Do our lives have meaning? Should we create more people? Is death bad? Should we commit suicide? Would it be better to be immortal? Should we be optimistic or pessimistic? Since Life, Death, and Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions first appeared, David Benatar's distinctive anthology designed to introduce students to the key existential questions of philosophy has won a devoted following among users in a variety of upper-level and even introductory courses.

We provide a retrospective of 25 years of the International Conference on AI and Law, which was first held in 1987. Fifty papers have been selected from the thirteen conferences and each of them is described in a short subsection individually written by one of the 24 authors. These subsections attempt to place the paper discussed in the context of the development of AI and Law, while often offering some personal reactions and reflections. As a whole, the subsections build into (...) a history of the last quarter century of the field, and provide some insights into where it has come from, where it is now, and where it might go. (shrink)

Barth, K. Ludwig Feuerbach.--Löwith, K. L. Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie.--Bloch, E. Keim und Grundlinie; zu den Elf Thesen von Marx über Feuerbach.--Lorenz, R. Zum Ursprung der Religionstheorie Ludwig Feuerbachs.--Löwith, K. Vermittlung und Unmittelbarkeit bei Hegel, Marx und Feuerbach.--Glasse, J. Barth zu Feuerbach.--Barth, H.-M. Glaube als Projektion.--Sass, H.-M. Argumentationsfiguren in der Kritik an Ludwig Feuerbachs Religions- und Metaphysikkritik.--Bayer, O. Gegen Gott für den Menschen.--Kosing, A. Ludwig Feuerbachs materialistische Erkenntnistheorie.--Finger, O. Von der anthropologisch-materialistischen Religionskritik zur historisch-materialistischen Ideologieanalyse.--Rotenstreich, N. (...) Anthropologie und Sinnlichkeit.--Arvon, H. Feuerbach und die Theologie.--Schmidt, A. Feuerbachs Stellung in der Geschichte des Materialismus.--Thies, E. Philosophie und Wirklichkeit; die Hegelkritik Ludwig Feuerbachs.--Rohrmoser, G. Warum sollen wir uns für Feuerbach interessieren? (shrink)

Cher Monsieur Forsthoff,C’est seulement maintenant que je viens de lire votre article à l’occasion du 70e anniversaire de Carl Schmitt, paru dans Christ und Welt le 17 juillet 1958. Je crois qu’avec cet article vous n’avez rendu service ni à Carl Schmitt ni à vous-même. Mais tous ceux qui ont une attitude critique envers l’œuvre de Carl..

