In this article E. Falque offers an original reading of the Augustinian epithet “I am a weight to myself” (oneri mihi sum, conf. 10.28). The question for Falque is not to determine whether Augustine belongs to the history of metaphysics (as is J.-L. Marión’s interest), but to determine what Augustine’s “weight of life” does to phenomenology in the backlash (‘le choc en retour’), or the after theafter, of metaphysics. Specifically, foliowing M. Heidegger, Falque finds the “weight of (...) life” particularly relevant to frame the post-metaphysical experience of memory and the question of pain. Overall, the infamous Augustinian “restless heart” finquietum, conf. 1.1) ineludes, through the “weight of life”, an unquenchable dynamic which is the divine action in human beings. The “weight of life” is such in the finitude of human existence that there always remains restlessness in rest. Thus, Falque recovers the restlessness of rest through an analysis of the backlash of the “weight of life” in the after the after of metaphysics. (shrink)

O Breviloquium de São Boaventura é, certamente, um “breve tratado” ou uma “pequena suma” de teologia, mas é também uma oração, mesmo uma liturgia. Para convencer-se disto, basta abrí-lo em seu Prólogo - que refere-se muito explicitamente à Epístola aos Efésios: “Eu me ajoelho diante do Pai de nosso senhor Jesus Cristo, de quem toda paternidade celeste e terrestre tira seu nome (Ep 14, 15)”. Mas os “joelhos do coração” são igualmente os “joelhos do pensamento”, ao menos para o franciscano. (...) O Doutor Seráfico é, antes de tudo, um “teólogo de joelhos”, e talvez esta seja uma de suas maiores originalidades, pois se há uma Entrada de Deus em teologia no pensamento de São Boaventura assim como nós o demonstramos alhures, é precisamente nesse aspecto que o Breviloquium é uma “suma de teologia revelada”. (shrink)

En s'appuyant sur le prologue et la première partie du ¤¤Breviloquium¤¤ de Bonaventure, l'auteur étudie la question de l'entrée de Dieu en philosophie comme en théologie, autrement dit son mode de manifestation à l'homme.

L'oeuvre du philosophe Paul Gilbert, jésuite belge professeur de métaphysique depuis vingt-cinq ans à l'Université Grégorienne, est considérable et mérite d'être mieux connue. Après avoir étudié les écrits de saint Anselme (Dire l'ineffable, 1984), Paul Gilbert a questionné la métaphysique classique, sous l'influence de la philosophie réflexive (La Simplicité du principe, 1994). Il a ensuite souligné les chances offertes à la réflexion fondamentale par l'analogie, thème classique mais oublié (La Patience d'être, 1996, et Sapere e sperare, 2003). Plus récemment, il (...) a abordé la question de la violence, ce mal- être si commun (Violence et compassion, 2009). En 1997 déjà, son travail a été récompensé du prix Cardinal Mercier de l'U.C.Louvain-la-Neuve. Durant de nombreuses années, Paul Gilbert a été professeur invité à l'Institut catholique de Paris. A l'occasion de son éméritat dans cette institution, un colloque y a été organisé. Dans leurs communications, S. Bonanni, Ph. Capelle-Dumont, S. D'Agostino, E. Gabellieri, J. de Gramont, 1. Malaguti, R. Repole et E. Tourpe reprennent et développent l'élaboration de la pensée de Paul Gilbert. Ce dernier fait écho à chacune d'elles et, dans un exposé final, retrace son propre itinéraire intellectuel. (shrink)

Reler o sentido e o teor do argumento de Anselmo à luz de sua vida oferece uma rica perspectiva sobre a famosa fórmula Deus est aliquid quo nihil majus cogitari possit – comumente traduzida: “Deus é algo do qual nada maior pode ser pensado”. Ela só receberá seu verdadeiro sentido para hoje à medida que descrever, por um lado, a experiência comum que se pretende aqui [(I) hermenêutica] e mostrar, por outro lado, o tipo de manifestação que aqui se considera (...) [(II) fenomenologia]. À luz dessa dupla leitura – tanto hermenêutica como fenomenológica – o célebre argumento do Proslogion reencontrará a sua verdadeira relevância para o nosso tempo. Evitando nos restringirmos às suas leituras puramente confessionais (K. Barth, M. Corbin) ou inteiramente laicas (R. Roques, P. Vignaux, A. de Libera, K. Flash, etc.), convém, ao contrário, devolver-lhe o seu teor “teofânico”, para que possa ser visto por uns e outros através do prisma de uma experiência vivida, seja ela apenas conceitual ou também religiosa. Há mística na filosofia pura e simples, se a estendermos a um tipo de experiência que nos envolve por completo. (shrink)

