Thalēs -- Pythagoras -- Parmenidēs -- Dēmokritos -- Empedoklēs -- Prōtagoras -- Sōkratēs -- Platōn -- Aristotelēs -- Diogenēs Epikouors -- Markos Aurēlios -- Chenkel -- Nitse.

Teksten van 12 moderne filosofen over de mens.

Our aim in this essay is to take a look at cartoons under philosophical light. What are some of the similarities between philosophy and the art of cartooning? In what ways can cartoons be helpful to philosophy? What are some of the problems cartoons pose for philosophy? Perhaps the most basic philosophical question concerning cartoons is, “What is a cartoon?”. We argue that it is not easy to pin down necessary and sufficient conditions for something being a cartoon. We defend (...) the view that cartoons form a class whose members are interconnected with the Wittgensteinian “family resemblance” relations. We then look into the problems involved in finding a connectionist parallel-processing correlate of the Wittgensteinian notion in the context of cartoons. (shrink)

This article explores the distinctive artistic form of caricature and the philosophical treatment it receives in the work of Karl Rosenkranz (1805–1879), who gives it a central role in the context of his remarkable book The Aesthetics of Ugliness (Die Ästhetik des Hässlichen). Rosenkranz’ legacy on this score is not much discussed (certainly in Anglo-American philosophical circles), but its importance for the development of post-eighteenth-century aesthetics—in particular, for an aesthetics that stretches beyond the conventional concerns with the beautiful and the (...) sublime—can hardly be overstated. After a presentation of Rosenkranz’ project on the aesthetics of ugliness, this article examines his take on caricature and its relation to philosophy (as well as philosophy’s relation to caricature), and then takes up some pressing contemporary questions that arise for caricature’s use of stereotypes. (shrink)

Philosophical debate over the infamous Danish cartoons of Muhammad continues.

The growing influence of the visual media in contemporary society is quite alarming; hence, learning to explicate them is inevitable. This is a paradigm shift from verbal argumentation to visual argumentation. The aim of this article is to contribute to the understanding of visual analysis and visual literacy, a part of discourse analysis. Visuals employ a number of rhetorical devices; however, understanding the effectiveness of these devices is still a challenge. Adopting Visual Argumentation Theory, the article analyzes argumentation in cartoons (...) on the post-election violence that rocked Kenya in 2007/2008. From the analyses, it is concluded that visuals can argue as simply and forcefully as their verbal counterparts. The blending of caricature and portraiture makes them even more explicit as portraiture denotes the characters so that we can recognize who they are; caricature ridicules them, analogy attributes actions to them in a satirical or sarcastic way, and cultural memory is needed to access the reference to the analogies. Visuals are designed to make the reader think not only about the event or the people being portrayed but also about the message being communicated. This means visuals have the ability to stretch the truth beyond caricature or mere amusement. (shrink)

A colorful history of utilitarianism told through the lives and ideas of Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and its other founders In The Happiness Philosophers, Bart Schultz tells the colorful story of the lives and legacies of the founders of utilitarianism—one of the most influential yet misunderstood and maligned philosophies of the past two centuries. Best known for arguing that "it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong," utilitarianism was developed (...) by the radical philosophers, critics, and social reformers William Godwin, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart and Harriet Taylor Mill, and Henry Sidgwick. Together, they had a profound influence on nineteenth-century reforms, in areas ranging from law, politics, and economics to morals, education, and women's rights. Their work transformed life in ways we take for granted today. Bentham even advocated the decriminalization of same-sex acts, decades before the cause was taken up by other activists. As Bertrand Russell wrote about Bentham in the late 1920s, "There can be no doubt that nine-tenths of the people living in England in the latter part of last century were happier than they would have been if he had never lived." Yet in part because of its misleading name and the caricatures popularized by figures as varied as Dickens, Marx, and Foucault, utilitarianism is sometimes still dismissed as cold, calculating, inhuman, and simplistic. By revealing the fascinating human sides of the remarkable pioneers of utilitarianism, The Happiness Philosophers provides a richer understanding and appreciation of their philosophical and political perspectives—one that also helps explain why utilitarianism is experiencing a renaissance today and is again being used to tackle some of the world's most serious problems. (shrink)

In Philosophical Questions: Readings and Interactive Guides, James Fieser and Norman Lillegard make classic and contemporary philosophical writings genuinely accessible to students by incorporating numerous pedagogical aids throughout the book. Presenting the readings in manageable segments, they provide commentaries that elucidate difficult passages, explain archaic or technical terminology, and expand upon allusions to unfamiliar literature and arguments. In addition, opening "First Reactions" discussion questions, study questions, logic boxes, and chapter summaries require students to delve more deeply into important issues and (...) to reconstruct arguments in their own words. Some study questions test for minimal comprehension, while others are designed to provoke analysis and independent philosophical reflection. This extensive pedagogical support enables students to more easily comprehend and engage with challenging material by establishing an interactive dialogue with the philosophers. This topically organized anthology and textbook includes numerous excerpts from contemporary philosophers, as well as from Western classics and major Eastern texts, encouraging students to explore connections between works from the Western and Eastern traditions and from different time periods. Topics covered include the philosophy of religion; human nature and the self; souls, minds, bodies, and machines; epistemology; ethics; and political philosophy. A glossary, portraits of philosophers, title pages of famous works, and thirteen specially commissioned cartoons are also included. Philosophical Questions: Readings and Interactive Guides is a rich and flexible volume ideal for introduction to philosophy courses. An Instructor's Manual with Test Questions will be available to adopters of the book. In addition, a Companion Website accompanies the book. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 4, Page 544-555, May 2022. Despite growing evidence that production of cartoons and caricatures of Muhammad causes deep hurt to Muslims across the world, European leaders are refusing to restrict their publication in the name of free speech. This article questions this position on three counts: one, the hurt these cartoons cause to the Muslims and the resulting frictions between Europe and leaders of the Muslim countries; two, the harm they cause to (...) European societies by increasing the tension between Muslims and ordinary citizens and the state at a time when Islamophobia and anti-immigrant feelings are already high; and, three, the need to question the intent of those publishing the cartoons given the overwhelming evidence on the first two counts. The article also questions the legitimacy and usefulness of labelling attacks triggered in response to these publications as ‘Islamic terrorism’ when the profiles of those perpetuating these attacks show criminal and deviant behaviour than evidence of religious devotion. The usefulness of using labels that make actions of a few taint whole of Islam, and Muslims as a collective, needs to be debated. (shrink)

