Environmental change requires individuals and institutions to facilitate adaptive governance. However, facilitating adaptive governance may be difficult because resource users' perceptions of desirable ways of life vary. These perceptions influence preferences related to environmental governance and may stem from the ways individuals subjectively value their work and their connections to their environment. This paper uses a value-based approach to examine individual and institutional preferences for adaptive governance in Carelmapu, Chile. We show that two groups had different value frames rooted in (...) divergent ontologies which influenced their actions related to adaptive governance, creating conflict. (shrink)

ANONYMITY: A STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ALFRED SCHUTZ by Maurice Natanson Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986. 172 pp., $25.00.

Christine M. Korsgaard has had a profound influence on moral philosophy over the past forty years. Through her writing and teaching she has developed a distinctive, rigorous, and historically informed way of thinking about ethics, agency, and the normative dimension of human life more generally. The twelve original essays in this volume are written in her honor on the occasion of her retirement from teaching. They engage questions that recur in her work: Why are we obligated to do what morality (...) demands? What features of our nature make us subject to moral obligation? What does it mean to be autonomous and responsible for what we do? What do we owe to nonhuman animals? Contributors include Stephen Darwall, Kyla Ebels-Duggan, Barbara Herman, Richard Moran, Japa Pallikkathayil, Faviola Rivera-Castro, T.M. Scanlon, Tamar Schapiro, Sharon Street, David Sussman, Sigrún Svavarsdóttir, and David Velleman. These essays shed light on Korsgaard's own views while staking out provocative new positions on the topics that feature centrally in her own work. (shrink)

Gerhard Ebeling on faith. Gerhard Ebeling (1912–2001), not only the foremost Luther researcher of the previous century but also one of the most prominent contributors to protestant theology during that period, wrote extensively about faith throughout his long and productive life as a professional theologian. He learnt from Luther that discerning judgement in the differentiation of related matters forms the basis of all sound theology. Applying this insight to his own thought, he reflects on the development of the phenomenon of (...) faith in the Old Testament community and early Christianity and the formalisation of the concept for use in the domain of religious studies. He defends the argument that Christian faith is not only faith in Jesus as the Christ and Lord but also that Jesus, and He only, is the founder and perfecter of faith. The concept of faith is also explored by Ebeling in relation to love, life and reason. The article concludes with a critical evaluation of Ebeling’s contribution in guiding us to witness authentically about our own faith in Jesus Christ within our own situation and against the background of the problems it poses for believing in Christ. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant's _Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals_ is widely regarded as one of the most influential works in the history of moral philosophy. Indeed, any student of ethics will soon encounter a translation of the book, although trying to read it is likely to cause bewilderment. What, one may ask, is Kant trying to say? This book provides the answers. Here, seven highly regarded teachers and scholars of Kant's ethics offer remarkably clear explanations of the most important concepts in (...) the _Groundwork_: the good will, happiness, duty, hypothetical and categorical imperatives, the Formula of Universal Law, the Formula of Humanity, and freedom._ Contents:_ Preface _The Good Will_, Nataliya Palatnik _Happiness_, Anne Margaret Baxley _Duty_, Laura Papish _Imperatives_, Tamar Schapiro _The Formula of Universal Law_, Kyla Ebels-Duggan _The Formula of Humanity_, Japa Pallikkathayil _Freedom_, Lucy Allais About the Contributors Index. (shrink)

This study described the relationships between academic class and student moral sensitivity and reasoning and between curriculum design components for ethics education and student moral sensitivity and reasoning. The data were collected from freshman (n = 506) and senior students (n = 440) in eight baccalaureate nursing programs in South Korea by survey; the survey consisted of the Korean Moral Sensitivity Questionnaire and the Korean Defining Issues Test. The results showed that moral sensitivity scores in patient-oriented care and conflict were (...) higher in senior students than in freshman students. Furthermore, more hours of ethics content were associated with higher principled thinking scores of senior students. Nursing education in South Korea may have an impact on developing student moral sensitivity. Planned ethics content in nursing curricula is necessary to improve moral sensitivity and moral reasoning of students. (shrink)

