The aim is to examine Alois Riehl’s contribution to the “culture war” (Kulturkampf) in the second half of the nineteenth century. We show that he used Kant’s autonomy principle to argue against the idea that religious dogmatism is a fundament of morality. We prove this thesis by focusing on the forgotten historical background, which is important for an understanding of Morals und Dogma. Originally this essay was an expert opinion for the court case of the socialist H. Tauschinski who was (...) accused of blasphemy. Tauschinski wrote an article in which he doubted the immortality of the soul and the existence of a personal God. These two dogmas of the Catholic Church were considered bу the Austrian authorities to be the foundations of public order. Riehl questioned not only the charge but also the validity of religious dogmas for morality. Based on Kant’s ethics, he argued for a moral indifferentism of religious dogmas. His career was significantly influenced by this essay, because of its anti-clerical content. During the culture war, Riehl repeatedly had problems with the authorities, especially in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The “Neurath-Haller Thesis” argues that in Austria the appointment of professorships was controlled and monitored by the state, with the goal of installing a philosophy which was beneficial to the interests of the state, and a strong anti-Kantianism in Austrian Philosophy as a consequence. We can agree with this thesis insofar as Riehl in the period of the “Catholic Renaissance” in Austria was not allowed to succeed Ernst Mach. The analysis of Riehl’s arguments allows us furthermore to understand Riehl as a neo-Kantian as early as 1871/1872, which has been questioned by many authors who think the early Riehl was no Kantian. (shrink)

The aim of this work is to provide a preliminary analysis of a much more far-reaching investigation into the relationship between technology and philosophy. In the context of the contemporary German thought, the author compares the different positions of Karl Marx, Martin Heidegger, Ernst and Friedrich Jünger, Arnold Gehlen and Gunther Anders. The term “machine” is used precisely to mean that complex material device assembled in the last quarter of the 18th century as a result of the definitive modern (...) refinement of certain fundamental technologies, i.e. metallurgy, precision mechanics and hydraulics. The “machine” discussed here arrived on the scene of man’s history when the processes of spinning and weaving were entrusted to semi-automatic means; when the water wheels used in mills, hitherto always made of wood, were supplanted by the metal levers of the steam engine; and especially when the steam engine was connected to the weaving frames, to the metalworking hammers, and to other machines used to manufacture other machines in an endless reiteration of assemblies and applications, the enormous outcome of which is what subsequently came to be described as “mass production”. The philosophers discussed here were also dealing with the type of machine described above and in their works she we can identify three model images of this idea of machine. These images have been drawn on at various times, also outside the realms of philosophy, and they still provide the backdrop for our knowledge of the machine, which has circulated in a great variety of languages. (shrink)

Some metaphysics are provided showing that what is commonly called ‘the physical world’ can be deconstructed into three ‘levels’: a single, unified ‘noumenal world’ on which everything supervenes; a ‘phenomenal world’ that we each privately experience through direct perception of phenomena; and a ‘collective world’ that people in any given ‘language using group’ experience through learning, using and adapting that group’s language. This deconstruction is shown to enable a clear account of qualia and of how people can hold some things (...) to be physically real even when it is clear no one can ever directly experience those things as phenomena. It is further shown to enable a single, internally consistent, largely empirically supported conceptual framework – a ‘metacosmology’ – able to encompass not only the physical world as people conceive of it for everyday purposes, and as scientists conceive of it for scientific purposes, but also people’s first person phenomenal experience of a physical world and, prospectively, the mechanisms by which such first person, conscious experiences can be generated. (shrink)

This is Appendix A to the note: Deconstructing the Physical World (DPW). It shows how the conceptual framework developed in DPW relates to Russellian Monism (RM) and that it can accrue RM’s benefits while defeating the combination problem that challenges many RMs.

Complementary and alternative medicine has become an important section of healthcare. Its high level of acceptance among the general population represents a challenge to healthcare professionals of all disciplines and raises a host of ethical issues. This article is an attempt to explore some of the more obvious or practical ethical aspects of complementary and alternative medicine.

The chapter is divided into three separate parts. In the first part I critically discuss Adorno's interpretation of Heidegger's concern with the question of Being. Central to this interpretation is Adorno's view that Being, for Heidegger, resonates with onto‐theological or metaphysical accounts of the highest and most general being – that of Plato's ideas, or Aristotle's substance. In various steps, looking at several key claims of Heidegger, I argue that this approach is misguided. Heidegger draws a clear and philosophically justified (...) distinction between his conception of Being and the Platonic vision of essence. The second part identifies a strand of Adorno's critique that does not depend on the onto‐theological reading. This is the critique of fetishization and reification – Adorno's view that Heidegger falsely seeks to imbue his thinking and diagnosis of modernity with a veneer of the timeless and transcendental. Adorno, I suggest, justifiably introduces his dialectical procedure as a means to correct this tendency: Concepts, he claims, should be viewed and analyzed in terms of the non‐identity between themselves and the states of affairs to which they purport to refer. In clear contrast to the Heideggerian call for some kind of essential or necessary reference – words that magically yet “necessarily” pick out their object, and that thereby aspire to overcome the fateful split between word and object (or subject and object) – Adorno insists on difference, differentiation, and absence, a historically indexed self‐reflection. In the final part I propose a reading of Heidegger that takes heed of Adorno's warnings against fetishization and reification. While far from trying to efface the decisive differences between the two thinkers, I highlight moments in Heidegger that lend themselves to a dialectical interpretation. I argue that these are moments of remembrance – moments in which human practice anticipate a more reconciled relation between subject and object. (shrink)

This paper examines Charles Peirce's graphical notation for first-order logic with identity. The notation forms a part of his system of "existential graphs," which Peirce considered to be his best work in logic. In this paper a Tarskian semantics is provided for the graphical system.

