Patronizing the Public is the first detailed and comprehensive examination of how American philanthropy has transformed culture, communication, and the humanities. Drawing on an impressive range of archival and secondary sources, the chapters in the volume shed light on philanthropic foundations have shaped numerous fields, including film, television, radio, journalism, drama, local history, museums, as well as art and the humanities in general.

This paper examines an argument of Saul Kripke for the necessity of theoretical identification statements and defends it against a criticism of M. Perrick ("Are Kripke's Theoretical Identifications Necessary Truths?", Logique et Analyse, Volume 115, September 1986, pages 381-384). It is argued that Perrick's criticism rests on a fallacy of ambiguity. Formal modal logic is used to examine a number of plausible interpretations of Kripke's argument, and Perrick's error is shown to arise from confusion concerning the scope of the modal (...) necessity operator. (shrink)

John Marshall is best remembered asthe first resident director of the RockefellerFoundation's Study and Conference Center atBellagio. Yet, his influence on knowledge,thought, and practice rivalled that of any ofhis contemporaries at the Rockefeller. Thispaper describes how he `went about hisbusiness' as a Foundation officer, and examineshis contribution to the creation of atransatlantic community of like-mindedtheorists and practitioners of communications.

It is hardly controversial to assert that recent work on Greek mythology is methodologically diverse. However, there is one body of writing which seems to have become a reference point against which scholars of many persuasions–not excluding orthodox positivist philologists and adherents of psychoanalysis–feel the need to define their own position. I mean structuralism. G.S. Kirk and, later, W. Burkert have conducted their dialogues with it; C. Segal and more unreconstructedly R. Caldwell have tried to accommodate Lévi-Strauss and Freud under (...) the same blanket; a glance at bibliographical citations in studies of tragedy over the last twenty years will show how J.-P. Vernant and P. Vidal-Naquet have moved from the periphery to the centre. The polemical attitudes being struck by M. Detienne and C. Calame are directly generated by over-confident structuralist attempts to map out the mental territory they claimed as their own. (shrink)

How do thought and language manage to be 'about' aspects of the world? J. Robert G. Williams investigates how representation arises out of a fundamentally non-representational world, showing the explanatory relations between the representational properties of language, of thought, and of perception and intention.

A new way to transpose the virtue epistemologist’s ‘knowledge = apt belief’ template to the collective level, as a thesis about group knowledge, is developed. In particular, it is shown how specifically judgmental belief can be realised at the collective level in a way that is structurally analogous, on a telic theory of epistemic normativity (e.g., Sosa 2020), to how it is realised at the individual level—viz., through a (collective) intentional attempt to get it right aptly (whether p) by alethically (...) affirming that p. An advantage of the proposal developed is that it is shown to be compatible with competing views—viz., joint acceptance accounts and social-distributive accounts—of how group members must interact in order to materially realise a group belief. I conclude by showing how the proposed judgment-focused collective (telic) virtue epistemology has important advantages over a rival version of collective virtue epistemology defended in recent work by Jesper Kallestrup (2016). (shrink)

Strange inversions occur when things work in ways that turn received wisdom upside down. Hume offered a strangely inverted story about causation, and Darwin, about apparent design. Dennett suggests that a strange inversion also occurs when we project our own reactive complexes outward, painting our world with elusive properties like cuteness, sweetness, blueness, sexiness, funniness, and more. Such properties strike us as experiential causes, but they are really effects—a kind of shorthand for whole sets of reactive dispositions rooted in the (...) nuts and bolts of human information processing. Understanding the nature and origins of that strange inversion, Dennett believes, is thus key to understanding the nature and origins of human experience itself. This paper examines this claim, paying special attention to recent formulations that link that strange inversion to the emerging vision of the brain as a Bayesian estimator, constantly seeking to predict the unfolding sensory barrage. (shrink)

The meta-problem is 'the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness' (Chalmers, 2018, p. 6). This presupposes that we think there is a problem in the first place. We challenge the breadth of this 'we', arguing that there is already sufficient empirical evidence to cast doubt on the claim. We then add to this body of evidence, presenting the results of a new cross-cultural study extending the work of Sytsma and Machery (2010).

