Table of ContentsAndrzej KLAWITER, Krzystof #ASTOWSKI: Introduction: Originality, Courage and Responsibility List of Books by Leszek NowakSelected Bibliography of Leszek Nowak's WritingsScience and Idealization Theo A.F. KUIPERS: On Two ...

This article argues that the citizens of Hegel's state cannot maintain themselves as politically free because they are susceptible to mutual enslavement. I demonstrate this by focusing on the Roman republican background of Hegel's constitution, the potential trajectory of its dissolution and the accompanying means of its cyclical fortification through courage. Hegel, by integrating aspects of the Roman mixed constitution also adopts the idea of decadence within his conception of civil society. After locating the source of decadence in the (...) contractual relations of peace and the bourgeois inability to overcome the fear of death, I go on to argue that war for Hegel provides a theatre where freedom may be regenerated through courage. However, I also show that modern wars do not provide sufficient means of perpetuating Hegel's constitution. To demonstrate this, I distinguish three forms of war: colonial, limited and total war, arguing that only the latter offers a solution to decay of political disposition and loss of freedom, but that—by being itself susceptible to decadence—it cannot salvage Hegel's state from dissolution and reduction to contractual relations. (shrink)

Intellectual courage requires acting to promote epistemic goods despite significant risk of harm. Courage is distinguished from recklessness and cowardice because the expected epistemic benefit of a courageous action outweighs (in some sense) the threatened harm. Sometimes, however, inquirers pursue theories that are not best supported by their current evidence. For these inquirers, the expected epistemic benefit of their actions cannot be explained by appeal to their evidence alone. The probability of pursuing the true theory cannot contribute enough (...) to the expected epistemic benefit for the action to count as courageous rather than reckless. Thus, there must be some other epistemic consideration which favors their action, besides evidence for their theory. I argue that the proper account of intellectual courage requires recognition of inquisitive reasons: a distinct category of epistemic reasons which concern successful inquiry. This category includes reasons to think a theory itself is promising, e.g., that the theory suggests potentially fruitful new research. It also includes social epistemic reasons, e.g., that pursuing a theory will improve the distribution of cognitive labor. Inquisitive reasons help explain why researchers who pursue improbable theories count as intellectually courageous, rather than reckless. The expected epistemic benefit of an action is partially determined by the inquisitive reasons in its favor. On my account, intellectually courageous inquiry requires acting in a way that is sensitive to inquisitive reasons. (shrink)

While regarding twentieth century French philosophy as a protracted conceptual war, Badiou has largely avoided an encounter with Foucault on the philosophical battlefield. According to Badiou, Foucault constructs a history of systems of thought starting from something other than philosophy (linguistic anthropology, postmodern sophism, democratic materialism) and, in so doing, exits the philosophical battleground. The present essay explores the prospect of rapprochement between these two thinkers, drawing attention to their shared concern with the theme of true life. For Foucault and (...) Badiou, the life in truth and for truth compels the subject to invent a new way of being at the site of exception to what there is. Although Badiou remains ambivalent about the Foucauldian notion of the philosophical subject, he ultimately endorses Foucault’s conception of the philosophical life, which calls for courage insofar as it summons the human animal to think differently and become other than what one is. (shrink)

What qualities do we need in order to be good philosophers? Wittgenstein insists that virtues of character – such as honesty, humility, courage, and strength – are more important for our philosophizing than the relevant intellectual talents and skills. These virtues are essential because doing good philosophy demands both knowing and overcoming the deep-seated desires and inclinations which lead us astray in our thinking, and achieving such self-knowledge and self-overcoming demands all of these virtues working in concert. In this (...) paper I draw together many of Wittgenstein’s seemingly offhanded remarks on these issues in order to reconstruct his understanding of philosophy’s ‘difficulties of the will’ and the virtues needed to overcome them. (shrink)

Hermeneutics promotes an awareness of the interpretive character of the world. With regard to the difficult and complex relationship between philosophy and theology,hermeneutics calls for critical rethinking of the Heideggerian postulate to exclude theology from philosophy on the grounds of the autonomy of philosophy, and to exclude philosophy from theology on Barthian revelational positivist grounds.Heidegger‟s philosophy has a long history of being interpreted as an invitation to theology to think about God and religion in a new, non metaphysical way. Reexamining (...) the question of the meaning of Being,Heidegger inspired a search for new paths of thinking God outside the established onto-theological tradition.I will argue that both exclusions—philosophy from theology, theology from philosophy—are hermeneutically untenable. (shrink)

