Recent studies on the effects of mandatory online teaching, resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, have widely reported low levels of satisfaction, unwillingness to continue online teaching, and negative impacts on the psychological well-being of teachers. Emerging research has highlighted the potential role of psychological need thwarting, in terms of autonomy, competence, and relatedness thwarting, resulting from online teaching. The aim of this study was to evaluate the immediate and delayed effects of PNT of online teaching on teachers’ well-being, intention to (...) continue online teaching, and job satisfaction. Moreover, data collected from both cross-sectional and longitudinal surveys allowed for a systematic validation of an important instrument in the field of teacher psychology, the Psychological Need Thwarting Scale of Online Teaching, in terms of longitudinal reliability and validity. The data reveal the usefulness of the construct of PNT in terms predicting and explaining teachers’ willingness to continue using online teaching as well as the degree of burnout after a period of 2 months, such that PNT is positively associated with burnout and negatively associated with willingness to continue online teaching. As such, the PNTSOT is recommended for future research evaluating the long-term psychological, affective, and intentional outcomes stemming from teachers’ PNT. Moreover, based on our findings that the impact from PNT of online teaching is persistent and long-term, we suggest that school leaders provide flexible and sustained professional development, model respectful and adaptive leadership, and create opportunities for mastery for the development of community of practice that can mitigate the thwarting of teachers’ autonomy, competence, and relatedness during times of uncertainty. Additionally, in terms of the psychometric properties of the PNTSOT instrument, our empirical findings demonstrate internal reliability, test–retest reliability, measurement invariance, and criterion validity based on cross-sectional and longitudinal data. (shrink)

Chu tu wen xian yu ru dao guan xi " nei rong jian jie: ru dao guan xi shi yi xiang gui mo hong da de yan jiu ke ti, ta she ji daozheng ge Zhongguo si xiang shi de nei zai jie gou he fa zhan guo cheng, she ji dao Zhongguo wen hua jin hou de zou xiang, yi yi zhong da. Er shi shi ji yi hou, yi huo de le shu liang ke guan de yan jiu (...) cheng guo. Zui jin chu tu wen xian de da liang yong xian you wei zhe ge wen ti de tao lun ti gong le xu duo xin cai liao, xin shi ye, xin guian dian."Chu tu wen xian yu ru dao guan xi " shou ji le 30 duo pian you dai biao xing de lun wen, tong guo "Kong Lao Meng Zhuang zhi bian", "Ru dao hu bu yu ying xiang", "Chu tu wen xian xin shi ye" san ge ban kuai jia yi cheng xian, xi wang du zhe jie ci dui yi wang ru dao guan xi yan jiu de fa zhan mai luo yu kuang jia you zong ti de ba wo, bing you ci kai chu xin de yan jiu tian di. (shrink)

Xue xi he yan jiu Zhongguo zhe xue, yi ban lai shuo, Feng xian sheng shi ke chao er bu ke yue de. Yi si shi, hou ren wan quan ke neng er qie ye ying dang sheng guo Feng xian sheng, dan shi que bu neng rao guo Feng xian sheng. Rao guo Feng xian sheng, bu dan bi ran yao duo fei li qi, er qie rong yi zou wan lu er nan yu shen ru tang ao. Feng (...) Youlan zuo wei wo guo jin dai zhe xue de yi dai ju bo, zai mou zhong yi yi shang, ying xiang liao zheng ge jin dai Zhongguo zhe xue de ge ju. Er dui yu Feng Youlan zhe xue ji qi xue shu sheng ya de yan jiu, ye sui zhe dang dai guo xue yan jiu de xing qi, shou dao yue lai yue duo de guan zhu. Minguo shi qi de Zhongguo xue shu jie, ying gai shuo shi hui ju le yi da pi kua shi dai de xue shu jing ying, te bie shi zai chuan tong xue shu ling yu, kan cheng yi chang si xiang de sheng yan.ben shu zuo zhe zai hao ru yan hai de Minguo wen xian zhong, jing xin zheng li chu dang shi xue jie dui Feng Youlan zhe xue de hui ying he dui hua, qi zhong bao kuo zhu ru Chen Yinke, Jin Yuelin, Hu Shi, Zhang Dainian, Cai Shangsi deng yi da pi xue jie tai dou de wen zhang, zi liao xing fei chang qiang, bu jin fan ying le zhu wei xue zhe ge ren de du dao jian jie, geng cong yi ge ce mian fan ying le Minguo shi qi Feng Youlan zhe xue yan jiu de sheng kuang, dui dang xia yan jiu Feng Youlan zhe xue si xiang ju you zhong yao de can kao jia zhi. (shrink)