Despite growing evidence that production of cartoons and caricatures of Muhammad causes deep hurt to Muslims across the world, European leaders are refusing to restrict their publication in the name of free speech. This article questions this position on three counts: one, the hurt these cartoons cause to the Muslims and the resulting frictions between Europe and leaders of the Muslim countries; two, the harm they cause to European societies by increasing the tension between Muslims and ordinary citizens and (...) the state at a time when Islamophobia and anti-immigrant feelings are already high; and, three, the need to question the intent of those publishing the cartoons given the overwhelming evidence on the first two counts. The article also questions the legitimacy and usefulness of labelling attacks triggered in response to these publications as ‘Islamic terrorism’ when the profiles of those perpetuating these attacks show criminal and deviant behaviour than evidence of religious devotion. The usefulness of using labels that make actions of a few taint whole of Islam, and Muslims as a collective, needs to be debated. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 4, Page 544-555, May 2022. Despite growing evidence that production of cartoons and caricatures of Muhammad causes deep hurt to Muslims across the world, European leaders are refusing to restrict their publication in the name of free speech. This article questions this position on three counts: one, the hurt these cartoons cause to the Muslims and the resulting frictions between Europe and leaders of the Muslim countries; two, the harm they cause to (...) European societies by increasing the tension between Muslims and ordinary citizens and the state at a time when Islamophobia and anti-immigrant feelings are already high; and, three, the need to question the intent of those publishing the cartoons given the overwhelming evidence on the first two counts. The article also questions the legitimacy and usefulness of labelling attacks triggered in response to these publications as ‘Islamic terrorism’ when the profiles of those perpetuating these attacks show criminal and deviant behaviour than evidence of religious devotion. The usefulness of using labels that make actions of a few taint whole of Islam, and Muslims as a collective, needs to be debated. (shrink)

A hilarious new exploration of philosophy through cartoons from the duo who brought you the New York Times bestselling Plato and a Platypus Walk Into A Bar... Thomas Cathcart and Daniel Klien have been thinking deep thoughts and writing jokes for decades, and now they are here to help us understand Philosophy through cartoons, and cartoons through Philosophy. Covering topics as diverse as religion, gender, knowledge, morality, and the meaning of life (or the lack thereof), I Think, Therefore I Draw (...) gives a thorough introduction to all of the major debates in philosophy through history and the present. And since they explain with the help of a selection of some of the smartest cartoonists working today, you'll breeze through these weighty topics as you guffaw and slap your knee. Cathcart and Klein's Plato and a Platypus Walk into a Bar... and Heidegger and a Hippo Walk Through Those Pearly Gates have been a favorite of philosophers and non-philosophers alike for years. Packed with dozens of witty cartoons and loaded with profound philosophical insight, I Think, Therefore I Draw will delight readers and leave them enlightened. (shrink)

I claim that caricature is an epistemically defective depiction. More precisely, when employed in service to some epistemic uptake, I claim that caricature can have a non-negligible epistemic effect only for a less than ideally rational audience with certain cognitive biases. An ideally rational audience, however, would take all caricature to be what I refer to as fairground caricature, i.e., an interesting or entertaining form of depiction that is at best only trivially revelatory. I then argue that any medium (or (...) genre) substantially employing caricature (or standardly featuring or prescribing its employment) in service to some epistemic uptake is to that extent an epistemically defective medium (e.g., beliefs informed by works specific to that medium are to that extent unwarranted). I then show the editorial cartoon to be just such an epistemically defective medium. (shrink)

The inclusion of De astrologia in the Lucianic corpus has been disputed for centuries since it appears to defend astrological practices that Lucian elsewhere undercuts. This paper argues for Lucian’s authorship by illustrating its masterful subversion of a captatio benevolentiae and subtle rejection of Stoic astrological practices. The narrator begins the text by blaming phony astrologers and their erroneous predictions for inciting others to “denounce the stars and hate astrology” (ἄστρων τε κατηγοροῦσιν καὶ αὐτὴν ἀστρολογίην μισέουσιν, 2). The narrator assures (...) readers that he, the knowledgeable astrologer, will correct for the “stupidity and laziness” (ἀμαθίῃ καὶ ῥαθυμίῃ, ibid.) that bring about false predictions. The narrator’s credibility quickly decays when he attempts to recast Orpheus, Bellerophon, Icarus, Daedalus, and a host of other mythological figures as Greek astrologers. Lucian’s audience would expect such far-fetched interpretations of myth from the stereotypical Stoic philosopher, a character lampooned elsewhere in the Lucianic corpus. (shrink)

In Helen Bannerman’s Little Black Sambo, the text describes its main character as witty, brave, and resourceful. The drawings of the story’s main character which accompany this text, however, present a unique kind of harm that only becomes clear when the work is read as a collection of single-panel comics rather than an illustrated book. In this chapter, I show what happens when we read drawings in books as textless comics, and, based on how things turn out from this reading, (...) motivate why we have some substantive reason to read both Little Black Sambo and other books with drawings-as-comics. (shrink)

