Mathematics is an important foundation for the development of science education. In the past, when instructors taught mathematical concepts of geometry shapes, they usually used traditional textbooks and aids to conduct teaching activities, which resulted in students not being able to understand the principles completely. Nowadays, it has become a trend to integrate emerging technologies into mathematics courses and to use digital instructional aids. Emerging technologies can effectively enhance students’ sensory experience while strengthening their impressions and understandings of subject concepts. (...) In this paper, we apply virtual reality immersive technologies to develop a “virtual reality immersive learning mathematics geometry system,” which is used to teach mathematical geometry concepts. Teachers use the system to develop three basic mathematical geometry learning materials: “Triangular pyramid volume = 1/3 prism volume,” “Cone volume calculation,” and “Triangle center of gravity derivation.” In the experimental activity, the teacher uses virtual reality teaching aids to guide students to learn mathematical geometry concepts in a fun way so that they can achieve the effectiveness of immersive learning. This study explores the impact of using the virtual reality immersive learning mathematics geometry system on students’ technology acceptance, learning motivations, and learning performance. The experimental result showed that using the virtual reality immersive learning mathematics geometry system can improve the learning motivation and learning performance of students. The findings indicated that the experimental group had better learning outcomes after completing the learning tasks of three geometric units. The experimental group used the virtual reality immersive learning mathematics geometry system which can lead to better learning outcomes. According to the ARCS questionnaire, students in the experimental group were confident to understand new subjects. At the same time, the mode of completing the game can effectively give students a sense of accomplishment. The use of emerging technologies in the classroom can be an attractive learning mode for students. (shrink)

This paper presents an adaptive fuzzy sliding-mode controller for multiple Euler–Lagrange systems communicated with directed topology. Based on the graph theory and Lyapunov–Krasovskii functions, a delay-dependent sufficient condition for the existence of sliding surfaces is given in terms of linear matrix inequalities. The asymptotic stability is analyzed by using the Lyapunov method in the presence of unknown parametric dynamics, actuator faults, and time-varying delays. The usage of adaptive techniques is to adapt the unknown parameters so that the objective of globally (...) asymptotic stability is achieved. Finally, simulation results are provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed control scheme. (shrink)

The essays on aesthetics in recent publications, beginning with the criticisms of Chu Kuang-ch'ien's point of view in aesthetics and continuing down to his article "How Can Aesthetics be Materialistic and Dialectic?" [Mei-hsüeh tsen-yang ts'ai neng shih wei-wu ti yu shih pien-cheng ti?"], have focused on the problem of the relationship between the subjective and the objective in beauty and in sense of beauty. This is a fundamental problem in aesthetics, and only when we have solved this problem can (...) we answer the questions of what beauty is and wherein beauty lies. Some people have presented their own tentative answers to these questions, and these have been discussed by our comrades. (shrink)

Using Chinese listed companies as research setting, this paper constructs a measure of corporate competing culture through textual analysis on firms’ management discussion and analysis disclosures, and examines the impact of corporate competing culture on environmental investment. The results show that competing culture has a significant and positive impact on firms’ environmental investment, and the results remain robust to a battery of robustness tests. Moreover, the mediating analysis indicates that competing culture promotes corporate environmental investment through enhancing firms’ internal control (...) quality. Furthermore, the heterogeneity results show that the positive impact of corporate competing culture on environmental investment is more pronounced in firms with larger size, stronger corporate governance, in high-polluting industry, and located in less developed regions. Our findings shed light on the importance of corporate competing culture and provide practical implications for corporate sustainable development. (shrink)

本书对方法论研究中的一些基本范畴、结构、功能和原理, 做出了科学的界定和阐发, 并在此基础上建立了方法学的理论体系.

