The editors of this volume have brought together a distinguished and truly diverse group of contributors to examine how all sorts of knowledges have been ...

One of the most dominant approaches to semantics for relevant (and many paraconsistent) logics is the Routley-Meyer semantics involving a ternary relation on points. To some (many?), this ternary relation has seemed like a technical trick devoid of an intuitively appealing philosophical story that connects it up with conditionality in general. In this paper, we respond to this worry by providing three different philosophical accounts of the ternary relation that correspond to three conceptions of conditionality. We close by briefly discussing (...) a general conception of conditionality that may unify the three given conceptions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Ecological Ethics: An IntroductionDavid Keller (bio)Patrick Curry, Ecological Ethics: An Introduction. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2007, 173pages.Were I in Bath having drinks with Patrick Curry, we would have much to agree about. Explaining his choice of title of his book, Ecological Ethics, he rightly points out that the more common descriptor "environmental ethics" presupposes a dualism between human beings and the nonhuman environment—an assumption which is itself anthropocentric (...) (p. 4). For philosophers interested in studying the human/ nonhuman dynamic, the legitimacy of anthropocentrism is itself an open question. Because the word 'ecology' treats humans, as biota, as integral parts of ecological systems, the phrase "ecological ethics" is less presumptuous and hence more accurate. The word 'ecological' also has the benefit of conveying the message that the subject is notgoing to involve extending moral considerability from humans out into the "environment." Instead, ecological systems as the locus of value provide the starting point for the elaboration of ethics (p. 2). For Curry, as for Leopold (1960) and Callicott (1989), "ecological community" is coextensive with the ethical community.To correlate the ethical community with the biotic community within the rubric of "ecological ethics" is nothing novel. Curry's claim that "there is something ancient about an ecological ethic" (p. 7) got me thinking: [End Page 153]prior to Abrahamic monotheism and Greek rationalism, ancient peoples, particularly nomadic hunter-gatherers, probably considered themselves as integral parts of what encompassed them, moving with herds, in concert with meteorological and seasonal changes, seeing themselves as one amongst other living beings. They probably did not see themselves apart from the "environment" as we have learned to do. Then with the advent of agriculture, linear furrows and controlled inundations must have fostered an addictive sense of security from flood and famine. Later, the innovations of industrial civilization further distanced us from the caprice of nature's wild vicissitudes. Yet that comfort comes at the expense of lost awareness of our responsibilities as bioticcitizens. Therefore, Curry says, following Sylvan (1973), we need a new ecological ethic since traditional Western morality "is no longer up to the job" (ibid.).Curry remarks that ethics, cast in this light, is not something "optional," something to be addressed after one's belly is full, debts settled, and lodging secured. Rather, ethics cuts directly to the core of human action, of all human activity (p. 5)—a claim reminiscent of Socrates' exhortation to Thrasymachus that it is no small matter that they are discussing, nothing of less importance than the right way to live one's life (Plato 2005, p. 603).Over the first sips of ale, I would praise him for giving his book a simple and straightforward structure that makes a challenging subject accessible, especially to students. After laying down the groundwork of basic concepts in moral philosophy (chapter 3)—objectivism versus relativism, the problem of the is/ought gap, religious morality and environmental philosophy (domination, stewardship, and managerialism), and virtue and rule-based ethics (chapter 4)—Curry addresses axiology (chapter 5). Are humans the sole locus of value (anthropocentrism), or are there other entities worthy of some sort of moral consideration who themselves do not carry the burden of moral responsibility (zoocentrism, biocentrism, ecocentrism)? Curry answers the latter in the affirmative, arguing that ontological interconnectedness of humans with other living beings within ecological systems discloses that something greater than humanity is the locus of value (p. 46).The most useful part of the book for my students out in Utah would be the middle chapters (6–8) in which Curry casts degrees of nonanthropocentrism [End Page 154]in shades of green. These shades range from light green or "shallow" anthropocentric ethics such Bookchin's Social Ecology (p. 50), Hardin's Lifeboat Ethics (pp. 52–54), and mainstream environmentalism (p. 51), through medium green ethics based on the extension of traditional human-oriented moral philosophy to nonhumans such as Singer's Animal Liberation (pp. 56–59), Regan's Animal Rights (pp. 59–60), and Taylor's Biocentrism (pp. 60–62). Curry proceeds to the dark green ethics of ecocentrism, such as Land Ethics (pp. 65–68), the Gaia Hypothesis (pp. 68–71... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Ecological Ethics: An IntroductionDavid Keller (bio)Patrick Curry, Ecological Ethics: An Introduction. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2007, 173pages.Were I in Bath having drinks with Patrick Curry, we would have much to agree about. Explaining his choice of title of his book, Ecological Ethics, he rightly points out that the more common descriptor "environmental ethics" presupposes a dualism between human beings and the nonhuman environment—an assumption which is itself anthropocentric (...) (p. 4). For philosophers interested in studying the human/ nonhuman dynamic, the legitimacy of anthropocentrism is itself an open question. Because the word 'ecology' treats humans, as biota, as integral parts of ecological systems, the phrase "ecological ethics" is less presumptuous and hence more accurate. The word 'ecological' also has the benefit of conveying the message that the subject is notgoing to involve extending moral considerability from humans out into the "environment." Instead, ecological systems as the locus of value provide the starting point for the elaboration of ethics (p. 2). For Curry, as for Leopold (1960) and Callicott (1989), "ecological community" is coextensive with the ethical community.To correlate the ethical community with the biotic community within the rubric of "ecological ethics" is nothing novel. Curry's claim that "there is something ancient about an ecological ethic" (p. 7) got me thinking: [End Page 153]prior to Abrahamic monotheism and Greek rationalism, ancient peoples, particularly nomadic hunter-gatherers, probably considered themselves as integral parts of what encompassed them, moving with herds, in concert with meteorological and seasonal changes, seeing themselves as one amongst other living beings. They probably did not see themselves apart from the "environment" as we have learned to do. Then with the advent of agriculture, linear furrows and controlled inundations must have fostered an addictive sense of security from flood and famine. Later, the innovations of industrial civilization further distanced us from the caprice of nature's wild vicissitudes. Yet that comfort comes at the expense of lost awareness of our responsibilities as bioticcitizens. Therefore, Curry says, following Sylvan (1973), we need a new ecological ethic since traditional Western morality "is no longer up to the job" (ibid.).Curry remarks that ethics, cast in this light, is not something "optional," something to be addressed after one's belly is full, debts settled, and lodging secured. Rather, ethics cuts directly to the core of human action, of all human activity (p. 5)—a claim reminiscent of Socrates' exhortation to Thrasymachus that it is no small matter that they are discussing, nothing of less importance than the right way to live one's life (Plato 2005, p. 603).Over the first sips of ale, I would praise him for giving his book a simple and straightforward structure that makes a challenging subject accessible, especially to students. After laying down the groundwork of basic concepts in moral philosophy (chapter 3)—objectivism versus relativism, the problem of the is/ought gap, religious morality and environmental philosophy (domination, stewardship, and managerialism), and virtue and rule-based ethics (chapter 4)—Curry addresses axiology (chapter 5). Are humans the sole locus of value (anthropocentrism), or are there other entities worthy of some sort of moral consideration who themselves do not carry the burden of moral responsibility (zoocentrism, biocentrism, ecocentrism)? Curry answers the latter in the affirmative, arguing that ontological interconnectedness of humans with other living beings within ecological systems discloses that something greater than humanity is the locus of value (p. 46).The most useful part of the book for my students out in Utah would be the middle chapters (6–8) in which Curry casts degrees of nonanthropocentrism [End Page 154]in shades of green. These shades range from light green or "shallow" anthropocentric ethics such Bookchin's Social Ecology (p. 50), Hardin's Lifeboat Ethics (pp. 52–54), and mainstream environmentalism (p. 51), through medium green ethics based on the extension of traditional human-oriented moral philosophy to nonhumans such as Singer's Animal Liberation (pp. 56–59), Regan's Animal Rights (pp. 59–60), and Taylor's Biocentrism (pp. 60–62). Curry proceeds to the dark green ethics of ecocentrism, such as Land Ethics (pp. 65–68), the Gaia Hypothesis (pp. 68–71... (shrink)