Ben shu zhi zai yong zhe xue yan jiu de fang shi zheng ti lun shu fo xue ti xi. wei le shi pu tong da zhong neng chu kui wan zheng de fo jiao xi tong, zuo zhe fen bie cong fo jiao de ge di yu pai bie,zhe xue si xiang guan dian,si miao jian zhu yi ji fo jing shu ji lun zhu deng fang mian jin xing liao xiang jin de xu shu ji tao lun. (...) shu zhong chu le dui fo jiao wen hua zhi shi de zheng li yu chuan hang, hai hui jie he you zuo zhe zai de zhe xue ji Zhongguo wen hua ling yu zhong di yan jiu cheng guo. ben shu zun zhong zong jiao ben shen, zai xie zuo shou fa shang shi fen yan jin, fo jing ji xue zhe guan dian jie zhi yi yin yong xing shi lie chu, bing bu zuo ping lun ; dui zhuan men de shu yu hui dai you jiao zhu,jian suo shen zhi shi fan wen yuan wen de shuo ming, ke du xing qiang bing yi yu cha yue. (shrink)

Ben shu wei "Song Ming shi qi Chang Jiang zhong you de ru xue yan jiu" cong shu zhi yi: ben cong shu shi ren wen she hui ke xue chong dian yan jiu ji di-Wuhan da xue Zhongguo chuan tong wen hua yan jiu zhong xin tou biao, jing jiao yu bu zu zhi zhuan jia ping shen tong guo, zheng shi pi zhun de jiao yu bu ren wen she hui ke xue 2001 nian du zhong da yan (...) jiu xiang mu, xiang mu pi zhun hao shi 01JAZJD720008, ding yu 2004 nian qian hou wan cheng. ke ti zu zhu chi ren wei Guo Qiyong jiao shou, "Jiangxi zhi xue"shi Zhu Xi ti chu de yi ge gai nian, zhu yao zhi chu zi yu Jiangxi Jinxi Lu shi jia zu yi men de xue shuo, qi nei he shi Lu Jiuyuan de xin xue; di 2 quan ze shi you "Song Yuan xue an" suo zai zhi Xiangshan xiong Zhangfu, Suoshan de xue shuo; di 3 quan wei Xiangshan xiong di de di zi men de si xiang. Ben shu quan mian kao cha Jiangxi zhi xue zai Song dai Chang Jiang zhong you xing qi de xue mo yuan yuan, zhu yao xue shuo, yu Luo xue Min xue Zhejiang zhu xue zhe (Lü Zuqian, Yong Shangsi xian sheng deng) zhi jian de guan xi, yi ji qi dui Wang (Yangming) xue xing qi de nei zai guan lian xing, bing yan ji dui xian dai xin ru xue de tan tao. ben shu de xie zuo jiang zhu zhong si xiang kao gu de fang fa, zai quan mian yan jiu you guan dian ji de ji chu shang, dui you guan ren wu de chu sheng di, huo dong de di qu (ru jia zu suo zai cun luo, xue zhe shu xin wang lai, jiang xue, hui jiang, shu yuan deng) jin xing shi di de kao cha, guang fan di yun yong fang zhi, nian pu, shu yuan zhi, jia pu deng cai liao, ba si xiang jia huan yuan yu ju ti huan jing zhi zhong, zai ju ti she hui de li shi de jia zu de bei jing xia kao cha qi si xiang de nei han, jie shi qi jing shen suo zai, bing jin er yin shen chu qi yi yi yu jia zhi. (shrink)