Given that citizenship challenges the basis and workings of the basic institutions market, state, and civil society, organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) become an important moral tenet found in some codes of ethical principles. This study explores service-oriented OCBs and their determinants. Three dimensions of service-oriented OCBs (loyalty, service delivery, and participation) are hypothetically influenced by distributive justice, procedural justice, personal cooperativeness, and the need for social approval through the mediation of organizational commitment. The three dimensions of OCBs are hypothetically influenced (...) by personal cooperativeness, need for social approval, task interdependence, and outcome interdependence through the mediation of social network ties. The model is tested using data from contact employees at several financial holding companies in Taiwan. Test results reveal that the relationships between need for social approval and organizational commitment and those between task interdependence and social network ties are insignificant, whereas all other paths are significant. This study also provides managerial implications and limitations. (shrink)

Most complex real systems are found to have multiple layers of connectivity and required to be modelled as multiplex networks. One of the extremely critical problems is to reduce the congestion and enhance the transfer capacity, especially in real communication networks with a big data environment. A novel and effective strategy to improve traffic and control congestion is proposed by adding edges according to their weights which are defined by the topology structural properties. Furthermore, which layer is more effective when (...) our strategy is applied is discussed based on its topology structure. Adding edges between nodes whose product of multiplex network betweenness is the highest is confirmed to be more effective, particularly in the layer with stronger community structure. Simulation experiments on both computer-generated and real-world networks demonstrate that our strategy can enhance the transfer capacity of multiplex networks significantly, which is in good agreement with our analysis. (shrink)

This study investigated eye-movement patterns during emotion perception for children with hearing aids and hearing children. Seventy-eight participants aged from 3 to 7 were asked to watch videos with a facial expression followed by an oral statement, and these two cues were either consistent or inconsistent in emotional valence. Results showed that while normal-hearing children paid more attention to the upper part of the face, children with hearing aids paid more attention to the lower face after the oral statement was (...) presented. When there was an inconsistency between the visual and auditory cues, children with hearing aids were likely to increase attention to the upper face. The results revealed the underlying mechanism of deficits in emotion perception for hearing-impaired children. (shrink)

Knowing-how is currently a hot topic in epistemology. But what is the proper subject matter of a study of knowing-how and in what sense can such a study be regarded as epistemological? The aim of this paper is to answer such metaepistemological questions. This paper offers a metaepistemology of knowing-how, including considerations of the subject matter, task, and nature of the epistemology of knowing-how. I will achieve this aim, first, by distinguishing varieties of knowing-how and, second, by introducing and elaborating (...) the concept of hybrid knowing-how, which entails a combination of a ground-level ability and a meta-level perspective on that ability. The stance I wish to advocate is that the epistemology of knowing-how is a normative discipline whose main task is to study the nature and value of human practical intelligence required to do things in a particular manner. (shrink)

Background: Upper limb functional exercise has a positive effect on promoting the rehabilitation of upper limb function. However, little is known, about what drives postoperative patients to engage in and even maintain the advised exercises. This study integrated the health action process approach and the theory of planned behavior theory to investigate the psychosocial determinants on the initiation and maintenance of ULFE in breast cancer patients. In addition, this study also tests key hypotheses relating to reasoned and implicit pathways to (...) ULFE and its maintenance among postoperative patients with breast cancer.Methods: Purposive sampling was used to recruit patients from two breast cancer wards in a provincial hospital in Jiangsu, China. Patients completed self-reported questionnaire about constructs from integrated theories concerning ULFE at an initial time point : task self-efficacy, positive outcome expectations, negative outcome expectations, risk perception, attitude behavior, subjective norm, perceived behavioral control, behavioral intention, and ULFE-in hospital. Three months later, patients self-reported: maintenance self-efficacy, action planning, coping planning, recovery self-efficacy, and ULFE-maintenance.Results: The model has a good fit. For behavioral intention of ULFE, subjective norm and perceived behavioral control were positively directly related to behavioral intention. Regarding the initiation of ULFE, perceived behavioral control and behavioral intention had a direct positive relation to ULFE-IH. In the maintenance of ULFE, action planning, coping planning, maintenance self-efficacy, and recovery self-efficacy all had significant positive relation on ULFE-M. In addition, maintenance self-efficacy had a significant positive association on action planning, coping planning, and recovery self-efficacy. Coping planning was significantly predicted by behavioral intention. Additionally, behavioral intention is a mediator of subjective norm and perceived behavioral control to ULFE-IH. Action planning, coping planning, and recovery self-efficacy are mediators of maintaining self-efficacy to ULFE-M.Conclusions: This study presents the first attempt to integrate the health behavior model in ULFE in postoperative patients with breast cancer. The study has shown that the HAPA-TPB integrated model has good applicability and effectiveness to explain and predict ULFE initiation and maintenance. Future work can be considered to develop appropriate intervention strategies based on this integrated behavioral theory. (shrink)

