Listen to the interview with Brian Kemple... and learn to appreciate the diachronic trajectory of semiotics. *** Live interview with Brian Kemple, Executive Director of the Lyceum Institute, to discuss the legacy and influence of John Deely (1942-2017), the thinker most responsible for developing semiotics into the 21st century. This interview, conducted by William Passarini (Mansarda Acesa) and Tim Troutman (Lyceum Institute), is part of the preliminary activities of the 2022 International Open Seminar on Semiotics: a Tribute to (...) John Deely on the Fifth Anniversary of His Passing, cooperatively organized by the Institute for Philosophical Studies of the Faculty of Arts and Humanities of the University of Coimbra, the Lyceum Institute, the Deely Project, Saint Vincent College, the Iranian Society for Phenomenology at the Iranian Political Science Association, the International Association for Semiotics of Space and Time, the Institute for Scientific Information on Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Semiotic Society of America, the American Maritain Association, the International Association for Semiotic Studies, the International Society for Biosemiotic Studies, the International Center for Semiotics and Intercultural Dialogue, Moscow State Academic University for the Humanities and the Mansarda Acesa with the support of the FCT - Foundation for Science and Technology, I.P., of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education of the Government of Portugal under the UID/FIL/00010/2020 project. Brian Kemple holds a PhD in Philosophy from the University of St. Thomas, in Houston TX, where he wrote his dissertation under the inimitable John Deely. He is the Founder and Executive Director of the Lyceum Institute (https://lyceum.institute). Philosophical interests and areas of study include: Thomas Aquinas, John Poinsot, Charles Peirce, Martin Heidegger, the history and importance of semiotics, scholasticism, phenomenology; as well as ancillary interests in the liberal arts, technology, and education as a moral habit. He has published two scholarly books— 'Ens Primum Cognitum in Thomas Aquinas and the Tradition' (Brill: 2017) and 'The Intersections of Semiotics and Phenomenology: Peirce and Heidegger in Dialogue' (De Gruyter: 2019), as well as a number of scholarly articles, popular articles, and his own 'Introduction to Philosophical Principles: Logic, Physics, and the Human Person' (2019) and the forthcoming 'Linguistic Signification: A Classical Course in Grammar and Composition' (2021). In addition to being the Executive Director of the Lyceum Institute, he is the Executive Editor of 'Reality: a Journal for Philosophical Discourse' (https://realityjournal.org/). *** Technical support was assured by Robert Junqueira and the cover image for the video was designed by Zahra Soltani. (shrink)

Many contemporary explanations of conscious human experience, relying either upon neuroscience or appealing to a spiritual soul, fail to provide a complete and coherent theory. These explanations, the author argues, fall short because the underlying explanatory constituent for all experience are not entities, such as the brain or a spiritual soul, but rather relation and the unique way in which human beings form relations. This alternative frontier is developed through examining the phenomenological method of Martin Heidegger and the semiotic theory (...) of Charles S. Peirce. While both of these thinkers independently provide great insight into the difficulty of accounting for human experience, this volume brings these insights into a new complementary synthesis. This synthesis opens new doors for understanding all aspects of conscious human experience, not just those that can be quantified, and without appealing to a mysterious spiritual principle. (shrink)

Ens Primum Cognitum in Thomas Aquinas and the Tradition presents a reading of Thomas Aquinas' claim that "being" is the first object of the human intellect. Blending the insights of both the early Thomistic tradition (c.1380--1637AD) and the Leonine Thomistic revival (1879--present), Brian Kemple examines how this claim of Aquinas has been traditionally understood, and what is lacking in that understanding. While the recent tradition has emphasized the primacy of the real (so-called ens reale) in human recognition of the (...) primum cognitum, Kemple argues that this misinterprets Aquinas, thereby closing off Thomistic philosophy to the broader perspective needed to face the philosophical challenges of today, and proposes an alternative interpretation with dramatic epistemological and metaphysical consequences. (shrink)

