El texto que se presenta aquí es la segunda parte de la traducción de New Theory of Universalsy se corresponde con las últimas secciones del artículo original. En el anterior número de Ideas y Valores (157 de abril de 2015) se publicó la primera parte, que corresponde a la introducción y las dos primeras secciones del original.

Second part of the translation into Spanish of David Lewis' "New Work for a Theory of Universals", corresponding to the last sections of the original paper. || Segunda parte de la traducción al español del trabajo de David Lewis "New Work for a Theory of Universals", correspondiente a últimas secciones del artículo original. Artículo original publicado en: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 61, No. 4, Dec. 1983, pp. 343-377.

First part of the translation into Spanish of David Lewis' "New Work for a Theory of Universals", corresponding to the introduction and the first two sections of the original paper. || Primera parte de la traducción al español del trabajo de David Lewis "New Work for a Theory of Universals", correspondiente a la introducción y las dos primeras secciones del artículo original. Artículo original publicado en: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 61, No. 4, Dec. 1983, pp. 343-377.

Contemporary moral psychology has focused on the notion of a universal moral sense, robust to individual and cultural differences. Yet recent evidence has revealed individual differences in the psychological processes for moral judgment: controlled cognition, mental-state reasoning, and emotional responding. We discuss this evidence and its relation to cross-cultural diversity in morality.

This is a three-page refutation of the Rachels's denial of moral diversity. In sections 2.5 and 2.6 of ‘The Challenge of Cultural Relativism,’ James and Stuart Rachels argue that diversity amongst cultures with regard to moral rules is overstated because all cultures have some values in common. I show that their argument is invalid and otherwise unsound and that cultures differ substantially with regard to their moral rules.

The following is simultaneously an essay in sociological theory, in cultural sociology, and in the empirical reconstruction of postwar Western history. Per theory, it introduces and specifies a model of cultural trauma - a model that combines a strong cultural program with concern for institutional and power effects - and applies it to large-scale collectivities over extended periods of time. Per cultural sociology, the essay demonstrates that even the most calamitous and biological of social facts - the prototypical evil of (...) genocidal mass murder - can be understood only inside of symbolic codes and narratives; that these frames change substantially depending on social circumstances; and that this culture process is critical to establishing understandings of moral responsibility. Empirically, this essay documents, in social and cultural detail, using both secondary and primary sources, how it was that the `Holocaust' gradually became the dominant symbolic representation of evil in the late twentieth century, and what its consequences have been for the development of a supra-national moral universalism that may restrict genocidal acts in the future. (shrink)

This paper examines two contemporary answers to the question of whether moral values and norms are apt for rational criticism and justification: Richard Rorty’s radically contextualist approach—which is centered around the notion of contingency and is characterized by a dismissal of all claims to philosophical justification—and Karl-Otto Apel’s transcendental-pragmatic version of discourse ethics—which encompasses highly ambitious claims to justification and universal validity. Contrasting the key theses of Rorty’s contextualism with those of Apel’s universalist discourse ethics and reconstructing their respective (...) conceptions of moral progress we argue that neither Rorty’s nor Apel’s position is convincing. (shrink)

En su libro Un lugar para la moral, Josep Corbí defiende un realismo moral particularista. En mi discusión enumero algunas dudas que me provoca su proyecto. La duda principal atañe la función que deben tener --si es que se considera que deben tener alguna función-- los principios universales en la vida moral. \\\ In his Un lugar para la moral, Josep Corbí argues for a particularist moral realism. In my discussion I express some doubts about (...) the feasibility of his project. My main point concerns the role that universal principies ought to play --if they play any role at all-- in moral life. (shrink)

Presented here is an argument for the existence of universals. Like Church's translation- test argument, the argument turns on considerations from intensional logic. But whereas Church's argument turns on the fine-grained informational content of intensional sentences, this argument turns on the distinctive logical features of 'that'-clauses embedded within modal contexts. And unlike Church's argument, this argument applies against truth-conditions nominalism and also against conceptualism and in re realism. So if the argument is successful, it serves as a defense of (...) full ante rem realism. The argument emphasizes the need for a unified treatment of intensional statements -- modal statements as well as statements of assertion and belief. The larger philosophical moral will be that ante rem universals are uniquely suited to carry a certain kind of modal information. Linguistic entities, mind-dependent universals, and instance-dependent universals are incapable of serving that function. (shrink)

Universals are putative objects like wisdom, morality, redness, etc. Although we believe in properties (which, we argue, are not a kind of object), we do not believe in universals. However, a number of ordinary, natural language constructions seem to commit us to their existence. In this paper, we provide a fictionalist theory of universals, which allows us to speak as if universals existed, whilst denying that any really do.