What grounds human rights? How do we determine that something is a genuine human right? This chapter offers a new answer: human beings have human rights to the fundamental conditions for pursuing a good life. The fundamental conditions for pursuing a good life are certain goods, capacities, and options that human beings qua human beings need whatever else they qua individuals might need in order to pursue a characteristically good human life. This chapter explains how this Fundamental Conditions Approach is (...) better than James Griffin’s Agency Approach as well as Martha Nussbaum’s Central Capabilities Approach. It also shows how it can be compatible with the increasingly popular Political Conceptions of human rights defended by John Rawls, Charles Beitz, and Joseph Raz. (shrink)

To imagine is to form a mental representation that does not aim at things as they actually, presently, and subjectively are. One can use imagination to represent possibilities other than the actual, to represent times other than the present, and to represent perspectives other than one’s own. Unlike perceiving and believing, imagining something does not require one to consider that something to be the case. Unlike desiring or anticipating, imagining something does not require one to wish or expect that something (...) to be the case. // -/- Imagination is involved in a wide variety of human activities, and has been explored from a wide range of philosophical perspectives. Philosophers of mind have examined imagination’s role in mindreading and in pretense. Philosophical aestheticians have examined imagination’s role in creating and in engaging with different types of artworks. Epistemologists have examined imagination’s role in theoretical thought experiments and in practical decision-making. Philosophers of language have examined imagination’s role in irony and metaphor. // -/- Because of the breadth of the topic, this entry focuses exclusively on contemporary discussions of imagination in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition. (shrink)

A major challenge to the Doctrine of Double Effect is the concern that an agent’s intention can be identified in such a fine-grained way as to eliminate an intention to harm from a putative example of an intended harm, and yet, the resulting case appears to be a case of impermissibility. This is the so-called “closeness problem.” Many people believe that one can address the closeness problem by adopting Warren Quinn’s version of the DDE, call it DDE*, which distinguishes between (...) harmful direct agency and harmful indirect agency. In this paper, I first argue that Quinn’s DDE* is just as vulnerable to the closeness problem as the DDE is. Second, some might think that what we should therefore do is give up on intentions altogether and move towards some kind of non-state-of-mind, victim-based deontology. I shall argue against this move and explain why intentions are indispensable to an adequate nonconsequentialist theory. Finally, I shall propose a new way of answering the closeness problem. (shrink)

The concept of right or fit is an important element entailed, but not fully articulated, in the concept of action or practice in Aristotle's theory of virtue; which, however, turns to be of the utmost importance in later Western ethics. Right is concerned with both feelings and actions, and is not the same for all individuals. It lies in between the two extremes of the spectrum of practical affairs, yet by no means equidistant from them. This account of the concept (...) of fitness or right is derived from the categories of quantity, relationship, and quality rather than from that of substance. Thus, it seems that virtue is relative to vice or error within a continuous existence. If, however, the right of passion and action is environmental and concrete, is it multiple and not singular? To this question, Aristotle gives his reply on two levels: On the level of concrete practitioners, what is right and fit to one man might not be so to another man, and hence the right of practice is not singular but multiple; whereas on the level concerned with the only right choice compared with the two extremes or errors, the right of practice will always be singular. /// "正确"是隐含于亚里士多德的德性学说中的一个重要而未充分展开的，在 后来的西方伦理学中却变成极为重要的关于行为或实践的概念。"正确"与感情和 行为都相关。"正确"并不是对所有人同样的。它是两端间的那个中间，但井不始 终与两端距离相等。对适度或正确的这种说明基本上是从数量、关系与性质范畴引 出，而不是从实体范畴引出的述说。所以，德性似乎始终是在一种有连续性的存在 中相对于恶或错误而言的。感情与行为的正确如果是环境的、具体的，它是否是多 而不是一?亚里士多德在两个层面上回答这个问题。在相对于具体实践者的层面， 对我而言的适度或正确很可能不同于对你而言的，实践的正确不是一而是多:在相 对于两端或错误唯有一个正确的选择而言，实践的正确始终只是一。. (shrink)