While there is an absence of treatises devoted to the question of ens ut primum cognitum, there is no shortage of brief and implicit treatments; indeed, nearly every Thomist of the past seven centuries seems to have at least something to say about the notion that being is the first of our intellectual conceptions. Most recent Thomist thinkers—including Gilson—assume this ens to be nothing other than the ens reale of things entitatively considered, operating as they do out of a framework (...) within which realism and idealism are presumed to be exhaustive and mutually exclusive attempts to answer the question of human knowledge. It is the intent of this essay to examine how Gilson arrives at his position, which he calls “metaphysical realism,” and to point to some of the difficulties it entails. (shrink)

If the desire to see God in Himself belongs to human nature, but the attainment of that vision can be affected only by supernatural grace, how is it that this desire remaining unfulfilled is not a frustration of the nature? How is it that nature is aiming at a good in vain, at an object that it cannot achieve? Even though the elicited natural desire to see God is not fulfilled in this life, and even though there is no demonstrative (...) proof that can be provided by natural reason alone of its being fulfilled after death, the natural human desire is nevertheless not frustrated by a natural deficiency. Rather than being contrary to human nature, this lack of fulfillment exists because of that nature, inasmuch as every human is by nature a limited intellector of being. (shrink)

If the desire to see God in Himself belongs to human nature, but the attainment of that vision can be affected only by supernatural grace, how is it that this desire remaining unfulfilled is not a frustration of the nature? How is it that nature is aiming at a good in vain, at an object that it cannot achieve? Even though the elicited natural desire to see God is not fulfilled in this life, and even though there is no demonstrative (...) proof that can be provided by natural reason alone of its being fulfilled after death, the natural human desire is nevertheless not frustrated by a natural deficiency. Rather than being contrary to human nature, this lack of fulfillment exists because of that nature, inasmuch as every human is by nature a limited intellector of being. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas holds not only that prudence, the virtue of right practical reasoning, is necessary for living well, but emphatically asserts that it “is the virtue most necessary to human life.” This essay argues that the force of Thomas’ assertion should not be understood as simply contradicting the objection—that “it seems that prudence is not a virtue necessary to living a good life”—with vigor, but rather, as we intend to show, that although all the moral virtues are necessary for the (...) good life, there is a superior importance to the need for prudence, as that whereby the parts of virtuous living are not merely stacked up like building blocks of moral righteousness, but coalesced into a complete whole. To make clear the reasons for this preeminent necessity, we shall first consider the parts and constitution of prudence itself, its relationship to the other virtues, and conclude with its principal act, praeceptum. (shrink)

More than ever do people seem entrenched in their intellectual positions despite a dearth of concerted and honest reflection upon them. This obstinacy presents a moral and rhetorical challenge—attempting persuasion through naked rational argumentation alone will prove fruitless. But we should not discount the role of the intellect in the fixation of even the least-reflectively formed beliefs. From the perspective of cognition, this fixation is proximately the result of interpretation. In the language of Thomism, this interpretive adherence to falsity consists (...) in a perverse process of discursive reasoning. To exposit the constitution of adherence to false interpretation, here we will draw on the traditions of Thomism, phenomenology, and semiotics. With the insights of these traditions, we will proceed: first, examining the process of interpretation itself; second, considering two different modes of interpretation; and third, situating interpretation in the context of the twofold movement of resolution. Through analyzing interpretation and resolution, we will demonstrate that obstinate intellectual insistence consists in two intellectual errors: adoption of the vague as sufficient for understanding; and reflexive confusions. In both cases, the error persists through the failure to pursue the twofold movement of resolution. (shrink)

1. Orienting to Reality Brian Kemple’s The Intersection of Semiotics and Phenomenology is an intellectual tour-de-force. Actually, the title is a misnomer… insofar as Kemple’s monograph intersects three, and not two, traditions: phenomenology, semiotics, and Thomism (i.e. philosophy in the tradition of Thomas Aquinas). Kemple’s Thomism can be presented to a layperson as a position of “realism,” as opposed to “nominalism.” Thomism, that is, implies a commitment to the intelligibility of realit...