This chapter contains sections titled: Born to Be Good? Are There Moral Universals? Is There a Morality Acquisition Device? Morality Without Innateness Appendix: Moral Anti‐nativism and Moral Relativism References.

This paper seeks to advance the horizon of Kwasi Wiredu’s philosophical defense of the compatibility of cultural universals and particulars. Wiredu reflects on language, biological identity, inter/intra cultural communication, as well as epistemic and moral fundamentals as cultural universals. In pursuing further Wiredu’s thesis on cultural universals, the present paper critically examines some of the inconsistencies implicit in Wiredu’s position. As a consequence, the paper extends the frontiers of the realm of universals by establishing the (...) plausibility of causality as another instance of a conceptual universal, transcending all cultural particularities. (shrink)

Kant, der Weltbürger im Wissen aus Königsberg, entwickelt eine universale kosmopolitische Philosophie, welche im heutigen Zeitalter der Globalisierung hochwillkommen und hochmodern erscheint. Sie verbindet interkulturelle Gültigkeit mit einem Recht auf kulturelle Differenz. Kants Kosmopolitismus baut nicht nur auf Wissen und Moral auf, sondern bezieht darüber hinaus auch die Gegenstandsbereiche Erziehung, Geschichtsphilosophie, Teleologie, Ästhetik und Rechtsphilosophie mit ein.

The global turn in media ethics has presented a tough challenge for traditional models of moral theory: How do we assert common moral standards while also showing respect for the values of those from outside the Western tradition? The danger lies in advocating for either extreme: reason-dependent absolutism or cultural relativism. In this paper, I reject Cliff Christian’s attempts to solve the problem and propose instead a moral theory of universal standards that are discovered via a mix (...) of rationally grounded methods. Such universality refutes relativism but, because it is grounded in evolutionary naturalism and life-world philosophy—as opposed to a Kantian or theological transcendentalism—it also avoids absolutism. (shrink)

This paper discusses the possibility of an ethics of difference. It begins with an introduction to current poststructural and critical theories in order to show their significance for transcultural politics and ethics. Its theme is formulated in terms of the debate between the affirmation of ethical cognitivism cast in the form of universalism and the advocacy of moral skepticism in the mode of communitarianism. Distancing itself from the idea of universal morality, this paper attempts to respond to the challenge (...) of both communitarians and deconstructionists in contemporary French poststructuralism. In the end, it argues for transversality in place of universality. (shrink)

There is a particular moral theory in which human rights are conceived as indestructible rights. Using Dworkin’s words we could say this is a good way of taking rights seriously. However, we may also ask whether there is another way of taking rights as seriously as Dworkin says without being a supporter of that theory. From this point of view, perhaps human rights cannot be considered neither as absolute ; nor universally valid ; and not even inalienable. Can this (...) proposal be seen as another way of taking rights seriously? (shrink)

The time of ideological conflicts has passed. But different brands of political ethnocentrism and cultural relativism, in a word, nationalism, have taken the place of former “universal” ideologies, and stalk the world. In the face of these tendencies the necessity for the promotion of intercultural understanding has become ever more urgent. On the philosophical scene, many versions of cultural pluralism and relativism have been asserted and maintained. Since the rise of nihilism in the history of European thought, almost all universal (...) standards of morality that had been traditionally handed down have been denied and all sorts of a priori ideas which might contribute to the development of a consensus between different cultural worlds have been dismissed as mere fictions. Yet still, serious attempts have been made to establish a certain universal background for communicative understanding among different cultures. (shrink)