Together, China and India account for almost two fifths of mankind. In purchase power parity terms the Chinese economy is the second largest in the world ahead of Japan, and the Indian economy is the fourth largest ahead of Germany. In less than two decades these two big Asian economies together might account for a quarter of the global product. Currently, however, both countries are still poor.Both countries might outgrow poverty, because potential advantages of backwardness as well as fairly strong (...) domestic investment favor growth. Concerning human capital formation China and India differ. China is much better than India in primary school education. Eradication of analphabetism is in sight in China, but far in the future in India. India, however, is much stronger in tertiary education than China. Another major difference between China and India is their degree of integration in the global economy. China benefits much more from the global division of labor than India does. China attracts much more foreign direct investment, too.In the past fifty years, Chinese economic performance was superior to the Indian performance. Nevertheless I reject the interpretation that either China’s autocracy or China’s communist ideology is responsible for China’s better performance. China started to grow faster than the global economy only after Deng Xiaoping liberalized and opened up the economy. Under Mao Zedong and during the great leap forward more than 30 million Chinese starved to death. Similar disasters did not happen in poorer India. If China and India teach a lesson about the impact of regime characteristics on growth, it is the following: Democracy promotes performance quite similar to the global average, autocracy as a constitution of arbitrariness permits much better performance or much worse performance.In the long run, the growth prospects of both China and India depend not only on their own economic policies, but also on Western readiness to take their exports. Open Western markets together with sensible policies in China and India may promote global prosperity and peace.A eux deux, la Chine et l’Inde représentent deux cinquièmes de l’humanité. En termes de capacité de pouvoir d’achat comparé, l’économie chinoise est la deuxième plus grande au monde, devant le Japon, et l’économie indienne est la quatrième plus grande, devançant l’Allemagne. Dans moins de deux décennies, ces deux gigantesques économies asiatiques pourraient représenter conjointement un quart du produit global. Aujourd’hui cependant, ces deux pays sont toujours pauvres.Les deux pays pourraient surmonter la pauvreté car les potentialités que recèle un retard économiq- ue ajoutées à un investissement intérieur relativement soutenu favorisent la croissance. En ce qui concerne la formation du capital humain, des différences existent entre la Chine et l’Inde. La Chine est meilleure que l’Inde dans le domaine de l’éducation primaire. L’éradication de l’analphabétisme semble être en vue en Chine mais est loin d’être une partie gagnée en Inde. A l’inverse, l’Inde devance la Chine dans le domaine de l’éducation tertiaire. Une autre différence majeure entre la Chine et l’Inde concerne leur degré d’intégration dans l’économie globale. La Chine bénéficie davantage de la division globale du travail que l’Inde. De plus, la Chine attire plus d’investissements directs de l’étranger. Durant les cinquante dernières années, la performance de l’économie chinoise a été supérieure à celle de l’Inde. Néanmoins, l’auteur rejette l’interprétation suivant laquelle ce serait ou l’autocratie chinoise ou l’idéologie communiste qui serait à l’origine de cette supériorité. La Chine commença à croître plus rapidement que l’économie globale seulement après que Deng Xiao Ping a libéralisé l’économie chinoise et ouvert ses frontières. Sous le règne de Mao Tsé Tung, et durant le “grand bond en avant”, plus de 30 millions de chinois sont morts de famine. De tels désastres n’ont pas été observés en Inde qui est relativement plus pauvre. Si une leçon peut être tirée des expériences chinoise et indienne à propos de l’impact des caractéristiques des régimes sur la croissance économique, c’est la suivante : la démocratie promeut des performances assez identiques à la moyenne globale, et l’autocratie en tant que constitution de l’arbitraire donne lieu à des performances bien meilleures ou bien pires. A long terme, les perspectives de croissance de la Chine et de l’Inde dépendent non seulement de leurs propres politiques, mais aussi de la volonté des pays occidentaux de digérer leurs exportations. Des marchés occidentaux ouverts et des politiques intelligentes en Chine et en Inde peuvent promouvoir la prospérité et la paix au niveau global. (shrink)