There is growing consensus that reward plays an important role in the control of attention. Until recently, reward was thought to influence attention indirectly by modulating task-specific motivation and its effects on voluntary control over selection. Such an account was consistent with the goal-directed (endogenous) versus stimulus-driven (exogenous) framework that had long dominated the field of attention research. Now, a different perspective is emerging. Demonstrations that previously reward-associated stimuli can automatically capture attention even when physically inconspicuous and task-irrelevant challenge previously (...) held assumptions about attentional control. The idea that attentional selection can be value driven, reflecting a distinct and previously unrecognized control mechanism, has gained traction. Since these early demonstrations, the influence of reward learning on attention has rapidly become an area of intense investigation, sparking many new insights. The result is an emerging picture of how the reward system of the brain automatically biases information processing. Here, I review the progress that has been made in this area, synthesizing a wealth of recent evidence to provide an integrated, up-to-date account of value-driven attention and some of its broader implications. (shrink)

A promotion of concepts of corporate family and employee participation as well as euphemisms which stress employee-employer long-term continuity makes the loss of loyalty flowing from downsizings and mass firings as well as corporate restructurings more difficult both for the employer and employee. The promotion of reciprocal obligations between employer and employee misleads both into a belief system which is to their mutual disadvantage.Corporate semanatics that soften employment realities and the implications of dislocation with positive rhetoric increases the sense of (...) failure and guilt on the part of both employer and employee. Unrealistic expectations create hostility. If employment dislocation is seen as part of a continual economic evolution, not shrouded in semantic double-speak, loss of employment no longer becomes an outrageous afront to the dignity of those involved but rather a normal process of economic change and renewal. (shrink)

Many recent experiments have used parallel Implicit Association Test (IAT) and selfreport measures of attitudes. These measures are sometimes strongly correlated. However, many of these studies find apparent dissociations in the form of (a) weak correlations between the two types of measures, (b) separation of their means on scales that should coincide if they assess the same construct, or (c) differing correlations with other variables. Interpretations of these empirical patterns are of three types: single-representation — the two types of measures (...) assess a single attitude, but under the influence of different extra-attitudinal process influences; dual-representation — the two types of measures assess distinct forms of attitudes (e.g., conscious vs. unconscious; implicit vs. explicit); and person vs. culture — a variant of the dualrepresentation view in which self-report measures reflect personal attitudes, whereas IAT measures reflect non-attitudinal cultural or semantic knowledge. Proponents sometimes interpret evidence for single versus dual constructs as evidence for single versus dual structural representations. Behavioral evidence can establish the discriminant validity of implicit and explicit attitude phenomena (dual constructs), but cannot choose among single- vs. dual-representation interpretations because the distinct constructs remain susceptible to interpretation in terms of either one or two representations. Selecting among representational accounts must therefore be based on considerations of explanatory power or parsimony. (shrink)

Enactivist accounts of language use generally treat concrete words in terms of motor intentionality systems and affordances for action. There is less consensus, though, regarding how abstract words are to be understood in enactivist terms. I draw on Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy to argue, against the representationalist paradigm that has dominated the cognitive scientific and philosophical traditions, that language is fundamentally a mode of participation in our world. In particular, language orients us within our milieus in a manner that extends into (...) the depth of the idea-endowed world. This conceptualization of language allows us to see that abstract words orient us bodily just as surely as concrete words do, albeit in a manner that is more diffuse across the entirety of given situations, as I will show with an example of abstract language use in Don DeLillo’s novel Underworld. These insights are applied to some of the recent enactivist discourse to suggest some ways in which representationalism maintains a latent presence in this discourse. I conclude by pointing to developments in conceptual metaphor theory that can enrich our sense of how abstract language is involved in embodied understanding. (shrink)