The conservation of energy and momentum have been viewed as undermining Cartesian mental causation since the 1690s. Modern discussions of the topic tend to use mid-nineteenth century physics, neglecting both locality and Noether’s theorem and its converse. The relevance of General Relativity has rarely been considered. But a few authors have proposed that the non-localizability of gravitational energy and consequent lack of physically meaningful local conservation laws answers the conservation objection to mental causation: conservation already fails in GR, so there (...) is nothing for minds to violate. This paper is motivated by two ideas. First, one might take seriously the fact that GR formally has an infinity of rigid symmetries of the action and hence, by Noether’s first theorem, an infinity of conserved energies-momenta. Second, Sean Carroll has asked how one should modify the Dirac–Maxwell–Einstein equations to describe mental causation. This paper uses the generalized Bianchi identities to show that General Relativity tends to exclude, not facilitate, such Cartesian mental causation. In the simplest case, Cartesian mental influence must be spatio-temporally constant, and hence 0. The difficulty may diminish for more complicated models. Its persuasiveness is also affected by larger world-view considerations. The new general relativistic objection provides some support for realism about gravitational energy-momentum in GR. Such realism also might help to answer an objection to theories of causation involving conserved quantities, because energies-momenta would be conserved even in GR. (shrink)

Moral philosophers tend to discriminate, explicitly or implicitly, three types of action from the point of view of moral worth. First, they recognize actions that are a duty, or obligatory, or that we ought to perform, treating these terms as approximately synonymous; second, they recognize actions that are right in so far as they are permissible from a moral standpoint and not ruled out by moral considerations, but that are not morally required of us, like the lead of this or (...) that card at bridge; third, they recognize actions that are wrong, that we ought not to do. (shrink)

Autonomous Knowledge: Radical Enhancement, Autonomy, and the Future of Knowing motivates and develops a new research programme in epistemology that is centred around the concept of epistemic autonomy.

A change in sense of self is an outcome commonly associated with Buddhist meditation. However, the sense of self is construed in multiple ways, and which changes in self-related processing are expected, intended, or possible through meditation is not well understood. In a qualitative study of meditation-related challenges, six discrete changes in sense of self were reported by Buddhist meditators: change in narrative self, loss of sense of ownership, loss of sense of agency, change in sense of embodiment, change in (...) self-other or self-world boundaries, and loss of sense of basic self. Changes in sense of self could be transient or enduring, positive or distressing, enhancing or impairing. These changes were also given varied appraisals, ranging from insights associated with Buddhist doctrines to psychopathologies such as depersonalization. In this study of practitioners reporting meditation-related challenges, more global changes in sense of self were associated with higher levels of impairment. These results have implications for both Buddhist meditation as well as mindfulness-based interventions. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe seminal work of David Marr, popularized in his classic work Vision, continues to exert a major influence on both cognitive science and philosophy. The interpretation of his work also co...

In the paper, the originator of the hiddenness argument, J. L. Schellenberg, responds to papers that challenge his reasoning. In his remarks he puts an emphasis on the concept of divine love and he explains why it is not only connected to the idea of the Christian God. He also clarifies his position on ultimism.

Here I reply to criticisms by Jeroen de Ridder and S. Kate Devitt to my "Collective (Telic) Virtue Epistemology".

Conceptual clarity is essential when engaging in dialogue to avoid unnecessary disagreement and to promote mutual understanding. In this issue devoted to clinical bioethics, the authors exemplify the virtue of careful conceptual analysis as they explore complex clinical questions regarding the essential nature of medicine, the boundaries of killing and letting die, the meaning of irreversibility in definitions of death, the argument for a right to try experimental medications, the ethical borders in complex medical billing, and the definition and modeling (...) of complex disease states. (shrink)

Minimally, metaphysical realists hold that there exist some mind-independent entities. Metaphysical realists also hold that we can speak meaningfully or truthfully about mind-independent entities. Those who reject metaphysical realism deny one or more of these commitments. This Element aims to introduce the reader to the core commitments of metaphysical realism and to illustrate how these commitments have changed over time by surveying some of the main families of views that realism has been contrasted with: such as scepticism, idealism, and anti-realism.