The skill model of wisdom argues that practical wisdom can be best understood in terms of practical skill or expertise, and the model is thought to have the characteristic of focusing on how wise people think rather than how wise people feel. However, from the perspective of Kunzmann and Glück, “it is time for an ‘emotional revolution’ in wisdom research, which will contribute to a more balanced view on wisdom that considers emotional factors and processes as equally typical of wisdom (...) as are cognitive and reflective factors” (Kunzmann U, Gluck J [2019] Wisdom and emotion. In: Sternberg R, Gluck J (eds) The cambridge handbook of wisdom. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 575–601). Kunzmann and Glück’s appeal for this emotional revolution is significant and intriguing because the inclusion of an explanation of the role of emotion in wisdom can contribute to developing the skill model of wisdom into a more comprehensive framework that recognizes the intricate relation between wisdom and emotions. In this paper, I shall propose and develop a skill account of the emotions of the wise to serve as a supplement to the skill model of wisdom. According to this account, first, at the critical level, having emotions and emotional competence as elements is not essential to wisdom; second, at the theoretical level, a wise person feels an emotion E if and only if E is strategically rational for the wise person; and third, at the metatheoretical level, the primary aim of the skill account is to explain why wise people feel in a particular way rather than to describe how wise people feel. (shrink)

Based on the stress interaction theory, this research constructed a model to study the joint moderating effects of the perception reduction of employment opportunities under the COVID-19 epidemic on the employment pressure of college students. With two moderating variables introduced, employment policy support and job-searching self-efficacy, this research studied the mechanism and boundary conditions of perception reduction of employment opportunities on employment pressure of college students from both individual and environmental aspects. The study found that during the epidemic if college (...) students perceived fewer employment opportunities, they could have greater employment pressure from themselves, schools, and families; and that under the joint moderation of employment policy support and job-searching self-efficacy, the perception reduction of employment opportunities under the COVID-19 epidemic, the employment pressure of college students, universities, and families were connected, with different adjustment mechanisms. Based on empirical data, this research can provide theoretical enlightenment and practical guidance for the government, universities, and families to alleviate the employment pressure on college students during the epidemic. (shrink)

What is wisdom? What does a wise person know? Can a wise person know how to act and live well without knowing the whys and wherefores of his own action? How is wisdom acquired? This Element addresses questions regarding the nature and acquisition of wisdom by developing and defending a skill theory of wisdom. Specifically, this theory argues that if a person S is wise, then (i) S knows that overall attitude success contributes to or constitutes well-being; (ii) S knows (...) what the best means to achieve well-being are; (iii) S is reliably successful at acting and living well (in light of what S knows); and (iv) S knows why she is successful at acting and living well. The first three sections of this Element develop this theory, and the final two sections defend this theory against two objections to the effect that there are asymmetries between wisdom and skill. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers have contributed to the development of the skill model of wisdom, according to which practical wisdom is practical skill. However, the model appears to be limited in its explanatory power, since there are asymmetries between wisdom and skill: A person with practical wisdom can and should deliberate about the end being pursued; by contrast, a person with a particular practical skill cannot deliberate about the end of the skill, and even if she can, she is not required to (...) do so. In this paper, I undermine these widely held asymmetries by elucidating the unnoticed nature of skill. (shrink)