Vítima, quer do contexto, quer da sua recepção, a obra de Eric Weil (1904-1977), editada entre os anos 50 e 70 do século passado, não tem obtido o devido acolhimento pela comunidade filosófica. Se as interpretações magistrais de Kant (Problèmes kantiens. Paris: Vrin, 1970) e de Hegel (Hegel et l’état. Paris; Vrin, 1950) constituem referências cada vez mais frequentes nos trabalhos da especialidade (os quais persistem, contudo, em ignorar os importantes artigos sobre a filosofia dos dois autor...

The Courage of the Truth is the last course that Michel Foucault delivered at the College de France before his death in 1984. In this course, he continues the theme of the previous year's lectures in exploring the notion of "truth-telling" in politics to establish a number of ethically irreducible conditionsbased on courage and conviction.

The aim of this article is to explore Gadamer’s early reflections on Plato’s utopian thought and its potential topicality. In the following section, I will show how areté, understood as a hermeneutical and existential virtue, is dialectically related to ethics and politics in Gadamer’s phenomenological reception of Plato’s philosophy. I argue that, in Gadamer’s eyes, Socratic-Platonic self-understanding enables human beings to be aware of their political responsibilities, to recognize how they are existentially and mutually related to the other, and to (...) clarify dialectically their own existential possibilities in order to transcend their inherited world of values. In the third section, I aim to show how these are the grounds on which Gadamer’s initial thoughts on the utopian dimension of Platonic political philosophy developed, mainly through his further critical account of the works on the German “political Plato” published in Germany between 1927 and 1933, i.e., Kurt Singer’s Platon, der Gründer (1927), Julius Stenzel’s Platon. Der Erzieher (1928), and Kurt von Hildendrandt‘s Platon, Der Kampf des Geistes um die Macht (1933). Then, in the fourth section, I will express my own views on the relevance of reconsidering how the notions of areté, phrónesis, and andreía are already related in Plato’s dialogues, complementing the insights on Gadamer’s interpretation of areté in section two. My purpose is to go beyond Gadamer’s reading and provide us with a more solid ground to address his late reflections on political courage and its relations with his dialectical understanding of Platonic utopia as a myth. Therefore, I will explore the problem of civil disobedience, a topic that was actually not at the centre of Gadamer’s concerns, as a genuine mode of utopian political action which can enact a true deviation from the sophistic pólis and its understanding of power. Finally, in the conclusion, I will characterize Gadamer’s portrait of Platonic utopia as a dialectical myth which enables human beings to recognize when politics are being reduced to mere power abuse by the State and also suggest why Gadamer’s approach to utopias is still relevant today. (shrink)

In this careful and compelling study, Ryan K. Balot brings together political theory, classical history, and ancient philosophy in order to re-conceive of courage as a specifically democratic virtue.

This work develops the ethical attitude of courageous vulnerability through the integration of the phenomenon of involuntary memory in Marcel Proust's work and ...

Could a Nazi soldier or terrorist be courageous? The Courage Problem asks us to answer this sort of question, and then to explain why people are reluctant to give this answer. The present paper sheds new light on the Courage Problem by examining a controversy sparked by Bill Maher, who claimed that the 9/11 terrorists’ acts were ‘not cowardly.’ It is shown that Maher's controversy is fundamentally related to the Courage Problem. Then, a unified solution to both (...) problems is provided. This solution entails that gutsy people who lack good ends are not courageous. (shrink)