In his concept of an anthropological physiology, F.J.J. Buytendijk has tried to lay down the theoretical and scientific foundations for an anthropologically-oriented medicine. The aim of anthropological physiology is to demonstrate, empirically, what being specifically human is in the most elementary physiological functions. This article contains a sketch of Buytendijk''s life and work, an overview of his philosophical-anthropological presuppositions, an outline of his idea of an anthropological physiology and medicine, and a discussion of some episternological and methodological problems. It is (...) demonstrated that Buytendijk''s design of an anthropological physiology is fragmentary and programmatic and that his methodology offers few points of contact for specific anthropological experimental research.Notwithstanding, it is argued that Buytendijk''s description of the subjective, animated body forms a pre-eminent point of reference for all research in physiology and psychology in which the specific human aspect is not ignored beforehand. (shrink)

Why is there a 'hard problem' of consciousness? Why do we seem unable to grasp intuitively that physical brain processes can be identical to experiences? Here I comment on the 'meta-problem' (Chalmers, 2018), based on previous ideas (Storm, 2014; 2018). In short: humans may be 'inborn dualists' ('neuroscepticism'), because evolution gave us two (types of) brain systems (or functional modes): one (Sp) for understanding relatively simple physical phenomena, and another (Sm) specialized for mental phenomena. Because Sp cannot deal with the (...) immense complexity of the brain processes underlying consciousness, it represents them as fundamentally different from nonmental physical phenomena (dualist intuition), using 'simulations' to produce 'Sm-type understanding'/predictions that seems radically different from 'Sp-type understanding'. (By analogy, different sensory modalities, handled by distinct brain systems, evoke qualitatively different experiences.) Brain systems for Sp representations of our brain processes never evolved, because they would be useless. When lacking a single 'template' matching different aspects of reality (objective vs. subjective = simulated), complementary 'models' are needed ('neuro-complementarity'), like the wave–particle duality in quantum mechanics. Thus, it seems plausible that Sp and Sm evolved because they were needed to cope with different challenges, and that 'problem intuitions' are side effects of these useful but different brain systems. (shrink)

Semantic Scholar extracted view of "Animal Welfare and Rights: V. Zoos and Zoological Parks" by J. Dunlap et al.

Everyone interested in Arabic and Persian literature, in Islam and in comparative religion, regrets the death of Arthur J. Arberry, Sir Thomas Adams's Professor of Arabic in the University of Cambridge. Arberry combined rare human qualities and exceptional professional attainment, and this enabled him to make a unique contribution both to learning and to mutual understanding between East and West. He had a deep sense of vocation, which he brought to his unremitting labours as a skilled editor of texts, especially (...) in the field of Islamic mysticism, and as an imaginative translator of these texts of the Koran and of Arabic and Persian poetry, and as a sympathetic interpreter of Sūfism. (shrink)

This paper critically evaluates an objection to introspective arguments for human freedom found within Spinoza's Ethics. The objection-- which we call Spinoza's dream argument -- challenges the evidentiary value of a person's experience of her own freedom by pointing out that some choices made within dreams are experienced as no less free than choices made while awake despite the fact that choices made within dreams are not free. After reconstructing Spinoza's dream argument, we critically evaluate it, concluding ultimately that it (...) fails in two respects. First, we draw upon the results of an experiment we conducted that suggests that dreamt choices are not experienced as free to the same extent as choices made while awake. Second, we argue that there is no compelling justification for the claim that choices made within dreams are not free. (shrink)

This 2002 volume brings together major works by German thinkers, writing just prior to and after Kant, who were enormously influential in this crucial period of aesthetics. These texts include the first translation into English of Schiller's Kallias Letters and Moritz's On the Artistic Imitation of the Beautiful, together with translations of some of Hölderlin's most important theoretical writings and works by Hamann, Lessing, Novalis and Schlegel. In a philosophical introduction J. M. Bernstein traces the development of aesthetics from its (...) still rationalist and mimetic construction in Lessing, through the optimistic construal of art and/or beauty as the appearance of human freedom in the work of Schiller, to Hölderlin's darker vision of art as the memory of a lost unity, and the variations of that theme - of an impossible striving after the lost ideal - which are found in the work of Schlegel and Novalis. (shrink)