In this thesis, Semantics, Meta-Semantics, and Ontology, I provide a critique of the method of truth in metaphysics. Davidson has suggested that we can determine the metaphysical nature and structure of reality through semantic investigations. By contrast, I argue that it is not semantics, but meta-semantics, which reveals the metaphysically necessary and sufficient truth conditions of our claims. As a consequence I reject the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment. In Part I, chapter 1, I argue that the metaphysically primary truth (...) bearers are not propositions, but rather concrete representations, either beliefs or sentences. I show, in chapter 2, that we can give sense to a truth predicate applying to sentences, given a truth operator and quantification into sentence position. I argue that this strategy does not commit us to the existence of propositions serving as truth bearers. In Part II I argue that although we must assign semantic values to sentences and/or predicates, the meaningfulness of these expressions is not thereby explained. In chapter 3 I articulate Davidson’s problem of predication and his solution, but argue that he was wrong to attribute this solution to Tarski. In chapter 4 I examine the semantics of modal languages; I conclude that although they require semantic values for predicates and/or sentences we should be instrumentalists about these theories. In Part III I consider the relationship between truth and existence. In chapter 5, I defend Pluralism about truth: in some domains of discourse, I claim, semantic reference plays a merely instrumental role in explaining truth. In chapter 6, I show that Hume’s Principle, which is committed by the Quinean criterion to the existence of numbers, can be true even though numbers do not exist. In doing so, I appeal to meta-semantic and diachronic considerations. In the conclusion I compare my views on ontology and commitment to Jody Azzouni’s; and in the appendix I suggest how one might pursue diachronic linguistics. (shrink)

This paper employs memetics to argue against the view that standardisation overwhelms the evolution of accounting. I suggest that, in an unregulated setting, accounting procedures constitute classic memes and survive according to their fitness for their environment, which is predominantly a matter of their suitability for investment decision-making. In a standardising regime, the standardising canon embodies a special kind of meme encoding ideas as actions to be imitated to realise those ideas. Evolutionary pressures and the canon develop in tandem, although (...) not necessarily synchronously.If we accept the central tenet of memetics, which is also the assumption underlying the argument challenged here, that memes emerging before regulation were responsive to evolutionary pressures, we can analyse the responsiveness of the standardising canon by examining its relationship to a counterfactual continuation of the pre-regulated regime. The degree of synchronicity is an empirical, but elusive, question and we should follow Dennett’s recommendation that we settle for the philosophical realisations we can glean from memetics.I argue that three factors are of importance in addressing the question. Accounting memes function within a dense ecology, limiting radical and destabilising change. There has been a high degree of continuity, permeability and commonality in the intellection driving development: the same thinking has influenced policy design wherever it has taken place. Finally, the principal determinant of successful adaptation did not change on the transition to standardisation and the canon and its vehicles have survived. Consequently, we can conclude that standardisation has not disrupted the development of accounting. (shrink)

The Environmental Uncanny argues that the increasing destitution of our world is the result of a certain forgetfulness: we have forgotten that the basis of our knowledge is not calculative reason, but our participation in the natural world. Offering a unique interdisciplinary perspective on the global environmental crisis - ranging from traditional phenomenology, including substantial discussion of both Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, to philosophy of biology, to architectural and urban design theory, to landscape photography, this book makes illuminating connections to paint (...) a multifaceted picture. (shrink)

The importance of the pure concepts of the understanding (i.e. the categories) within Kant’s system of philosophy is undeniable. As I hope to make clear in this essay, however, the categories are also an essential part of Kant’s critique of Christian Wolff. In particular, I argue that Kant’s development of the categories represents a decisive break with the Wolffian conception of the understanding and that this break is central to understanding the task of the Transcendental Analytic. This break, however, is (...) not merely that Kant affirms while Wolff and his followers deny a sharp distinction between sensibility and the understanding, which is the aspect of Kant’s rejection of Wolff that scholars most frequently note. Rather, this break concerns differences in their views about the understanding itself. For while Wolff conceives of the understanding as a mental capacity to extract and make distinct content already present in the senses, Kant conceives of the understanding in its “real use” as a capacity to produce purely intellectual content. (shrink)

The Reformed witness to grace may be even more needed today than it was in the sixteenth century, since now Pelagianism seems comfortably at home in the Reformed churches. But the question is whether “sovereign grace” requires the predestinarianism that the Reformers took over from Augustine.