In this chapter, DeYoung looks at the culturally and historically recognized virtue of courage. She specifically questions how we should think of all the pictures of courage and where we might look for Christlike examples of courage. To do this, DeYoung explores courage as it relates to fear and love and then delves into how courage can be a Christian practice.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Psychological CourageDaniel Putman (bio)AbstractBeginning with Aristotle philosophers have analyzed physical courage and moral courage in great detail. However, philosophy has never addressed the type of courage involved in facing the fears generated by our habits and emotions. This essay introduces the concept of psychological courage and argues that it deserves to be recognized in ethics as a form of courage. I examine three broad (...) areas of psychological problems: destructive habits; irrational anxieties; and psychological servitude in which one individual emotionally controls another. Psychological courage is the strength to confront and work through these problems. Such courage involves facing our deep-seated fear of psychological instability. I conclude that the development of psychological courage is essential to the well-being of many people.Keywordscourage, Aristotle, habits, dependency, rashness, cowardice, anxiety disorders, patienceThe virtue of courage exhibits different forms in human life. Types of courage can be broadly differentiated in terms of the fear which must be faced and the goal to be attained. Two forms of courage have been discussed at some length in the history of ethics. “Physical courage” is characterized by overcoming a fear of death or physical harm. The goals to be achieved by its exercise are traditionally defined by society or by the requirements of survival. The paradigmatic example is Aristotle’s (1987) brave soldier who faces death to defend his city (1115a25–35). Another example would be bravely defending self and family against a threat from nature such as a flood or dangerous carnivore. The second form, “moral courage,” also has some allusions in Aristotle (1115a12–13; 1115b1–2), but Plato’s portrayal of Socrates is in many ways the archetype for moral courage in Western philosophy. While Socrates is also said to have displayed physical courage in defending Athens, it is his fearlessness in defending a deeply held greater moral good against society which has inspired untold numbers of Plato’s readers, from the Stoics to today’s students. 1 In moral courage the major fear is loss of ethical integrity or authenticity, but moral courage is also tied to dealing with social disapproval (Martin 1986, ch. 4; Walton 1986). The person confronting her peer group over a racist joke displays moral courage. In acting courageously the individual maintains moral integrity while at the same time overcoming the fear of being rejected by friends. Other examples abound: the whistle-blower facing ostracism from colleagues for calling attention to injustice in the workplace, or the Quaker or Buddhist protesting against a manufacturer of armaments. Examples of physical and moral courage often overlap. Gandhi (as well as Socrates) exhibited moral courage while facing death, and a soldier in battle may have to deal with peer rejection of his heroic actions. However, the distinction, while imprecise, does speak usefully to quite different forms of courageous experience. [End Page 1]In this paper I want to introduce a third form of courage almost never discussed in the literature. Best called “psychological courage,” it is a form of the virtue which millions of human beings have to possess and exercise on a regular basis. The fear to be faced is not usually that of physical harm, nor is it fear of social ostracism. Nor is loss of moral integrity a major concern. The fear centers around a loss of psychological stability. I speak of the courage it takes to face our irrational fears and anxieties, those passions which, in Spinoza’s terms, hold us in bondage. These can range from habits and compulsions to phobias. Aristotle would have classified many of these under lack of temperance. A drinking habit or an irrational fear of open spaces reflects a lack of proper balance regarding the pleasures of life. But facing and working through these habits or anxieties can involve courage for several reasons. First, to admit the problem is to face the possibility of being stigmatized by society. In this sense psychological courage has some similarities to moral courage. Second, a great deal of pain, physical and psychological, can be involved in confronting the anxiety or changing the habit, and the individual knows this beforehand. Third, and most significant to this form of courage, the stability... (shrink)

The article emphasizes the cultural and educational importance of H. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy for the spiritual development of the Ukrainian society, especially in the direction of democracy and establishment of the worldview culture as a requirement for the culture of freedom. From the position of the included observer the author of the article describes some episodes of relationship in the scientist’s communities which can be defined as justice and solidary community. On the basis of the Heidegerian scheme, some dangers (...) are analyzed as demands addressed to philosophical thinking. This scheme is used by structuring of the article. The metaphoric of these dangers indicates the contextual problems which are important for producing of philosophical ideas. The experience of the Institute of Philosophy gained by solving of problems is very remarkable for the fulfillment of philosophical studies and educational practices especially by mentoring of the postgraduate students. The fact of naming the Institute after H. Skovoroda is regarded as a symbolic act with a great creative potential and energy which can be used for reviving of national traditions of philosophical thinking. The role of lyric in activating of philosophical ideas is showed. The symbiotic coexisting of the poetry, art, journalism and philosophy is one of the original features of the Skovorodian tradition caring by the well-known representatives of the Institute. All these characteristics joined with the civic culture, which was demonstrated by all generations of the Institute, allow defining it as a metaphysical place with the ability both to follow on the road of the way of light and to represent it on the landscapes of philosophical science and education. The history of the Institute, especially, in the period of its post-totalitarian transformations, gives the opportunity of taking comparison with the Institute for Social Research Frankfurt. The civic courage of the Ukrainian intellectual elites was always initiated, supported and generated by philosophers gathering in Institute of Philosophy. (shrink)