Literature on testimonial injustice and ways that perpetrators might combat it have flourished since Miranda Fricker’s ground-breaking work on testimonial injustice. Less attention has been given, however, to the role of bystanders. In this paper, I examine the accountability that bystanders may have for their omissions to redress testimonial injustice. I argue that bystander accountability applies in cases where it is opportune for bystanders to intervene, and if they are also sufficiently equipped and able to redress the testimonial injustice. Moreover, (...) I recommend that we move beyond virtue responsibilism for ameliorative thinking about testimonial injustice. (shrink)

Principles of expert deference say that you should align your credences with those of an expert. This expert could be your doctor, the objective chances, or your future self, after you've learnt something new. These kinds of principles face difficulties in cases in which you are uncertain of the truth-conditions of the thoughts in which you invest credence, as well as cases in which the thoughts have different truth-conditions for you and the expert. For instance, you shouldn't defer to your (...) doctor by aligning your credence in the de se thought 'I am sick' with the doctor's credence in that same de se thought. Here, I generalise principles of expert deference to handle these kinds of problem cases. (shrink)

The Carol J. Adams Reader gathers together Adams's foundational and recent articles in the fields of critical studies, animal studies, media studies, vegan studies, ecofeminism and feminism, as well as relevant interviews and conversations in which Adams identifies key concepts and new developments in her decades-long work. This volume, a companion to The Sexual Politics of Meat (Bloomsbury Revelations), offers insight into a variety of urgent issues for our contemporary world: Why do batterers harm animals? What is the relationship between (...) genocide and attitudes toward other animals? How do activism and theory feed each other? How do race, gender, and species categories interact in strengthening oppressive attitudes? In clear language, Adams identifies the often hidden aspects of cultural presumptions. The essays and conversations found here capture the decades-long energy and vision that continue to shape new ways of thinking about and responding to oppression. (shrink)