In Infinity and the Mind, Rudy Rucker leads an excursion to that stretch of the universe he calls the "Mindscape," where he explores infinity in all its forms: potential and actual, mathematical and physical, theological and mundane. Here Rucker acquaints us with Gödel's rotating universe, in which it is theoretically possible to travel into the past, and explains an interpretation of quantum mechanics in which billions of parallel worlds are produced every microsecond. It is in the realm of infinity, he (...) maintains, that mathematics, science, and logic merge with the fantastic. By closely examining the paradoxes that arise from this merging, we can learn a great deal about the human mind, its powers, and its limitations. Using cartoons, puzzles, and quotations to enliven his text, Rucker guides us through such topics as the paradoxes of set theory, the possibilities of physical infinities, and the results of Gödel's incompleteness theorems. His personal encounters with Gödel the mathematician and philosopher provide a rare glimpse at genius and reveal what very few mathematicians have dared to admit: the transcendent implications of Platonic realism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Judaism and EnlightenmentHeidi Morrison RavvenAdam Sutcliffe. Judaism and Enlightenment. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. xv + 314. Cloth, $60.00.Adam Sutcliffe's detailed and wide-ranging historical study of the image of the Jews and of Judaism in the minds of Enlightenment thinkers very broadly conceived might better be [End Page 343] titled Enlightenment Myths of Jews and Judaism. Sutcliffe admirably captures the consistently mythic portrayal of Jews and (...) Judaism mostly offered as interpretations of the Hebrew Bible (Old Testament) rather than with reference to actual living or historical Jews. Although not explicitly acknowledged, what Sutcliffe offers the reader is a comprehensive catalogue of Enlightenment ideology or, better, theologizing about Judaism and the Jews. I say theologizing because the ubiquitous stark ambivalence toward the Jews that Sutcliffe argues Enlightenment thinkers to a person harbored, from the early Christian Hebraists and Kabbalists to the deists, to Voltaire and beyond the Enlightenment proper even to Freud (whom Sutcliffe not completely in jest regards as the last philosophe) echoes and reconfigures the quintessential Christian ambivalence toward Jews as both God's chosen and God's rejected. Christianity's need to legitimate the Hebrew Bible as the Old Testament stands in perpetual conflict with its need to de-legitimate the Jews as its rightful owners and heirs. Sutcliffe is utterly convincing that the Enlightenment conception of the Jews has irreducible mythic and conflictual aspects.The author's intended purpose, however, which is to convince the reader that Judaism and the Jews are the paradigmatic crux of the unassimilability of the mythic and particular by Enlightenment reason and hence to bring into question Enlightenment ideals themselves, is less convincing. Instead the data Sutcliffe amasses seem to point to the conclusion that Enlightenment thinkers were deeply imbued with mythic categories and ancient prejudices not easily sloughed off by mere protestations of rational autonomy and commitment to universal ideals.Sutcliffe's mistake is to grant to the Enlightenment thinkers their ground on both their self-valuation as exemplars of the deployment of universal reason or rational universalism and also their classification of Judaism as particularist mythos in opposition to just such reason. What Sutcliffe's carefully collected and exhaustively presented data suggest, instead, is that when it came to Judaism, the Enlightenment thinkers were neither rational nor universalist but instead culture bound and impassioned. The book's great strength is its admirable and exhaustive scholarly grasp of European Enlightenment works and its systematic presentation of the Jews in the imagination of these Enlighteners. Nevertheless, missing from this book is a scholarly understanding of Jewish sources both biblical and post-biblical and especially of Jewish philosophy. As a result, Judaism (and even the Hebrew Bible) signify to the author what Enlighteners mistakenly and prejudicially cast it as, namely, Europe's quintessential mythic particularism. But this caricature ignores the reality of rabbinic Judaism's profoundly rationalist tendencies and also the universalist aspirations and claims of the Jewish philosophic tradition whose deep roots go back to the Hellenistic era, let alone the universality of the Bible which is hardly less than that of Shakespeare. Hence Sutcliffe perpetuates a negative (and false) stereotype in the name of valorizing it. In this he is persuaded by a post-modernist agenda suggested, but not generally intrusive, throughout the book and made explicit at the end.Particularly jarring is Sutcliffe's inclusion of Spinoza in his catalogue of Enlightenment villifiers of Judaism as a form of unassimilable particularism and mythic primitivism. Spinoza instead clearly and repeatedly argues in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus that biblical Judaism is exemplified par excellence by its universalist ethics and hence it is the Ancient Jewish Commonwealth that ought to serve as an exemplar for the Dutch republic and all modern polities, as Michael Rosenthal has admirably shown in several essays. Spinoza draws this conclusion from the deployment of what he explicitly develops as his scientific method of reading texts, a method he argues is the same as the scientific method of amassing the data of nature and systematizing it in order to let its explanatory categories emerge therefrom (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, vii). The central result of using the scientific method on the Bible... (shrink)

This brief and engaging introductory text treats philosophy as a dramatic and continuous story--a conversation about humankind's deepest and most persistent concerns, in which students are encouraged to participate. Tracing the exchange of ideas between history's key philosophers, Philosophical Conversations: A Concise Historical Introduction demonstrates that while constructing an argument or making a claim, one philosopher almost always has others in mind. The book addresses the fundamental questions of human life: Who are we? What can we know? How should (...) we live? and What sort of reality do we inhabit? Throughout, author Norman Melchert provides a generous selection of excerpts from major philosophical works and makes them more easily understandable with his lucid explanations. Extensive cross-references highlight the organizing themes and show students how philosophers have responded to each other's arguments. A more concise edition of Norman Melchert's The Great Conversation: A Historical Introduction to Philosophy, Fifth Edition, Philosophical Conversations is designed to be especially accessible and visually attractive to first- and second-year college students in introduction to philosophy courses. Enhanced by numerous pedagogical features, it offers: * Shorter and/or simplified presentations of much of the material * A second color that enlivens the text and makes it more visually interesting * An expanded art program featuring more than 100 photographs, illustrations, and cartoons * Classic art at the opening of each chapter * Numerous brief quotations from poets, politicians, and thinkers that underscore philosophical points and stimulate thought * Explanatory footnotes and basic study questions throughout * "Questions for Further Thought" at the end of each chapter * Key terms, boldfaced at their first appearance and collected at the end of each chapter and in a detailed glossary at the back of the book * "Sketches"--which provide glimpses of the ideas of various philosophers not already discussed in detail in the narrative--and "Profiles," which offer more in-depth looks at several thinkers, philosophical schools, and movements including Taoism, Zen, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Iris Murdoch * An Instructor's Manual and Test Bank on CD that highlights essential points and offers numerous exam questions. (shrink)

