically controlled by different ICRs, at 11p15 and other chromosomal regions. BioEssays 28: 453–459, 2006. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

O objetivo central neste artigo é o de explicar o que é testemunho e como ele produz conhecimento e justificação. Conforme essa concepção, o testemunho é uma importante e habitual fonte de conhecimento e de justificação, bem como um conceito relevante em epistemologia social, comunicação e psicologia da aquisição de crença. Apesar de o testemunho, nessa concepção, não ser considerado uma fonte básica de conhecimento e justificação, é alegado que ele é uma fonte de conhecimento básico pois crenças básicas não (...) precisariam derivar de uma fonte básica. Assim, novas crenças podem ser geradas a partir do testemunho, mas novo conhecimento não pode ser produzido a não ser a partir de conhecimento anterior. Apesar disso, a posição defendida neste artigo considera que, mesmo que a justificação com base no testemunho seja, em última instância, dependente de outras fontes de justificação, o testemunho constitui uma fonte essencial tanto de conhecimento como de justificação. (shrink)

SummaryThe essay intends to find out why although many studies have focused on the three-year revolutionary period in Italy from 1796–1799, the Cisalpine Republic has never been studied in the same detail as the Neapolitan Republic. In reconstructing these events, the two republics are regularly presented in opposing terms. The Cisalpine Republic is portrayed as exemplifying subordination to the military protectorate and politics of France, while the Neapolitan Republic is put forward as the shining example of revolutionary resistance within Italy (...) at the time. The essay intends to underline why the nineteenth and the twentieth century historiography has negatively and prejudicially judged the political experience of the Cisalpine Republic. (shrink)

Foucault repère une transformation du pouvoir lorsque la vie entre dans ses préoccupations à partir du XVIIIe siècle. Il appelle « bio-pouvoir » les techniques spécifiques du pouvoir s’exerçant sur les corps individuels et les populations, hétérogènes aux mécanismes juridico-politiques du pouvoir souverain. Agamben, dans Homo sacer, reprend l’hypothèse foucaldienne et la fait fonctionner précisément sur le terrain délaissé par Foucault, celui de la souveraineté. La souveraineté ne porte pas à ses yeux sur des sujets de droits, mais de manière (...) cachée sur une « vie nue », ex-ceptée par le pouvoir qui l’expose à sa violence et à sa décision souveraine. On peut alors interroger le déplacement de l’hypothèse foucaldienne opéré par Agamben et les rapports problématiques entre pouvoir souverain et bio-pouvoir, afin d’évaluer la pertinence et la fécondité de la notion de bio-pouvoir. (shrink)

Zhuangzi purports to follow a particular method of viewing human emotion and suggests freeing oneself from worldly emotions—this is called “doctrine of non-emotion” (wuqing shuo 無情說). This article attempts to show that the idea of non-emotion in Zhuangzi does not in any way conflict with the expression of emotion in poetry, and moreover, it provides a foundation for the poet to express his emotions naturally and freely. We will use the Chinese poetry of the Wei-Jin Period—a period that is strongly (...) influenced by the philosophy of Zhuangzi, yet at the same time emphasizes the expression of the poet's emotion in poetry—as an example to show how fruitful it indeed is when Zhuangzi's philosophy becomes applied to Chinese poetry. (shrink)