Hjorth introduced a Scott analysis for general Polish group actions, and asked whether his notion of rank satisfies a boundedness principle similar to the one of Scott rank—namely, if the orbit equivalence relation is Borel, then Hjorth ranks are bounded. We answer Hjorth’s question positively. As a corollary we prove the following conjecture of Hjorth—for every limit ordinal \, the set of elements whose orbit is of complexity less than \ is a Borel set.

I develop and argue for a kind of externalism about certain kinds of non-doxastic attitudes that I call policy externalism. Policy externalism about a given type of attitude is the view that all the reasonable policies for having attitudes of that type will not involve the agent's beliefs that some relevant conditions obtain. My defense primarily involves attitudes like hatred, regret, and admiration, and has two parts: a direct deductive argument and an indirect linguistic argument, an inference to the best (...) explanation of some strange ways we use certain conditionals. The main thought throughout is that attitudes we reason with, like belief, are very different from attitudes we don't reason with, in a way that constrains the former but not the latter. Finally, I investigate some consequences of policy externalism, including that it secures the possibility of genuine conditional apologies. (shrink)

In her stimulating article, Catherine Wilson considers the moment of worlds-making in Leibniz’s philosophy. She raises the following question: “How do possible substances give rise to possible worlds?“ and observes that the moment of world-making is as puzzling as it is interesting. In section 2 of her article, Wilson considers two approaches to the question. According to the first, possible individuals logically precede possible worlds and possible worlds are constituted either by combinations of possible individuals or by mechanically checking the (...) compossibility relations among them. This approach assumes that possible individuals are given and complete and that worlds result from their various conjunctions. On this approach, a world is a set of compossible individuals, i.e., a set of complete individuals whose co-existence is possible. (shrink)

This article publishes the surviving parts of a hitherto unknown Mandaean spell for the protection of a woman from childlessness. The spell has been reconstructed from two fragmentary amulets that were written on lead lamellae in the Sasanid period (MLSC 18 and 19). The overlapping sections of the two amulets show some linguistic differences but are otherwise clearly parallel copies of the same formula. The spell is narrated in the name of Iauar son of Iauar and mentions other figures known (...) from the Mandaean canonical literature. Iauar witnesses the unnatural behavior of the demons, who cause barrenness and infertility by the purloining of male and female seed, and cause infant mortality through acts of demonic violence. The text breaks off at the point where the narrator binds the demons. The formula adds several words to the Mandaic lexicon and a previously unattested form of the 1 c.s. personal pronoun. (shrink)

This article presents a first edition of three Mandaic lamellae from the Schøyen Collection, MS 2087/10, 2087/11, and 2087/18, which are the product of the same scribe and probably constituted a single amulet. The language of the amulet differs from that of other Mandaic texts, and demonstrates unknown or rare phonetic and morphological features. In addition, several lexemes that were hitherto unattested in Mandaic have been identified. Some of the amulet’s formulae are familiar from previously published texts, but in several (...) cases the new textual evidence allows us to improve upon their readings. (shrink)

The ArgumentMicroscopical consideration played a crucial role in German physiology in the period of, grosso modo, 1780–1830. Specifically, a conception of material change was established, according to which all life is grounded in the process of the generation of microscopical forms out of an amorphous, primitive generative substance. Embryological development, tissue growth, and the generation of microorganisms were all considered to be the manifestation of this fundamental developmental process. In contrast to the common historiography, I try to understand Theodor Schwann's (...) 1838 discovery of the cell theory in terms of the epistemological categories he applied to the prevailing conceptions of life and living matter. I argue that Schwann was able to discern cells not because of any superior microscopical methods, but rather as part of his wider investigative endeavor to explicate life processes according to specific causal agents. I argue that Schwann was able to demonstrate the existence of cells only when he considered animal tissues in terms of a causal relation between specific material agents and their effect, that is, the developmental history of tissue. (shrink)