In his paper "Noneism or Allism" David Lewis argued that Richard Sylvan's rehabilitation of Meinong's theory of objects was not a noneist one but rather an allist, that is, that all objects whatsoever actually exist and thus Meinong and Sylvan are among the greatest "entity-multipliers". But this is exactly what Sylvan tried to show is not the case. I'll argue that Lewis' attack ultimately fails in re-instating an old serious misinterpretation of Meinongian metaphysics. In doing so (...) he deflects attention away from the substance of Sylvan's position and casts him as the defender of something unintelligible. (shrink)

In his well-known paper on Euclid’s geometry, Ken Manders sketches an argument against conceiving the diagrams of the Elements in ‘semantic’ terms, that is, against treating them as representations—resting his case on Euclid’s striking use of ‘impossible’ diagrams in some proofs by contradiction. This paper spells out, clarifies and assesses Manders’s argument, showing that it only succeeds against a particular semantic view of diagrams and can be evaded by adopting others, but arguing that Manders nevertheless makes a compelling case that (...) semantic analyses ought to be relegated to a secondary role for the study of mathematical practices. (shrink)

I develop an account of how mathematized theories in physics represent physical systems, in response to the frequent claim that any such account must presuppose a non-mathematized, and usually linguistic, description of the system represented. The account I develop contains a circularity, in that representation is a mathematical relation between the models of a theory and the system as represented by some other model --- but I argue that this circularity is not vicious, in any case refers in linguistic accounts (...) of meaning and representation, and is simply a consequence of the fact that we have no unmediated, representation-independent access to the world. (shrink)

El presente artículo es un estudio sobre las diferenciaciones (aqsām) del amor, uno de los puntos más importantes del principal escrito que Ibn ʿArabī dedicó a la cuestión amorosa, el capítulo 178 de Las Iluminaciones de La Meca (al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya). A través de un juego de oscilación y equilibrio entre perspectivas ontológicas y epistemológicas aparentemente enfrentadas –incomparabilidad/similaridad, oculto/manifiesto, unidad/multiplicidad, espíritu/cuerpo– y un recurrente manejo del lenguaje de las alusiones (išāra), el maestro andalusí distingue entre amor divino (ilāhī), espiritual (rūḥānī), natural (...) (ṭabī‘ī) y elemental (ʿunṣurī). Se ofrece un análisis y comentario del texto akbarí que pretende aclarar la especificidad de cada una de estas nociones, así como su íntima relación con el discurso amoroso del autor. (shrink)

Na poti do sem sem razmišljal, kako začeti to srečanje – in bolj sem razmišljal, bolj se mi je zdelo absurdno, da bi uvodoma predstavljal nekoga, ki ga vsi poznate. Pač pa lahko povem anekdoto, za katero mogoče ne veste vsi. V Društvu za antične in humanistične študije smo predlani prišli na idejo, da bi profesorja Gantarja predlagali za neko drugo nagrado, ki je imela med obrazci tudi obrazec za soglasje predlaganega. Naredil sem osnovnošolsko napako ter pisal profesorju, če ga (...) lahko izpolni in podpiše. On pa mi je odpisal, da je nagrad v življenju dobil preveč in da prosi, naj ga ne predlagamo. Eksplicitno izraženi zahtevi se je težko upreti. Smo pa v društvu tudi poznavalci Otona Župančiča, ki je, kot veste, napisal, da gre osel enkrat na led, »baš to je oslovstvo«, in da modrec ve, kako je »danes pal«, jutri bo pa plesal po njem. Ko smo tako profesorja predlagali naslednjič, tokrat za Prešernovo nagrado, ga nismo nič spraševali. Na tem mestu bi se zato rad zahvalil Miljani Cunta s Slovenske matice, ki je vse to koordinirala, in SAZU, ki je predlog takoj podprla; resnično sem vesel, da ob tej priložnosti lahko sediva tukaj. (shrink)

This paper revisits Giorgio Agamben’s text The Time That Remains and through a comparative analysis contrasts the author’s reading of St Paul’s Romans to relevant Derridean thematics prevalent in the text. Specific themes include language, the law, and the subject. I illustrate how Agamben attempts to revitalise the idea of philosophical anthropology by breaking away from the deconstructive approach. Agamben argues that language is an experience but is currently in a state of nihilism. Consequently, the subject has become lost; or, (...) more specifically, the subject and its object have not disappeared in language but through language. The resuscitation of experience is thus required to defeat this condition: only in language does the subject have its site and origin. Unlike deconstruction, which highlights an inherent paradox within a situation unearthing a questionable foundation, Agamben argues that, by investigating the “exception,” one finds neither a norm nor an inherent truth of the situation, but the confusion which surrounds them both. (shrink)