I propose a method of assessing the degree of enlightenment of a society based on its discourses. My hypothesis is that the more objectivity prevails in a society’s spheres of discourse, the more enlightened it is; the more subjectivity dominates, the more unenlightened. This relationship can be made evident through the reconstruction of Kant’s Theory of Prejudice by taking into account the handwritten notes and fragments and the lectures on logic. First, I will discuss some key aspects of Kant’s concept (...) of prejudice. Secondly, I will address the epistemological function of the public sphere in order to show what conditions it must satisfy to fulfil its function. Thirdly, I will argue that not only Selbstdenken but also participatory reason, and therefore the public sphere itself, are both fundamental elements of enlightenment in that they function as counter-maxims against prejudice. (shrink)

This volume deals with the transformation of unchurched religious creativity in the late modern West.

"Nicht die Bedingungen der Moglichkeit irgendwelcher Erkenntnisse, nicht die Voraussetzungen des Erkennens, weder die formalen noch die materialen, sondern das Erkennen selbst zu untersuchen ist die Aufgabe dieser Erkenntnistheorie. Dass etwas erkannt wird, d. h. dass in Wahrnehmungen, Erinnerungen, Gedanken, im Zweifeln, Glauben und Wissen Gegenstande erfasst werden, diese Tatsache bildet den Ausgangspunkt der folgenden Betrachtungen. Wie die verschiedenen Arten des Erkennens sich voneinander unterscheiden, aus welchen Elementarprozessen sie sich zusammensetzen und welche Gesetze ihre Entwickelung beherrschen, das sind die Fragen, (...) die von der Psychologie des Erkennens zu beantworten sind." Der Verlag der Wissenschaften verlegt historische Literatur bekannter und unbekannter wissenschaftlicher Autoren. Dem interessierten Leser werden so teilweise langst nicht mehr verlegte Werke wieder zugangig gemacht. Dieses Buch uber die Erkenntnistheorie von Dr. Ernst Durr ist ein unveranderter, hochwertiger Nachdruck der Originalausgabe aus dem Jahr 1910.". (shrink)

The originality of Foucault’s work lies in part in how he reverses the question of power, asking not how power is held and imposed, but how it is produced. In both his discussion of sovereignty and governmentality, though, Foucault skips over the res publica; a form of political organization that fits neither Foucault’s characterization of sovereignty nor the care of the self. I extend Foucault’s discussion to identify a ratio of government around the discipline of ownership by which the res (...) publica was made intelligible, its relations understood, and its logic organized. I end by suggesting some implications for neo-Roman interpretations of liberty as non-domination. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas' view that Adorno's thinking is characterized by a commitment to a philosophy of consciousness, and that therefore the only alternative to identitarian reason is to appeal to an intuitive competence operating beyond the range of conceptual thought, it is arged (1) that Adorno conceptualizes the modern epistemic subject (the subject of a philosophy of consciousness) as based on a reification, and (2) that he denies the possibility of a concept-transcendent (foundationalist) constraint on judgments. In seeking to demonstrate against (...) versions of subjective idealism and foundationalism how thought can be responsive to a non-identical (mind-independent) reality, Adorno defends an intersubjectivist and historicist view of knowledge according to which the operative and yet anamnetic aspiration of knowledge is to know reflectively the object as it is in itself. The conclusion is that although Adorno questions the modern (Kantian) stress on epistemic autonomy, he does not take leave of modernity in the sense ascribed to him by Habermas. (shrink)

My starting point is a fundamental paradox that lies at the heart of the slow demise of the Roman Republic: why does the system collapse when, as many scholars have noted, there is nothing that suggests that there was ever an intention by anyone to overthrow the Republic? Understanding this paradox is key to identifying what Rome might have to say to us today. What changes in the final decades of the Roman Republic is a declining view of the ability (...) of political institutions to project the community into the future. This change is due to important alterations in the norms that provide the background context by which individuals working through institutions can get things done. The changes in these norms not only disable these institutions, making them seem less capable of projecting the community into the future, but also make possible alterations in the political framework that might have been inconceivable before. In particular, one sees the elevation of individuals who offer solutions by promising to bypass those ineffective and unresponsive institutions. (shrink)