Traditionally, autoimmune disease has been considered to be a case of false recognition; the immune system mistakenly identifies 'self' tissues as foreign, attacking them thus causing damage and malady. Accordingly, the history of autoimmunity is usually told as part ot the history of immunology, that is, of theories and experiments relating to the ability of the immune system to discriminate between self and nonself. This paper challenges this view, claiming that the emergence of the notion of autoimmunity in the 1950s (...) must be considered as part of a long develolpment in thought about pathology throughout the twentieth century, namely the conceptualisaiton of disease as a reactive and self-destructive process. During the first part of the twentieth century this notion became one of the cornerstones of pathology and was increasingly employed for the explanation of the non-infections, slow-burning diseases. Thus, the category of chronic disease had been defined anew, now encompassing all those diseases characterised by a persistent inflammatory process. Inflammation, in turn, was conceived as double-eged physiological mechanism, which was usually the direct mediator of damage, of the essence of disease. The paper also shows how this kind of analysis could emable a unified historical discussion of autoimmunity and allergy, hitherto considered to have distinct conceptual origins. (shrink)

I make a proposal about what wondering is and how it differs from other mental phenomena like curiosity. I argue that, though it's tempting to analyze wondering as a desire to know the answer to the question one wonders about, that would be wrong, since wondering is an activity rather than a state, i.e., something we do. I also argue that wondering about a question needn't even essentially involve a desire to know the answer to that question, even as a (...) necessary part of what rationalizes the wondering. Instead, on my account, to wonder about a question is to consider various possible answers as possible answers, guided by mechanisms whose function is to make the subject epistemically better off with respect to those answers, and which considering ceases at least when a person is consciously certain of the answer to their question. This allows wondering to not be objectionably metacognitive, and allows us to make sense of cases in which the motivating desire isn't to know an answer but just to wonder itself. (shrink)

While the definition of the ‘genotype’ has undergone dramatic changes in the transition from classical to molecular genetics, the definition of the ‘phenotype’ has remained for a long time within the classical framework. In addition, while the notion of the genotype has received significant attention from philosophers of biology, the notion of the phenotype has not. Recent developments in the technology of measuring gene-expression levels have made it possible to conceive of phenotypic traits in terms of levels of gene expression. (...) We demonstrate that not only has this become possible but it has also become an actual practice. This suggests a significant change in our conception of the phenotype: as in the case of the ‘genotype’, phenotypes can now be conceived in quantitative and measurable terms on a comprehensive molecular level. We discuss in what sense gene expression profiles can be regarded as phenotypic traits and whether these traits are better described as a novel concept of phenotype or as an extension of the classical concept. We argue for an extension of the classical concept and call for an examination of the type of extension involved. (shrink)

I consider difficult data involving the interaction of attitudes and conditionals, specifically non-doxastic attitude expressions like 'regret'. I first show that felicitous attitude conditionals in "ignorance contexts", where the relevant person doesn't know the antecedent is true, give rise to a number of difficult problems given widely held assumptions in semantics. I then argue that, even so, we should expect these conditionals to be true and reasonable to utter in ignorance contexts, given certain other kinds of attitude construction that tend (...) to involve free relatives like `whatever'. I then use that observation to explain many of the more puzzling aspects of these conditionals, and to show that we should treat felicitous doxastic attitude conditionals differently from felicitous non-doxastic ones. I leave explaining felicitous doxastic attitude conditionals for future work, but offer constraints on a satisfying explanation of them. (shrink)

I investigate when we can (rationally) have attitudes, and when we cannot. I argue that a comprehensive theory must explain three phenomena. First, being related by descriptions or names to a proposition one has strong reason to believe is true does not guarantee that one can rationally believe that proposition. Second, such descriptions, etc. do enable individuals to rationally have various non-doxastic attitudes, such as hope and admiration. And third, even for non-doxastic attitudes like that, not just any description will (...) allow it. I argue that we should think of attitude formation like we do (practical) choices among options. I motivate this view linguistically, extending "relevant alternatives'' theories of the attitudes to both belief and to the other, non-doxastic attitudes. Given a natural principle governing choice, and some important differences between doxastic and non-doxastic "choices'', we can explain these puzzling phenomena. (shrink)