Anti-intellectualists in epistemology argue for the thesis that knowing-how is not a species of knowing-that, and most of them tend to avoid any use of the notion “knowing-that” in their explanation of intelligent action on pain of inconsistency. Intellectualists tend to disprove anti-intellectualism by showing that the residues of knowing-that remain in the anti-intellectualist explanation of intelligent action. Outside the field of epistemology, some philosophers who try to highlight the nature of their explanation of intelligent action in certain fields, such (...) as ethics, tend to classify themselves as intellectualist simply because they appeal to the notion of knowing-that in their explanation. In a word, the idea of knowing-that is harmful to the anti-intellectualist explanation of intelligent action, whether from an insider or outsider perspective. In this paper, I argue that these tendencies are unjustified because they are based on an unclear conception of anti-intellectualism. I shall use Gilbert Ryle’s anti-intellectualism as a paradigm with which to describe anti-intellectualism and to illustrate why the notion of knowing-that is not harmful to but is, on the contrary, beneficial to the anti-intellectualist explanation of intelligent action. If my explication of Ryle’s anti-intellectualism is correct, then most anti-intellectualists in the literature blindly worry about the notion of knowing-that, most intellectualists fire into the wrong flock, and some philosophers outside epistemology mischaracterize their own position. (shrink)

Hung Yao-hsün is one of the most creative, albeit long overlooked, thinkers in Japanese-ruled Taiwan. This paper’s aim is threefold. It first argues that while Hung’s early philosophy was rooted in the Kyoto school, he is a key founder of the Sit-chûn movement of Taiwanese philosophy. It next shows that during Taiwan’s martial law, Hung’s thought features a “Buddhist turn,” in which Zen is incorporated within existentialism. Third, while this turn is a sharp contrast to his prewar (...) philosophical activism, Hung’s last work stressed Abraham Kaplan’s view that philosophy should be connected to one’s life experience, echoing Hung’s prewar usage of fūdo in justifying Taiwan’s cultural subjectivity. In other words, there is an implicit continuity between his early and late philosophy. (shrink)

Epistemology of language, a branch of both epistemology and the philosophy of language, asks what knowledge of language consists in. In this paper, I argue that such an inquiry is a pointless enterprise due to its being based upon the incorrect assumption that linguistic competence requires knowledge of language. However, I do not think the phenomenon of knowledge of language is trivial. I propose a virtue-theoretic account of linguistic competence, and then explain the phenomenon from a virtue-semantic point of view.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 104, Issue 3, Page 606-622, May 2022.

How can we acquire understanding? Linda Zagzebski has long claimed that understanding is acquired through, or arises from, mastering a particular practical technê. In this paper, I explicate Zagzebski’s claim and argue that the claim is problematic. Based on a critical examination of Zagzebski’s claim, I propose, in conclusion and in brief, a new claim regarding the acquisition of understanding.

In “Knowing How”, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001) propose an intellectualist account of knowledge-how, according to which all knowledge-how is a type of propositional knowledge about ways to act. In this article, I examine this intellectualist account by applying it to the epistemology of language. I argue that (a) Stanley and Williamson mischaracterize the concept of knowledge-how in the epistemology of language, and (b) intellectualism about knowledge of language fails in its explanatory task. One lesson that can be drawn (...) from this case study is that Stanley and Williamson's intellectualism is limited in its explanatory scope and power insofar as it cannot explain the knowledge of language, which is usually conceived as knowledge-how and as non-propositional in character. Their intellectualist claim that all knowledge-how is knowledge-that should be withdrawn. (shrink)

Ruyu HungNational Chiayi University, TaiwanThis is a collective writing experiment of PESA members, orchestrating the Philosophy of Education in a New Key regarding East Asia. In 2016 the pioneerin...

Michael Dummett has long argued that we should ascribe implicit knowledge of a meaning-theory to speakers, and that the task of a theory of meaning is to tell us what such knowledge consists in. But he also sees it as a problem that how implicit knowledge is actually used, that is, how a speaker's metalinguistic knowledge of a meaning-theory issues or delivers the speaker's knowledge of meanings of utterances (the delivery problem). In this paper 1argue that Dummett's instrumental construal of (...) implicit knowledge does not and cannot solve the delivery problem. However, I do not suggest Dummett to modify or abandon his instrumental construal; rather, I think he can dissolve the delivery problem by recognizing that knowledge of semantics for a language is not a necessary condition for mastering a language. 1 shall argue this point through Davidson's attitude towards the role of linguistic knowledge and his thesis in his (in)famous paper "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs.". (shrink)