The question “What is humour?” has exercised in varying degrees such philosophers as Aristotle, Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Schopenhauer and Bergson and has traditionally been regarded as a philosophical question. And surely it must still be regarded as a philosophical question at least in so far as it is treated as a conceptual one. Traditionally the question has been regarded as a search for the essence of humour, whereas nowadays it has become almost a reflex response among some philosophers (...) to dismiss the search for essences as misconceived. Humour, it will be said, is a family-resemblance concept: no one could hope to compile any short list of essential properties abstracted from all the many varieties of humour— human misfortune and clumsiness, obscenity, grotesqueness, veiled insult, nonsense, wordplay and puns, human misdemeanours and so on, as manifested in forms as varied as parody, satire, drama, clowning, music, farce and cartoons. Yet even if the search for the essence of humour seems at first sight unlikely to succeed, I do not see how we can be sure in advance of any conceptual investigation; and in any case we might do well to start with the old established theories purporting to give the essence of humour, for even if they are wrong they may be illuminatingly wrong and may help us to compile a list of typical characteristics. (shrink)

So much of the history of science has been written from the point of view of the scientist or the proto-scientist that it may be salutary for the modern reader occasionally to consider how science and its early practitioners were viewed from the outside. We must not be too surprised if a pioneering activity performed by controversial agents was misunderstood or misrepresented and if what emerges is, therefore, sometimes less of a portrait than a caricature. We are concerned here much (...) less with what natural philosophers actually did than what they were thought to have done, or what they were thought to stand for. The image is sometimes more influential than the reality. Considering that the period to be studied is one of major political and social unrest and that the principal spokesman, Edmund Burke (1729–1797), had made his reputation mainly in the arena of parliamentary politics, we can anticipate rather more polemic than dispassionate argument. In the formation of public opinion a colourful exaggeration or even an occasional sneer are often more effective than the objective exposition of a case. The spectacles through which Burke looked at his world sometimes magnified and often distorted, but they produced a view of knowledge and society shared by many of his contemporaries and of considerable subsequent influence. (shrink)

Appearance and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Physics addresses quantum mechanics and relativity and their philosophical implications, focusing on whether these theories of modern physics can help us know nature as it really is, or only as it appears to us. The author clearly explains the foundational concepts and principles of both quantum mechanics and relativity and then uses them to argue that we can know more than mere appearances, and that we can know to some extent the (...) way things really are. He argues that modern physics gives us reason to believe that we can know some things about the objective, real world, but he also acknowledges that we cannot know everything, which results in a position he calls realistic realism. This book is not a survey of possible philosophical interpretations of modern physics, nor does it leap from a caricature of the physics to some wildly alarming metaphysics. Instead, it is careful with the physics and true to the evidence in arriving at its own realistic conclusions. It presents the physics without mathematics, and makes extensive use of diagrams and analogies to explain important ideas. Engaging and accessible, Appearance and Reality serves as an ideal introduction for anyone interested in the intersection of philosophy and physics, including students in philosophy of physics and philosophy of science courses. (shrink)