This article analyses the biochemical object of tnf inhibitors from the perspective of living with an autoimmune disease. The author tries to tease out how the concept of immune inhibition is used in tandem with the biochemical object of tnf inhibitors to dominate in defining and narrating what health and disease, normal and pathological, cure and healing can mean in the context of autoimmune bodies. Specifically, and within the ‘pathological’ framework of autoimmune diseases, the pharmacological treatment of tnf inhibition is (...) designed to suppress the ‘overly’ active immune system, thus acting as a negative or suppressing biochemical agent aimed at putting the ‘malfunctioning’ immune system back in balance. As can be seen in the current conjuncture, tnf inhibitors officially —and governmentally— place those taking them in a risk group, as they 'lower' their overall bodily immunity and make them more vulnerable to infectious diseases, while stabilizing their patho-logical, ‘over’-immune uninhibited condition. Part personal narrative of being diagnosed with an autoimmune condition, part speculative autoimmune theory inspired by such a diagnosis, the article ultimately calls for a different form of embodiment that is neither negative nor affirmative, and yet is resistant even to itself. (shrink)

I argue that we can reason not only to new beliefs but to basically any change in attitude we can think of, including the abandonment of belief (contra John Broome), the acquisition of non-belief attitudes like relief and admiration, and the elimination of the same. To argue for this position, which I call generalism, I defend a sufficient condition on reasoning, roughly that we can reason to any change in attitude that is expressed by the conclusion of an argument we (...) can be convinced by. I then produce examples of such arguments, and argue that they are indeed arguments. To produce such examples of the elimination of non-doxastic attitudes, I develop the idea of a state of attitudinal constraint acceptance, and show how it is useful for solving this problem, and useful in other parts of philosophy as well. (shrink)

I develop and argue for a kind of externalism about certain kinds of non-doxastic attitudes that I call policy externalism. Policy externalism about a given type of attitude is the view that all the reasonable policies for having attitudes of that type will not involve the agent's beliefs that some relevant conditions obtain. My defense primarily involves attitudes like hatred, regret, and admiration, and has two parts: a direct deductive argument and an indirect linguistic argument, an inference to the best (...) explanation of some strange ways we use certain conditionals. The main thought throughout is that attitudes we reason with, like belief, are very different from attitudes we don't reason with, in a way that constrains the former but not the latter. Finally, I investigate some consequences of policy externalism, including that it secures the possibility of genuine conditional apologies. (shrink)

The concept of ideology plays an important part in contemporary social and political thinking. In many works which raise the question about the relationship between what men think and how their societies operate some mention of ideology is made. Since the variety of thinkers who write about this relationship have a variety of views on the subject, it is not at all surprising that they disagree about just what an ideology is. It might be helpful if we could agree on (...) just one usage, or, failing that, understand why a variety of usages is necessary and understand them. (shrink)

We argue that philosophers ought to distinguish epistemic decision theory and epistemology, in just the way ordinary decision theory is distinguished from ethics. Once one does this, the internalist arguments that motivate much of epistemic decision theory make sense, given specific interpretations of the formalism. Making this distinction also causes trouble for the principle called Propriety, which says, roughly, that the only acceptable epistemic utility functions make probabilistically coherent credence functions immodest. We cast doubt on this requirement, but then argue (...) that epistemic decision theorists should never have wanted such a strong principle in any case. (shrink)

This paper argues that God's immanent causation and Spinoza's account of activity as adequate causation (of finite modes) do not always go together in Spinoza's thought. We show that there is good reason to doubt that this is the case in Spinoza's early Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well‐being. In the Short Treatise, Spinoza defends an account of God's immanent causation without fully endorsing the account of activity as adequate causation that he will later introduce in the Ethics (...) (E3def2). We turn to an examination of how God's immanent causation relates to the activity of finite things in the Ethics. We consider two ways to think about the link between God, seen as immanent cause, and the activity of finite things: namely, in terms of entailment and in terms of production. We argue that the productive model is most promising for understanding the way in which the activity of finite things and God's immanent causality are connected in Spinoza's (mature) philosophy. (shrink)