Experiments have suggested that umbilical cord blood stem cells can be used to prevent diseases such as atherosclerosis. This paper discusses ethical issues surrounding such usage such as the uncertainty that individuals at risk of a disease will actually get the disease; issues related to research with children; safety issues; from where these stem cells would be obtained; and whether these usages should be considered as therapies or as physical enhancements.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The Tao Te Ching by Laozi is the philosophical inception of all Chinese thoughts and concepts. As its disparate versions, it is very hard to backtrack to the very original meaning of the Tao Te Ching. There are three most important versions of the Tao Te Ching: the original Wang Bi's version, the silk book (versions A and B) and the Chu Jian version. The preferred version of Laozi is the original Wang Bi's version. This edition is mainly based on (...) Chu Jian and Version A of the silk book, with supplement of the text of Version B. If the supplement is incomplete, this book uses Wang Bi's version. Both Version A of the silk book and Chu Jian were before the Western Han Dynasty. It was the period when Laozi rescued the highest prestige and Confucianism was in the doldrums. They were not tampered with by the emperor and Confucianism. It is the intention of the author that readers should not believe in the correction and proofreading of Confucian scholars and materialist dialectics. (shrink)

There has been a long history of arguments over whether happiness is anything more than a particular set of psychological states. On one side, some philosophers have argued that there is not, endorsing a descriptive view of happiness. Affective scientists have also embraced this view and are reaching a near consensus on a definition of happiness as some combination of affect and life-satisfaction. On the other side, some philosophers have maintained an evaluative view of happiness, on which being happy involves (...) living a life that is normatively good. Within the context of this debate we consider how people ordinarily understand happiness, and provide evidence that the ordinary understanding of happiness reflects aspects of both evaluative and descriptive views. Similar to evaluative views, normative judgments have a substantive role in the ordinary understanding of happiness. Yet, similar to descriptive views, the ordinary understanding is focused on the person’s psychological states and not the overall life they actually lived. Combining these two aspects, we argue that the ordinary understanding of happiness suggests a novel view on which happiness consists in experiencing positive psychological states when one ought to. This view, if right, has implications for both philosophical and psychological research on happiness. (shrink)

Along with the notion of being a person (zuo ren 做人), the notion of doing business (zuo shi 做事) in ordinary Chinese is basically an over-all notion of the norms in the practical and associative activities, carrying typically obscure meanings on practice and association affairs in some external world. Ordinary Chinese not only distinguishes these two notions but also defines a dictionary order of them, with the affairs of the internal world prior to those of the external. The fact that (...) the notion of doing business refers to business (shi 事) rather than person (ren 人) makes this order clear at a deeper level. It shows that this notion regards the practical affairs of the external world less important to the person itself than those of the internal. Except for these qualities, the notion of doing business holds some normative meanings, although contains no definite rules. These meanings indirectly relate to the notion of person that people form in their private associations and emerge as some mixture with a tactical attitude out of the need of earning a life. The notion of person gives birth to some obscure requirements, for instance, the requirement of 'doing business in accordance with your conscience' and that of 'doing business seriously'. The core world of family is marginalized in the public transition of associations. There are reasons to anticipate that in this process the notion of doing business will undergo more radical changes than that of being a person. (shrink)

From a phenomenological perspective of game-space and horizon, this paper tries to make a deconstructive reading of Hegel's "two galleries", namely, "the gallery of opinions" and "the gallery of knowledge", which are mentioned in the introduction of Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy. The reading shows that the Game-space or the ab-gruendiger Grund of the Hegelian concept of philosophical history lies in an originally differencing space that is keeping in absence, which is called by Edmund Husserl and Jacques Derrida (...) "the gallery of Dresden". (shrink)

