Results for 'Logical omniscience'

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  1. Ideal Rationality and Logical Omniscience.Declan Smithies - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.
    Does rationality require logical omniscience? Our best formal theories of rationality imply that it does, but our ordinary evaluations of rationality seem to suggest otherwise. This paper aims to resolve the tension by arguing that our ordinary evaluations of rationality are not only consistent with the thesis that rationality requires logical omniscience, but also provide a compelling rationale for accepting this thesis in the first place. This paper also defends an account of apriori justification for (...) beliefs that is designed to explain the rational requirement of logical omniscience. On this account, apriori justification for beliefs about logic has its source in logical facts, rather than psychological facts about experience, reasoning, or understanding. This account has important consequences for the epistemic role of experience in the logical domain. In a slogan, the epistemic role of experience in the apriori domain is not a justifying role, but rather an enabling and disabling role. (shrink)
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  2. Fragmentation and Logical Omniscience.Adam Elga & Agustin Rayo - forthcoming - Noûs.
    It would be good to have a Bayesian decision theory that assesses our decisions and thinking according to everyday standards of rationality — standards that do not require logical omniscience (Garber 1983, Hacking 1967). To that end we develop a “fragmented” decision theory in which a single state of mind is represented by a family of credence functions, each associated with a distinct choice condition (Lewis 1982, Stalnaker 1984). The theory imposes a local coherence assumption guaranteeing that as (...)
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  3. Impossible Worlds and Logical Omniscience: An Impossibility Result.Jens Christian Bjerring - 2013 - Synthese 190 (13):2505-2524.
    In this paper, I investigate whether we can use a world-involving framework to model the epistemic states of non-ideal agents. The standard possible-world framework falters in this respect because of a commitment to logical omniscience. A familiar attempt to overcome this problem centers around the use of impossible worlds where the truths of logic can be false. As we shall see, if we admit impossible worlds where “anything goes” in modal space, it is easy to model extremely non-ideal (...)
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  4. The Problem of Logical Omniscience, the Preface Paradox, and Doxastic Commitments.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):917-939.
    The main goal of this paper is to investigate what explanatory resources Robert Brandom’s distinction between acknowledged and consequential commitments affords in relation to the problem of logical omniscience. With this distinction the importance of the doxastic perspective under consideration for the relationship between logic and norms of reasoning is emphasized, and it becomes possible to handle a number of problematic cases discussed in the literature without thereby incurring a commitment to revisionism about logic. One such case in (...)
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  5. Logical Omniscience and Acknowledged Vs. Consequential Commitments.Niels Skovgaard Olsen - 2014 - Questions, Discourse and Dialogue: 20 Years After Making It Explicit, Proceedings of AISB50.
    The purpose of this paper is to consider the explanatory resources that Robert Brandom‟s distinction between acknowledged and consequential commitments affords in relation to the problem of logical omniscience. With this distinction the importance of the doxastic perspective under consideration for the relationship between logic and norms of reasoning is emphasized, and it becomes possible to handle a number of problematic cases discussed in the literature without thereby incurring a commitment to revisionism about logic. 12.
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  6. Hintikka and Cresswell on Logical Omniscience.Mark Jago - 2006 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (3):325-354.
    I discuss three ways of responding to the logical omniscience problems faced by traditional ‘possible worlds’ epistemic logics. Two of these responses were put forward by Hintikka and the third by Cresswell; all three have been influential in the literature on epistemic logic. I show that both of Hintikka's responses fail and present some problems for Cresswell’s. Although Cresswell's approach can be amended to avoid certain unpalatable consequences, the resulting formal framework collapses to a sentential model of knowledge, (...)
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  7. The Fundamental Problem of Logical Omniscience.Peter Hawke, Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (4):727-766.
    We propose a solution to the problem of logical omniscience in what we take to be its fundamental version: as concerning arbitrary agents and the knowledge attitude per se. Our logic of knowledge is a spin-off from a general theory of thick content, whereby the content of a sentence has two components: an intension, taking care of truth conditions; and a topic, taking care of subject matter. We present a list of plausible logical validities and invalidities for (...)