Plato is the first philosopher to see courage as primarily a philosophical virtue. This innovation, the necessary link between courage and philosophy, stands in stark opposition to the traditional view linking courage with military or civic affairs. Plato makes courage so central to the life of philosophy that this fact alone sets him apart from almost every other author in the western philosophical canon. Courage of a new type, philosophical courage, emerges in his writings, (...) a kind of courage necessary for and configured to the philosophical life. ;The Introduction presents an overview of the pre-philosophical development of courage from Homer to Thucydides in order to prepare the transition to the Platonic understanding. Chapter One discusses the Laches, the most extensive Platonic text on courage. Chapter Two takes up the Protagoras, which discusses the issue of knowledge and its relation to courage. Chapter Three turns to the Republic and argues that whereas the highest civic activity is characterized by a desire for honor, whose psychological basis is thumos, the life of philosophy is essentially erotic. Thus, thumos and eros are connected respectively to two distinct types of courage and the move from thumos to eros is the key to explaining the move from courage in the conventional sense to philosophical courage. ;Philosophical courage implies faith in the abiding power of reason to shed light on how to face ignorance, evil, and injustice with the conviction that the remedy is philosophy itself. Plato's account of the life of philosophy is, in its very essence, characterized by philosophical courage as an enduring commitment to the project of showing that the good is the ruling principle of the universe. Philosophy remains, therefore, a quest and philosophical courage is the virtue needed to endure in that quest. Philosophical courage sustains the life of philosophy, the striving after wisdom, by maintaining the conviction of the ultimate goodness of such a life in the absence of complete and comprehensive knowledge. If the life of philosophy represents the highest human activity, then the type of courage associated with this life is correspondingly highest. (shrink)

How may progressive political theorists advance the Enlightenment after Darwin shifted the conversation about human nature in the nineteenth century, the Holocaust displayed barbarity at the historical center of the Enlightenment, and 9/11 showed the need to modify the ideals and strategies of the Enlightenment? Kantian Courage considers how several figures in contemporary political theory--including John Rawls, Gilles Deleuze, and Tariq Ramadan--do just this as they continue Immanuel Kant's legacy.

The course given by Michel Foucault from February to March 1984, under the title 'The Courage of Truth', was his last at the Collège de France. His death shortly after, on June 25th, tempts us to detect a philosophical testament in these lectures, especially in view of the prominence they give to the theme of death, notably through a reinterpretation of Socrates' last words--'Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius'--which, with Georges Dumézil, Foucault understands as the expression of a (...) profound gratitude towards philosophy for its cure of the only serious illness: that of false opinions and prejudices. These lectures continue and radicalize the analyses of those of the previous year. Foucault's 1983 lectures investigated the function of 'truth telling' in politics in order to establish courage and conviction as ethical conditions for democracy irreducible to the formal rules of consensus. With the Cynics, this manifestation of the truth no longer appears simply as a risky speaking out, but in the very substance of existence. In fact, Foucault offers an incisive study of ancient Cynicism as practical philsophy, athleticism of the truth, public provocation, and ascetic sovereignty. The scandal of the true life is constructed in oppositon to Platonism and its world of transcendent intelligible forms"--Publisher's description, p. [2] of dust jacket. (shrink)