The long 19th century was a period of many developments and technical innovations in agriculture and animal biology, during which actors sought to incorporate new practices in light of new information. By the middle of the century, however, while heredity steadily became the dominant concept in animal husbandry, some policies related to livestock improvement in Brazil seemed to have been tailored following a climate-deterministic concept established in the mid-18th century by the French naturalist Georges-Louis Leclerc, the Comte de Buffon. His (...) theory of animal degeneration posited, among other things, the necessity of recurrent crossbreeding to preserve animal species living in nonnative environments from climate-induced degeneration. Although largely discredited by the early 19th century, the teachings of the French naturalist seem to have found supporters in a Brazilian program to modernize national agriculture through the application of the natural sciences. Herein I examine the revival of Buffon’s theories in that government-sponsored program to improve animal husbandry and breeding techniques, including actual applications of this theory in the real world. Ultimately, I argue that Buffon’s theory of degeneration was used to tailor public policies and funding for the improvement of domesticated animals in Brazil between 1856 and 1860. (shrink)

Libertarianism has a problem, perhaps an insurmountable one, and its problem lies squarely in the domain from which it is sourced: the intellectual and political elite of the West. As such, it rests on an ontological viewpoint far outside the purview and experience of quotidian man. Furthermore, it rests on an epistemology of the person as sovereign, Natural Law, which requires a concomitant education or understanding of the Classics, or at least self-awareness and the ability to think logically. Many non-intellectuals (...) are either uninterested or incapable of following the Libertarian arguments of personal sovereignty and instead submit. This unconscious submission to the authority of a government, father figure, or other self-appointed “authority” relieves the individual of the psychological pain of breaking out of the herd. C. G. Jung (1875-1961) was adamant that to be an individual is a radical act: “To develop one’s own personality is indeed an unpopular undertaking, a deviation that is highly uncongenial to the herd, an eccentricity smelling of the cenobite, as it seems to the outsider [11, Para. 298]. Further, Alexander Hamilton (1755 or 1747-1804) noted that the elite are more than happy to have the masses submit to their authority without question as it advances their control: “a fondness for power is implanted in most men, and it is natural to abuse it when acquired” [9]. The rest of this article explores this psychosis of authority and how Libertarianism suffers in popularity as a result. (shrink)

The writings of William H. Whyte do not loom large in the literature of my field: environmental ethics, the branch of ethics devoted to consideration of whether and how there are moral reasons for protecting non-human animals and the larger natural environment. Environmental ethics is a very new field of inquiry, only found in academic philosophy departments since the early 1970s. While there is no accepted reading list of indispensable literature in environmental ethics, certainly any attempt to create such a (...) list would begin with Henry David Thoreau, John Muir, Aldo Leopold, Rachel Carson, and a more recent handful of senior scholars who had been writing on these topics early on, such as J. Baird Callicott, Val Plumwood, Peter Singer, Richard Sylvan, Tom Regan, and Holmes Rolston III (for a review of contemporary environmental ethics, see Light 2002, Palmer 2003, and Wenz 2001). (shrink)

This book was written with three aims in mind. The first was to provide a reasonably concise account of Hume's social and political thought that might help students coming to it for the first time. The second aim was to say something about the relationship between philosophy and politics, with explicit attention to Hume, but implicit reference to a general issue. The third is to offer an integrated account of Hume's thought. The book accounts for the varying interpretation of the (...) conservative and liberalist traditions by arguing that the distinction between liberalism and conservatism had little application in mid-18th-century Britain. Hume's ideology contained elements that we should now identify as conservative and liberal respectively, and so by selective emphasis it is possible to make him seem a thoroughbred conservative or liberal according to choice. These two problems the relationship between Hume's philosophy and his politics, and the ideological character of his thought are pursued through the first and second parts of the book respectively. (shrink)

This article explores the relationship between the philosophy of the limit of Eugenio Trías and the sufism of Ibn ʿArabī. Firstly, it explains the function of the philosophy of religion in the triasian system and why the andalusian master has a privileged position. Secondly, it presents some essential aspects of the akbarian doctrine obtured by the philosophy of limit, as the declaration of the unity of Being, the path of servanthood, the transit from the sudden passion of love to the (...) spiritual love, the spiritual knighthood and the station of no-station. All of them share a common element: the trascendence of the egoic and the interest on the other as other. Finally, the article defends that Trias obturates the andalusian master doctrine due to the influence of Henry Corbin and mainly to the own limitations of its own philosophical project. The absent Ibn ʿArabī will be its shadow. (shrink)