Uma comparação entre dois intérpretes americanos de Heidegger, que destaca as premissas e os objetivos comuns a ambos. Dreyfus e Rorty usam o pensamento de Heidegger seletivamente. A autora aponta as dificuldades a que tal leitura leva, e faz uma distinção entre as respostas de Dreyfus e de Rorty. Dreyfus atribui a Heidegger uma má compreensão do seu próprio projeto. Rorty reconhece que suas premissas e objetivos não são heideggerianos, e defende que é legítimo usar uma teoria a serviço do (...) pragmatismo e da democracia. A filosofia, e, por conseguinte, a interpretação, é um modo de esclarecer e legitimar as preferências da comunidade nacional a que pertencemos. A conclusão desse estudo é que Rorty está certo em parte, na medida em que não se pode evitar uma apropriação nacional, seletiva, de uma obra. Mas pode-se e deve-se colocar em questão as premissas e os objetivos que motivam e orientam nossa interpretação.A comparison between two American commentators on Heidegger that underlines their shared aims and premises. Both Dreyfus and Rorty use Heidegger's thinking as a toolbox. The author points out the problems raised by this approach, and makes a distinction between Dreyfus's and Rorty's responses. Dreyfus claims that Heidegger misunderstood his own project. Rorty is aware that his premises are not Heideggerian, and upholds his way of using Heidegger in the service of pragmatism and democracy. Philosophy, and therefore interpretation, is a way to explain and legitimize the preference of the community we live in. The conclusion of this study is that Rorty is partly right; one cannot help being selective and "national". However, one can and ought to clarify their premises and aims. (shrink)

In these comments on David Hunter's insightful new book On Believing, I consider Hunter's account of believing that p as being in a position to act in light of the fact (or apparent fact) that p. After investigating how this kind of view is supposed to work, I raise a challenge for it: the account is unlikely to generalize to other attitudes like hoping and fearing that p. I then argue that this really is an objection to the account of (...) believing, since all the attitudes have so many fundamental features in common that there should be a common core to the accounts of all the different attitudes. Since hoping and fearing that p in no way even commit the speaker to the belief that p, they can't allow the agent to act in light of the (apparent) fact that p. Thus, I conclude, believing isn't a matter of being in such a position, and neither is the having of any other type of attitude. (shrink)

Inquiry into the felt dimension of experience can be deeply transformative, but more than promoting transcendence it can help us make contact with the intricacy of our open and embodied self-….

In notes from 1675-76 Leibniz is using the notion of an infinite number as an illustration of an impossible notion. In the same notes, he is also using this notion in contrast to the possibility of the ‘Ens perfectissumum’ (A.6.3 572; Pk 91; A.6.3 325). I suggest that Leibniz’s concern about the possibility of the notion of ‘the greatest or the most perfect being’ is partly motivated by his observation that similar notions, such as ‘the greatest number’, are impossible. This (...) leads to the question how Leibniz convinced himself that the notion of the greatest number is self-contradictory and that of the greatest being is not. I consider two suggestions, one that stress the difference between beings and numbers and one that stress the difference between two notions of infinity, and conclude that neither of them provides a satisfactory solution to this question. (shrink)

I argue that military commanders have professional responsibilities for the environment in both peace and war. Peacetime responsibilities arise out of the commander’s general responsibilities as an agent of the state. Wartime responsibilities are part of the commander’s responsibility to protect noncombatants and to protect an environment that is the inherently valuable heritage of mankind. Commanders must assurne some risk to protect the environment. I conclude that we must stop not only the environmental damage caused by war, but also war (...) itself if we are to remain a viable species. (shrink)