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  8. Dynamic Epistemic Logic and Logical Omniscience.Mattias Skipper Rasmussen - 2015 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 24 (3):377-399.
    Epistemic logics based on the possible worlds semantics suffer from the problem of logical omniscience, whereby agents are described as knowing all logical consequences of what they know, including all tautologies. This problem is doubly challenging: on the one hand, agents should be treated as logically non-omniscient, and on the other hand, as moderately logically competent. Many responses to logical omniscience fail to meet this double challenge because the concepts of knowledge and reasoning are not (...)
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  9. Solving the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Sinan Dogramaci - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):107-128.
    This paper looks at three ways of addressing probabilism’s implausible requirement of logical omniscience. The first and most common strategy says it’s okay to require an ideally rational person to be logically omniscient. I argue that this view is indefensible on any interpretation of ‘ideally rational’. The second strategy says probabilism should be formulated not in terms of logically possible worlds but in terms of doxastically possible worlds, ways you think the world might be. I argue that, on (...)
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  10.  48
    Logical Omniscience as Infeasibility.Sergei Artemov & Roman Kuznets - 2014 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 165 (1):6-25.
    Logical theories for representing knowledge are often plagued by the so-called Logical Omniscience Problem. The problem stems from the clash between the desire to model rational agents, which should be capable of simple logical inferences, and the fact that any logical inference, however complex, almost inevitably consists of inference steps that are simple enough. This contradiction points to the fruitlessness of trying to solve the Logical Omniscience Problem qualitatively if the rationality of agents (...)
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  11. A Dynamic Solution to the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Mattias Skipper & Jens Bjerring - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):501-521.
    The traditional possible-worlds model of belief describes agents as ‘logically omniscient’ in the sense that they believe all logical consequences of what they believe, including all logical truths. This is widely considered a problem if we want to reason about the epistemic lives of non-ideal agents who—much like ordinary human beings—are logically competent, but not logically omniscient. A popular strategy for avoiding logical omniscience centers around the use of impossible worlds: worlds that, in one way or (...)
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  12. The Problem of Logical Omniscience, I.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1991 - Synthese 89 (3):425 - 440.
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  13. Sentences, Belief and Logical Omniscience, or What Does Deduction Tell Us?Rohit Parikh - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (4):459-476.
    We propose a model for belief which is free of presuppositions. Current models for belief suffer from two difficulties. One is the well known problem of logical omniscience which tends to follow from most models. But a more important one is the fact that most models do not even attempt to answer the question what it means for someone to believe something, and just what it is that is believed. We provide a flexible model which allows us to (...)
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  14. On Logical Omniscience.Jacques Dubucs - 1991 - Logique Et Analyse 133 (133-140):41-55.
  15.  6
    Dealing with Logical Omniscience: Expressiveness and Pragmatics.Joseph Y. Halpern & Riccardo Pucella - 2011 - Artificial Intelligence 175 (1):220-235.
  16.  18
    Divine Omniscience and Human Free Will: A Logical and Metaphysical Analysis.Ciro De Florio & Aldo Frigerio - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.
    This book deals with an old conundrum: if God knows what we will choose tomorrow, how can we be free to choose otherwise? If all our choices are already written, is our freedom simply an illusion? This book provides a precise analysis of this dilemma using the tools of modern ontology and the logic of time. With a focus on three intertwined concepts - God's nature, the formal structure of time, and the metaphysics of time, including the relationship between temporal (...)
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  17. On Epistemic Logic and Logical Omniscience.William J. Rapaport & Moshe Y. Vardi - 1988 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2):668.
    Review of Joseph Y. Halpern (ed.), Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Proceedings of the 1986 Conference (Los Altos, CA: Morgan Kaufmann, 1986),.
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  18.  2
    Justification as Ignorance and Logical Omniscience.Daniel Waxman - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1).
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  19.  42
    Subjective Situations and Logical Omniscience.Antonio Moreno, Ulises Cortés & Ton Sales - 2002 - Studia Logica 72 (1):7-29.