Many recent writers in the philosophy of mathematics have put great weight on the relative categoricity of the traditional axiomatizations of our foundational theories of arithmetic and set theory. Another great enterprise in contemporary philosophy of mathematics has been Wright's and Hale's project of founding mathematics on abstraction principles. In earlier work, it was noted that one traditional abstraction principle, namely Hume's Principle, had a certain relative categoricity property, which here we term natural relative categoricity. In this paper, we show (...) that most other abstraction principles are not naturally relatively categorical, so that there is in fact a large amount of incompatibility between these two recent trends in contemporary philosophy of mathematics. To better understand the precise demands of relative categoricity in the context of abstraction principles, we compare and contrast these constraints to stability-like acceptability criteria on abstraction principles, the Tarski-Sher logicality requirements on abstraction principles studied by Antonelli and Fine, and supervaluational ideas coming out of Hodes' work. (shrink)

Ibn al-ʻArabī, 1165-1240; views on freedom; Sufism; Islamic philosophy.

Ausgehend von Nietzsches Medienkritik an der zeitgenössischen Massenpresse, ihrer Mitverantwortung für die Vermittelmäßigkeit moderner Kultur, Meinungsmanipulation und Informationsüberflutung, die auch die Künste und Wissenschaften verändert, werden Fragen gestellt, inwieweit und ob Nietzsches Beobachtungen und Schlussfolgerungen für den Umgang mit modernen Massenmedien und digitaler Kommunikation produktiv gemacht werden können. Greifen seine Auffassungen auch, wenn es um Internet, social media, Virtual Reality oder KI geht? Gibt es Schnittstellen zwischen moderner Medien-, Kunst- und Theorieentwicklung und Nietzsches Beobachtungen am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts? Die (...) Beiträge thematisieren u.a. den Zusammenhang von Digitalität und Medien, Fragen nach der Wahrheit unter massenmedialen Vorzeichen, mögliche Folgen einer ebenso erhofften wie gefürchteten ‚Herrschaft der Algorithmen‘, Perspektiven der Acceleration, neue Dimensionen der Künste und neue Denkansätze in Philosophie, Psychologie und Kunsttheorie. Diese Fragen betreffen die Herausforderungen des modernen Menschen, sein Selbstverständnis, seine Wahrnehmungswelten, seine Wertepräfiguationen und die Zukunft einer medial dominierten Welt betreffen. (shrink)

Seit der Antike wird der Musik eine große emotionale Wirkung zugeschrieben. Bis heute sind unterschiedliche Erklärungsmodelle diskutiert worden. Das betrifft zunächst das Phänomen der Gefühle im Allgemeinen, aber auch die Frage nach der Ursache der ästhetischen Empfindungen im Besonderen. Die Gefühlslehre von Carl Stumpf versucht u. a. in seiner Auseinandersetzung mit William James (James-Lange-Theorie, die vornehmlich auf die somatische Genese der Emotionen insistiert) Erklärungsansätze zu entwickeln, die sowohl kognitive als auch emotional-wertende psychische Funktionen berücksichtigen. Dennoch ist in Bezug auf das (...) nur scheinbar triviale Verhältnis von Hören und Fühlen, Musik und Emotionalität unter stringent wissenschaftlichen Kriterien erst ein Anfang gemacht worden, weil die Thematik - wie der Band zeigt - von einer bislang unterschätzten Komplexität zeugt, die zukünftig wohl nur mit vereinten interdisziplinären Kräften einem besseren Verständnis näherzubringen sein wird. (shrink)

I argue that rather than aiming at the well-being of those whom we love, we should aim to share in their ends. The former stance runs the risk of being objectionably paternalistic and, as I explain, only the latter makes reciprocal relationships possible. I end by diagnosing our attraction to the idea that we should promote our loved-ones’ well-being.