Human excellences such as intelligence, morality, and consciousness are investigated by philosophers as well as artificial intelligence researchers. One excellence that has not been widely discussed by AI researchers is practical wisdom, the highest human excellence, or the highest, seventh, stage in Dreyfus’s model of skill acquisition. In this paper, I explain why artificial wisdom matters and how artificial wisdom is possible (in principle and in practice) by responding to two philosophical challenges to building artificial wisdom systems. The result is (...) a conceptual framework that guides future research on creating artificial wisdom. (shrink)

One of the main challenges in the philosophy of language is determining the form of knowledge of the rules of language. Michael Dummett has put forth the view that knowledge of the rules of language is a kind of implicit knowledge; some philosophers have mistakenly conceived of this type of knowledge as a kind of knowledge-that . In a recent paper in this journal, Patricia Hanna argues against Dummett’s knowledge-that view and proposes instead a knowledge-how view in which knowledge of (...) the rules of language is a kind of practical knowledge, like an agent’s non-propositional knowledge of counting. In this paper I argue, first, that Hanna misunderstands Dummett’s conception of knowledge of linguistic rules, and, second, that Dummett’s considerations of practical knowledge of language pose a problem for Hanna’s knowledge-how view. At the end of the paper, I briefly sketch an account of practical knowledge of language that meets the requirements set by Dummett. (shrink)

What is the nature and structure of phronesis or practical wisdom? According to the view widely held by philosophers and psychologists, a person S is wise if and only if S knows how to live well. Given this view of practical wisdom, the guiding question is this: What exactly is “knowing how to live well”? It seems that no one has a clear idea of how to answer this simple but fundamental question. This paper explores knowing how to live well (...) (or “life know-how”) by showing how its nature and structure can be understood through contemporary epistemology of knowledge-how. I will achieve this by doing the following. In Section I, I highlight the two as-yet unanswered “integration questions” about life know-how. In Section II, I explain why the epistemology of knowledge-how has good potential to address the integration questions. In Sections III and IV, I construct two positions—intellectualism and anti-intellectualism—for the epistemology of life know-how and show how they address the two integration questions. In Section V, I show how the epistemology of life know-how established in the previous sections can be used in the philosophy of wisdom and the psychology of wisdom. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a virtue-theoretic approach to semantics, according to which the study of linguistic competence in particular, and the study of meaning and language in general, should focus on a speaker's interpretative virtues, such as charity and interpretability, rather than the speaker's knowledge of rules. The first part of the paper proffers an argument for shifting to virtue semantics, and the second part outlines the nature of such virtue semantics.

The aim of this paper is twofold: First, to generalize Quine's epistemology, to show that what Quine refutes for traditional epistemology is not only Cartesian foundationalism and Carnapian reductionism, but also any epistemological program if it takes atomic verificationist semantics or supernaturalism, which are rooted in the linguistic/factual distinction of individual sentences, as its underlying system. Thus, we will see that the range of naturalization in the Quinean sense is not as narrow as his critics think. Second, to normalize Quine's (...) epistemology, to explain in what sense Quinean naturalized epistemology is normative. The reason I maintain that critics miss the point of Quinean naturalized epistemology is that they do not appreciate the close connection between Quine's naturalistic approach and his holistic approach to epistemology. To show this I shall reconstruct Quine's argument for naturalizing epistemology within his systematic philosophy, and focus specifically on his holism and its applications, on which Quine relies both in arguing against traditional epistemology, and in supporting his theses of underdetermination of physical theory and indeterminacy of translation. This is the key to understanding the scope and the normativity of Quine's epistemology. In the conclusion I will point out what the genuine problems are for Quinean naturalized epistemology. (shrink)

This paper examines Aristotle’s vocabulary of pain, that is the differences and relations of the concepts of pain expressed by synonyms in the same semantic field. It investigates what is particularly Aristotelian in the selection of the pain-words in comparison with earlier authors and specifies the special semantic scope of each word-cluster. The result not only aims to pin down the exact way these terms converge with and diverge from each other, but also serves as a basis for further understanding (...) Aristotle’s philosophical conception of pain. (shrink)