Hans-Georg Gadamer, despite his exchanges with and reception by major figures in the field of political theory, is often thought of as a philosopher as opposed to a political theorist. For instance, the title of one of his essays, "On the Political Incompetence of Philosophy," is sometimes taken to indicate that Gadamer thought of his own philosophy as "politically incompetent" (Code 2003, 15). In this paper, I argue that Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy is deeply concerned with our relation to the political (...) world. To bring out these political concerns, I put Gadamer in conversation with Hannah Arendt, who overtly disavowed philosophy in favor of political theory. I show that Gadamer and Arendt share many of the same worries about the solitary model of much philosophy – particularly that of Heidegger – and that both try to promote a more involved, worldly mode of thinking. For Arendt, this mode of thinking attends in large part to the newness and distinctiveness of other people, whereas Gadamer emphasizes what other people say and how we must relate to them if we are to understand what they are telling us. I argue that although these are complementary ways of addressing political thinking, one important advantage of Gadamer's account is the way it brings into view the centrality of courage for understanding our shared political world. Because understanding frequently requires that we question our identities and renegotiate our existing relation to the world in often uncomfortable ways, political thinking involves what I call "hermeneutic courage.". (shrink)

The world is currently in a state of deregulation. Even stronger: the world is in a state of disruption. Covid-19 has changed the lives of many people, communities, societies and countries all over...

The criteria of “forced, live, and momentous options,” as William James utilized them in his pragmatic defense of religious belief, cannot, I argue, both support religious pluralism and acknowledge lessons about failure of epistemic responsibility in Heaven’s Gate-followers. But I attempt to re-vitalize the pragmatic argument, showing it capable of walking this narrow line. I proceed (1) by developing the distinction and relationship between a commitment to a particular religious system or community, and a commitment to the generic “religious hypothesis” (...) itself; and (2) by explicating and expanding upon the “experimental” status—and associated pragmatic criteria for success or failure—that James already recognized for commitments to particular religious communities. I thus show how the “pragmatic argument” takes on heightened significance—and renewed promise—in light of problems associated with New Age and so-called “cult” religiosity. (shrink)

This paper analyzes aesthetic courage, a virtue directed towards aesthetic objects when subjects are asked to confront content that is psychologically or socially risky. I examine aesthetic courage to explore how it plays a role in a virtue theoretic account of the good life. I contend that the virtue theoretic concept of phronesis, or practical wisdom, plays a strong role in guiding the virtuous agent to make decisions about the course of action that promotes her good life. The (...) concept of phronesis in service of the good life acts as the foundation for my concept of aesthetic courage. I analyze several examples of aesthetic courage, including the controversy surrounding the contemplative garden at Stanford University in honor of Chanel Miller and other survivors of sexual assault. (shrink)

LEADERSHIP, I SHALL ARGUE, is a role obligated by social conditions, deriving from the reality of value, and demanding the exercise of courage. Plato, Confucius, and the author of the Books of Samuel enunciated these interlocked themes early in the axial age, and they require fresh reflection in every age. That the bearing of value and courage on leadership is a metaphysical theme, and not merely a topic for political philosophy or Weberian sociology, is a promissory note at (...) this stage in my remarks, to be paid up by their conclusion. (shrink)

In a nearly paradoxical manner, the virtue of martial courage is best understood through violent acts that are typically vicious, such as killing, maiming, and bombing. To ameliorate this worry, I make a new distinction that is dependent on whether the agent acts in accord with social norms or against them. We usually understand martial courage through social courage, where soldiers are courageous through performing violent acts that society determines are necessary. While this understanding is accurate for (...) a just war, violence cannot be virtuous when fighting for an unjust cause. The oppositional form of martial courage involves acting contrary to social norms by refusing to fight on behalf of an unjust cause or in unjust ways. As a virtue, martial courage should include bravely renouncing and resisting unjust wars. In this way, oppositional courage provides a non-violent grounding for martial courage: while martial courage often requires violence, it also requires a vigilant readiness to refuse to be violent when justice requires oppositional courage. (shrink)

This article considers Socrates's conception of courage in Plato's Socratic dialogues. Although the Laches, which is the only dialogue devoted in toto to a pursuit of the definition of courage, does not explicitly provide Socrates's definition of courage, I shall point out clues therein which contribute to an understanding of Socrates's conception of courage. The Protagoras is a peculiar dialogue in which Socrates himself offers a definition of courage. Attending to the dramatic structure and personalities (...) of the dialogue, I will point out that Socrates does not commit to the definition and that the hedonism and the definition of courage are used to disclose Protagoras's confusion regarding virtue. Following one of the clues within the Laches I will turn to the Apology and indicate Socrates's conception of courage which is based on his awareness of lack of knowledge of death and his religious conviction that nothing will happen for the good in life or in death. Finally I will show that such conception of Socratic courage satisfies the criteria in the Laches. (shrink)