    The beliefs of the agents in a multi-agent system have been formally modelled in the last decades using doxastic logics. The possible worlds model and its associated Kripke semantics provide an intuitive semantics for these logics, but they commit us to model agents that are logically omniscient. We propose a way of avoiding this problem, using a new kind of entities called subjective situations. We define a new doxastic logic based on these entities and we show how the belief operators (...)
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  20.  17
    Epistemic Logic Without Logical Omniscience.Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara - 1991 - In Georg Schurz (ed.), Advances in Scientific Philosophy. pp. 87.
  21.  33
    Omnipotence and Logical Omniscience.G. B. Keene - 1987 - Philosophy 62 (242):527 - 528.
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  22.  3
    A Nonstandard Approach to the Logical Omniscience Problem.Ronald Fagin, Joseph Y. Halpern & Moshe Y. Vardi - 1995 - Artificial Intelligence 79 (2):203-240.
  23.  85
    Truth in Evidence and Truth in Arguments Without Logical Omniscience.Gregor Betz - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (4):1117-1137.
    Science advances by means of argument and debate. Based on a formal model of complex argumentation, this article assesses the interplay between evidential and inferential drivers in scientific controversy, and explains, in particular, why both evidence accumulation and argumentation are veritistically valuable. By improving the conditions for applying veritistic indicators , novel evidence and arguments allow us to distinguish true from false hypotheses more reliably. Because such veritistic indicators also underpin inductive reasoning, evidence accumulation and argumentation enhance the reliability of (...)
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  24. Postcripts to "A Pragmatic Approach to the Problem of Logical Omniscience".Paul Egré - unknown
     
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  25. A Pragmatic Approach to the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Paul Egré - unknown
     
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  26.  9
    The Logic of Knowledge-the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Eric Gillet & Paul Gochet - 1993 - Dialectica 47 (2-3):143-171.
  27.  26
    An Externalist Way to Avoid Logical Omniscience Without Getting Logically Ignorant.Stephan Cursiefen - 2006 - In Ingvar Johansson, Bertin Klein & Thomas Roth-Berghofer (eds.), Wspi 2006: Contributions to the Third International Workshop on Philosophy and Informatics.
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  28. Future Contingents and the Logic of Temporal Omniscience.Patrick Todd & Brian Rabern - 2021 - Noûs 55 (1):102-127.
    At least since Aristotle’s famous 'sea-battle' passages in On Interpretation 9, some substantial minority of philosophers has been attracted to the doctrine of the open future--the doctrine that future contingent statements are not true. But, prima facie, such views seem inconsistent with the following intuition: if something has happened, then (looking back) it was the case that it would happen. How can it be that, looking forwards, it isn’t true that there will be a sea battle, while also being true (...)
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  29.  46
    Omniscience in Łukasiewicz’s, Kleene’s and Blau’s Three-Valued Logics.Stamatios Gerogiorgakis - 2011 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):59-78.
    In this paper several assumptions concerning omniscience and future contingents on the one side, and omniscience and self-reference on the other, areexamined with respect to a classical and a three-valued semantic setting.Interesting features of both settings are highlighted and their basic assumptions concerning omniscience are explored. To generate a context in which the notion of omniscience does not deviate from some basic intuitions, two special futurity operators are introduced in this article: one for what will definitely (...)
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  30.  5
    Omniscience: From a Logical Point of View.Paul Weingartner - 2008 - Ontos.
    The aim of the book is to clarify the concept of omniscience. This is done first by discussing basic questions on omniscience (chs.1-12) and secondly by offering a theory of omniscience as an axiomatic system in which also a definition of omniscience is given (ch.13). The twelve chapters deal with questions like whether everything is true what God knows, whether God's knowledge is bound to time, whether it concerns singular truths or only laws, whether it extends (...)
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  31. Logic and Omniscience. Alexander of Aphrodisias and Proclus.Mario Mignucci - 1985 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 3:219.
  32. Logical Ignorance and Logical Learning.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9991-10020.
    According to certain normative theories in epistemology, rationality requires us to be logically omniscient. Yet this prescription clashes with our ordinary judgments of rationality. How should we resolve this tension? In this paper, I focus particularly on the logical omniscience requirement in Bayesian epistemology. Building on a key insight by Hacking :311–325, 1967), I develop a version of Bayesianism that permits logical ignorance. This includes: an account of the synchronic norms that govern a logically ignorant individual at (...)