Il y a trois défis pour la sécurité de l’Ouest. Le premier est que l’Ouest, comparé à l’Asie de l’Est, est en déclin. Dans vingt-cinq ans, la taille économique de la Chine continentale pourrait être supérieure à la taille du marché américain ; celle de l’Inde et de l’Indonesie être supérieure à la taille économique de l’Allemagne ; celle de la Corée du Sud excéder l’Angleterre ou la France ou l’Italie. Le second est la prolifération d’un savoir à doubleemploi et (...) le désastre économique de l’ex-Union Soviétique qui auront pour conséquence vraisemblable une prolifération du nucléaire. Le troisième concerne les changements de valeurs qui s’opèrent à l’Ouest et qui favorisent la formation de sociétés occidentales de moins en moins aptes à attaquer ou à se défendre. Mais la réduction du poids de l’Occident dans l’économie globale ne garantit plus que les efforts faciles l’emportent face aux défis du futur, qu’ils viennent des pouvoirs renforcés de l’Est asiatique ou des “desperados” islamiques. Ces défis ne seront vraisemblablement pas relevés au moyen de deux fausses prescriptions qui trouvent quelques faveurs en Europe Continentale. Premièrement, une grande partie de l’Europe de l’Ouest est lasse d’être confrontée à la “destruction créatrice” de ses emplois du fait de la concurrence de l’Asie de l’Est et désire ardemment le protectionnisme. Le remède protectionniste se bâtit sur un diagnostic grandement correct des problèmes occidentaux, mais il est tout de même dangereux si l’on met en perspective la morale, l’économie et la politique du pouvoir. Deuxièmement, certains Européens reconnaissent à juste titre que les grandes puissances historiques, comme la Grande- Bretagne ou la France ou l’Allemagne, n’ont plus une envergure suffisante pour être qualifiées de grandes puissances. Cependant, elles sousestiment la gravité et la vitesse du déclin de l’Occident. Une Europe définie par le noyau dur francoallemand deviendra trop étroite, avant même qu’elle ne soit établie dans cette structure. Vraisemblablement, même l’Union Européenne dans sa totalité sera trop petite avant qu’elle ne devienne une véritable communauté sur le plan sécuritaire. Au lieu de ces fausses prescriptions, cet article propose trois réponses aux dilemmes de l’Occident, ou encore trois façons de gérer le déclin de l’Occident. Premièrement, seule la coopération atlantique promet d’être une réponse efficace au dynamisme de l’Asie de l’Est et au déclin de l’Ouest. De plus, la coopération entre l’Amérique du Nord et l’Europe de l’Ouest a besoin d’être complétée par un nouvel engagement à l’égard d’une économie globale ouverte et d’une disposition à s’ajuster aux défis de celle-ci, afin de coopter l’Est asiatique dans une sphère globale de coprospérité. Cela doit vraisemblablement engendrer quelques coupes radicales dans l’Etat-providence. Deuxièmement, la prolifération nucléaire exige aussi une réponse. Il est concevable que la stratégie de défense contre la Chine soit encore plus difficile dans une vingtaine d’années qu’elle le fut contre l’Union Soviétique dans les années 1980. Mais cela ne devrait pas être une excuse pour ne pas construire des missiles de défense en réponse à ceux de l’Iran, de l’Irak, de la Lybie ou de l’Algerie. Troisièmement, les changements des valeurs en Occident semblent plus difficiles à traiter, mais ils renforcent la nécessité d’investir dans la coopération occidentale plutôt qu’uniquement européenne, la nécessité de coopter l’Asie de l’Est plutôt que de plonger dans une autre guerre froide, et la nécessité de contenir l’Etat-providence plutôt que de le développer. There are three challenges to Western security. First, compared to East Asia the West is in decline. In another twenty-five years, the economic size of Mainland China may exceed the size of the American market, India and Indonesia may exceed Germany, South Korea may exceed Britain or France or Italy. Second, the proliferation of dual use knowledge and the economic disaster in the former Soviet Union are likely to result in some nuclear proliferation. Third, value changes within the West will make Western societies ever less capable of deterrence and defense. But the reduced weight of the West in the global economy no longer guarantees that leisurely efforts succeed in meeting future challengers, whether from East Asian great powers or Islamic desperados. These challenges are unlikely to be met by two false prescriptions which enjoy some appeal in Continental Europe. First, much of Western Europe gets tired of observing the “creative destruction” of its jobs by East Asian competitors and longs for protectionism. The protectionist cure is built on a largely correct diagnosis of some Western problems, but nevertheless dangerous from an economic, moral, and power politics perspective. Second, some Europeans rightly recognize that historical great powers, like Britain or France or Germany, are no longer large enough to be great powers. But they underestimate the severity and speed of the decline of the West. A Franco- German core Europe will become too small, even before it is established. Conceivably, even the entire European Union will be too small before it becomes an effective security community. Instead of these false prescriptions this paper advocates three responses to Western dilemmas, or three modes of managing Western decline. First, only Atlantic cooperation promises to be an effective response to East Asian dynamism and Western decline. Moreover, cooperation between North America and Western Europe needs to be complemented with a renewed commitment to an open global economy and a readiness to adjust to its challenges, in order to coopt East Asia into a global co-prosperity sphere. This is likely to necessitate some radical cuts in the welfare state. Second, nuclear proliferation also needs some response. Conceivably, strategic defense is as difficult against China twenty years from now, as it was against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. But this should be no excuse for not building a missile and air defense against the likes of Iran, Iraq, Lybia, or Algeria. Third, the value changes within the West seem least tractable, but they reinforce the necessity of investing in Western rather than merely European cooperation, the necessity of coopting East Asia rather than stumbling into another Cold War, and the necessity for containing the welfare state rather than expanding it. (shrink)