The article presents Leibniz's preoccupation (in 1675?6) with the difference between the notion of infinite number, which he regards as impossible, and that of the infinite being, which he regards as possible. I call this issue ?Leibniz's Problem? and examine Spinoza's solution to a similar problem that arises in the context of his philosophy. ?Spinoza's solution? is expounded in his letter on the infinite (Ep.12), which Leibniz read and annotated in April 1676. The gist of Spinoza's solution is to distinguish (...) between three kinds of infinity and, in particular, between one that applies to substance, and one that applies to numbers, seen as auxiliaries of the imagination. The rest of the paper examines the extent to which Spinoza's solution solves Leibniz's problem. The main thesis I advance is that, when Spinoza and Leibniz say that the divine substance is infinite, in most contexts it is to be understood in non-numerical and non-quantitative terms. Instead, for Spinoza and Leibniz, a substance is said to be infinite in a qualitative sense stressing that it is complete, perfect and indivisible. I argue that this approach solves one strand of Leibniz's problem and leaves another unsolved. (shrink)

This paper examines the Leibnizian background to Kant's critique of the ontological argument. I present Kant's claim that existence is not a real predicate, already formulated in his pre-critical essay of 1673, as a generalization of Leibniz's reasoning regarding the existence of created things. The first section studies Leibniz's equivocations on the notion of existence and shows that he employs two distinct notions of existence ? one for God and another for created substances. The second section examines Kant's position in (...) his early paper of 1763. My claim is that Kant's view of existence in 1763, namely that it is not a predicate, is strongly related to the logical notion of possibility, formulated by Leibniz and accepted by Kant. (shrink)

I present and explore a normative theory of non-doxastic attitudes like desire, hatred, and admiration. The viewpoint is general and abstract: independent of any particular flavor or source of normativity, I explore general features any acceptable way of forming these attitudes would have, especially in contrast to doxastic attitudes like belief. The first three chapters present a relatively unified picture of non-doxastic attitude formation, grounded in types of non-doxastic attitudes we can have in contrast to their impossible doxastic analogues. In (...) particular, I defend a kind of externalism; I apply it to a specific attitude, desire, to show how the approach works; and then based on a different aspect of the view, I present what I take to be some of the best ways to motivate the view, and some of the best ways to criticize it, as well. In the last chapter, I develop a theory about how these attitudes are best communicated, this time meant to capture how belief is best communicated, too, though it is inspired by certain features of non-doxastic attitudes. (shrink)

The garish glow of neon was part of what put Las Vegas on the map—quite literally. The city’s most distinctive form of expression, neon signs tell an elaborate story of the history of Las Vegas, from their debut in 1929 at the onset of the Depression, when their seductive tones lured travelers through the Mojave Desert to part with scarce dollars, to today, when their flickering glow is a vanishing facet of the gaudy spectacle that is contemporary Vegas. Established in (...) 1996 to preserve Las Vegas’s underappreciated neon heritage, the Neon Boneyard houses many of the city's historic casino signs on a three-acre site at the edge of the city. The core of the collection of unrestored signage came from the pioneering Young Electric Sign Company, one of the first to produce neon signs in the area; but, in recent years, it has grown through donations from businesses and individuals who appreciate the key role played by neon in the growth of Las Vegas. Through Judy Natal’s photographs, the Neon Boneyard becomes a dynamic archaeological site that brings Vegas’s past to life in startling ways. The towering figure of Mr. O’Lucky becomes a home for the homeless, while the crumpled sign of a wedding chapel reflects the faded dreams of a lost paradise. Through such juxtapositions of success and failure, of past and present, Neon Boneyard: Las Vegas A–Z returns us to an earlier image of Vegas, suffused with the warm, commercial glow of neon, lighting the desert and inventing modern nightlife. (shrink)