Any acceptable account of moral epistemology must accord with the following points. (1) Different people acquire seemingly very different moralities. (2) All normal people acquire a moral sense, whether or not they are given explicit moral instruction. Language resembles morality in these ways. There is considerable evidence from linguistics for linguistic universals. This suggests that (3) despite the first point, there are moral universals. If so, it might be possible to develop a moral (...) epistemology that is analogous to the theory of universal grammar in linguistics. In what follows, I will try to sketch what might be involved in such a moral epistemology. (shrink)

This paper discusses the possibility of an ethics of difference. It begins with an introduction to current poststructural and critical theories in order to show their significance for transcultural politics and ethics. Its theme is formulated in terms of the debate between the affirmation of ethical cognitivism cast in the form of universalism and the advocacy of moral skepticism in the mode of communitarianism. Distancing itself from the idea of universal morality, this paper attempts to respond to the challenge (...) of both communitarians and deconstructionists in contemporary French poststructuralism. In the end, it argues for transversality in place of universality. (shrink)

We propose a revised set of moral dilemmas for studies on moral judgment. We selected a total of 46 moral dilemmas available in the literature and fine-tuned them in terms of four conceptual factors (Personal Force, Benefit Recipient, Evitability and Intention) and methodological aspects of the dilemma formulation (word count, expression style, question formats) that have been shown to influence moral judgment. Second, we obtained normative codings of arousal and valence for each dilemma showing that emotional (...) arousal in response to moral dilemmas depends crucially on the factors Personal Force, Benefit Recipient, and Intentionality. Third, we validated the dilemma set confirming that people's moral judgment is sensitive to all four conceptual factors, and to their interactions. Results are discussed in the context of this field of research, outlining also the relevance of our RT effects for the Dual Process account of moral judgment. Finally, we suggest tentative theoretical avenues for future testing, particularly stressing the importance of the factor Intentionality in moral judgment. Additionally, due to the importance of cross-cultural studies in the quest for universals in human moral cognition, we provide the new set dilemmas in six languages (English, French, German, Spanish, Catalan and Danish). The norming values provided here refer to the Spanish dilemma set. (shrink)

This book provides an analysis of the debate surrounding cultural diversity, and attempts to reconcile the seemingly opposing views of "ethical imperialism," the belief that each individual is entitled to fundamental human rights, and cultural relativism, the belief that ethics must be relative to particular cultures and societies. The author examines the role of cultural tradition, often used as a defense against critical ethical judgments. Key issues in health and medicine are explored in the context of cultural diversity: the physician-patient (...) relationship, disclosing a diagnosis of a fatal illness, informed consent, brain death and organ transplantation, rituals surrounding birth and death, female genital mutilation, sex selection of offspring, fertility regulation, and biomedical research involving human subjects. Among the conclusions the author reaches are that ethical universals exist, but must not be confused with ethical absolutes. The existence of ethical universals is compatible with a variety of culturally relative interpretations, and some rights related to medicine and health care should be considered human rights. Illustrative examples are drawn from the author's experiences serving on international ethical review committees and her travels to countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where she conducted educational workshops and carried out out her own research. (shrink)

The approach to generative grammar originating with Chomsky (1957) has been enormously successful within linguistics. Seeing such success, one wonders whether a similar approach might help us understand other human domains besides language. One such domain is morality. Could there be universal generative moral grammar? More specifically, might it be useful to moral theory to develop an explicit generative account of parts of particular moralities in the way it has proved useful to linguistics to produce generative grammars for (...) parts of particular languages? Should moral theorists attempt to develop a theory of moral universals that is analogous to the theory of universal grammar in linguistics? Can moral theorists develop a “principles and parameters” account of possible moralities inspired by the principles and parameters approach to language in current linguistics? Could there be a “minimalist” program for moral theory inspired by the minimalist program in linguistics? In this chapter we offer a preliminary account of some analogies, focusing on clarifying issues, making distinctions, and considering how—in a general way—such analogies might yield a fruitful research program for moral theory. There are two main parts to our discussion, one focusing on an analogy between generative grammar and moral theory, the other focusing on analogies between universal grammar and theories of moral universals. In the first part, we say a little about the background and say how we are going to understand morality and moral theory. We describe certain aspects of generative grammar and how claims about generative grammars are tested, allowing for a distinction between “competence” and “performance”. We then try to say what a corresponding “generative moral grammar” would be and how it would be tested. We next discuss a number of objections to the analogy between moral theory and generative grammar and indicate possible responses. In the second part, we discuss certain universal constraints on grammars and consider whether there might be similar constraints on moralities. Then we discuss how linguists describe core aspects of languages in terms of principles and parameters and consider what aspects of moralities might be described in similar terms. After that we make some brief remarks about minimalism. (shrink)

