In this article I discuss the 'procedural postulationist' view of mathematics advanced by Kit Fine in a recent paper. I argue that he has not shown that this view provides an avenue to knowledge of mathematical truths, at least if such truths are objective truths. In particular, more needs to be said about the criteria which constrain which types of entities can be postulated. I also argue that his reliance on second-order quantification means that his background logic is not free (...) of ontological commitment and that his doctrine of 'creative expansion' only makes sense from a radically anti-realist perspective. (shrink)

Expressivism's problem in solving the Frege/Geach problem concerning unasserted contexts is evaluated in the light of Blackburn's own methodological commitment to assessing philosophical theories in terms of costs and benefits, notably quasi-realism's aim of minimising the ontological commitments of a broadly naturalistic worldview. The problem emerges when a competitor theory can explain the same phenomena at lower cost: the minimalist about truth has no problem with unasserted contexts whereas the quasi-realist/expressivist package does. However, this form of projectivism is supposed to (...) be a local and contrastive thesis or the central metaphor of projection makes no sense. So in competition with minimalism, projectivism must - at least for non-contested areas of thought and language - presuppose non-minimal truth. This casts new light on Blackburn's proposal globally to revise the relations between logic and truth so as to model ethical discourse as tracking a notion of commitment to contents that can be either attitudinal or truh evaluable. Why globally revise logic, in order solely to explain the problem of unasserted contexts, when a rival view can do so much better according to the standards set by the quasi-realist? Why do so when a notion of non-minimal truth and a classical explanation of logic are already available to you, given the local and contrastive claims of quasi-realism? (shrink)

Cet article établit que John Toland, né à la fin du xvne siècle, partageait la culture des Irlandais de langue maternelle gaélique. Il met en évidence l'intérêt de J. Toland, tout au long de sa vie, pour la culture et les langues celtes et repère l'influence de celles-ci sur le contenu et la présentation de ses idées peu orthodoxes.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nietzsche. His Philosophy of Contradictions and the Contradictions of His PhilosophyAlan D. SchriftWolfgang Müller-Lauter. Nietzsche. His Philosophy of Contradictions and the Contradictions of His Philosophy. Translated from the German by David J. Parent. Foreword by Richard Schacht. Ghicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999. Pp. xviii + 246. Paper, $21.95.Since this work first appeared in 1971, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter has been at the forefront of German Nietzsche scholarship. The long (...) overdue appearance in English translation of this important work is a welcome addition to the Nietzsche literature and, although dated in some respects, it remains an important work that warrants careful attention. As Richard Schacht notes in his foreword, the original publication of this work was a significant event in the history of Nietzsche studies in Germany. Coming ten years after the publication of Heidegger's massive two-volume Nietzsche, Müller-Lauter's book "provided a much-needed counterweight" to Heidegger's idiosyncratic treatment (ix). Aside from proferring a significant rejoinder to the Heideggerian interpretation, Müller-Lauter also responds to a vast array of German Nietzsche scholars, some well-known (K. Löwith, K. Jaspers, E. Fink, K. Schlechta), but many much less familiar. As such, this book is an important piece of historical scholarship, offering the contemporary English-speaking reader an interesting picture of German scholarship on Nietzsche before Heidegger's work took center stage as the dominant (unfortunately, some would say only) German work worth engaging.But Müller-Lauter's book is not just of historical interest; it offers a powerful and profound reading of Nietzsche's corpus focused on the question of contradiction, both the contradictions readers find amidst Nietzsche's various works and Nietzsche's own philosophy of contradiction, namely, that contradictoriness is in some sense constitutive of the world. For Müller-Lauter, contradiction, the unresolvable conflict between essentially antithetical perspectives, grounds Nietzsche's philosophizing in wills to power. Emphasizing the plurality of conflicting wills to power, Müller-Lauter offers in successive chapters interpretations of Nietzsche's views on history as the "concrete occurrences" of these conflicting wills to power; nihilism as the process by which an organized system of forces (physical, social, intellectual, cultural) disintegrates into an antagonistic multiplicity of competing wills; morality as demanding truths that, once discovered, it can neither face nor accept, fleeing instead into a fictitious world of its own creation; Christian truthfulness as a destruction of truth that presents a "multiplicity of mutually opposing untruths" (72). All of these interpretations are shown to rest upon a contradiction at the heart of Nietzsche's own account of will to power, namely, that the strong will to power both affirms the multiplicity of perspectives and yet imposes its perspective as absolute.This is the paradox of the overman, a paradox Müller-Lauter addresses in his final chapter on "the doctrine of eternal recurrence." Not surprisingly, the eternal recurrence reveals itself to be essentially contradictory. But this contradiction is not self-refuting; rather "since the eternal recurrence is only as a thought and a doctrine, its meaning remains insurmountably split into a duality" (121) reflected in two ultimately incompatible types of overman. There is, on the one hand, the "powerful overman" who sees the entirety of what is as necessary for his own existence; to affirm eternal [End Page 453] recurrence is to understand everything that has been as a necessary series of events that ends with himself at its apex. But there is also the "wise overman," who understands the totality of what has been and is as necessary for his having arrived at the present moment in which he transcends himself and becomes other. Where the meaning of the powerful overman's affirmation of eternal recurrence resides in his appearance as the being who is dominant, the meaning of the wise overman's affirmation lies in understanding and accepting what has been as the precondition for both what he presently is and what he can become. Although both types of overman want recurrence, Müller-Lauter concludes they want something different in it and by it: the wise overman "is concerned with dissolving in the stream of... (shrink)