Books Reviewed in this Article: Reason, Truth and History. By Hilary Putnam. Pp.xii, 222, Cambridge University Press, 1982, £15.00 , £4.95 . Fundamentals of philosophy. By David Stewart and H. Gene Blocker. Pp.xiii, 378, New York, Macmillan, 1982, £12.95. Modern Philosophy: An Introduction. By A.R. Lacey. Pp.vii, 246, London and Boston, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982, £7.95 , £3.95 . Merleau‐Ponty's Philosophy. By Samuel B. Mallin. Pp.xi, 302, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1979, £14.20. Thought and Object: Essays (...) on Intentionality. Edited by Andrew Woodfield. Pp.xvi, 316, Oxford, Clarendon Pressl Oxford University Press, 1982, £16.00. Philosophical Ethics: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy. By Tom L. Beauchamp. Pp.xv, 396, New York & London, McGraw‐Hill, 1982, £14.25. The Limits of Obligation. By James S. Fishkin. Pp.viii, 184, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1982, £12.95. Religion and the One: Philosophies East and West. By Frederick Copleston. Pp.281, London, Search Press, 1982, £10.50. Religious Experience and Christian Faith. By F.W. Dillistone. Pp.viii, 120. London, SCM Press, 1982, £4.95. Exploring Inner Space: Scientists and Religious Experience. By David Hay. Pp.256, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1982, £2.95. Judaism and Psychoanalysis. Edited by Mortimer Ostrow. Pp.ix, 305, New York, Ktav, 1982, $20.00. Ecclesial Reflection: An Anatomy of Theological Method. By Edward Farley. Pp.xix, 380, Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1982, $29.95. The Pastoral Nature of the Ministry. By Frank Wright. Pp.89, London, SCM Press, 1980, £2.50. Power and Authority in the Catholic Church. By Charles Dahm in collaboration with Robert Ghelardi. Pp.xviii, 334, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1981, £12.35. Religion in Sociological Perspective. By Bryan Wilson. Pp.vii. 187, Oxford University Press, 1982, £8.50. Myth, Religion and Society: Structuralist Essays. By M. Detienne, L. Gernet, J.‐P. Vernant and P. Vidal‐Naquet. Pp.xviii, 306, Cambridge University Press, 1981, £20.00 , £6.95 . Seven Theories of Human Society. By Tom Campbell. Pp.244, Oxford, Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press, 1981, £10.00. The Aims of Education Restated. By John White. Pp.xi, 177, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982, £8.95 , £4.95 . Love and Meaning in Religious Education: An Incarnational Approach to Teaching Christianity. By D.J. O'Leary and T. Sallnow. Pp.147, Oxford University Press, 1982, £3.50. Servant and Son: Jesus in Parable and Gospel. By J. Ramsey Michaels. Pp.xiii, 323, Atlanta, John Knox Press, 1981, £7.80. Parables for Now. By Edmund Flood. Pp.98, London, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1981, £2.50. More Parables for Now. By Edmund Flood. Pp.102, London, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1981, £2.50. Councils and Synods: With other Documents relating to the English Church, Vol.1 , A.D. 871–1204. Edited by D. Whitelock, M. Brett and C.N. Brooke. Pp.1 xxix, xii, 1151, Oxford University Press, 1981, £65.00. The Architectural History of Canterbury Cathedral. By Francis Woodman. Pp.xviii, 282, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981, £35.00. The Correspondence of Erasmus, Volume VI. Translated by R.A.B. Mynors and D.F.S. Thomson, annotated by Peter G. Bietenholz. Pp.xxii, 448, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1982, £56.25. Erasme: Vie de Jean Vitrier et de John Colet. Edited by Andrd Godin. Pp.160, Angers, Editions Moreana, 1982, $7.00. Erasme, lecteur d'Origène. By André Godin. Pp.ix, 724, Geneva, Librairie Droz, 1982, no price given. Thomas More: history and providence. By Alistair Fox. Pp.xi, 271, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1982, no price given. Thomas More: Essays on the Icon. Edited by D. Grace and B. Byron. Pp.129, Melbourne, Dove Communications, 1980, no price given. The Cambridge Connection and the Elizabethan Settlement of 1559. By W.S. Hudson. Pp.x, 158, Durham , Duke University Press, 1980, $14.75. Faith by Statute: Parliament and the Settlement of Religion, 1559. By Norman L. Jones. Pp.viii, 245 , London, Royal Historical Society, 1982, £17.52. Richard Hooker and the Politics of a Christian England. By Robert K. Faulkner. Pp.x, 190, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1981, £15.75. Icon and Conquest. By Bernadette Bucher. Pp.xvii, 220, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1981, £9.95. The Wooden Churches of Eastern Europe: An Introductory Survey. By David Buxton. Pp.viii, 405, Cambridge University Press, 1982, £42.50. American Catholics: A History of the Roman Catholic Community in the United States. By James Hennessey. Pp.xii, 397, New York, Oxford University Press, 1981, £13.50. Peter Maurin: Prophet in the Twentieth Century. By Marc H. Ellis. Pp.191, Ramsey, New Jersey and Leominster, England, Paulist Press/Fowler Wright Books, 1981, £7.45. The Newman Movement: Roman Catholics in American Higher Education, 1883–1971. By John Whitney Evans. Pp.xvi, 248, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1980, $14.95. Priests and People in Pre‐Famine Ireland, 1780–1845. By S.J. Connolly. Pp.338, Dublin, Gill & Macmillan, 1982, £17.00. The Nonconformist Conscience: Chapel and Politics, 1870–1914. By D.W. Bebbington. Pp.x, 193, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1982, £10.00. Heinrich Pesch: sein Leben und seine Lehre. By Franz H. Mueller. Pp.220, Cologne, J.P. Bachem, 1980, no price given. Beyond Survival: Reflections on the Future of Judaism. By Dow Marmur. Pp.xix, 218, London, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1982, £7.95. (shrink)