Despite wide acceptance that the attributes of living creatures have appeared through a cumulative evolutionary process guided chiefly by natural selection, many human activities have seemed analytically inaccessible through such an approach. Prominent evolutionary biologists, for example, have described morality as contrary to the direction of biological evolution, and moral philosophers rarely regard evolution as relevant to their discussions. -/- The Biology of Moral Systems adopts the position that moral questions arise out of conflicts of interest, and (...) that moral systems are ways of using confluences of interest at lower levels of social organiation to deal with conflicts of interest at higher levels. Moral systems are described as systems of indirect reciprocity: humans gain and lose socially and reproductively not only by direct transactions, but also by the reputations they gain from the everyday flow of social interactions. -/- The author develops a general theory of human interests, using senescence and effort theory from biology, to help analye the patterning of human lifetimes. He argues that the ultimate interests of humans are reproductive, and that the concept of morality has arisen within groups because of its contribution to unity in the context, ultimately, of success in intergroup competition. He contends that morality is not easily relatable to universals, and he carries this argument into a discussion of what he calls the greatest of all moral problems, the nuclear arms race. (shrink)

In ‘A Dialogue’, Hume offers an important reply to the moral skeptic. Skeptics traditionally point to instances of moral diversity in support of the claim that our core values are fixed by enculturation. Hume argues that the skeptic exaggerates the amount of variation in moral codes, however, and fails to adopt an indulgent stance toward attitudes different from ours. Hume proposes a charitable interpretation of moral disagreement, moreover, which traces it back to shared principles of human (...) nature. Contemporary philosophers attempt to locate examples of moral variability that cannot be accommodated in this way. But they are no more successful than their predecessors. Moral skeptics have not found a single case of moral diversity that is resistant to the Humean strategy. (shrink)

Current dogma holds that all cultures and moral values are conditional, nothing human is innate, and Einstein proved that the whole universe is "relative." Challenging this position, William Gairdner argues that relativism is not only logically and morally self-defeating but that progress in scientific and intellectual disciplines has actually strengthened the case for absolutes, universals, and constants of nature and human nature. Gairdner refutes the popular belief in cultural relativism by showing that there are hundreds of well-established cross-cultural (...) "human universals." He then discusses the many universals found in physics - as well as Einstein's personal regret at how his work was misinterpreted by the public's eagerness to promote relativism. Gairdner also gives a lively account of the many universals of human biology, including the controversial topic of universal gender differences or "brain sex." He then looks at universal concepts of both natural and international law, and ends by discussing language theory. He shows how philosophers from Nietzsche to Derrida have misused linguistic concepts to justify their relativism, even though a sustained and successful effort by serious scientists and philosophers of language has revealed myriad universals of human language, ranging from language acquisition, to word-order, to "Universal Grammar." From ethics to Einstein, culture to biology, law to language, The Book of Absolutes makes complex topics accessible to a broad audience and demonstrates that there are plenty of certainties, even in our postmodern world. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss cases in which moral grievances, particularly assertions that a moral injury has taken place, are systematically obstructed by received linguistic and epistemic practices. I suggest a social epistemological model for theorizing such cases of moral epistemic injustice. Towards this end, I offer a reconstruction of Lyotard’s concept of the differend, comparing it with Miranda Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice, and considering it in light of some criticisms posed by Axel Honneth. Through this (...) reconstruction and a series of examples, I demonstrate that a basic formal structure recurs in cases of discursively repressed moral injury, namely, a particular kind of dilemma. I argue that appreciating this dilemma pushes us in the direction of a form of non-ideal ethical theory and I conclude by elaborating a conception of moral reflective judgement that begins from particular experiences of moral injury and moves towards the creation of new moral universals. (shrink)