Un - combat amoureux - (Heidegger) ou une - lutte entre les penseurs - (Husserl) determine le destin de l'histoire de la philosophie. Au coeur du debat avec la phenomenologie francaise, cet ouvrage engage une veritable disputatio philosophique ancree sur ledit -tournant theologique de la phenomenologie francaise-. Assure que l'heure n'est plus au simple choc frontal, mais a un veritable dialogue et confrontation entre les disciplines, ce livre tente de montrer en quoi une -phenomenologie de la limite- peut aussi servir (...) de contrepoint a la -phenomenologie de la revelation-, et la tourner davantage vers une pensee de l'-i ncarnation- ou de l'-e xperience-. Jacques Derrida, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion, Michel Henry, Jean-Louis Chretien, Jean-Yves Lacoste, Claude Romano et Jean Greisch, marquent les differents etapes de cette -traversee- point par point articulee, et en quete d'un respondeo a meme d'autrement decider.". (shrink)

La philosophie, et en particulier la phénoménologie, se trouve aujourd'hui en France dans une situation pour le moins paradoxale dans son vis-à-vis avec la théologie. Alors que les uns e - accusent les phénoménologues d'un prétendu tournant théologique et que les autres s'en défendent comme si toute théologisation devait entacher leur intégrité, nul ne tente délibérément la traversée en prenant en charge les deux disciplines comme telles. En osant " passer le Rubicon " avec cette conviction que " plus on (...) théologise, mieux on philosophe ", cet ouvrage tente donc de mettre fin à la trop fréquente position de " chiens de faïence " et propose un " choc en retour " de la théologie sur la phénoménologie. Loin des philosophies du " seuil " ou du " saut ", une véritable rencontre des disciplines est ici revendiquée, dans l'assurance qu'elles seront mieux distinguées si elles acceptent d'être davantage assumées. Alea jacta est : " le sort en est jeté ", avec audace et peut-être témérité mais en sachant que nul ne pense s'il ne vient à s'exposer. (shrink)

Première partie : Trois chemins. Trois commencements -- Entre sans-nom et nom propre -- L'entre-deux -- Deuxieme partie : Dans ces jours qui sont incertains. Éloge de l'inquiétude : À propos de l'Éloge de la philosophie de Maurice Merleau-Ponty -- La pensée sans autorité : À partir de Blanchot et Wittgenstein -- L'autorité en défaut : sur l'oeuvre de Kierkegaard -- Troisième partie: Vers le nom propre. L'arc herméneutique d'Emmanuel Falque -- Acheminement vers nom : À partir de Jean-Luc (...) Nancy -- Regards sur Celui que est : En marge de Romano Guardini -- Fin: Apologie du Judgment dernier. (shrink)

A reflexão que aqui propomos pretende ser somente uma nota introdutória ao pensamento do filósofo francês Emmanuel Falque, a partir da sua última obra Hors phénomène: Essai aux confins de la phénoménalité. Para tal, partiremos dos pontos fundamentais do seu livro, colocando-o no interior do seu já amplo, vigoroso e maturado projecto filosófico. Assim, esperamos mostrar não só a génese de um pensamento denso e criativo no âmbito da filosofia fenomenológica, e para além-dela, possivelmente, mas também evidenciar alguns horizontes (...) que está obra poderá abrir no âmbito do pensamento contemporâneo. Aventamos aqui a hipótese de que Hors phénomène constitui, de certo modo, um momento charneira ou de inflexão fundamental no percurso filosófico e intelectual do seu autor. Um conceito pensado e forjado a partir da experiência vivida da radical finitude humana, ou melhor, nos confins de toda a fenomenalidade. (shrink)

Growing concern has been expressed that we have entered a “post-truth” era in which each of us willfully believes whatever we choose, aided and abetted by alternative and social media that spin alternative realities for boutique consumption. A prime example of the belief in alternative realities is said to be acceptance of “conspiracy theories”—a term that is often used as a pejorative to indict claims of conspiracy that are so obviously absurd that only the unhinged could believe them. The epistemological (...) standard often involved in this indictment, however—the standard of “obvious” falsity—invites subjectivity in its application, because what is obviously false to one person can be common sense to another. This is not just a truism; considerable research suggests that people’s political beliefs, in general, and their acceptance or rejection of conspiracy theories in particular, tends in large part to be determined by partisan, ideological, and other priors. (shrink)

The notion of fundamentality, as it is used in metaphysics, aims to capture the idea that there is something basic or primitive in the world. This metaphysical notion is related to the vernacular use of “fundamental”, but philosophers have also put forward various technical definitions of the notion. Among the most influential of these is the definition of absolute fundamentality in terms of ontological independence or ungroundedness. Accordingly, the notion of fundamentality is often associated with these two other technical notions.