S. Matthew Liao argues here that children have a right to be loved. To do so he investigates questions such as whether children are rightholders; what grounds a child's right to beloved; whether love is an appropriate object of a right; and other philosophical and practical issues. His proposal is that all human beings have rights to the fundamental conditions for pursuing a good life; therefore, as human beings, children have human rights to the fundamental conditions for pursuing a (...) good life. Since being loved is one of those fundamental conditions, children thus have a right to be loved. Liao shows that this claim need not be merely empty rhetoric, and that the arguments for this right can hang together as a coherent whole. This is the first book to make a sustained philosophical case for the right of children to be loved. It makes a unique contribution to the fast-growing literature on family ethics, in particular, on children's rights and parental rights and responsibilities, and to the emerging field of the philosophy of human rights. (shrink)

We apply a familiar distinction from philosophy of language to a class of material artifacts that are sometimes said to “speak”: statues. By distinguishing how statues speak at the locutionary level versus at the illocutionary level, or what they say versus what they do, we obtain the resource for addressing two topics. First, we can explain what makes statues distinct from street art. Second, we can explain why it is mistaken to criticize—or to defend—the continuing presence of statues based only (...) on what they represent. Both explanations are driven by the same core idea: the significance of statues arises primarily from what they do, and not what they say. (shrink)

abstract In this paper, we examine issues raised by the possibility of regulating emotions through pharmacological means. We argue that emotions induced through these means can be authentic phenomenologically, and that the manner of inducing them need not make them any less our own than emotions arising 'naturally'. We recognize that in taking drugs to induce emotions, one may lose opportunities for self-knowledge; act narcissistically; or treat oneself as a mere means. But we propose that there are circumstances in which (...) none of these concerns arise. Finally, we consider how the possibility of drug-regulation might affect duties to feel emotions. (shrink)

Prozac's introduction in the late 1980s, caused a furor and focused debate on the acceptability of a drug that could do more than merely cure illness, pharmacological mood enhancement – that is, the use of drugs to improve mood beyond a level that is merely normal or healthy. As the possibilities and demand for mood enhancement increase, existing legislation will prove inadequate, designed as it is to regulate pharmaceuticals mainly for therapeutic use. This chapter explains why mood enhancement might be (...) desirable, explores some key ethical issues associated with it, and suggests how policy makers can respond to ensure that people use mood enhancement safely and responsibly. Whether it is appropriate to enhance one's mood might also depend on the manner in which the mood is experienced. While unpleasant states like depression may be appropriate and valuable in some cases, they can be disruptive and disabling if they continue indefinitely. (shrink)

EDITOR’S ABSTRACTThis paper argues that we cannot determine with certainty the sequence of the two parts of the Laozi text: “Way” and “Virtue”. These two parts were originally written independently by Lao Zi and in an uncertain chronological order. They originally circulated separately, and were later combined differently by various editors. Thus emerged the two Laozi versions: The one with “Way” preceding “Virtue” has dominated the transmission; the alternative order can be retrieved from recently discovered sources such as the Mawangdui (...) Silk Manuscripts and Han Bamboo Slips. (shrink)

Where is imagination in imaginative resistance? We seek to answer this question by connecting two ongoing lines of inquiry in different subfields of philosophy. In philosophy of mind, philosophers have been trying to understand imaginative attitudes’ place in cognitive architecture. In aesthetics, philosophers have been trying to understand the phenomenon of imaginative resistance. By connecting these two lines of inquiry, we hope to find mutual illumination of an attitude (or cluster of attitudes) and a phenomenon that have vexed philosophers. Our (...) strategy is to reorient the imaginative resistance literature from the perspective of cognitive architecture. Whereas existing taxonomies of positions in the imaginative resistance literature have focused on disagreements over the source and scope of the phenomenon, our taxonomy focuses on the psychological components necessary for explaining imaginative resistance. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In analyzing oppressive systems like racism, social theorists have articulated accounts of the dynamic interaction and mutual dependence between psychological components, such as individuals’ patterns of thought and action, and social components, such as formal institutions and informal interactions. We argue for the further inclusion of physical components, such as material artifacts and spatial environments. Drawing on socially situated and ecologically embedded approaches in the cognitive sciences, we argue that physical components of racism are not only shaped by, but also (...) shape psychological and social components of racism. Indeed, while our initial focus is on racism and racist things, we contend that our framework is also applicable to other oppressive systems, including sexism, classism, and ableism. This is because racist things are part of a broader class of oppressive things, which are material artifacts and spatial environments that are in congruence with an oppressive system. (shrink)