Recently virtue ethicists, such as Julia Annas and Matt Stichter, in order to explain what a moral virtue is and how it is acquired, suggest modeling virtue on practical expertise. However, a challenging issue arises when considering the nature of practical expertise especially about whether expertise requires articulacy, that is, whether an expert in a skill is required to possess an ability to articulate the principles underlying the skill. With regard to this issue, Annas advocates the articulacy requirement, while Stichter (...) denies. Stichter raises two objections to Annas’s requirement: first, Annas provides no argument for the requirement; second, there exist counterexamples in which there are experts who cannot articulate what and why they did in skilled performance. In this paper I shall show that Annas did provide an argument and can respond to the counterexamples; however, her argument and response are not convincing. Instead, I construct a new argument for the articulacy requirement by which I call the argument from success-conduciveness. The main idea involved in this new argument, i.e., articulacy is success-conducive, supports further that ethical expertise requires articulacy due to the seriousness of morality. (shrink)

Recently, there is a renewed debate concerning the role of perspective in vision. Morales et al. (2020) present evidence that, in the case of viewing a rotated coin, the visual system is sensitive to what has often been called “perspectival shapes.” It has generated vigorous discussions, including an online symposium by Morales and Cohen, an exchange between Linton (2021) and Morales et al. (2021), and most recently, a fierce critique by Burge and Burge (2022), in which they launch various conceptual (...) and empirical objections. Although Morales and Firestone (2022) have responded to them recently, and we are in agreement with Morales and Firestone in general, there are further problems in Burge and Burge (2022) that are worth highlighting. The main point of this comment is that what the Burge–Burge team call “viewpoint-dependent relational properties” are simply instances of what the Morales–Firestone team call “perspectival shapes”; the confusion arises from Burge and Burge’s misconstrual of Morales et al.’s claims. This shows that conceptually, the two teams are in large agreement, as Morales and Firestone (2022) also point out, and the focus should be put on the empirical disagreements, which has been covered by Morales and Firestone (2022). Relatedly, we argue that Burge and Burge (2022) misinterpret Morales et al. (2020) as supporting a new entity in perception science, and that this misinterpretation is a primary source of their apparent disagreement. This is worth pointing out because such misunderstanding generates many unnecessary quarrels that hinder progress. (shrink)

This article systematically surveys the history of Anglo-American philosophy in Taiwan since the late nineteenth century. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it argues that pragmatism remained influential given the dominance of continental philosophy in Japanese colonized Taiwan, where the universal values assumed by pragmatists were used to resist the Empire’s ideology, after WWII, immigrated Chinese scholars brought in more novelty to Taiwanese philosophy than the Vienna circle diasporas brought to their Anglo-American counterparts, in which liberal scholars’ emphasis on science and democracy (...) challenged Chiang’s dictatorship and Chinese nationalism, and analytic philosophy thrived with the advance of democratizing in the 1980s, which, in turn, diversified the philosophy in 1990s Taiwan. Accordingly, Anglo-American philosophy was never confined to the academic ivory tower but had positive impacts on Taiwan’s centennial social transformation. (shrink)

According to Dreyfusian anti-intellectualism, know-how or expertise cannot be explained in terms of know-that and its cognates but only in terms of intuition. Hubert Dreyfus and Stuart Dreyfus do not exclude know-that and its cognates in explaining skilled action. However, they think that know-that and its cognates (such as calculative deliberation and perspectival deliberation) only operate either below or above the level of expertise. In agreement with some critics of Dreyfus and Dreyfus, in this paper, I argue that know-that and (...) its cognates are constitutive of rather than external to know-how and expertise. However, unlike those critics, who argue for this point only from a phenomenological point of view, my argument adopts a (telic) normative point of view. (shrink)

