Expressions in a language, whether words, phrases, or sentences, have meanings. So it seems reasonable to suppose that there are meanings that expressions have. Of course, it is fashionable in some philosophical circles to deny this.

When we dream, it is often assumed, we are isolated from the external environment. It is also commonly believed that dreams can be, at times, accurate, convincing replicas of waking experience. Here I analyse some of the implications of this view for an enactive theory of conscious experience. If dreams are, as described by the received view, “inactive”, or “cranially envatted” whilst replicating the experience of being awake, this would be problematic for certain extended conscious mind theories. Focusing specifically on (...) Alva Noë’s enactive view, according to which the vehicles of perceptual experience extend beyond the brain, I argue that dreams are a quandary. Noë’s view is that dreaming is consistent with enactivism because even if dreams are inactive and shut off from the external environment, they are not “full-blown” perceptual consciousness, and also, there is some reason to reject the inactive claim. However, this view rests on an unjustified and reductive account of dreams which is not supported... (shrink)

Now in a thoroughly revised and expanded third edition, this authoritative Handbook reviews current knowledge about all aspects of emotion and its role in human ...

'Thought insertion' in schizophrenia involves somehow experiencing one's own thoughts as someone else's. Some philosophers try to make sense of this by distinguishing between ownership and agency: one still experiences oneself as the owner of an inserted thought but attributes it to another agency. In this paper, we propose that thought insertion involves experiencing thought contents as alien, rather than episodes of thinking. To make our case, we compare thought insertion to certain experiences of 'verbal hallucination' and show that they (...) amount to different descriptions of the same phenomenon: a quasi-perceptual experience of thought content. We add that the agency/ownership distinction is unhelpful here. What requires explanation is not why a person experiences a type of intentional state without the usual sense of agency, but why she experiences herself as the agent of one type of intentional state rather than another. We conclude by sketching an account of how this might happen. (shrink)

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, his main work of theoretical philosophy, frequently uses metaphors from law. In this first book-length study in English of Kant's legal metaphors and their role in the first Critique, Sofie Møller shows that they are central to Kant's account of reason. Through an analysis of the legal metaphors in their entirety, she demonstrates that Kant conceives of reason as having a structure mirroring that of a legal system in a natural right framework. Her study shows (...) that Kant's aim is to make cognisers become similar to authorized judges within such a system, by proving the legitimacy of the laws and the conditions under which valid judgments can be pronounced. These elements consolidate her conclusion that reason's systematicity is legal systematicity. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Amongst other things, African culture (societies) has been characterised by its perception and fear of witchcraft. Even though the belief in witchcraft is an old phenomenon, its growth is revealed and to some extent mitigated by videos, films and accounts and stories of church ministers. Whilst some Christian worship services have been turned into witchcraft-centred campaigns against witchcraft, a second group perceive witchcraft as a way of getting rid of one's enemies and a third group see it as the (...) root of human misfortune. Indeed ministers (including preachers and pastoral caregivers) are almost 'measured' by their ability to successfully ward off demons (believed to have been sent by witches), as a yardstick for determining whether they are good ministers with a good following or congregation. The first group of people attend church to pray for protection against 'the enemy', the second group approach native doctors to protect their households from attacks by witches, and the third group rid themselves of witches by burning them along with their personal belongings. This article investigates the impact and consequences of a fear of witchcraft amongst Christians in African societies, particularly those in the Limpopo province of South Africa. It also offers pastoral guidelines for a theological response to witchcraft and its life-threatening influence on people in the affected communities. (shrink)