The point of departure used in the article is the statement that in the bourgeois character there is embedded a feeling, not always conscious, of profound impotence. Psychoanalytic experiences are presented to illustrate such feelings. In extreme cases the content of such feeling may be described as follows : „There is nothing I can influence ; nothing I can move ; nothing I can change by my will in the external {World or in myself. I have no power, I am (...) not taken seriously, I am for other people like air which no one notices.“The feeling of being without power may be in relation to other people, to oneself, or to things. Its most important psychological consequences are a feeling of inferiority, fear, and anger. A series of examples are described in which an attempt was made to soften the intensity of the feeling of impotence, or to eliminate it entirely. In this sphere rationalizations explain the impotence as the result of certain non-psychological conditions, rationalizations which console because of their belief in sudden miracles or changes over long periods of time ; finally, a reaction which consists in an attempt to hide this feeling in activity and mere routine.The social conditions of the origin of this feeling of impotence are found in two fields : first in the fact that the child in the bourgeois family, even if treated very favorably, is not really taken seriously, and then in the place the adult has in modern society, his helplessness and dependence on powers he cannot comprehend and control, in particular his position of impotence in a process of production governed by the principle of division of labor.At the end the author attempts to show this feeling of impotence and the rationalizations which covered it up in the political behavior of the European masses during the post-war period.L'article constate tout d'abord qu'un sentiment d'impuissance profond, encore que d'ordinaire inconscient, marque la vie bourgeoise. L'article utilise l'expérience que livre la psychanalyse des individus pour décrire ce sentiment d'impuissance. Dans les cas extrêmes, la description aboutit aux traits suivants : je ne puis exercer d'influence sur rien, je ne puis rien mettre en mouvement, ma volonté est incapable de rien changer ni dans le monde extérieur ni en moi-même, je n'ai pas de force, je n'existe pas pour les autres, je suis comme l'air qu'ils respirent. Le sentiment d'impuissance peut se rapporter aussi bien à d'autres hommes qu'à la personne elle-même, ou à des choses. Les suites psychologiques les plus importantes de ce sentiment sont : complexe d'infériorité, angoisse, colère. L'article décrit une série de tentatives pour adoucir, ou même chasser de la conscience la souffrance qui naît de cette impuissance. A cette catégorie appartiennent des rationalisations explicatives qui ramènent l'impuissance à certaines circonstances extra-psychiques ; des rationalisations consolatrices qui font croire à la brusque irruption d'un miracle, ou bien à des changements progressifs, fruits d'une longue durée ; enfin une forme de réaction qui, à force d'activité, de routine affairée parvient à couvrir le sentiment d'impuissance, qui reste inconscient. Deux ordres de conditions sociales favorisent la formation du sentiment d'impuissance : d’abord le fait que l'enfant dans la société bourgeoise, si affectueusement qu'il puisse être traité, n'est pas — au fond — pris au sérieux ; d'autre part, le rôle de l'adulte dans la société bourgeoise, sa propre impuissance et sa dépendance à l'égard de forces qu'il est incapable de maîtriser ou même de reconnaître, plus particulièrement sa position dans le procès de production, qui, par suite de l'extrême division du travail, lui enlève autonomie et efficacité. Pour terminer, l'article tente de retrouver ce sentiment d'impuissance et les diverses formes de rationalisations qui le dissimulent, dans l'attitude des masses européennes durant l'époque de l'après-guerre. (shrink)