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  33.  46
    Grim on Logic and Omniscience.Selmer Bringsjord - 1989 - Analysis 49 (4):186 - 189.
  34. The Logic of Fast and Slow Thinking.Anthia Solaki, Francesco Berto & Sonja Smets - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):733-762.
    We present a framework for epistemic logic, modeling the logical aspects of System 1 and System 2 cognitive processes, as per dual process theories of reasoning. The framework combines non-normal worlds semantics with the techniques of Dynamic Epistemic Logic. It models non-logically-omniscient, but moderately rational agents: their System 1 makes fast sense of incoming information by integrating it on the basis of their background knowledge and beliefs. Their System 2 allows them to slowly, step-wise unpack some of the (...) consequences of such knowledge and beliefs, by paying a cognitive cost. The framework is applied to three instances of limited rationality, widely discussed in cognitive psychology: Stereotypical Thinking, the Framing Effect, and the Anchoring Effect. (shrink)
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  35. Epistemic Logic for Rule-Based Agents.Mark Jago - 2009 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (1):131-158.
    The logical omniscience problem, whereby standard models of epistemic logic treat an agent as believing all consequences of its beliefs and knowing whatever follows from what else it knows, has received plenty of attention in the literature. But many attempted solutions focus on a fairly narrow specification of the problem: avoiding the closure of belief or knowledge, rather than showing how the proposed logic is of philosophical interest or of use in computer science or artificial intelligence. Sentential epistemic (...)
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  36.  15
    God’s Omniscience and Logical Virtue.Mirosław Szatkowski - 2015 - In Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), God, Truth, and Other Enigmas. De Gruyter. pp. 97-116.
  37.  25
    Review of Paul Weingartner, Omniscience: From a Logical Point of View[REVIEW]Daniel J. Hill - 2008 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (11).
  38.  37
    Restricted Omniscience and Ways of Knowing.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - Sophia 53 (4):427-434.
    Recently, several philosophers have moved from a classical account of divine omniscience according to which God knows all truths to a restricted account of divine omniscience according to which God knows all knowable truths. But an important objection offered by Alexander Pruss threatens to show that if God knows all knowable truths, God must also know all truths. In this paper, I show that there is a way out of Pruss’s objection for the advocate of restricted omniscience (...)
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  39.  50
    Problems for Omniscience.Patrick Grim - 2013 - In J. P. Moreland, Chad Meister & Khaldoun A. Sweis (eds.), Debating Christian Theism. Oxford Univ. Press. pp. 169-180.
    A survey of logical problems for the concept of omniscience.
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  40. Epistemic Logic and Epistemology.Wesley H. Holliday - forthcoming - In Sven Ove Hansson Vincent F. Hendricks (ed.), Handbook of Formal Philosophy. Springer.
    This chapter provides a brief introduction to propositional epistemic logic and its applications to epistemology. No previous exposure to epistemic logic is assumed. Epistemic-logical topics discussed include the language and semantics of basic epistemic logic, multi-agent epistemic logic, combined epistemic-doxastic logic, and a glimpse of dynamic epistemic logic. Epistemological topics discussed include Moore-paradoxical phenomena, the surprise exam paradox, logical omniscience and epistemic closure, formalized theories of knowledge, debates about higher-order knowledge, and issues of knowability raised by Fitch’s (...)
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  41.  20
    Egocentric Omniscience and Self-Ascriptive Belief.Brian Macpherson - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:125-140.
    David Lewis’s property-centered account of belief falls prey to the problem of egocentric omniscience: In self-ascribing the property of being an eye doctor, an agent is thereby self-ascribing the property of being an oculist. It is argued that the problem of egocentric omniscience can be made palatable for Lewis’s property-centered account of belief, at least for the case of linguistic beliefs. Roughly, my solution is as follows: An agent can believe that he or she has the property of (...)
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  42.  10
    Omniscience and Semantic Information.Bernardo Alonso - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (4):77-96.