Moral particularists and generalists alike have struggled over how to incorporate the role of moral salience in ethical reasoning. In this paper, I point to neglected resources in Kant to account for the role of moral salience in maxim formation: Kant's theory of reflective judgment. Kant tasks reflective judgment with picking out salient empirical particulars for formation into maxims, associating it with purposiveness, or intentional activity (action on ends). The unexpected resources in Kantian reflective judgment suggest the (...) possibility of a particularist universalism, where recalcitrant particulars directly inform, and in some cases revise, moral principles. Such an account improves on particularist accounts of moral salience and moral perception: rather than deriving moral sensitivity solely from an agent's upbringing or cultural resources, the reflective dimension is situated alongside the universalist dimension of moral principles typically identified with Kantian ethics, allowing for a critical approach both to moral universals and to the reception of moral particulars. (shrink)

This paper is a reply to Anton Leist’s criticisms of the view I develop in my book, Morality, Normativity, and Society. Leist claims that my “standard-based” account of the truth conditions of moral propositions is incoherent. I argue that he is mistaken about this. Leist claims that my “society-centered” account of the justification of moral standards has “nasty” implications. In the course of answering this worry, I develop the idea of a “moral necessity”. My theory implies that (...) although moral propositions are metaphysically contingent, they are most likely morally necessary. I also explain that, despite its relativism, the society-centered view is quite compatible with the idea that there are certain “moral universals”. Finally, Leist claims that the arguments I have given in favor of my view are unsuccessful. But it is a mistake to think that decisive arguments can be expected in this area. The most we can expect is a clear statement of the costs and benefits of a theory. I claim that my account of the nature and grounding of morality has important advantages over familiar alternatives. (shrink)

Este artículo tiene como objetivo discutir la concepción pública de las razones para justificar la obligación moral propuesta por Christine Korsgaard en sus libros The Sources of Normativity (1996a) y Self-constitution (2009). Se enfatizará principalmente dos puntos conectados. Por un lado, la descripción de Korsgaard de la naturaleza pública de las razones, que afirma que su fuerza normativa es potencialmente compartida, es insuficiente para su propia concepción de las obligaciones morales universales, porque estas obligaciones se basan en la normatividad (...) compartida existente de las razones. Por otra parte, Korsgaard no considera su propia explicación de la normatividad de las razones para dar cuenta del paso de la fuerza normativa compartible de las razones a su normatividad compartida existente, y esto se debería a que ello traería consecuencias perjudiciales para apoyar el respeto incondicional a la humanidad. Además, revisaré formas alternativas de entender la publicidad de las razones y esbozaré un trilema para la justificación moral de Korsgaard. (shrink)

There is now increasing evidence for significant ?moral universals??that is, patterns of ethical principles that are recognized by virtually every human society. James Q. Wilson has assembled an engaging collection of this evidence for the existence of a ?moral sense.? At least in regard to the universality of the key features of sympathy and a sense of fairness or reciprocity, Wilson is right. Indeed, these features are even more universal than Wilson realizes: they extend to our closest (...) nonhuman relatives as well. Yet the claim that these facts are best accounted for by positing the existence of a ?moral sense? remains vague. Particularly when we consider what Wilson calls ?the universal aspiration,? the basis of this tendency in our moral thinking is as likely to lie in our capacity to reason as in our moral sentiments. (shrink)

This paper explores the nature of the relationship between reasonable variations in moral justifications and universal moral principles. It examines Wiredu’s distinction between custom and morality, and its implications for the issue of moral justification in African cultures. It argues that Wiredu’s distinction does not adequately articulate how universal moral principles are employed in different circumstances to justify actions and judgments. Wiredu’s distinction implies that a conceptual account of moral justification does not involve custom regarding (...) relative facts and cultural norms. The paper defends a variant of the relativism about moral justification that does imply relativism of truth and incommensurability between two culturally relative moral perspectives. It argues that the plausibility of such relativism is contingent on the possibility of conceptual, cognitive, and epistemic universals, and the idea that moral reasoning is a kind of practical reasoning that does not necessarily depend on intellectual rationality. (shrink)