The result and the duration of an analysis depend on how quickly a patient succeeds in penetrating the resistance which prevents the unconscious data from becoming conscious. In addition to the fears that the patient brings with him into the analysis, the attitude of the analyst is a factor strengthening or weakening the fears and, therefore, the resistance. It is not primarily relevant here what the analyst says or thinks consciously, but whether he unconsciously accepts the patient and his claim (...) to happiness unconditionally. Freud s attitude towards the patient might be characterized fundamentally as „tolerance“. He recommends facing the patient indifferently and coolly. The essay proceeds to demonstrate that this conscious liberalism involves unconsciously a strict repudiation and rejection of those impulses which are tabooed by bourgeois society, especially the sexual ones. Therefore, Freud in his authoritarian and patricentric character must be recognized as a typical representative of a society, which demands obedience and subjection. This attitude creates in the patient, despite its liberalism, new fears which make it more difficult to overcome the resistance and, therefore, blocks the success of the analysis.The liberal tolerance represents at the same time a conscious relativism towards all values and an unconscious recognition of the taboos of bourgeois society. To utilize the Freudian therapy in the best possible way, it is necessary to connect it with an independent philosophy to accept unconditionally the patient’s claim to happiness and eliminating from all valuations the taboos and abstract traits. Le succès et la durée de l’analyse dépendent de la rapidité avec laquelle le malade réussit à briser la résistance qui empêche les réalités inconscientes de parvenir à la conscience. Abstraction faite des angoisses avec lesquelles le malade arrive à l’analyse, l’attitude de l’analyste est elle-même un facteur susceptible de renforcer ou au contraire d’affaiblir les angoisses et, par suite, la résistance. Ce qui importe en première ligne ce n’est pas ce que l’analyste dit ou pense consciemment, l’essentiel est de savoir si, inconsciemment aussi, il prend une attitude entièrement favorable à T égard du malade et de la prétention au bonheur de celui-ci. L’attitude de Freud à l’égard du malade peut être caractérisée d’abord par le mot de „tolérance“. Il recommande de ne pas porter de jugements de valeur, d’être indifférent et froid à l’égard du malade. L’article montre que derrière ce libéralisme conscient se cache un refus brutal, une condamnation des désirs qui sont en opposition avec les tabous de la société, spécialement les tabous sexuels. En même temps Freud se révèle un représentant typique de la société actuelle par son caractère autoritaire „patrocentrique“ qui réclame obéissance et soumission. Cette attitude, en dépit de son libéralisme conscient, crée au malade de nouvelles angoisses qui augmentent la difficulté de l’effort pour surmonter les résistances et ainsi rendent plus difficile le succès de l’analyse.La tolérance libérale avec son double visage, relativisme conscient à l’égard de toutes les valeurs et respect inconscient des tabous bourgeois, marque les limites de la thérapeutique analytique. La mise en valeur maximum de la thérapeutique Freudienne ne serait assurée que si elle était liée à une philosophie indépendante. Accepter inconditionnellement l’exigence du bonheur du malade, dépouiller toutes les valeurs de leur caractère tabou et abstrait constitueraient les traits essentiels d’une telle mise en valeur. (shrink)

Individual differences in mental accounting have rarely been studied, and empirical evidence regarding the relation between mental accounting and personality characteristics is scarce. The present paper reports three studies applying a Likert-type scale to assess the extent individuals engage in mental accounting practices. In each study, the five items of the measure loaded on a single dimension and had acceptable reliability, with a Cronbach’s α between.72 and.77. Study 1 (N = 165) regards the mental processing of prior losses in the (...) theater-ticket problem (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Study 2 (N = 114) is based on prior work on income source effects (Fogel 1997) and analyzes mental accounting of prior gains. In both studies, individual differences in mental accounting moderated the effects of the experimental treatments. In an explorative survey conducted for Study 3 (N = 373), the extent of engaging in mental accounting was found to be positively correlated with being female, with conscientiousness, and financial literacy, and negatively related with education and non-planning impulsivity. Identification of individual differences and their correlates adds to existing evidence for some of the core assumptions of mental accounting theory. A practical implication of the findings is that providers of financial services must take individual differences into account when designing trainings and supportive tools for money management. (shrink)

The essence оf the Christian dogma by Erich Fromm. In the article is widely considered the dynamics of religious beliefs Erich Fromm. For the first time a comparative analysis of all Fromm’s work relating to the theme of religion. Fromm devoted to the search itself and society in faith quite a lot of time because such research is very important and requires a recess in the nature of some of the world’s religions, including Christianity. Questions and countermeasures manifestations (...) of humanism and authoritarian Christianity, its historical evolution and ideals throw a kind of challenge to the outstanding philosopher, and forced him to work on this complex issue almost all his life. Dogma Erich Fromm developed so that initially there was an idea of the man who became God, and turned on the idea of God became man. The concept of the Old Testament prophets world extend beyond relationships between people, harmony should prevail between man and nature. Peace between man and nature is harmony between them. Erich Fromm permanently broke with Judaism in ‘26 and has since considered himself a Christian. But Christianity Fromm, his understanding of God, the role of Christ in history, the interpretation of the evolution of ideas and Savior is surprising for its boldness. (shrink)