What processes of the brain or the mind can explain the uniquely personal experience we have of smelling a rose, or feeling the pain of toothache, or seeing the point of a newspaper cartoon, or sensing a pang of post-modernist angst in the run up to the Millenium. The phenomenon of humanhigher-order consciousness has puzzled philosophers, naturalists, and theologians down the ages. Now, somewhat belatedly, consciousness has caught the interest of scientists, some of whom believe they are on the (...) brink of discovering its basis in neurobiological processes. This book, drawing together leading figures from the spheres of science and philosophy, is about the prospects of finding a scientific explanation of consciousness. And it is also about how our view of ourselves could be affected by such a scientific explanation. Until recently, the vast complexityof the brain had kept researchers from tackling the thorny topic of consciousness. But now, new imaging techniques are revealing many of the brain's mysteries to neuroscientists, while some researchers in the field of artificial intelligence believe they will be able to replicate consciousness withsilicon and circuitry. Meanwhile, philosophers continue to take issue with the methodology used by science to investigate this phenomenon. These are the issues that are debated in this book, in which exponenets of each view have the opportunity to argue their case, and the result is a collectionthat will both enlighten all those interested in the question of consciousness, and stimulate debate among those at the forefront of research in the many fields now investigating it. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On Doing Theology and Buddhology:A Spectrum of Christian ProposalsAmos YongThis essay addresses the following questions: "Can/should Buddhists and Christians do theology/Buddhology together? If no, why not? If yes, why and how?" As a Pentecostal Christian systematician and comparativist, I review a number of volumes recently published in the field in light of these queries1 and situate them across a typological spectrum.2 I will conclude by providing my own constructive (...) theological response.3Evangelical VoicesKeith Yandell, the Julius R. Weinberg Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and Harold Netland, former missionary to Japan and longtime faculty member in philosophy of religion and intercultural studies at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School in Deerfield, Illinois—one of the most important evangelical seminaries in North America—have collaborated on a volume recently jointly released by two of the most important evangelical publishing houses, InterVarsity Press and Paternoster Press.4 These are senior evangelical scholars; between them, they have written or edited numerous books in the areas of philosophy of religion, epistemology, theology of pluralism, and theology of interreligious encounter, among other topics, along the way touching on many aspects of the subject matter in their coauthored book, Buddhism.5 How would they respond to the set of questions above? More particularly, how might we anticipate their response in light of their book?In contrast to previous evangelical engagements with Buddhist traditions, Yandell and Netland provide an exemplary model for future evangelical discussions of Buddhism in the following respects. First, they take the time to understand Buddhist traditions on their own terms, devoting the first half of their book to a historical exposition of Buddhism's emergence, growth, and development across Asia and the West. Second, both have familiarized themselves with the diversity of Buddhist debates and internal disputes, and thus recognize that Buddhists rarely speak with [End Page 103] one voice, especially on complex issues; this is important since it enables them, by and large, to avoid caricatures of Buddhist positions and of erecting straw-man arguments against Buddhist doctrines and ideas. Last but not least, Yandell and Netland do engage in negative apologetics against central Buddhist doctrines,6 as might be expected of evangelical scholars, but they undertake their critical analysis respectfully and with dialogical rhetoric quite different from the kinds of polemic deployed by prior generations of evangelicals.7Yet even given these advances, in the end, Yandell and Netland emphasize the incommensurability of Buddhism and Christianity. The final chapter of their book distinguishes Christian views of God versus Buddhist conceptions of ultimate reality, Jesus vis-à-vis the Buddha, and the human fall into sin needing gracious forgiveness over and against human ignorance needing enlightenment. Their concluding words assert: "These are not simply variations on a common theme, or different ways of expressing the same spiritual insight. The choice here is between two radically different perspectives on reality, on the nature of the human predicament, and the way to overcome it."8To be sure, Yandell and Netland have provided reasoned arguments for such a contrastive perspective, emphasizing especially what they feel to be the incoherence or unintelligibility of the Buddhist teachings that they examine. But if their evangelical readers agree with their conclusions, it will be only because they are not in the position to appreciate—the expositions of this volume notwithstanding—how Buddhists have wrestled with these issues over the millennia but yet come to peace with some of the answers that continue to mystify Yandell and Netland. More specifically, this book will probably appeal to evangelicals because they also presume the sort of either/ or logic at work in its central arguments. Put alternatively, the Buddhist worldview will remain baffling to most evangelicals because they either lack access to or refuse to avail themselves of the practices that give these ideas meaning. Such is the cost of staying primarily at the level of philosophical discourse and analysis.9This probably means that Yandell and Netland would answer "no" to the leading questions of this essay. Christians and Buddhists occupy, in their perspective, incommensurable religious and intellectual grounds. Sustained interreligious encounter can result only in the awareness of the differences... (shrink)

Let me attempt a drastic summary, or symbolic reduction, of Mr. Foss's adeptly metaphorical exposition. The use of the copula is, implicit in the appositive series, will do some violence to the complexity of the argument, but since causes and parts are frowned on by the same argument, the simpler arrangement cannot be altogether out of keeping. In logical and grammatical terms, we have on two sides of a profound ledger: "symbolic reduction," the divisive subject and predicate,--and "metaphoric process," the (...) underlying and unifying energy of the proposition, the subjectum. The negations of dialectic operate to show the insufficiency of symbolic concepts and are the "door to philosophic truth." And in ontological terms, we have on the one hand number, time, space, cause and effect, coincidence and contingency; and on the other the different, the naught, the apeiron, the potential, the tension of process, freedom and necessity in metaphoric lawful unity. There are two closely similar extremes of reduction between which one locates the transcendent philosophy of metaphor: that of sensationalism, the philosophy of the brute and atomic, and that of rationalism, the philosophy of expedient action. And in more or less theological terms, we have on the one hand the environment and its complement the ego, purposive and possessive; on the other, World, the I and the Thou, prayer, sin and grace in the metaphorical unity of consciousness, the widening power of personality in intercession or metaphorical representation. On the one hand, birth and death, past and future, and a present extending ad libitum into either; on the other, the eternal present of the integrated process stretching over past and future, expressed in its purest form in art. And so in aesthetic terms: on the one hand catharsis, a rationalized mixture of the ego's pleasure and pain, asceticism and hedonism, play; on the other, drama--especially tragedy, which par excellence action--Eudaimonia, purification, artistic distance, stylization, imagination, conscience, love. On the one hand, comedy in the sense of farce, environment symbolically reduced, actions and persons according to type, the mechanism of means and ends, rules, rituals, tricks, chance, the caricature of symbolic fixation--producing laughter: on the other hand, true and great comedy, the attempt to understand life in all its contradictions, producing the smile. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Richard J. Arneson BENTHAMITE UTILITARIANISM AND HARD TIMES IT is commonly understood that Dickens's vaguely specified criticisms of the "Hard Facts" philosophy in Hard Times are intended as criticisms of Benthamite Utilitarianism. It is also commonly held that, on the level of theory at any rate, Dickens's criticisms are in the form of caricature so crudely painted as almost entirely to misrepresent its object. ' It would be foolish (...) to deny the presence of bathos, flat caricature, and stereotyped sentiment in this novel, or for that matter in any of Dickens's novels. But alongside the flamboyantly bad there is much stronger and subtler material. In this paper I examine the criticisms of Utilitarianism in Hard Times, and argue that Dickens's arguments possess more cogency than he is usually given credit for. It will turn out that much of the intellectual interest of the novel derives from the tension between what Dickens says to us in authorial sermons and what he shows us in the structure of his plot. One complaint Dickens offers is that Utilitarians like Thomas Gradgrind oppose fact to fancy and, in their gross worship of fact and downcrying of fancy, stifle much in human beings that is essential to their flourishing. The fact-versus-fancy theme is traceable in the novel's handling of education in the Gradgrind school, of the upbringing of the Gradgrind children, and of working-class life in industrial towns such as Coketown. Here as elsewhere Dickens means to present in tandem a criticism of the "Hard Facts" philosophy and of the society which he believed increasingly to be operating on the principles of that philosophy; hence a response to Hard Times must deal with social criticism as well as philosophical critique. What exactly is it that Gradgrind thinking aims to excise from Victorian culture by its campaign against "fancy"? Critics have objected that 60 Richard J. Arneson61 Dickens's notion of fancy comprehends only playful imagination and light-minded amusement and as such cannot bear the heavy burden of argument he rests upon it.2 In many passages of the novel fancy is indeed tantamount to play. But Dickens insists on the significance of fancy for moral education and on the continuity between light fancy and the poetical imagination that heightens moral sensibility. Fancy, nurtured in a child even in the humble pursuits of nursery rhymes and fairy tales, turns into moral imagination in an adult, who is thereby enabled to place himself in thought in the position of another, intuit his way of thinking, sense his feelings, and so acquire the knowledge and the inclination to treat the other with intelligent sympathy. That Gradgrind education frustrates this natural process is Dickens's complaint against it. It is worth calling attention to the similarity between Dickens's complaint against a vaguely discerned spirit of the times and the much more focused criticism urged by J. S. Mill against Bentham in his 1838 essay in London and Westminster Review. Bentham, says Mill, lacked himself, and failed to appreciate, a certain sort of imagination— that which enables us, by a voluntary effort, to conceive the absent as if it were present, the imaginary as if it were real, and to clothe it in the feelings which, if it were indeed real, it would bring along with it. This is the power by which one human being enters into the mind and circumstances of another. This power constitutes the poet, insofar as he does anything but melodiously utter his own actual feelings.... Mill concludes that Bentham, lacking imagination and an historical sense, "saw accordingly in man little but what the vulgarest eye can see."3 And in his Autobiography, Mill acknowledges that in the Benthamite Radical circles he frequented in the 1820's, "From this neglect both in theory and in practise of the cultivation of feeling, naturally resulted, among other things, an undervaluing of poetry, and of Imagination generally, as an element of human nature."4 A sympathetic internal critic of Utilitarianism, Mill tries to retain the essentials of Bentham's secular and empiricist moral doctrine while softening its cruder aspects. Like Bentham, Mill identifies morality with furthering the greatest happiness... (shrink)