In recent scholarship, a widely agreed upon definition of post-truth has proved elusive, particularly because the term is used in tandem with so-named alternative facts, fake news, misinformation, and references to an anti-expert, anti-intellectual climate. This paper will consider recent educators’ efforts in the Australasian region to address the political and cultural disruption that post-truth has evoked, by inquiring into how their pedagogy mirrors or differs from that used in public spaces by protest movements. In the first section, scholarship on (...) post-truth will be examined for how it constitutes a form of revisionist history, in which the present has been corrupted over time by comparison to a more idealised and distant past. The second section will focus on how theories about the construction of knowledge, such as Latour’s notion of hybridised modernity and notions of historical consciousness, can be used to frame forms of activism as means to educate the public and disrupt the dominant political ideologies. The focus in the last section will be on examining how educators might enable learners’ critical literacy so they can accommodate and overcome the negativity, cynicism, and disempowerment which characterises a post-truth paradigm. (shrink)

Doctors’ strikes are legally permissible in the UK, with the situation differing in other countries. But are they morally permissible? Doug McConnell and Darren Mann have systematically attempted to dismiss the arguments for the moral impermissibility of doctors’ strikes and creatively attempted to provide further moral justification for them. Unfortunately for striking doctors, they fail to achieve this. Meanwhile, junior doctors’ strikes have continued in the UK through 2023 and have now extended into 2024. In this response, which focuses on (...) the UK situation and specifically junior doctors’ strikes in the National Health Service (NHS) in England, I will demonstrate a central problem with their arguments—namely that they underplay the harms caused by prolonged doctors’ strikes by ignoring the harms to patients with cancer. This weakens their conclusion that strikes are morally permissible in terms of the conditions and thresholds they set. I then provide a psychological critique of their justification for strikes in terms of the interests of the public. It follows that invoking the controversial concept of supererogatory action is ungrounded but also absurd when you consider time-critical cancer care. If those representing striking doctors wish to maintain a modicum of moral respectability, they should mitigate for patients with cancer and negotiate reasonably and with urgency. (shrink)

George Clough‘s donation of old master prints raised the Whitworth Institute‘s collection to international standing. Simultaneously, it presented Manchester with a viewing experience that was possibly unique in Britain, and placed on permanent display one of the nations finest collections of engravings, etchings and woodcuts so as to offer a visual history of the medium of print. Clough had a special interest in Marcantonio Raimondi, collecting over forty prints by him at a time when such works commanded high prices. This (...) article examines the history and composition of Clough‘s collection and its place in the collecting culture of northern England, and of Manchester in particular, around 1900. (shrink)

Amongst philosophers, there is ongoing debate about what successful event remembering requires. Causal theorists argue that it requires a causal connection to the past event. Simulation theorists argue, in contrast, that successful remembering requires only production by a reliable memory system. Both views must contend with the fact that people can remember past events they have experienced with varying degrees of accuracy. The debate between them thus concerns not only the account of successful remembering, but how each account explains the (...) various forms of memory error as well. Advancing the debate therefore must include exploration of the cognitive architecture implicated by each view and whether that architecture is capable of producing the range of event representations seen in human remembering. Our paper begins by exploring these architectures, framing casual theories as best suited to the storage of event instances and simulation theories as best suited to store schemas. While each approach has its advantages, neither can account for the full range of our event remembering abilities. We then propose a novel hybrid theory that combines both instance and schematic elements in the event memory. In addition, we provide an implementation of our theory in the context of a cognitive architecture. We also discuss an agent we developed using this system and its ability to remember events in the blocks world domain. (shrink)