In this book, one of the most distinguished scholars of German culture collects his essays on a figure who has long been one of his chief preoccupations. Erich Heller's lifelong study of modern European literature necessarily returns again and again to Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche prided himself on having broken with all traditional ways of thinking and feeling, and once even claimed that he would someday be recognized for having ushered in a new millennium. While acknowledging Nietzsche's radicalism, Heller also (...) insists on the continuity of the story in which he does indeed occupy a central place. By considering Nietzsche in relation to Goethe, Rilke, Wittgenstein, Yeats, and others, Heller shows the philosopher's ambivalence toward the tradition he inherited as well as his profound effect on the thought and sensibility of those who followed him. It is hardly an exaggeration to say, as Heller does in his first essay, that Nietzsche is to many modern writers and thinkers--including Mann, Musil, Kafka, Freud, Heidegger, Jaspers, Gide, and Sartre--what St. Thomas Aquinas was to Dante: the categorical interpreter of a world, which they contemplate imaginatively and theoretically without ever much upsetting its Nietzschean structure. Thus it is Nietzsche's thought, so pervasively present in the themes of modernity, that gives coherence and unity to Heller's essays. What emerges from them is that, despite his iconoclastic declarations and unorthodox philosophical practices, Nietzsche deals with the human spirit's persistent concerns. His questions remain urgent, and even the answers, in all their contradictoriness, possess the commanding force of his inquiry. An example is the incompatibility of the famous extremes, the teaching of the U;bermensch and the Eternal Recurrence of All Things. These cancel each other out and yet grow from the same intellectual and spiritual roots, as is shown lucidly and cogently by one of Heller's most forceful essays, "Nietzsche's Terrors: Time and the Inarticulate." In fathoming the depth of this contradiction, Heller at the same time reveals the importance of Nietzsche for those who seek to understand the wellsprings of the epoch's disquiet, turmoil, and creativity. (shrink)

First published in 1962, this is a book about Marx and Freud - the two intellectual giants of the 20th century.

CHAPTER ONE The Human Scene: INDIVIDUAL, COMMUNITY, COLLECTIVE IN THE COURSE of this study we shall see the evidences of disintegration of the individual in ...

This translation of four of Plato's dialogues brings these classic texts alive for modern readers. Allen introduces and comments on the dialogues in an accessible way, inviting the reader to re-examine the issues Plato continually raises.

A family heirloom. An endangered species. An ancient piece of pottery. A threatened language. These things differ in myriad ways, but they are tied together by a common thread: they are all examples of things that call out to be saved. The world is brimming with things worth saving, and we have limited time and resources. How do we decide what to save? Why do we make these choices? -/- Philosopher Erich Hatala Matthes explores these questions as they surface (...) in radically diverse contexts--from museums to TikTok, and from National Parks to the corner of your attic. Matthes illustrates the deep relationship between the things we might save and our sense of self. If our cares and concerns are a fundamental part of our identity, then what we care for and preserve will play a significant role in shaping and maintaining our understanding of who we are. In a world in which everything that we care about is subject to powerful forces of change--from climate disturbance and armed conflict, to social transformation and the wear and tear of time--the terms on which we confront change will be key to whether and how we can save the things we care about in the ways that really matter to us. Will change be foisted upon us? Or is there a role for us to play in rejecting, influencing, or managing change? As he explores these questions, Matthes tackles related themes such as authenticity, agency, and appropriation: Who exactly should be responsible for saving things, and on whose behalf should such efforts be pursued? These are all essential elements to a fuller understanding of what to save and why. (shrink)