It is often claimed that the structure of the Transcendental Logic is modeled on the Wolffian division of logic textbooks into sections on concepts, judgments, and inferences. While it is undeniable that the Transcendental Logic contains elements that are similar to the content of these sections, I believe these similarities are largely incidental to the structure of the Transcendental Logic. In this essay, I offer an alternative and, I believe, more plausible account of Wolff’s influence on the structure of the (...) Transcendental Logic, one that puts the focus on his empirical psychology rather than his logic. In particular, I argue that the structure of the Transcendental Logic is deeply indebted to a conception of purity that Wolff introduces in his empirical psychology and that this conception sheds more light on the overall structure of the Transcendental Logic than the accepted view. In section one, I outline two conceptions of purity found in Kant and trace them to similar views in Wolff. In section two, I turn to Kant’s views about logic as they are expressed in the Critique and argue that it is best to interpret Kant’s taxonomy of logic on its own terms rather than reading it through its terminological similarities to aspects of the Wolffian tradition. In section three, I argue that the second of the two conceptions of purity identified in section one is central to the structure of the Transcendental Logic. In doing so, I argue against the widespread view that this section of the Critique is modeled solely on what Kant calls pure general logic as opposed to both pure and applied general logic. I then conclude by briefly reviewing my account and considering some of its broader implications for our understanding of Kant. (shrink)

This article describes how cc. 39 and 37 create distinct tones of voice and use them to preclude the social pretensions of Egnatius in different spheres. The style of c. 39, markedly oratorical—and non-Catullan—in the syntax of its opening lines, develops into the voice of a respectable senex by way of archaisms of vocabulary and syntax and is capped by a figure of humor otherwise absent from the polymetrics, the apologus. The style thus creates a voice perfectly suited to chastise (...) Egnatius' social ineptitudes and, more importantly, constitutes on the verbal level an embodiment of the standards of the urban elite. Catullus thus illustrates to Egnatius that a subtle system of social gestures can be learned - something which Egnatius, for all his apparent pretensions to social prominence, manifestly has not grasped, marred as he is by the habit of grinning inappropriately. C. 37, which ends with an attack on the same Egnatius, is far different in tone, commingling tokens of artfulness with vulgarity and forcefulness. That mixed style exercises ironic decorum towards Lesbia's lovers, who are themselves an oddly mixed group, well-off on the one hand, but "backstreet adulterers" on the other. But the two tones of voice, and indeed the two groups of lovers, also embody the paradoxes of the Roman construction of stylish behavior, which could be represented as elegant dalliance or reprehensible vice. Inasmuch as Egnatius' fashion affectations, ridiculed at the poem's end, fail to qualify him for the ranks of Lesbia's lovers, he is represented as outside sophisticated society, however it be constructed. In concert the two poems utterly derail Egnatius' social pretensions: c. 39 as it were outflanks him on the "right," barring him from respectable society, and c. 37 outflanks him on the "left," barring him from the "jet set.". (shrink)

The moral domain is broader than the empathy and justice concerns assessed by existing measures of moral competence, and it is not just a subset of the values assessed by value inventories. To fill the need for reliable and theoretically grounded measurement of the full range of moral concerns, we developed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire on the basis of a theoretical model of 5 universally available sets of moral intuitions: Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity. We present evidence for the (...) internal and external validity of the scale and the model, and in doing so we present new findings about morality: Comparative model fitting of confirmatory factor analyses provides empirical justification for a 5-factor structure of moral concerns; convergent/discriminant validity evidence suggests that moral concerns predict personality features and social group attitudes not previously considered morally relevant; and we establish pragmatic validity of the measure in providing new knowledge and research opportunities concerning demographic and cultural differences in moral intuitions. These analyses provide evidence for the usefulness of Moral Foundations Theory in simultaneously increasing the scope and sharpening the resolution of psychological views of morality. (shrink)