At the close of their searching critique, Saunders & van Brakel raise, but do not address, the question: There are two distinct traditions of colour research, one based on disembodied coloured lights and another on surface colour. The coherence and integrity of both these traditions are challenged by the nonautonomy of colour.

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;This thesis considers the place of values in comparative political inquiry. After a review of the debate in the philosophy of social science between the positivist and hermeneutic approaches , the argument is divided into two parts. The first part looks at the origins, and consequences, of the attempt to establish a positivistic value-free comparative political science. The second part considers the basis, and the potential nature, of a (...) self-consciously normative discipline of comparative politics. ;The idea of value-freedom is criticised; it is argued: that the failure to take into account the values of the comparative theorist results in the imposition of a non-neutral framework on the phenomena under investigation; and that the failure to take into account the values of the agents under investigation makes it impossible to properly describe or explain political phenomena. ;Examples are used to illustrate these points but also to show how, and why, the rhetoric of neutrality is sustained in practice. It is suggested that mainstream comparative political science conflates a positivist epistemology and a quantitative research methodology. This mixture results in a variety of confusions but is seen to protect comparative politics from "the problem of relativism", which is treated as the principal weakness of the hermeneutic approach. ;Two possible foundations for a normative comparative politics are considered. Firstly, the idea that it is possible to found comparative politics on a non-relative moral theory is reviewed and rejected. It is argued that the best candidates for such a theory, utilitarianism and "thin" theories of the good, cannot be established a priori. Secondly, the assumption that the existence of a plurality of cultures, moral beliefs, and theoretical perspectives leads to relativism is rejected. Instead it is argued that the existence of diversity and disagreement itself provides the basis for a coherent and self-critical discipline, and enhances the scope of comparative politics. (shrink)

A critical edition of two great works by Thomas Hobbes. The Dialogue of the Common Laws is his classic critique of common law, essential reading for anyone interested in English political thought or legal theory. It is accompanied by Hobbes's last word on politics, a fragment in which he mounts a robust defence of hereditary right.

Depue & Collins associate dopaminergically mediated incentive motivational processes with extraversion. In this commentary I consider dopaminergic indices from neuroimaging investigations which correlate more closely with impulsive sensation seeking personality traits than with extraversion. Measures of relevant behavioural processes also appear to correlate with personality measures other than extraversion.