Untangle the complex web of philosophical dilemmas of Spidey and his world—in time for the release of The Amazing Spider-Man movie Since Stan Lee and Marvel introduced Spider-Man in Amazing Fantasy #15 in 1962, everyone’s favorite webslinger has had a long career in comics, graphic novels, cartoons, movies, and even on Broadway. In this book some of history’s most powerful philosophers help us explore the enduring questions and issues surrounding this beloved superhero: Is Peter Parker to blame for the (...) death of his uncle? Does great power really bring great responsibility? Can Spidey champion justice and be with Mary Jane at the same time? Finding your way through this web of inquiry, you’ll discover answers to these and many other thought-provoking questions. Gives you a fresh perspective and insights on Peter Parker and Spider-Man’s story lines and ideas Examines important philosophical issues and questions, such as: What is it to live a good life? Do our particular talents come with obligations? What role should friendship play in life? Is there any meaning to life? Views Spider-Man through the lens of some of history’s most influential thinkers, from Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Immanuel Kant to Nietszche, William James, Ayn Rand, and Alasdair MacIntyre. (shrink)

Appearance and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Physics addresses quantum mechanics and relativity and their philosophical implications, focusing on whether these theories of modern physics can help us know nature as it really is, or only as it appears to us. The author clearly explains the foundational concepts and principles of both quantum mechanics and relativity and then uses them to argue that we can know more than mere appearances, and that we can know to some extent the (...) way things really are. He argues that modern physics gives us reason to believe that we can know some things about the objective, real world, but he also acknowledges that we cannot know everything, which results in a position he calls "realistic realism." This book is not a survey of possible philosophical interpretations of modern physics, nor does it leap from a caricature of the physics to some wildly alarming metaphysics. Instead, it is careful with the physics and true to the evidence in arriving at its own realistic conclusions. It presents the physics without mathematics, and makes extensive use of diagrams and analogies to explain important ideas. Engaging and accessible, Appearance and Reality serves as an ideal introduction for anyone interested in the intersection of philosophy and physics, including students in philosophy of physics and philosophy of science courses. (shrink)

The caricature of Friedrich Nietzsche as a proto-Nazi is still with us. Behind this caricature sits a long history of misreading and deception, including the well-known story of Nietzsche's Nazi sister, Elisabeth Förster, who took over Nietzsche's work when he became catatonic and systematized a disparate set of texts as The Will to Power. Despite much remarkable work by scholars to debunk the idea that Nietzsche was a racist, or an anti-Semite, or both, this view continues to influence much of (...) the popular perception of Nietzsche and his work. In Nietzsche and Race, Marc de Launay, editor of the Pléiade edition of Nietzsche's writings, deftly counters this persistent narrative in a series of concise and highly accessible reflections on the concept of "race" in Nietzsche's published writings, notebooks, and correspondence. De Launay relates these discussions of race to the central themes of Nietzsche's philosophical project, definitively showing how Nietzsche's use of the term "race" simply does not map onto "racism" in any of the ways his detractors have claimed. (shrink)

Quantum theory is one of science's most thrilling, challenging and even mysterious areas. Scientists such as Planck, Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg and Schrödinger uncovered bizarre paradoxes in the early 20th century that seemed to destroy the fundamental assumptions of 'classical physics' - the basic laws we are taught in school. Notoriously difficult, quantum theory is nonetheless an amazing and inspiring intellectual adventure, explained here with patience, wit and clarity.