    ABSTRACT First, I consider a few motivations to idealize epistemic logics1 in such a degree that brings up the problem of logical omniscience [LOP]. I argue that the main motivation to hold omniscience is of a philosophical-scientific2 background, in the sense philosophers have a not so peculiar way of investigating underlying mechanisms, i.e., the interaction of several different components of complex systems may be better understood in isolation, even if such components are not found isolated in a (...)
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  43.  22
    An Omniscience Principle, the König Lemma and the Hahn‐Banach Theorem.Hajime Ishihara - 1990 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 36 (3):237-240.
  44.  23
    Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions.M. O. L. Bacharach, L. Gérard-Varet, P. Mongin & H. S. Shin (eds.) - 1997 - Dordrecht: Springer.
    This collection of papers in epistemic logic is oriented towards applications to game theory and individual decision theory. Most of these papers were presented at the inaugural conference of the LOFT (Logic for the Theory and Games and Decisions) conference series, which took place in 1994 in Marseille. Among the notions dealt with are those of common knowledge and common belief, infinite hierarchies of beliefs and belief spaces, logical omniscience, positive and negative introspection, backward induction and rationalizable equilibria (...)
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  45.  93
    Logical Omnipotence and Two Notions of Implicit Belief.Danilo Fraga Dantas - 2019 - In Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues (ed.), Epistemologia Analítica: Debates Contemporâneos. Santa Maria: Editora Fi. pp. 29-46.
    The most widespread models of rational reasoners (the model based on modal epistemic logic and the model based on probability theory) exhibit the problem of logical omniscience. The most common strategy for avoiding this problem is to interpret the models as describing the explicit beliefs of an ideal reasoner, but only the implicit beliefs of a real reasoner. I argue that this strategy faces serious normative issues. In this paper, I present the more fundamental problem of logical (...)
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  46.  14
    Weihrauch Degrees, Omniscience Principles and Weak Computability.Vasco Brattka & Guido Gherardi - 2011 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 76 (1):143 - 176.
    In this paper we study a reducibility that has been introduced by Klaus Weihrauch or, more precisely, a natural extension for multi-valued functions on represented spaces. We call the corresponding equivalence classes Weihrauch degrees and we show that the corresponding partial order induces a lower semi-lattice. It turns out that parallelization is a closure operator for this semi-lattice and that the parallelized Weihrauch degrees even form a lattice into which the Medvedev lattice and the Turing degrees can be embedded. The (...)
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  47.  24
    Omniscience Principles and Functions of Bounded Variation.Fred Richman - 2002 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 48 (1):111-116.
    A very weak omniscience principle is formulated, related omniscience principlesare considered, and the theorem that a function of bounded variation is the difference of two increasing functions is shown to be equivalent to the omniscience principle WLPO. It is a so shown that an arbitrary function with located variation on an interval is the difference of two increasing functions.
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  48.  55
    Omniscience, Omnipotence and Pantheism.Richard Francks - 1979 - Philosophy 54 (209):395 - 399.
    Spinoza is a pantheist: he believes that everything that is, is God. Traditional Judaeo-Christian theologians dislike the idea, and Spinoza has always been unpopular for it. Nevertheless, I want here to suggest that, simply by following out the logic of omniscience and omnipotence—two attributes of God on which both Spinoza and his opponents are agreed—it is possible to arrive at a conception of God which is at least very close to Spinoza's own. I do not claim that any of (...)
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    Logic with Numbers.Colin Howson - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):491-512.
    Many people regard utility theory as the only rigorous foundation for subjective probability, and even de Finetti thought the betting approach supplemented by Dutch Book arguments only good as an approximation to a utility-theoretic account. I think that there are good reasons to doubt this judgment, and I propose an alternative, in which the probability axioms are consistency constraints on distributions of fair betting quotients. The idea itself is hardly new: it is in de Finetti and also Ramsey. What is (...)
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  50.  13
    Omniscience, Sequential Compactness, and the Anti-Specker Property.Douglas Bridges - 2011 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 19 (1):53-61.
    Working within Bishop-style constructive mathematics, we derive a number of results relating the nonconstructive LPO and sequential compactness property on the one hand, and the intuitionistically reasonable anti-Specker property on the other.
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