There are at least two apparently conflicting views of courage found in Plato's dialogues: the intellectualist view exemplified by Socrates’s identification of courage with wisdom as found in the Protagoras; and the dispositional view of courage as a natural temperament to overcome fear in situations of danger, the necessary qualification for the auxiliary class in the Republic. In this paper I argue that these views are complementary, dispositional courage being a necessary precondition for the pursuit of (...) the proper human excellence of wisdom. I demonstrate this by considering the role opinion plays in each understanding of courage, showing both that dispositional courage is necessary to ensure that proper opinions be retained in the pursuit of wisdom and that wisdom is necessary to guarantee these opinions are the proper ones. Finally, I argue that not only is this relationship of the two understandings of courage present in the Republic, but even in the Protagoras Socrates’s method of conducting the el.. (shrink)

This article offers a critical perspective on two lines of thought in recent epistemology and philosophy of science, namely Michael Dummett?s anti-realist approach to issues of truth, meaning, and knowledge and Bas van Fraassen?s influential programme of?constructive empiricism?. While not denying the salient differences between them it shows how they converge on a sceptical outlook concerning the realist claim that truth might always transcend the restrictions of some given state of knowledge. The author puts the case that such sceptical arguments, (...) if followed through consistently, must involve giving up all claim to account for our knowledge of the growth of scientific knowledge. He also takes issue with Dummett?s idea of truth as nothing more than a matter of?warranted assertibility? and with van Fraassen?s likewise verificationist conception of empirical warrant as the most we can have by way of epistemic justification. Thus it is wrong to suppose that the realist is merely indulging in a display of? courage not under fire? when she assumes ontological commitments in excess of the observational data. This disavowal of realism in favour of a theory which?saves the appearances? has a less-than-distinguished prehistory in the range of compromise strategies adopted by upholders of a dominant metaphysics or world-view, starting out with the orthodox Catholic attempt to defuse the implications of the heliocentric hypothesis advanced by Copernicus and Galileo. Such theological motives are nowadays not so prominent although? it is suggested fithey do emerge at certain points in Dummett?s writing. More constructively, this article presents a case for objectivism with regard to scientific truth and also for inference to the best causal explanation on both the micro- and the macrophysical scale as the only approach with an adequate claim to make sense of the history of advancements in scientific knowledge to date. (shrink)

Afin d’examiner la définition du courage chez Aristote, cet article pose un certain nombre de questions de procédure. (i) Comment Aristote s’y prend-il pour construire la définition du courage dans sa philosophie morale et politique? Suit-il réellement la procédure de rassemblement et de division qu’il a héritée de Platon, mais qu’il a aussi révisée et continué à prôner dans ses développements théoriques sur la définition? (ii) La définition du courage que pose Aristote a-t-elle la structure qu’il recommande, (...) sur laquelle il insiste même, dans ses écrits théoriques? Je soutiens que tel est bien le cas, en demandant dès lors (iii) pourquoi Aristote inclut, dans chacune de ses discussions sur le courage, une section qui porte sur la manière de distinguer les états moraux qui peuvent ressembler au courage – qui pourraient même être appelés courage par certaines personnes (malavisées) – du courage à proprement parler. Une question finale est ainsi suggérée: (iv) la manière dont Aristote procède démontre-t-elle qu’il s’assigne pour tâche, en définissant le courage, d’expliquer comment ses contemporains utilisaient le concept et le terme dans les faits? En d’autres termes, Aristote décrit-il simplement l’usage contemporain du terme (offrant ainsi, pourrait-on dire, une définition nominale), ou est-il en train de produire la justification d’un idéal normatif? (shrink)

In the 1930s, the Bengali philosopher K. C. Bhattacharyya proposed a new theory of rasa, or aesthetic emotion, according to which aesthetic emotions are feelings that have other feelings as their intentional objects. This paper articulates how Bhattacharyya’s theory offers a novel solution to the puzzle of how it is both possible and rational to enjoy the kind of negative emotions that are inspired by tragic and sorrowful tales. The new solution is distinct from the conversion and compensation views that (...) dominate the existing literature, and it derives its significance from how it ties aesthetic experience to self-awareness. (shrink)