What do pictures and mental images have in common? The contemporary tendency to reject mental picture theories of imagery suggests that the answer is: not much. We show that pictures and visual imagery have something important in common. They both contribute to mental simulations: pictures as inputs and mental images as outputs. But we reject the idea that mental images involve mental pictures, and we use simulation theory to strengthen the anti-pictorialist's case. Along the way we try to account for (...) caricature and for some basic features of pictorial representations. (shrink)

Turing made strong statements about the future of machines in society. This article asks how they can be interpreted to advance our understanding of Turing’s philosophy. His irony has been largely caricatured or minimized by historians, philosophers, scientists, and others. Turing is often portrayed as an irresponsible scientist, or associated with childlike manners and polite humor. While these representations of Turing have been widely disseminated, another image suggested by one of his contemporaries, that of a nonconformist, utopian, and radically (...) progressive thinker reminiscent of the English Romantic poet Percy B. Shelley, has remained largely underexplored. Following this image, I will reconstruct the argument underlying what Turing called (but denied being guilty of) his “Promethean irreverence” (1947–1951) as a utopian satire directed against chauvinists of all kinds, especially intellectuals who might sacrifice independent thought to maintain their power. These, Turing hoped, would eventually be rivaled and surpassed by intelligent machines and transformed into ordinary people, as work once considered “intellectual” would be transformed into non-intellectual, “mechanical” work. I study Turing’s irony in its historical context and follow the internal logic of his arguments to their limit. I suggest that Turing genuinely believed that the possibilities of the machines he envisioned were not utopian dreams, and yet he conceived them from a utopian frame of mind, aspiring to a different society. His ever-learning child machines, whose intelligence would grow out of their own individual experiences, would help distribute power. (shrink)

Forster’s study is welcome and important, not least because it corrects the widespread but mistaken impression that Hegel and skepticism are mutually exclusive opposites. Forster is one of the few who have taken seriously Hegel’s early Critical Journal essay, “The Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy.” This essay shows that, contrary to received opinion, Hegel was not only familiar with skepticism, but also that he regarded ancient skepticism as more important than its modern Humean counterpart. But the point is not simply (...) that Hegel knew the history of philosophy better than most others; Forster’s thesis is that Hegel’s interpretation of the skeptical tradition is fundamental to Hegel’s own philosophical position, such that large regions of Hegel’s thought remain obscure if Hegel’s interpretation of and relation to skepticism are not understood. Moreover, Hegel’s construction of a system of philosophy, far from ignoring skepticism, is a response to those skeptical problems that Hegel regarded as genuinely important, which any philosophy worthy of the name must meet. To view Hegel from this perspective is not only to gain understanding of his thought, it shows the standard picture of Hegel as the culmination of metaphysics based on naively optimistic epistemological assumptions, to be an irresponsible caricature. (shrink)

Even as art theory and analytic philosophy have failed to connect in their studies of photography, the two disciplines have joined in tying conceptions of the specific character of photography to ideas about automaticity and agency.1 In rough caricature, the philosopher reasons: “An item is a work of art only insofar as it is the product of agency, so a photograph is not an art work insofar it is not the product of artistic agency. After all, in Lady Eastlake's colorful (...) words, the ‘obedience of the machine’ in photography is no ‘picturesque agent.’”2 This much is accepted both by philosophers who go on to conclude that photography is not an art and also by those who defend the contrary.3 The reasoning on the side of theory and criticism often goes, again in caricature, as follows: “Art works sometimes result from a suppression of agency, and the distinctive ‘obedience of the machine’ in photography is no ‘picturesque agent,’ so the automatism of the photographic machine shapes the distinctive profile of photographic art.” The triadic assemblage of the medium, automatism, and agency is clearly more than a trope in writing on photography; it regulates and structures reasoning about photography, even as it sends that reasoning off in remarkably divergent directions in different disciplines. In the spirit of the nudge towards convergence that this special issue represents, this afterword develops some thoughts that are sparked by and that offer a friendly challenge to the preceding papers. In brief, the triad that controls thinking about photography across disciplines depends on some rather demanding conceptions of agency and automatism. As it turns out, less demanding conceptions of agency and automatism pave the way to a new and more modest conception of the specificity of photography as an art medium. If our common ground is what keeps us apart, perhaps we should find some new common ground? (shrink)

When philosophers consider art, they typically do so from the standpoint of an outside observer, yielding a description of the phenomenon as though it was in actuality a mode of philosophy. Here the work appears to have been constructed as part of a purely rational process, or at least dominated by logic and cognitive intention at all meaningful points along the way. In the final account the anoetic is eclipsed by the noetic, which is taken as its most important (...) and most valid dimension.Recently Thomas C. Hilde claimed that “the typical philosopher’s vantage is nevertheless bound to present an account of art and the practices the artwork implies or conceals that is different from and sometimes a caricature... (shrink)

Information, knowledge and understanding, history/tradition and novelty, fashion and science, show business and intellectual product are the contexts to review in order to answer the question why humanities have been losing credibility and have come under the hammer. The present article, informed by philosophers like Bertrand Russell and Mary Midgley, authors like Charles K. Ogden and Ivor A. Richards, semioticians like Algirdas Greimas and Roland Barthes and classical English literature, argue that the problem originates between the continuity of thought (...) and indoctrination, between the stance of Rectors of universities and henchmen in the politics of market economy, and it is best exemplified by the caricature of humanities in some universities resulting from the implementation of the courses of technical skills. Knowing that humanities have been prized for intellectual attainment (Lincoln Barnett, Paul Goodman), their precarious state seems to depend on unbalanced philosophical, ethical, educational and economic principles. With economy being the factor which is hard to dispute, political and ethical principles tend to invite a revision because of a traceable tendency to promote the production of the manageable rather than the enlightened. (shrink)