In June 2021, new waves of the current COVID-19 pandemic are still messing up our lives and magnetizing the compass of our life. No other epidemics or pandemics have been politicized at such a level since ancient times. The full political spectrum from right to left has tried to ride this pandemic and upset the public health response efforts. Statistics and politics have changed our daily approach to this brutal infection, but even crueler has been the palpable miscommunication. Massive and (...) uncontrolled lockdowns and not climate change are destroying the economy of our planet. Intolerance against vaccine opponents and hesitant families has been vocalized with martial tones in both social media and news channels. In this book, the author analyzes the pandemic in a historical context, emphasizes the importance of facemasks, but also highlights our human approach to anti-mask psychology. It would be appalling to call mistakes in public health decisions "learned lessons" because it reduces the gravity of the consequences of inadequate communication. Our youth is our future. The mental issues arising from a lack of social interaction and in-person education are dreadful. Vaccines are powerful and represent the most outstanding progress in medicine. There is light at the end of the tunnel, but vaccine acceptance or herd immunity is not the answer, or probably, not the only one. There is true hope that we are going back to our world, but the COVID-19 pandemic may be an occasion to reconsider the traditional family in the center of our lives and daily politics. A tolerance towards any race needs to be contagious, militant, and blazing to vehemently rebuild and revitalize the American Dream. (shrink)

Quantum mechanical measurements on a physical system are represented by observables - Hermitian operators on the state space of the observed system. It is an important question whether all observables may be realized, in principle, as measurements on a physical system. Dirac’s influential text ( [1], page 37) makes the following assertion on the question: The question now presents itself – Can every observable be measured? The answer theoretically is yes. In practice it may be very awkward, or perhaps even (...) beyond the ingenuity of the experimenter, to devise an apparatus which could measure some particular observable, but the theory always allows one to imagine that the measurement can be made. This Letter re-examines the question of whether it is possible, even in principle, to measure every quantum mechanical observable. Unexpectedly, ideas from com-. (shrink)

Danielle Wenner has crafted novel arguments in defense of republican accounts of freedom. I learned a lot from her discussion of how Philip Pettit's neorepublican account of freedom as nondomination does a better job than standard accounts of freedom as noninterference of explaining how power over an agent can restrict their freedom to act autonomously. The real crux of Wenner's argument, however, is that freedom as nondomination can do this work in a way that those who defend an account of (...) relational autonomy cannot. I will start with Wenner's defense of freedom as nondomination and of what it can do as the background for assessing her critique of relational autonomy. The upshot of my comments will be that Wenner... (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Hume’s theory of pride and the ‘remarkable mechanism’ of sympathy. In the first part of the paper I outline the ways in which Hume’s theory can accommodate the sense in which the passions are directed on things or possess intentionality while still holding to his view that passions are simple feelings. In the second part of the paper I consider a problem internal to Hume’s account of pride which arises in his discussion of the love (...) of fame and the functioning of sympathy; I explain how the tensions can be reconciled by recognising that Hume’s theory of sympathy is more nuanced than has commonly been recognized. In the third part I turn back to the evaluation of Hume’s theory of pride and argue that while it is unfair to complain that Hume does not make self-evaluation a central component of pride, Hume’s treatment of the idea of self in his theory of the passions is inadequate because he can make no proper room for the phenomenon of vicarious pride. (shrink)

The sensorimotor theory promises a fresh explanation of phenomenal consciousness, for instance of the feeling of experiencing redness. But can it also be extended to explaining aspects of phenomenal consciousness which are only possible thanks to culture, thanks to our embeddedness in social practices? In this paper, I argue that the sensorimotor theory is in need of such an extension, and I make a proposal for how this might be accomplished. I concentrate on one example of culturally shaped experiences, namely (...) on feeling socially shaped emotions, and in particular moral emotions, such as resentment, guilt, forgiving someone, etc.. My main suggestion is this: in our case of enculturated humans, our implicit knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies is informed by, and transformed by, sociocultural practices. There are, I suggest, 'sociocultural contingencies', the mastery of which can contribute to one's phenomenal consciousness. For example, in order to have the experience of feeling resentment or guilt, one has to engage in an actual fight and make use of one's sociocultural skills of blaming someone or of justifying oneself. (shrink)

Originally published in 1988, M.C. Dillon's classic study of Merleau-Ponty is now available in a revised second edition containing a new preface and a new chapter on "Truth in Art." Dillon's thesis is that Merleau-Ponty has developed the first genuine alternative to ontological dualism seen in Western philosophy. From his early work on the philosophical significance of the human body to his later ontology of flesh, Merleau-Ponty shows that the perennial problems growing out of dualistic conceptions of mind and body, (...) subject and object, immanence and transcendence can be resolved within the framework of a new way of thinking based on the exemplar of the worldly embodiment of thought. (shrink)