Kant's notion of ‘discipline’ has received considerable attention from scholars of his philosophy of education, but its role in his theoretical philosophy has been largely ignored. This omission is surprising since his discussion of discipline in the first Critique is not only more extensive and expansive in scope than his other discussions but also predates them. The goal of this essay is to provide a comprehensive reading of the Discipline that emphasizes its systematic importance in the first Critique. I argue (...) that its goal is to establish a set of rules for the use of pure reason that, if followed, will mitigate and perhaps even eliminate our tendency to make judgments about supersensible objects. Since Kant's justification for these rules relies crucially on claims he has defended in the Doctrine of Elements, I argue further that, far from being a dispensable part of the Critique as commentators have tended to claim, the Discipline is, in fact, the culmination of Kant's critique of metaphysics. (shrink)

This article aims to highlight the extent to which Kant’s account of belief draws on the views of his contemporaries. Situating the non-evidentialist features of Crusius’s account of belief within his broader account, I argue that they include antecedents to both Kant’s distinction between pragmatic and moral belief and his conception of a postulate of pure practical reason. While moving us closer to Kant’s arguments for the first postulate, however, both Crusius’s and Meier’s arguments for the immortality of the soul (...) fail to anticipate the most important aspect of their Kantian counterparts. Developing the non-evidentialist features of Basedow’s account of belief, I distinguish it from its Pascalian and Jamesian relatives and argue that it is the clearest antecedent to Kant’s arguments for the first and second postulates. Finally, I consider the development of Kant’s account of belief after the first Critique in light of the foregoing, and discuss the broader implications of my analysis. (shrink)

Takes us through a daringly comprehensive argument ... the simplicity and sheer readability of his writing and the lucidity and humaneness of his overall position deserve, and will attract, one hopes, a wide readership. For Wren, education in justice consists in the development of a critical awareness of ourselves as oppressor or oppressed in the unjust society . He shows us something of what justice might be and why we should aspire to it. He also offers vivid illustration of what (...) injustice and cultural oppression mean in the contemporary world' (Epworth Review). It is a measure of Brian Wren's achievement that he has caused at least one world-weary reader to think again about the possibility of radical and effective political change. His analysis of contemporary institutional oppression and our implication in it, particularly in its damaging effect upon the Third World, is a well-stated repetition of the socialist critique of the use and abuse of power. The new thing here, however, is the tone of the book: there is a calm and loving but utterly piercing description of the pathology of power and the lengths to which we'll all go to justify our share in it' (Church Times). (shrink)

This paper offers a rigorous philosophical defence for the approaches and methods of classical financial accounting research, drawn from New Pragmatism and, in particular, the ideas of Huw Price and Michael Lynch’s functional theory of truth. Such an underpinning is important because classical approaches and methods are often characterised as unscientific and lacking theoretical support. It can justify the resumption of scholarly efforts to employ classical approaches and methods to contribute to the development and refinement of accounting practice, including, and (...) especially, accounting’s conceptual framework, as part of the mainstream of the academy’s work. In addition, giving explicit attention to aspects of the functional theory of truth in the design of accounting research may improve its rigour and coherence. (shrink)

This paper illustrates how Priestley duality can be used in the transfer of an optimal natural duality from a minimal generating algebra for a quasi-variety to other generating algebras. Detailed calculations are given for the quasi-variety of Kleene algebras and the quasi-varieties n of pseudocomplemented distributive lattices (n 1).