In Man for Himself , Erich Fromm examines the confusion of modern women and men who, because they lack faith in any principle by which life ought to be guided, become the helpless prey forces both within and without. From the broad, interdisciplinary perspective that marks Fromm’s distinguished oeuvre, he shows that psychology cannot divorce itself from the problems of philosophy and ethics, and that human nature cannot be understood without understanding the values and moral conflicts that confront us (...) all. He shows that an ethical system can be based on human nature rather than on revelations or traditions. As Fromm asserts, “If man is to have confidence in values, he must know himself and the capacity of his nature for goodness and productiveness.”. (shrink)

During the last 25 years, a large number of publications on the history of analytic philosophy have appeared, significantly more than in the preceding period. As most of these works are by analytically trained authors, it is tempting to speak of a 'historical turn' in analytic philosophy. The present volume constitutes both a contribution to this body of work and a reflection on what is, or might be, achieved in it. The twelve new essays, by an international group of contributors, (...) range from case studies on individual philosophers through discussions of broader themes in the history of analytic philosophy to related methodological reflections. (shrink)

In this paper, I present an outline of the oppression account of cultural appropriation and argue that it offers the best explanation for the wrongfulness of the varied and complex cases of appropriation to which people often object. I then compare the oppression account with the intimacy account defended by C. Thi Nguyen and Matt Strohl. Though I believe that Nguyen and Strohl’s account offers important insight into an essential dimension of the cultural appropriation debate, I argue that justified objections (...) to cultural appropriation must ultimately be grounded in considerations of oppression as opposed to group intimacy. I present three primary objections to the intimacy account. First, I suggest that in its effort to explain expressive appropriation claims (those that purportedly lack an independent ground), the intimacy account doubles down on the boundary problem. Second, I question whether group intimacy possess the kind of bare normativity that Nguyen and Strohl claim for it. Finally, I argue that these objections give us reason to accept the importance of group intimacy to the cultural appropriation debate, but question the source of its significance as identified by Nguyen and Strohl. (shrink)

An account of non-existing objects called 'classical possibilism', according to which objects that don't actually exist do exist in various other ways, is implemented in a two-dimensional modal logic with non-traditional predication theory. This account is very similar to Priest's, but preserves bivalence and does not endorse dialethism. The power of classical possibilism is illustrated by giving some examples that makes use of a description theory of reference. However, the same effect could also be achieved in a more Millian fashion. (...) It is argued that classical possibilism is ontologically more neutral than is commonly thought, because it allows for the formulation of various forms of reductionism within the object language. (shrink)

Is there something morally wrong with cultural appropriation in the arts? I argue that the little philosophical work on this topic has been overly dismissive of moral objections to cultural appropriation. Nevertheless, I argue that philosophers working on epistemic injustice have developed powerful conceptual tools that can aid in our understanding of objections that have been levied by other scholars and artists. I then consider the relationship between these objections and the harms of cultural essentialism. I argue that focusing on (...) the systematic nature of appropriative harms may allow us to sidestep the problem of essentialism, but not without cost. (shrink)

In the title essay, Erich Fromm uses the tools of psychoanalysis to examine the development of the dogma of Christ in the context of social history. The remaining essays examine psychological and cultural problems with keen insight and humanistic sympathies.

The book, with its emphasis on the interaction of microstructures with the entire biosphere, ecosystems etc., and on how micro- and macrocosmos mutually create the conditions for their further evolution, provides a comprehensive framework for a deeper understanding of human creativity in a time of transition.

We introduce an atomic formula ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{z}}$ intuitively saying that the variables ${\vec{y}}$ are independent from the variables ${\vec{z}}$ if the variables ${\vec{x}}$ are kept constant. We contrast this with dependence logic ${\mathcal{D}}$ based on the atomic formula = ${(\vec{x}, \vec{y})}$ , actually equivalent to ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{y}}$ , saying that the variables ${\vec{y}}$ are totally determined by the variables ${\vec{x}}$ . We show that ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{z}}$ gives rise to a natural logic capable of formalizing basic intuitions about independence and dependence. (...) We show that ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{z}}$ can be used to give partially ordered quantifiers and IF-logic an alternative interpretation without some of the shortcomings related to so called signaling that interpretations using = ${(\vec{x}, \vec{y})}$ have. (shrink)