1 Non-reductive physicalists deny that there is any explanation of mentality in purely physical terms, but do not deny that the mental is entirely determined by and constituted out of underlying physical structures. There are important issues about the stability of such a view which teeters on the edge of explanatory reductionism on the one side and dualism on the other (see Kim 1998). 2 Save perhaps for eliminative materialism (see Churchland 1981 for a classic exposition). In fact, however, while.

There have been many attempts to determine what makes a natural kind real, chief among them is the criterion according to which natural kinds must be mind-independent. But it is difficult to specify this criterion: many supposed natural kinds have an element of mind-dependence. I will argue that the mind-independence criterion is nevertheless a good one, if correctly understood: the mind-independence criterion concerns the unification principles for natural kinds. Unification principles determine how natural kinds unify their properties, and only those (...) natural kinds that have a mind-independent unification principle should be considered real. (shrink)

After introducing the new field of cultural evolution, we review a growing body of empirical evidence suggesting that culture shapes what people attend to, perceive and remember as well as how they think, feel and reason. Focusing on perception, spatial navigation, mentalizing, thinking styles, reasoning (epistemic norms) and language, we discuss not only important variation in these domains, but emphasize that most researchers (including philosophers) and research participants are psychologically peculiar within a global and historical context. This rising tide of (...) evidence recommends caution in relying on one’s intuitions or even in generalizing from reliable psychological findings to the species, Homo sapiens. Our evolutionary approach suggests that humans have evolved a suite of reliably developing cognitive abilities that adapt our minds, information-processing abilities and emotions ontogenetically to the diverse culturally-constructed worlds we confront. (shrink)

The title of this paper reflects the fact truthmaking is quite frequently considered to be expressive of realism. What this means, exactly, will become clearer in the course of our discussion, but since we are interested in Armstrong’s work on truthmaking in particular, it is natural to start from a brief discussion of how truthmaking and realism appear to be associated in his work. In this paper, special attention is given to the supposed link between truthmaking and realism, but it (...) is argued that this link should not be taken too seriously, as truthmaking turns out to be, to a large extent, ontologically neutral. Some consequences of this are studied. (shrink)

Feminists note an association of arguing with aggression and masculinity and question the necessity of this connection. Arguing also seems to some to identify a central method of philosophical reasoning, and gendered assumptions and standards would pose problems for the discipline. Can feminine modes of reasoning provide an alternative or supplement? Can overarching epistemological standards account for the benefits of different approaches to arguing? These are some of the prospects for argumentation inside and outside of philosophy that feminists consider. -/- (...) The further concern is that the academic study of argumentation – in philosophy and other disciplines – has failed to account for the type of reasoning needed for social justice movements. What resources for addressing these concerns can be found in informal logic and interdisciplinary argumentation theory? Since part of the perceived problem derives from assuming that arguing is a contest, are more collaborative epistemological frameworks better? Can regular politeness or civility hedge against undesirable tendencies of argumentation? Can “critical thinking” pedagogy involving argument educations answer the needs of social justice? (shrink)

It is now possible to have a child without sexual intercourse. The history of this apparently new statement has been breefly synthetised.The new perspectives open ethical problems for the scientific community and a new social context for single women.