This paper explores the nature of the relationship between reasonable variations in moral justifications and universal moral principles. It examines Wiredu’s distinction between custom and morality, and its implications for the issue of moral justification in African cultures. It argues that Wiredu’s distinction does not adequately articulate how universal moral principles are employed in different circumstances to justify actions and judgments. Wiredu’s distinction implies that a conceptual account of moral justification does not involve custom regarding (...) relative facts and cultural norms. The paper defends a variant of the relativism about moral justification that does imply relativism of truth and incommensurability between two culturally relative moral perspectives. It argues that the plausibility of such relativism is contingent on the possibility of conceptual, cognitive, and epistemic universals, and the idea that moral reasoning is a kind of practical reasoning that does not necessarily depend on intellectual rationality. (shrink)

: La democracia es una expresión de la subjetividad de la sociedad y por tanto merece reconocimiento. Hoy en día, sin embargo, la democracia está amenazada con una separación de los valores universales y aliada con el relativismo moral. El resultado de este proceso es la reducción de la democracia a meros procedimientos. Esto puede llevar a la tiranía de la mayoría democrática. Los procedimientos democráticos requieren valores fundamentales que son la base del consenso social, el acuerdo y la (...) cooperación para el bien común. El Cristianismo es una fuente importante de estos valores. Los valores universales están también arraigados en el Evangelio y los Cristianos que participan activamente en los procesos democráticos desempeñan un papel crucial en su transmisión. (shrink)

Intent and mitigating circumstances play a central role in moral and legal assessments in large-scale industrialized societies. Al- though these features of moral assessment are widely assumed to be universal, to date, they have only been studied in a narrow range of societies. We show that there is substantial cross-cultural variation among eight traditional small-scale societies (ranging from hunter-gatherer to pastoralist to horticulturalist) and two Western societies (one urban, one rural) in the extent to which intent and mitigating (...) circumstances influence moral judgments. Although participants in all societies took such factors into account to some degree, they did so to very different extents, varying in both the types of considerations taken into account and the types of violations to which such considerations were applied. The particular patterns of assessment characteristic of large-scale industrialized societies may thus reflect relatively recently culturally evolved norms rather than inherent features of human moral judgment. (shrink)

Minogue's criticism of MacIntyre and Gorovitz's concept of medicine as a science of individuals is flawed by an assumption of the perfectibility of science that is not well supported by experience to date. More significantly, both Minogue and MacIntyre and Gorovitz have been led astray by choosing to use the malpractice issue as a philosophical point of departure for an inquiry into medical error. The problem of error in medicine, and moral culpability for error, is of great philosophical interest (...) but requires a more detailed contextual approach than these two studies provide. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

O artigo aborda sucintamente alguns aspectos inerentes à compreensão habermasiana acerca de uma moral universal à luz da qual é possível pensar o princípio da inclusão do outro como justiça. O desenvolvimento deste tema abrange, inicialmente, um item introdutório sobre etapas no pensamento habermasiano, as quais culminam numa revisão realista do conceito de agir comunicativo. É apresentado, a seguir, um item sobre analogia entre os conceitos de “verdade” e “verdade moral”. Tal analogia permite pensar, de um lado, a (...) inclusão em um mundo ou comunidade moral como ideia reguladora da “verdade moral”. De outro lado, permite pensar a justiça como inclusão do outro. (shrink)

In this paper, I hope to provide an account of the conditions of moral realism whereby there are still significant metaphysical commitments made by the realist which set the view apart as a distinct position in the contemporary meta-ethical landscape. In order to do so, I will be appealing to a general account of what it is for realism to be true in any domain of experience, whether it be realism about universals, realism about unobservable scientific entities, realism (...) about artifacts, and so forth. (shrink)

Este trabajo defiende la necesidad, por razones elementales de justicia, de universalizar de manera cabal el ideal de la igualdad de derechos que inspira la concepción de los derechos humanos. Realiza un repaso por varios hitos históricos desde el siglo XIX en una lucha que todavía a finales del siglo siguiente revela que la aspiración a la igualdad de derechos políticos de la mujer sigue siendo un reto pendiente de carácter legal, moral y político.