This article challenges the importance and necessity of confidentiality, which are often taken for granted, and questions whether the default promise of confidentiality to all participants, particularly in educational research, could in fact be an unnecessary concern. This article begins by reviewing the difference in the way confidentiality is handled in different fields and the applicability of some underlying assumptions. This is followed by an explanation of why confidentiality is investigated in the sense of anonymity in this article. Then the (...) article draws on an empirical study where original researchers and their original participants were interviewed about their views on anonymity. Lastly, the contradiction between the promises of confidentiality and the recognition of a participant’s contribution is highlighted. The article concludes with a call for more empirical observation and investigation into the importance of confidentiality. (shrink)

Despite a plethora of empirical evidence on the potential role of senior management in the success of corporate social responsibility in Western-dominated organizational contexts, little attempt has been made to document the various managerial mindsets toward CSR in organizations in Muslim-dominated countries in the Middle East region. To address this existing lacuna of theoretical and empirical research in CSR management, this paper offers a qualitative case study of CSR in three manufacturing firms operating in Iran’s auto industry. Based on an (...) inductive analysis of the qualitative data, three types of managerial mindset toward CSR are identified: conformist, self-seeker, and satisfier. While it is evident that these different mindsets of Iranian managers seek to serve managerial ends and short-term self-interests, they fall short of core values of Islamic ethics and CSR. (shrink)

It is well-known that racism is encoded into the social practices and institutions of medicine. Less well-known is that racism is encoded into the material artifacts of medicine. We argue that many medical devices are not merely biased, but materialize oppression. An oppressive device exhibits a harmful bias that reflects and perpetuates unjust power relations. Using pulse oximeters and spirometers as case studies, we show how medical devices can materialize oppression along various axes of social difference, including race, gender, class, (...) and ability. Our account uses political philosophy and cognitive science to give a theoretical basis for understanding materialized oppression, explaining how artifacts encode and carry oppressive ideas from the past to the present and future. Oppressive medical devices present a moral aggregation problem. To remedy this problem, we suggest redundantly layered solutions that are coordinated to disrupt reciprocal causal connections between the attitudes, practices, and artifacts of oppressive systems. (shrink)

Organizational leaders are eager to unlock the creative potential of followers. Yet, there is growing evidence that creativity can also have a dark side within organizations. Building on research linking creativity and unethical behavior, we develop the construct of creative unethicality—behavior that is both unethical and novel. We draw on social exchange theory to develop a model that identifies both why and when creative unethicality emerges within organizations. Specifically, we investigate the exchange dynamics through which creative support provided by empowering (...) leaders facilitates creative unethicality under conditions of high performance pressure. Across two multi-wave, multi-source field studies with employee-coworker and leader-subordinate dyads and an experimental study with a novel unethicality measure in a business simulation, we find convergent support for our theoretical model. These findings have important theoretical and practical implications for fostering creativity in organizations without simultaneously facilitating creative unethicality. (shrink)

In recent years, a number of philosophers have conducted empirical studies that survey people's intuitions about various subject matters in philosophy. Some have found that intuitions vary accordingly to seemingly irrelevant facts: facts about who is considering the hypothetical case, the presence or absence of certain kinds of content, or the context in which the hypothetical case is being considered. Our research applies this experimental philosophical methodology to Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous Loop Case, which she used to call into question (...) the validity of the intuitively plausible Doctrine of Double Effect. We found that intuitions about the Loop Case vary according to the context in which the case is considered. We contend that this undermines the supposed evidential status of intuitions about the Loop Case. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings for philosophers who rely on the Loop Case to make philosophical arguments and for philosophers who use intuitions in general. (shrink)