Combining in-depth analysis with strikingly apt examples of the role that courage plays in the life of human beings, this major contribution to moral philosophy argues that courage is necessary to personal achievement as well as to the common good of a civic community. Bauhn insists that courage is necessary for reinforcing people's understanding of themselves as autonomous agents, which is in turn necessary for countering widespread feelings of alienation and depression. He defines courage as the (...) ability to confront fear, but crucially distinguishes a variety of fears that give rise to different types of courage. (shrink)

Cet article se propose d’étudier comment Platon, Aristote et Thucydide participent à la remise en question du rôle prépondérant accordé au courage dans le domaine militaire avant la guerre du Péloponnèse. Le courage n’est rien sans le savoir ni l’expérience. Telle est la thèse que ces trois auteurs déclinent chacun à leur manière, qu’il s’agisse pour Platon d’interroger la dimension intellectuelle du courage, pour Thucydide d’établir la complémentarité du courage et de l’expérience, ou, pour Aristote, de (...) faire de la connaissance des particuliers qu’est l’expérience le premier critère dans la désignation des stratèges. (shrink)

Courage is dangerous. If it is defined in traditional ways, as a set of dispositions to overcome fear, to oppose obstacles, to perform difficult or dangerous actions, its claim to be a virtue is questionable. Unlike the virtue of justice, or a sense of proportion, traditional courage does not itself determine what is to be done, let alone assure that it is worth doing. If we retain the traditional conception of courage and its military connotations–overcoming and combat–we (...) should be suspicious of it. Instead of automatically classifying it as a virtue, attempting to develop and exercise it, we should become alert to its dangers. And yet and yet. There is an aspect of traditional courage that serves us: we require the capacities and traits that enable us to persist in acting well under stress, to endure hardships when following our judgments about what is best is difficult or dangerous. If courage is checked, redefined as the virtue that enables virtue–the various sets of dispositions, whatever they may be, that make us resolute in worthy, difficult action–then we need not fear the dangers of courage. We need rather to reform it by diversifying it, as a heterogeneous variety of traits that enable us to act well under stress, against the natural movements of self-protection. (shrink)

Patricia White; Educating Courageous Citizens, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 67–74, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-.

The things I wish to say here are relatively few and simple. Reflection on certain moral phenomena suggests, by way of a rather loose dialectical argument, a certain traditional theory of the nature of virtue. This is the notion that virtue consists, partly, of acting on the basis of some principle. If we do not assume in advance some narrow conception of what principles are like, this theory can provide us with a plausible account of the virtue of courage. (...) If we take it seriously and follow its implications where they lead us we can learn something, not only about virtue, but about the nature of principle as well. (shrink)

An important question about the nature of courage is whether it is a form of self-control. In this paper I argue that there are different kinds of courage and therefore the question whether courage is a form of self-control cannot be given a uniform answer. Courage exhibited in all cases may be classified as either spontaneous or deliberative courage. Spontaneous courage is not a form of self-control and usually is called for in emergency situations. (...) It results from long-term moral cultivation, not a mindless impulse. Deliberative courage is usually shown in nonemergency situations. It may or may not involve self-control. In general, other things being equal, courage without exercising self-control is morally preferable. The absence of self-control is a necessary condition for ideal courage but ordinary courage is always accompanied by the exercise of will power. (shrink)

An important question about the nature of courage is whether it is a form of self-control. In this paper I argue that there are different kinds of courage and therefore the question whether courage is a form of self-control cannot be given a uniform answer. Courage exhibited in all cases may be classified as either spontaneous or deliberative courage. Spontaneous courage is not a form of self-control and usually is called for in emergency situations. (...) It results from long-term moral cultivation, not a mindless impulse. Deliberative courage is usually shown in nonemergency situations. It may or may not involve self-control. In general, other things being equal, courage without exercising self-control is morally preferable. The absence of self-control is a necessary condition for ideal courage but ordinary courage is always accompanied by the exercise of will power. (shrink)