Este estudio emprende, desde el marco del Metalenguaje Semántico Natural desarrollado por Wierzbicka y algunos colegas, un detallado análisis semántico contrastivo y comparativo de dos conceptos de emoción: bei y ai , que son considerados como emociones básicas en los textos filosóficos chinos tradicionales. En él se demuestra que: a) de ninguna manera son intercambiables, ni equivalentes a la idea occidental de tristeza, b) son artefactos de la cultura china, conformados por las experiencias morales y sociales del pueblo chino y (...) su visión de la vida y del universo. En esencia, bei comporta una visión fatalista y ai es una emoción moral. Esto lleva a la autora a poner en duda el postulado de universalidad basado en la visión arraigada en la lengua inglesa, y llama a los investigadores a prestar atención al marco analítico empleado en la búsqueda de aspectos universales de las emociones humanas. (shrink)

En el debate ético contemporáneo coexisten planteamientos derivados de la filosofía moral moderna con otros enfoques que cuestionan sus ambiciones normativas. Estos enfoques se han descrito como “éticas sin moral”, dando por sentado que el término “moral” recoge un aspecto nuclear del pensamiento ético moderno: el deseo de identificar las normas universales objetivas. En este ensayo me propongo examinar si es posible defender la normatividad de la razón sustrayéndose a las críticas esgrimidas desde las contemporáneas éticas sin (...) moral. (shrink)

This paper argues that geography has a prominent, though at present underdeveloped, role to play in the moral education of young people. The need for geography teachers at all levels to engage students effectively with matters, themes and issues associated with ‘supercomplex’ environmental processes of various kinds, in a global context, requires the application of morally careful teaching. This is the case with respect to both the way selected content is handled in the classroom and the curriculum context in (...) which it is placed. These are arguments which reassert the prime importance of identifying the educational goals of geography programmes. The paper goes on to recommend the rediscovery by geography teachers of ‘values education’ strategies to allow students to engage in the dialectic between universals and relativities simultaneously. There are particular reasons why at school level the moral dimension of geography has been marginalised over recent years, and these are discussed in the paper. The paper also takes care to distinguish the promotion of environmental values and such like from educational values which require students to make judgements through the careful reading of information, argument and a propensity to reconsider what is right. The paper as a whole therefore considers the question of what geography is for. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the dynamics of ethical perspectives that embody the Golden Rule of Morality. Based on critical analysis of this rule in various cultural and religious contexts, but also from the perspective of humanism, the author presents its paradoxical character, the essence of which is interpreted here in terms of a pointer to metaphysical reality. It turns out that social conditionality, as well as the self-referential concept as a starting point of any ethical reasoning, are serious epistemological challenges (...) for the application of the Golden Rule in the position of universal normativity that this study addresses. On the other hand, Judeo-Christian cosmology and the related basis for ethical foundations is presented here as an inspirational space of ethical reasoning in which the paradoxical character of the Golden Rule becomes rather an indicator of a deeper metaethical interpretation of one's own particular ethical attitudes and outcomes than a practical guide to the discovery of ethical universals. (shrink)

This paper argues that geography has a prominent, though at present underdeveloped, role to play in the moral education of young people. The need for geography teachers at all levels to engage students effectively with matters, themes and issues associated with 'supercomplex' environmental processes of various kinds, in a global context, requires the application of morally careful teaching. This is the case with respect to both the way selected content is handled in the classroom and the curriculum context in (...) which it is placed. These are arguments which reassert the prime importance of identifying the educational goals of geography programmes. The paper goes on to recommend the rediscovery by geography teachers of 'values education' strategies to allow students to engage in the dialectic between universals and relativities simultaneously. There are particular reasons why at school level the moral dimension of geography has been marginalised over recent years, and these are discussed in the paper. The paper also takes care to distinguish the promotion of environmental values and such like from educational values which require students to make judgements through the careful reading of information, argument and a propensity to reconsider what is right. The paper as a whole therefore considers the question of what geography is for. (shrink)

Leo Tolstoy’s Moralism is a call for the purification of moral universals as the foundations of culture, in which there is no contradiction between the values of an individual life and the values of the social “world.” A “moralist preacher” must fulfill two main requirements. First, he must personally fulfill the principles of his teaching. Second, he must be absolutely sure that he speaks on behalf of the truth he knows. Otherwise, his preaching will be deceptive and will (...) serve the destruction rather than creation of a moral culture. Lev Shestov rejects this pathos of preaching as incompatible with existential perception of the world. Shestov replaces “absolute morality” with the absolute of human individuality, but this absolute is incompatible with the universalism of cultural values. (shrink)