A medical student's ability to present a case history is a critical skill that is difficult to teach. Case histories presented without theatrical engagement may fail to catch the attention of their intended recipients. More engaging presentations incorporate ‘stage presence’, eye contact, vocal inflection, interesting detail and succinct, well organised performances. They convey stories effectively without wasting time. To address the didactic challenge for instructing future doctors in how to ‘act’, the Mayo Medical School and The Mayo Clinic Center for (...) Humanities in Medicine partnered with the Guthrie Theater to pilot the programme ‘Telling the Patient's Story’. Guthrie teaching artists taught storytelling skills to medical students through improvisation, writing, movement and acting exercises. Mayo Clinic doctors participated and provided students with feedback on presentations and stories from their own experiences in patient care. The course's primary objective was to build students' confidence and expertise in storytelling. These skills were then applied to presenting cases and communicating with patients in a fresher, more engaging way. This paper outlines the instructional activities as aligned with course objectives. Progress was tracked by comparing pre-course and post-course surveys from the seven participating students. All agreed that the theatrical techniques were effective teaching methods. Moreover, this project can serve as an innovative model for how arts and humanities professionals can be incorporated for teaching and professional development initiatives at all levels of medical education. (shrink)

By comparing Adorno's conception of evil with those of Kant and Levinas, it is argued that the commitment to a notion of materialist transcendence, which Adorno introduces as a philosophical response to Auschwitz, is compatible with an equally strong commitment to philosophical modernity and autonomy. Whereas Kant's moral theology, on the one hand, proceeds in a too immanent fashion, and Levinas's heterology, on the other, in seeking to explode ontology, denies the conditions of thought's rational responsiveness, Adorno succeeds in combining (...) the quest for radical otherness with an idealist interpretation of modernity. Key Words: Adorno • Auschwitz • evil • Kant • Levinas • metaphysics • modernity • moral theology • transcendence. (shrink)

Hegel's philosophy of religion is characterized by what seems to be a deep tension. On the one hand, Hegel claims to be a Christian thinker, viewing religion, and in particular Christianity, as a manifestation of the absolute. On the other hand, however, he seems to view modernity as largely secular, devoid of authoritative claims to transcendence. Modernity is secular in the political sense of requiring the state to be neutral when it comes to matters of religion. However, it is also (...) secular in the sense of there being no recourse to authoritative representations of a transcendent God. Drawing on Charles Taylor's view of secularization, the article focuses on the second strand of his religious thinking, exploring how Hegel can be thought of as a theorist of secularization. It is claimed that his dialectic of religious development describes a process of secularization. Ultimately, Hegel's system offers a view of the absolute as immanent, suggesting that an adequate account of religion will necessarily have to accept secularization as the end-point of spirit's development. This is how the tension between religion and secularization can be resolved. (shrink)

Based on European National Transfer Accounts data from 2010, this paper quantifies and evaluates the balance of intergenerational transfer flows in 16 EU countries, including transfers in the form of unpaid household work. On average, the value of net transfers received by a child amounts to sixteen times the labour income of a full-time worker, and the net transfers received by an elderly person to six times the labour income of a full-time worker. Intergenerational transfers can be regarded as the (...) reciprocal exchange between two generations: the size of the transfers to the child generation determines their potential to generate income and finance public transfers to the elderly population once they enter employment. We develop and calculate an indicator to analyse if there is a balance between transfers to children and transfers expected by the elderly population. The results indicate that in most of the analysed countries the human capital investments in children are far too low to finance the generous transfers to the elderly population in the future. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to reconstruct and discuss Stanley Cavell’s interpretation and critique of analytic philosophy. Cavell objects to the tradition of analytic philosophy that, in its eagerness to provide abstract, theoretical reconstructions, it has failed to understand the importance of “the human voice” for philosophy. First, I outline Cavell’s retelling of the history of analytic philosophy from Frege and Russell to ordinary language philosophy. Second, I turn to Cavell’s reading of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein in order to show what (...) the suppression of the human voice is supposed to mean and entail. Central to Cavell’s account is a particular view of language according to which no structure can explain our capacity for sense-making. Third, I exemplify Cavell’s approach by analyzing his debate with Kripke. Kripke sees the absence of “rails” determining meaning as a skeptical problem and calls for a communal solution. Cavell, by contrast, accepts the absence of rails while highlighting the need for individual responsiveness. In the conclusion I contrast the analytic interest in theory, structure, and abstraction with what I see as Cavell’s humanism. While respectful of key aspects of the analytic tradition such as its commitment to rigor and transparency, Cavell wished to bring the human subject back into philosophy. (shrink)

Analyzing Eros and Civilization, in this article I argue that Marcuse is incapable of offering an account of the empirical dynamics that may lead to the social change he envisions, and that his appeal to the benefits of automatism is blind to its negative effects. I then claim that Marcuse's vision of the good life as centered on libidinal self-realization, if actualized, would threaten the freedom of individuals and potentially undermine their sense of self-integrity. Comparing Marcuse's position with that of (...) Adorno, I argue that the former fails to take temporality and transience properly into account. Unlike Adorno, Marcuse has no genuine appreciation of the need for mourning. Instead, Marcuse's concept of primary narcissism, which is meant to represent the gist of his utopian vision, leads him to recommend an essentially melancholic position. I finally argue that political action requires a stronger ego-formation than what Marcuse's conception allows for. (shrink)

1. Textband.--2. Anmerkungen und Register.