Tennis champion Maria Sharapova has a habit of grunting when she plays on the court. Assume that she also has a habit of hitting the ball in a certain way in a certain situation. The habit of on-court grunting might be bad, but can the habit of hitting the ball in a certain way in a certain situation be classified as intelligent? The fundamental questions here are as follows: What is habit? What is the relation between habit and skill? Is (...) there such a thing as intelligent habit? In this paper I expound the nature of habit by developing and defending a Rylean conception of habit, according to which an acquired disposition is a habit if and only if the manifestation of the disposition is repeated, automatic, and uniform. One implication of this conception is that there is no such thing as intelligent habit. A practical application in athletic expertise is that sport coaches can help athletes go beyond repeated, automatic, and uniform dispositions in sport. (shrink)

This paper examines racial discrimination and algorithmic bias in predictive policing algorithms (PPAs), an emerging technology designed to predict threats and suggest solutions in law enforcement. We first describe what discrimination is in a case study of Chicago’s PPA. We then explain their causes with Broadbent’s contrastive model of causation and causal diagrams. Based on the cognitive science literature, we also explain why fairness is not an objective truth discoverable in laboratories but has context-sensitive social meanings that need to be (...) negotiated through democratic processes. With the above analysis, we next predict why some recommendations given in the bias reduction literature are not as effective as expected. Unlike the cliché highlighting equal participation for all stakeholders in predictive policing, we emphasize power structures to avoid hermeneutical lacunae. Finally, we aim to control PPA discrimination by proposing a governance solution—a framework of a social safety net. (shrink)

Despite intensive debates regarding action imitation and sentence imitation, few studies have examined their relationship. In this paper, we argue that the mechanism of action imitation is necessary and in some cases sufficient to describe sentence imitation. We first develop a framework for action imitation in which key ideas of Hurley’s shared circuits model are integrated with Wolpert et al.’s motor selection mechanism and its extensions. We then explain how this action-based framework clarifies sentence imitation without a language-specific faculty. Finally, (...) we discuss the empirical support for and philosophical significance of this perspective. (shrink)

Regulative virtue epistemology argues that intellectual virtues can adjust and guide one’s epistemic actions as well as improve on the quality of the epistemic actions. For regulative virtue epistemologists, intellectual virtues can be cultivated to a higher degree; when the quality of intellectual virtue is better, the resulting quality of epistemic action is better. The intellectual virtues that regulative epistemologists talk about are character virtues (such as intellectual courage and open-mindedness) rather than faculty virtues (such as sight and hearing), since (...) they don’t think that faculty virtues could be cultivated. This article refers to Xunzi’s philosophy, explaining how a regulative faculty-based virtue epistemology is possible. If this explanation works, on the one hand, a new branch of contemporary virtue epistemology is shown, and, on the other hand, a clear theoretical framework of Xunzi’s epistemology is constructed. (shrink)

Should you be targeted by police for a crime that AI predicts you will commit? In this paper, we analyse when, and to what extent, the person-based predictive policing (PP) — using AI technology to identify and handle individuals who are likely to breach the law — could be justifiably employed. We first examine PP’s epistemological limits, and then argue that these defects by no means refrain from its usage; they are worse in humans. Next, based on major AI ethics (...) guidelines (IEEE, EU, and RIKEN, etc.), we refine three basic moral principles specific to person-based PP. We also derive further requirements from case studies, including debates in Chicago, New Orleans, San Francisco, Tokyo, and cities in China. Instead of rejecting PP programs, we analyse what necessary conditions should be met for using the tool to achieve social good. While acknowledging its risks, we conclude that the person-based PP could be beneficial in community policing, especially when merging into a larger governance framework of the social safety net. (shrink)

According to the universality thesis, the epistemic properties referred to by the English epistemic verb “know” contained in the expressions of the form “S knows that p” or “S knows how to φ‎” are shared by the translations of the epistemic verb in all other languages such as Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Russian, and so on. Some doubt that there is reason to think the universality thesis is true because little or nothing is shown about the meanings and uses of the (...) epistemic terms in languages other than English. Critics of the universality thesis find counterevidence to the thesis; that is, the evidence demonstrates that translations of the epistemic verb “know” are used differently in some languages from the way “know” is used in English. In this chapter, the authors examine the effectiveness of such counterevidence. (shrink)