This paper illustrates how Priestley duality can be used in the transfer of an optimal natural duality from a minimal generating algebra for a quasi-variety to other generating algebras. Detailed calculations are given for the quasi-variety \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $$\mathbb{I}\mathbb{S}\mathbb{P}(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle-}$}}{4} )$$ \end{document} of Kleene algebras and the quasi-varieties \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $$B$$ \end{document}n of pseudocomplemented distributive lattices (n ≥ 1).

This paper illustrates how Priestley duality can be used in the transfer of an optimal natural duality from a minimal generating algebra for a quasi-variety to other generating algebras. Detailed calculations are given for the quasi-variety \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $$\mathbb{I}\mathbb{S}\mathbb{P}(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle-}$}}{4} )$$ \end{document} of Kleene algebras and the quasi-varieties \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $$B$$ \end{document}n of pseudocomplemented distributive lattices (n ≥ 1).

This paper argues that the metaphysics of financial performance in the conceptual framework employed by accounting standard-setters is incoherent: income and expenses cannot, as the framework holds, both be independent elements of financial statements, identified from underlying events, tested for recognition and measured by discrete acts, separately from the identification, testing and measurement of other elements and satisfy the analytical relationship between performance and position embraced by the framework. An alternative conceptualisation is proposed, under which income and expenses are part (...) of a wider system of classifying all changes in assets and liabilities, measured indirectly. This approach improves the metaphysical coherence, and thus the intellectual strength, of the framework project; while it leaves the measurement of financial performance unchanged, by emphasising the importance of classification, it invites further attention to the presentation of financial performance, with the potential for improving the usefulness of disclosures. (shrink)

We give a coalgebraic view of the restricted Priestley duality between Heyting algebras and Heyting spaces. More precisely, we show that the category of Heyting spaces is isomorphic to a full subcategory of the category of all -coalgebras, based on Boolean spaces, where is the functor which maps a Boolean space to its hyperspace of nonempty closed subsets. As an appendix, we include a proof of the characterization of Heyting spaces and the morphisms between them.

Development and targeting efforts by academic organizations to effectively promote research integrity can be enhanced if they are able to collect reliable data to benchmark baseline conditions, to assess areas needing improvement, and to subsequently assess the impact of specific initiatives. To date, no standardized and validated tool has existed to serve this need. A web- and mail-based survey was administered in the second half of 2009 to 2,837 randomly selected biomedical and social science faculty and postdoctoral fellows at 40 (...) academic health centers in top-tier research universities in the United States. Measures included the Survey of Organizational Research Climate (SORC) as well as measures of perceptions of organizational justice. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses yielded seven subscales of organizational research climate, all of which demonstrated acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach’s α ranging from 0.81 to 0.87) and adequate test–retest reliability (Pearson r ranging from 0.72 to 0.83). A broad range of correlations between the seven subscales and five measures of organizational justice (unadjusted regression coefficients ranging from 0.13 to 0.95) document both construct and discriminant validity of the instrument. The SORC demonstrates good internal (alpha) and external reliability (test–retest) as well as both construct and discriminant validity. (shrink)

In response to the publication of a lively new volume on modern Indian philosophy during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this essay offers four brief interventions intended to prompt further critical reflection on the concept of the Indian Renaissance.

Kant's response to scepticism in the Critique of Pure Reason is complex and remarkably nuanced, although it is rarely recognized as such. In this paper, I argue that recent attempts to flesh out the details of this response by Paul Guyer and Michael Forster do not go far enough. Although they are right to draw a distinction between Humean and Pyrrhonian scepticism and locate Kant's response to the latter in the Transcendental Dialectic, their accounts fail to capture two important aspects (...) of this response. The first is that Kant's response to Pyrrhonian scepticism is also a response to Hume. The second is that aspects of this response are decidedly positive. In particular, I argue (1) that Kant believed Hume's scepticism manifested important elements of Pyrrhonian scepticism and (2) that both Pyrrhonian scepticism and Hume had a significant positive influence on the development of the Transcendental Dialectic. (shrink)