Benacerraf’s 1965 multiple-reductions argument depends on what I call ‘deferential logicism’: his necessary condition for number-set identity is most plausible against a background Quineanism that allows autonomy of the natural number concept. Steinhart’s ‘folkist’ sufficient condition on number-set identity, by contrast, puts that autonomy at the center — but fails for not taking the folk perspective seriously enough. Learning from both sides, we explore new conditions on number-set identity, elaborating a suggestion from Wright.

Rawls' requirement that citizens of liberal democracies support only policies which they believe can be justified in 'public reason' depends on a certain ideal for the relationships between citizens. This is a valuable ideal, and thus citizens have reasons to try to achieve it. But it is not always possible to find the common ground that we would need in order to do so, and thus we should reject Rawls' strong claim that we have an obligation to defend our views (...) in public reason. Because I recognize that we have strong reasons to conduct our political enquiry within the guidelines of political liberalism, but deny that we always have an obligation to do so, one might call my view 'permissive political liberalism'. (shrink)

I attempt to vindicate our authority to create new practical reasons for others by making choices of own own. In The Doctrine of Right Kant argues that we have an obligation to leave the Juridical State of Nature and found the state. In a less familiar passage in Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason he argues for an obligation to leave what he calls the Ethical State of Nature and join together in the Moral Community. I read both texts (...) as addressing and trying to resolve a tension between our individual freedom and our authority to make claims on one another. I explicate the political argument, and then develop the view that Kant sketches in the Religion, arguing that regarding others as capable of making choices that give you reasons to act is a condition of the full exercise of your autonomy. (shrink)

Contrary to Vaesen's argument that humans are unique with respect to nine cognitive capacities essential for tool use, we suggest that although such cognitive processes contribute to variation in tool use, it does not follow that these capacities arenecessaryfor tool use, nor that tool use shaped cognition per se, given the available data in cognitive neuroscience and behavioral biology.

We often come to value someone or something through experience of that person or thing. You may thereby come to embrace a value that you did not grasp prior to the experience in question. Moreover, it seems that in a large and important subset of cases you could not have fully appreciated that value merely by considering a report of the reasons or arguments that purport to establish that it is valuable. Despite its ubiquity, this phenomenon goes missing in a (...) great deal of contemporary work in ethics and political philosophy. In this paper I further specify the phenomenon of interest by developing a series of examples. Then I support the claim that philosophers routinely overlook it by surveying several significant philosophical positions that do so. (shrink)

Advocates of epistemic conceptions of democracy sometimes argue that democratic decision-making is a more reliable guide to getting the issues at stake right than the decision-making of individuals. Such arguments give rise to the question of whether those finding themselves in the minority should defer to democratic outcomes. In this article, I discuss the bearing of the normative criterion of reasonable acceptability on this question. I thus ask, can the demand to defer to democratic outcomes be rendered reasonably acceptable to (...) citizens who disagree with them? Using the example of David Estlund’s epistemic proceduralism, I show that the problem of moral deference is inherent to epistemic conceptions of democracy. I then discuss the kind of reasons that would make a demand of deference reasonably acceptable to the minority, arguing that they should be independent from the reasons supporting the majority position. Subsequently, I introduce the conciliatory conception of democracy as an example of what such reasons could be. The conception’s central idea is that disagreement between citizens conceived as equal epistemic authorities carries epistemic significance. This significance makes it rational for citizens so conceived to conciliate their conflicting judgments. Because democratic decision-making has an inbuilt tendency to track such conciliatory positions, the conception offers an independent reason to accept democratic outcomes as the more reliable guide to getting the issues at stake right. (shrink)