Zwar wurde den Nonkonformisten 1689 religiöse Toleranz zugesichert, doch wurden sie von den Universitäten in Oxford und Cambridge ausgeschlossen. Daher rührt die Bedeutung ihrer eigenen Akademien, von denen einige eine allgemeinere Form der höheren Bildung anboten, andere dagegen speziell die Kandidaten für geistliche Ämter unterichteten. Die Mehrheit der hier besprochenen Theologen waren akademische Lehrer.Die nonkormistischen Theologen schrieben über viele Themen. Abgesehen von der Bibel lasen sie kontinentaleuropäische Theologen, Puritaner und auch Locke. Was die Moralphilosophie angeht, waren sie sich bewußt, daß (...) sie ihre Aufmerksamkeit sowohl dem moralischen Gesetz als auch der göttlichen Offenbarung zu widmen hatten, und einige von ihnen bezogen geradezu fanatische Gegenpositionen zu Hobbes. Während manche von Zeit zu Zeit an das moralische Gefühl appellierten, zogen andere einen rationalen Intuitionismus vor. In den Schriften der meisten zeigt sich ein gewisser Eklektizismus. In der Praxis der liberaleren Theologen wurde die Ethik mehr und mehr von der Dogmatik geschieden, obwohl die Autoren Gott nie gänzlich aus ihren Gedanken verbannten. Demgegenüber bietet John Gill, Puritaner in Gedanken wie in der Methode, ein konservatives Gegenbeispiel und illustriert die Verzögerung auf intellektuellem Gebiet.Die Beiträge zur Moralphilosophie von Isaac Watts, Henry Grove, John Taylor, Thomas Amory, Samuel Bourn III, Richard Price und Thomas Belsham werden vorgestellt, und die Positionen dieser Autoren, ebenso wie die Position von Joseph Priestley, zur Freiheit - Freiheit und Notwendigkeit, Freiheit des Gewissens und Freiheit des Gottesdienstes - werden untersucht.Themen, die für eine weitere Diskussion fruchtbar wären, werden vorgestellt. Außerdem werden abschließend einige kurze Betrachtungen zu den Versuchen einiger heutiger Philosophen angestellt, den Graben zwischen Moralphilosophie und Theologie, der seit dem achtzehnten Jahrhundert immer größer wird, zu schließen..Zwar wurde den Nonkonformisten 1689 religiöse Toleranz zugesichert, doch wurden sie von den Universitäten in Oxford und Cambridge ausgeschlossen. Daher rührt die Bedeutung ihrer eigenen Akademien, von denen einige eine allgemeinere Form der höheren Bildung anboten, andere dagegen speziell die Kandidaten für geistliche Ämter unterichteten. Die Mehrheit der hier besprochenen Theologen waren akademische Lehrer.Die nonkormistischen Theologen schrieben über viele Themen. Abgesehen von der Bibel lasen sie kontinentaleuropäische Theologen, Puritaner und auch Locke. Was die Moralphilosophie angeht, waren sie sich bewußt, daß sie ihre Aufmerksamkeit sowohl dem moralischen Gesetz als auch der göttlichen Offenbarung zu widmen hatten, und einige von ihnen bezogen geradezu fanatische Gegenpositionen zu Hobbes. Während manche von Zeit zu Zeit an das moralische Gefühl appellierten, zogen andere einen rationalen Intuitionismus vor. In den Schriften der meisten zeigt sich ein gewisser Eklektizismus. In der Praxis der liberaleren Theologen wurde die Ethik mehr und mehr von der Dogmatik geschieden, obwohl die Autoren Gott nie gänzlich aus ihren Gedanken verbannten. Demgegenüber bietet John Gill, Puritaner in Gedanken wie in der Methode, ein konservatives Gegenbeispiel und illustriert die Verzögerung auf intellektuellem Gebiet.Die Beiträge zur Moralphilosophie von Isaac Watts, Henry Grove, John Taylor, Thomas Amory, Samuel Bourn III, Richard Price und Thomas Belsham werden vorgestellt, und die Positionen dieser Autoren, ebenso wie die Position von Joseph Priestley, zur Freiheit - Freiheit und Notwendigkeit, Freiheit des Gewissens und Freiheit des Gottesdienstes - werden untersucht.Themen, die für eine weitere Diskussion fruchtbar wären, werden vorgestellt. Außerdem werden abschließend einige kurze Betrachtungen zu den Versuchen einiger heutiger Philosophen angestellt, den Graben zwischen Moralphilosophie und Theologie, der seit dem achtzehnten Jahrhundert immer größer wird, zu schließen. (shrink)

In his thoughtful review of my book Absolute Knowledge, in the Fall 1984 Owl, John McCumber identifies several potentially problematic aspects of my interpretation of Hegel’s Logic as transcendental ontology. I would like to respond to several of his objections, not polemically, but rather in order to contribute to a conversation I value. The relevant issues are: 1) dialectical necessity, 2) the specificity of the philosophy of nature, 3) the historical relativity of the system, 4) the Logic as “ground,” and (...) 5) ontology and theology. (shrink)

Intentionalism must be distinguished from computational psychology. The former is a mentalist-realist metatheoretical stance vis-a-vis the latter, which is a research programme devoted to the construction of informationally-characterized simulation models for human behavior, perception, cognition, etc. Intentionalism has its attractive aspects, but unfortunately it is plagued by severe conceptual difficulties. Recent attempts to justify the intentionalist interpretation of computational models, by J.A. Fodor and by C. Graves, J.J. Katz et al., fail to secure a conceptually adequate and genuinely intentional sense (...) for the intentional idiom they employ. (shrink)