Ursula K. Le Guin’s classic work of anarchist literature, _The Dispossessed_ (1974), is preoccupied with the issue of imprisonment. This is hardly surprising given anarchism’s longstanding critical engagement with the prison as state apparatus. For classical anarchists, the prison represents one of the most vile and visible examples of state repression. However, while the abolition of prisons constitutes one of the fundamental goals of anarchism, the alternatives put forth by classical anarchist thinkers risk perpetuating the underlying power relations of carceral (...) justice by encouraging social shaming and the policing of norms. The anarchist society of _The Dispossessed_ uses these techniques to discourage the accumulation of power in order to create an egalitarian society. Unfortunately, these same techniques encourage a conformity that hinders other anarchist values, such as creativity and individual self-determination. In essence, the anarchist society depicted in the novel replaces the literal prison with a different form of imprisonment—the social prison, which continues the repressive function of the state through different means. By creating an “ambiguous” anarchist utopia, Le Guin anticipates the critiques of classical anarchism formulated by poststructural and postmodern anarchist theorists. These critiques are most evident in the theme of imprisonment that threads throughout the novel. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Abnegation as Key to Providence:Six Spiritual Theologians on ProvidenceDavid W. FagerbergIf a contest were held for the most difficult doctrine, I suppose it would be a toss-up between Trinity, Incarnation, and transubstantiation. But if the contest were over the most awkward doctrine, I predict that providence would take the prize. We believe it; we want to believe it; we find it difficult to believe it. In the continuing friction (...) between Christian faith and a modern worldview, the rivalry seems sharpest between providence and modernity's footings in secularity (no divine reality), autonomy (no divine interference), and chance (no divine steering).Several reactions might follow. One might ignore the issue; one might house the viewpoints in two heterogeneous spheres; one could believe the one but live under the regulation of the other; perhaps one would call in philosophy to conduct a workaround by metaphysics, or linguistic analysis of determinism and freedom. I do not propose to follow any of these paths, but to rather turn to a different resource, namely, consult some classic Catholic spiritual writers to examine how they treat the doctrine of providence. They believed it; they wanted to believe it; they found less difficulty in believing it than we do. In fact, they seem to find joy in the doctrine of providence. My suspicion as to why this is so is because they place the difficulty of believing providence in the heart, and not in the head, and so attunement to providence is less an intellectual struggle and more an interior accomplishment. They gazed fixedly at what God wants for the soul. Most of the actions taken by a parent might be misunderstood by the child if the child does not know the actions were designed to encourage and support coming to maturity. [End Page 343] Most of the actions taken by God might be misunderstood by the soul if the soul does not believe these graces were designed to bring about deification. Providence is the execution of God's design for the perfection of a human being as a mystical liturgist living in union with him.I have recently been researching a cast of characters I have been calling "theologians of liturgical abnegation," for whom providence is undergirded by an act of liturgical abnegation.1 Although all speak of providence, six of these authors have given significant attention to the doctrine of providence, either in a separate monograph or in large portions of their corpus, and for an understanding of providence I propose to listen to these spiritual writers instead of to the philosophers. Providence is being "abyssed" in love (de Sales), and it requires particular and personal faith (Grou), which means we do not choose our own crosses (Fénelon), but instead make trustful surrender (Saint-Jure and de la Colombière) because we prefer God's will to our own (de Caussade).Francis de Sales—Being Abyssed in Love"It is our duty to adore this amiable Providence, by casting ourselves into its arms."2 We cannot worship God as God without acknowledging his providence. The obligation to daily liturgize God with adoration, glory, and thanksgiving requires delight in his daily providence, but such acknowledgment is not primarily a rational act, it is an act of liturgical abnegation that consists of casting ourselves into God's arms in a way that will contribute to his greater glory. Even sorrow, trial, and tempest can contribute to God's glory. "I am expecting a great tempest to burst over me, but I await it joyously; and looking to the Providence of God, I hope that this will conduce to His greater glory, and the more perfect repose of my soul."3 Providence operates differently in each life because God desires a different measure of [End Page 344] glory from each life. If we are confused about providence's work in a life, it is because we are ignorant of the glory to which each life will contribute. Our life-liturgies will not be the same, but they will each delight God, who is their source. "Every one will see and love him, according to the particular measure of glory which the divine Providence... (shrink)

"This paper investigates musical relationships in the case of the early mother-infant dyadic interactions. To accomplish this task, it is first needed to come back to some important authors from the tradition of both phenomenology and psychoanalysis. The theories of Husserl, Schutz and Taipale will prove themselves to be useful. Secondly, I shall deepen the investigation of the early mother-infant interactions through the prism of theories coming from Winnicott, Stern and Thomas Fuchs. My main task will be to demonstrate that (...) these early interactions have a musical quality, similar to Colwyn Trevarthen’s thematization of communicative musicality. To prove my point, I have to first establish the features that make these early interactions be musical-like. Winnicott’s potential space and the example of babbling will follow my argumentation. I will also stress on the importance of the face-to-face interaction through affect attunement and mutual tuning-in. All these interactions are modes of being-with-another (Stern). An example will be found throughout this paper, namely a specific mode of being-with-another, which was called by Winnicott the primary maternal preoccupation. Keywords: musical relationships, babbling, potential space, face-to-face interaction, mutual tuning-in, affect attunement, primary maternal preoccupation, synchronization, rhythm, being-with. ". (shrink)