Kant’s political theory stands in the social contract tradition, but departs significantly from earlier versions of social contract theory. Most importantly Kant holds, against Hobbes and Locke, that we have not merely a pragmatic reason but an obligation to exit the state of nature and found a state. Kant holds that each person has an innate right to freedom, but it is possible to simultaneously honor everyone’s right only under the rule of law. Since we are obligated to respect each (...) person’s right to freedom, and can do so only in a state, we are obligated to submit to the authority of the state if we have one, and to establish one if we do not. In the first half of the essay I reconstruct this argument in more detail. In the second half I survey four points of controversy: (i) What is the relationship between Kant’s political philosophy and his moral philosophy? (ii) How does the innate right to freedom support the postulate that we are permitted to acquire property and other private rights? (iii) How does the postulate support an obligation to found the state? (iv) How should we understand Kant’s views about political revolutions? (shrink)

Text-generative AI-systems have become important semantic agents with ChatGPT. We conducted a series of experiments to learn what teachers’ conceptions of text-generative AI are in relation to philosophical texts. In our main experiment, using mixed methods, we had twenty-four high school students write philosophical essays, which we then randomized to essays with the same command from ChatGPT. We had ten prospective teachers assess these essays. They were able to tell whether it was an AI or student essay with 78.7 percent (...) accuracy, which is better than the Open AI Classifier. Interestingly, however, they used criteria like argumentative and logical flawlessness and neutrality. We concluded from this that they are using an inverted Turing test and are no longer looking for rationality in machines but for irrationality in humans. (shrink)

Neo-Fregeans have been troubled by the Nuisance Principle, an abstraction principle that is consistent but not jointly satisfiable with the favored abstraction principle HP. We show that logically this situation persists if one looks at joint consistency rather than satisfiability: under a modest assumption about infinite concepts, NP is also inconsistent with HP.

I argue that we cannot adequately characterize the aims of education in terms of some formal conception of what it is to think well. Implementing any such aim requires reliance on and communication of further, substantive normative commitments. This reveals that a standard contrast between an old-fashioned approach to education that aims to communicate a particular normative outlook, and a progressive approach that aims to develop skills of critical reasoning and reflection is confused and misleading.

This article improves two existing theorems of interest to neologicist philosophers of mathematics. The first is a classification theorem due to Fine for equivalence relations between concepts definable in a well-behaved second-order logic. The improved theorem states that if an equivalence relation E is defined without nonlogical vocabulary, then the bicardinal slice of any equivalence class—those equinumerous elements of the equivalence class with equinumerous complements—can have one of only three profiles. The improvements to Fine’s theorem allow for an analysis of (...) the well-behaved models had by an abstraction principle, and this in turn leads to an improvement of Walsh and Ebels-Duggan’s relative categoricity theorem. (shrink)

The injective version of Cantor’s theorem appears in full second-order logic as the inconsistency of the abstraction principle, Frege’s Basic Law V (BLV), an inconsistency easily shown using Russell’s paradox. This incompatibility is akin to others—most notably that of a (Dedekind) infinite universe with the Nuisance Principle (NP) discussed by neo-Fregean philosophers of mathematics. This paper uses the Burali–Forti paradox to demonstrate this incompatibility, and another closely related, without appeal to principles related to the axiom of choice—a result hitherto unestablished. (...) It discusses both the general interest of this result, its interest to neo-Fregean philosophy of mathematics, and the potential significance of the Burali–Fortian method of proof. (shrink)

This article presents two interlocking arguments for epistemic political egalitarianism. I argue, first, that coping with multidimensional social complexity requires the integration of expertise. This is the task of political parties as collective epistemic agents who transform abstract value judgments into sufficiently coherent and specific conceptions of justice for their society. Because parties thus severely lower the relevant threshold of comparison of political competence, citizens have reason to regard each other as epistemic equals. Drawing on the virulent “peer disagreement debate,” (...) I then analyze the epistemic significance of political disagreement. I contend that citizens ought to pursue epistemic conciliation, an idea I contrast to the ideals of compromise and of consensus. Subsequently, I introduce insights from public choice theory and empirical findings which show that and why multi-party electoral competition coupled with equal rights to participation tends to produce conciliatory outcomes. We thus have reason to endorse political egalitarianism on epistemic grounds. (shrink)