The main aim of this paper is to introduce the logics of evidence and truth $$LET_{K}^+$$ and $$LET_{F}^+$$ together with sound, complete, and decidable six-valued deterministic semantics for them. These logics extend the logics $$LET_{K}$$ and $$LET_{F}^-$$ with rules of propagation of classicality, which are inferences that express how the classicality operator $${\circ }$$ is transmitted from less complex to more complex sentences, and vice-versa. The six-valued semantics here proposed extends the 4 values of Belnap-Dunn logic with 2 more values (...) that intend to represent (positive and negative) reliable information. A six-valued non-deterministic semantics for $$LET_{K}$$ is obtained by means of Nmatrices based on swap structures, and the six-valued semantics for $$LET_{K}^+$$ is then obtained by imposing restrictions on the semantics of $$LET_{K}$$. These restrictions correspond exactly to the rules of propagation of classicality that extend $$LET_{K}$$. The logic $$LET_{F}^+$$ is obtained as the implication-free fragment of $$LET_{K}^+$$. We also show that the 6 values of $$LET_{K}^+$$ and $$LET_{F}^+$$ define a lattice structure that extends the lattice L4 defined by the Belnap-Dunn four-valued logic with the 2 additional values mentioned above, intuitively interpreted as positive and negative reliable information. Finally, we also show that $$LET_{K}^+$$ is Blok-Pigozzi algebraizable and that its implication-free fragment $$LET_{F}^+$$ coincides with the degree-preserving logic of the involutive Stone algebras. (shrink)

Argues that there can be interaction without breaking physical laws: e.g. by basic psychic forces, or by varying physical constants, or especially by arranging fractal trees of physical causation leading to behavior.

Between 1873 and 1876, Felix Klein published a series of papers that he later placed under the rubric anschauliche Geometrie in the second volume of his collected works (1922). The present study attempts not only to follow the course of this work, but also to place it in a larger historical context. Methodologically, Klein’s approach had roots in Poncelet’s principle of continuity, though the more immediate influences on him came from his teachers, Plücker and Clebsch. In the 1860s, Clebsch reworked (...) some of the central ideas in Riemann’s theory of Abelian functions to obtain complicated results for systems of algebraic curves, most published earlier by Hesse and Steiner. These findings played a major role in enumerative geometry, whereas Plücker’s work had a strongly qualitative character that imbued Klein’s early studies. A leitmotif in these works can be seen in the interplay between real curves and surfaces as reflected by their transformational properties. During the early 1870s, Klein and Zeuthen began to explore the possibility of deriving all possible forms for real cubic surfaces as well as quartic curves. They did so using continuity methods reminiscent of Poncelet’s earlier approach. Both authors also relied on visual arguments, which Klein would later advance under the banner of intuitive geometry (anschauliche Geometrie). (shrink)

The thought that empathy plays an important role in moral motivation is almost a platitude of contemporary folk psychology. Parallel themes were mooted in German moral philosophy and aesthetics in the 1700s, and versions of the empathy construct remained prominent in continental accounts of moral motivation through the nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries. This chapter elucidates the Empathic Motivation Hypothesis (EMH) and sets out some of the conceptual and empirical challenges it faces. It distinguishes empathic concern from other dimensions (...) of empathy (e.g., resonance, attunement, distress, and non-empathic concern) and examines the merits of EMH as a developmental thesis, focusing on evidence from psychopathology and attachment theory. (shrink)

For Tamsin Lorraine, the works of Luce Irigaray and Gilles Deleuze open up new ways of thinking about subjectivity. Focusing on the affinities between the theorists' views—while addressing weaknesses of each—she offers both a cogent analysis of their often challenging writings on this topic and an accessible introduction to their philosophical projects. Through her readings she articulates an approach to subjectivity as an embodied, dynamic process, one that speaks to beliefs about personal identity as well as to the practical problems (...) people face in their relations with one another.Lorraine begins by distinguishing between "conceptual" and "corporeal" considerations of subjectivity and by reviewing recent interdisciplinary efforts to theorize the body. She then turns to Irigaray and Deleuze, finding in the former's notion of the "feminine other" and in the latter's, unique conceptions of nomadic thinking inspiration for a model designed to overcome mind/body dualisms. Her analysis of Irigaray and Deleuze suggests a conception of humanity which amounts to a visceral philosophy—a way of thinking that is receptive to the fluxes of dynamic life forces. (shrink)

Discusses the rationality of the Christian religion and examines the philosophical arguments for the existence of God.

This original and lively book explores Greek ideas about health and disease and their influence on Greek thought. Fundamental issues such as causation and responsibility, purification and pollution, mind-body relations and gender differences, authority and the expert and who can challenge them, reality and appearances, good government, happiness, and good and evil themselves are deeply implicated. Using the evidence not just from Greek medical theory and practice but also from epic, lyric, tragedy, historiography, philosophy, and religion, G. E. R. Lloyd (...) offers the first comprehensive account of the influence of Greek thought about health and disease on the Greek imagination. (shrink)