There were three broad categories of academic responses to Alfred Kinsey’s Sexual Behavior in the Human Male : method; findings; and broader reflections on the book’s place in American social life and democracy. This article focuses primarily on archival academic responses to Kinsey’s work that appeared in the year following the book’s publication. Many academics agreed that some aspects of Kinsey’s method were flawed and that his interpretations sometimes overreached his raw data. Nonetheless, they also agreed that no one else (...) had gathered such a diverse sampling of interviewees whose behaviors Kinsey could use to create new interpretive models of human sexuality. As Kinsey’s research was deliberately interdisciplinary, his research and statistical methodologies began to catch on in the human sciences and to encourage academics and intellectuals to rethink their human science practices. As academics reflected on the volume’s larger meaning in American life, several of them thought it exemplified the worst American values while others saw the very existence of the Male volume as an excellent example of the ability of free citizens to pursue and to publish research on any topic. While members of the American intelligentsia championed the Male volume and its findings as democratic, the reception of Sexual Behavior in the Human Female, published at an intense moment of the cold war, was viewed as a communist threat to American security for revealing the sexual secrets of the public. (shrink)

This paper examines the role of clinical practitioners and clinical researchers internationally in establishing the utility of harm-reduction approaches to substance use. It thus illustrates the potential for clinicians to play a pivotal role in health promoting structural interventions based on harm-reduction goals and public health models. Popular media images of drug use as uniformly damaging, and abstinence as the only acceptable goal of treatment, threaten to distort clinical care away from a basis in evidence, which shows that some ways (...) of using drugs are far more harmful than others and that punitive approaches and insistence on total abstinence as the only goal of treatment often increases the harms of drug use rather than reducing drug use. Therefore the leadership and scientific authority of clinicians who understand the health impact of harm-reduction strategies is needed. Through a review of harm-reduction interventions in Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, we identify three ways that clinicians have helped to achieve a paradigm shift from punitive approaches to harm-reduction principles in clinical care and in drug policy: through clinical research to provide data establishing the effectiveness and feasibility of harm-reduction approaches, by developing innovative clinical programmes that employ harm reduction, and thereby changing the standard of care to include routine use of these evidence-based approaches in their practices. We argue that through promotion of harm-reduction goals and methods, clinicians have unique opportunities to improve the health outcomes of vulnerable populations. (shrink)

Während Leibniz' Vorstellung eines vollständigen Begriffs viel Beachtung fand, blieb die Frage seiner Begründung im Verstand Gottes eher unbeachtet. In diesem Aufsatz versuche ich auf diese Frage einzugehen, indem ich den Zeitraum (ungefähr 1672-1679), in dem Leibniz die Vorstellung eines vollständigen Begriffs als eine explizite Definition eines Individuums entwickelte, näher untersuche. Meine Darstellung über die Begründung des individuellen Begriffs im Verstand Gottes beinhaltet drei Thesen: (1) Leibniz sieht einen inneren Zusammenhang zwischen der Bildung einfacher Begriffe zu zusammengesetzten Begriffen und der (...) Individuation von Begriffen, so daß die Zusammengesetztheit der Begriffe zu ihrer Individualität und Einzigartigkeit beiträgt. (2) Ein individueller Begriff sollte nicht als eine Menge von Prädikaten betrachtet werden, sondern vielmehr als eine einzigartige Struktur von Prädikaten, in der die Reihenfolge der Prädikate eine essentielle Rolle spielt. (3) Ein individueller Begriff sollte nicht nur mit einer einzigartigen Struktur in Verbindung gebracht werden, sondern auch mit einer kombinatorischen Regel, die eine solche einzigartige Struktur von Prädikaten im Verstand Gottes erzeugt. (shrink)

This work presents Leibniz's view of infinity and the central role it plays in his theory of living beings. Nachtomy argues that Leibniz employs three degrees of infinity: absolute infinity, which applies to God; maximum or infinite in kind, which applies to created, living beings; and mathematical infinity.

This volume contains essays that examine infinity in early modern philosophy. The essays not only consider the ways that key figures viewed the concept. They also detail how these different beliefs about infinity influenced major philosophical systems throughout the era. These domains include mathematics, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, science, and theology. Coverage begins with an introduction that outlines the overall importance of infinity to early modern philosophy. It then moves from a general background of infinity up through Kant. Readers will learn (...) about the place of infinity in the writings of key early modern thinkers. The contributors profile the work of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant. Debates over infinity significantly influenced philosophical discussion regarding the human condition and the extent and limits of human knowledge. Questions about the infinity of space, for instance, helped lead to the introduction of a heliocentric solar system as well as the discovery of calculus. This volume offers readers an insightful look into all this and more. It provides a broad perspective that will help advance the present state of knowledge on this important but often overlooked topic. (shrink)

I formulate and tentatively defend the view that we cannot be rationally required to have one type of doxastic attitude (e.g., beliefs, credences, imprecise credences, etc.) because we have another type; in other words, we can only be required to have, say, given credences because we have some other credences already. I explore an argument that appeals to the idea that there is no good reasoning from one type to the other type. I consider some important possible responses, and conclude (...) by sketching a different argument for the same conclusion, appealing to the nature of inquiry and belief-formation. (shrink)

This paper examines a widely accepted reading of monads as the most fundamental elements of reality. Garber [Leibniz – Body, Substance, Monad, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009] argues that simple monads – seen as mind-like atoms without parts and extension – replace the corporeal substance of Leibniz’s middle period. Phemister [Leibniz and the Natural World – Activity, Passivity and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz’s Philosophy, Dordrecht: Springer, 2005] argues that monads figure also at the top as complete corporeal substances. Building on (...) Fichant [‘L’invention métaphysique’ in G.W. Leibniz, Discours de métaphysique suivi de Monadologie et autres textes, edited by Michel Fichant, Paris: Gallimard, 2004], I argue that, for Leibniz, monads function not only as building blocks at the bottom level of composition but also at the top, as grounding the unity and hence the being of complete substances and organic unities. Since organic unities or living beings are seen by Leibniz as natural machines with a nested structure, and since monads are likened to living beings, this would imply that the use of the concept ‘monad’ holds not only at the bottom, and not only at the top, but all over the range between them. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWe express and communicate many attitudes beyond belief, such as amusement, joy, admiration, hatred, and desire. I consider whether there are any general norms that would cover all of these cases. The most obvious generalisation of the most popular norms for assertion, fittingness-based theories, fail in part because it is sometimes an intrinsic good to have certain kinds of mental states. I develop an alternative, rightness-based, approach, according to which it is appropriate to communicate a mental state to an interlocutor (...) when it is right to make the interlocutor have that mental state because of the speech act. This view arises naturally from conversational participants’ common interests, and it helps to make sense of linguistic phenomena like expressives. (shrink)

In this article we examine the “phenotype” concept in light of recent technological advances in Genome-Wide Association Studies . By observing the technology and its presuppositions, we put forward the thesis that at least in this case genotype and phenotype are effectively coidentifled one by means of the other. We suggest that the coidentiflcation of genotype-phenotype couples in expression-based GWAS also indicates a conceptual dependence, which we call “co-deñnition.” We note that viewing these terms as codeflned runs against possible expectations, (...) viz., that genotypes and phenotypes could ultimately be expressed independently from one another. In addition, the co-definition of genotypes and phenotypes in this context emphasizes the correlative character of both genotypes and phenotypes in GWAS. (shrink)

In her stimulating article, Catherine Wilson considers the moment of worlds-making in Leibniz’s philosophy. She raises the following question: “How do possible substances give rise to possible worlds?“ and observes that the moment of world-making is as puzzling as it is interesting. In section 2 of her article, Wilson considers two approaches to the question. According to the first, possible individuals logically precede possible worlds and possible worlds are constituted either by combinations of possible individuals or by mechanically checking the (...) compossibility relations among them. This approach assumes that possible individuals are given and complete and that worlds result from their various conjunctions. On this approach, a world is a set of compossible individuals, i.e., a set of complete individuals whose co-existence is possible. (shrink)