The oeuvre of Hegel, like that of many thinkers of the post-Kantian tradition in European philosophy, has been subject to a number of misreadings and misrepresentations by both specialists and nonspecialists alike that have until fairly recently rendered Hegel’s reception in the Anglo-American philosophical world extremely problematic. These often willful misrepresentations, variously referred to by scholars as the Hegel myths or legends, have given rise to a number of prejudices against Hegel’s philosophy primarily, although by no means exclusively, in the (...) English-speaking world. Among the caricatures that have enjoyed the widest currency are the following: that Hegel denied the law of contradiction; that his dialectical method of argumentation took the form of the thesis-antithesis-synthesis triad; that he saw the end of history in his own philosophical system; that he tried to prove a priori the number of planets; that he was a reactionary apologist for the Prussian state, or worse, a protofascist; finally, that he was a kind of pre-Kantian metaphysician or “cosmic rationalist” who believed like Schelling and some of the Romantics in a metaphysical world soul. (shrink)

This book discusses five philosophers and writers, Hume, Kierkegaar, Camus, Simone Weil and Dostoevsky, who represents different strands of our cultural inheritance which are all theologically and religiously alive today. What they have in common is willingness to explore the borderlands between belief and unbelief and to review their own position in the light of what those coming from the opposite direction may have to teach them. What they each reject is the sort of caricature which assumes that belief (...) an unbelief and to review their own position in the light of what those coming from the opposite direction may have to teach them. What they each reject is the sort of caricature which assumes that belief and unbelief are two homogeneous wholes which have nothing to say to each other and no ground for common discussion other that that of agnosticism. Equally, however, they disdain the implications that the only possibility of dialogue is a marshmallow middle ground where the only rule is that you avoid saying what you really think. Theologians and believers have often stood back from exploration on this middle ground. Encounters with secular philosophies or systems of belief are risky and dangerous. On the other hand, a theology which avoids such encounters is a much impoverished theology. Professor Sutherland's discussion considers the nature and extent of the risk, and the title of his book indicates where the believers who live close to the boundaries often share more with neighbourly unbelievers than they do with fellow believers who view the pastures of unbelief as far distant and dangerou lands from which they will for ever remain separated. (shrink)

From a certain simplistic and inaccurate, although regrettably popular, perspective philosophy, at least for the past few decades, is available only in two main flavours – analytic and continental. Some self-identified members of both camps are apt to endorse uncharitable caricatures of what the others are up to. Among the many lines of criticism that can be directed against this false dichotomy, I wish to focus on discussion of a broadly naturalistic orientation that rejects many of the commitments both (...) of paradigmatic analytic philosophy and paradigmatic continental philosophy. For the committed naturalist, the enterprise of philosophy is continuous with that of systematic empirical enquiry into the workings of the world . From a naturalistic perspective many of the standard moves of analytic philosophy, such as testing a proposal against ‘intuitions’, are as preposterous as the claims of ‘continental’ and ‘analytic’ philosophers sometimes appear to one another. (shrink)

In a symposium with Roger Trigg, Renford Bambrough remarks that in discussing the difference between reason and faith philosophers too often raise the issue in a misleading form.1 The form is that of the ‘treacherous singular’. In other words, they assume that there is a single difference between reason and faith, that a line may be drawn with faith entirely on one side and reason entirely on the other. Against this, Bambrough argues that there is no sharp difference between (...) the two, that they are related in many ways and that within the network of our discourse they come to different things at different points. Philosophers too often look only at one or two points, assume a radical divergence and produce a caricature alike of reason and of faith. A more extensive view will reveal no such radical incompatibility; rather it will enable us to see faith as a mode of reason. (shrink)

One of the strangest of the many strange habits of philosophers, which mark them out as the Ishmaels of the scientific world, is their refusal to agree as to the precise meaning of the words they use. No philosopher, it seems, is bound by the definitions given by predecessors or contemporaries of even the most central terms: each has to define his terms for himself. The resulting situation certainly lends itself to ridicule and caricature, as in the legend of (...) the theological disputants who arrived after long argument at the conclusion that when the one said ‘God’ he meant what the other meant when he said ‘Devil.’ Still it is probable that this idiosyncrasy of philosophers has some real ground in the special nature of the task on which they are engaged, and is not a mere exhibition of aimless malice or sheer incompetence. Whether that is so or not, one of the consequences of this situation is that the titles of philosophic discourses are apt to be singularly unilluminating: as an indication of the problem to be raised they are, to say the least, highly ambiguous. How the reader may understand the title of this paper I do not know; but the question which I had in mind in choosing it was this. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Zen and Philosophy: An Intellectual Biography of Nishida KitarōThomas P. KasulisZen and Philosophy: An Intellectual Biography of Nishida Kitarō. By Michiko Yusa. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002. 482 pp.Readers of this journal know that much Buddhist-Christian dialogue over the past three decades has featured Kyōto School philosophy for the Buddhist side of the conversations. The major figures in that school known to the West are Nishida Kitarō, (...) Tanabe Hajime, Nishitani Keiji, Takeuchi Yoshinori, and Ueda Shizuteru. Other philosophers not formally connected to the school but in some ways kindred spirits with it include Watsuji Tetsurō, Hisamatsu Shin'ichi, and Abe Masao. Both individually and collectively these philosophers represent a formidable intellectual tradition, simultaneously challenging and inspiring their Western theological and philosophical counterparts. In surveying the Western responses to the Kyōto School, however, I often find an odd lacuna: the philosophers behind the thought are often absent or, at best, caricatured.The mischief here comes from two directions. On one hand, there are the Western theologians and philosophers who read in translation the works by Nishitani or Tanabe and are astounded by the sophistication of the thought and the way familiar Western philosophical thinkers such as Hegel, Kant, Heidegger, and Plato are interwoven in the arguments. Not being Asian specialists, these readers quite naturally focus on parts of the texts most familiar and intelligible—the interplay with Western ideas and values. This approach has helped Western thinkers discover hidden cultural assumptions in their own philosophizing and religious thinking. Missing, however, is the culturally Japanese character of the Kyōto School philosophers. At least until very recently, these philosophers did not write for a Western audience, but [End Page 268] for their Japanese compatriots. Thus, however much their philosophies might be Western in style and content, it is likely that at least some of their questions (and therefore their answers) were responses to Japanese, rather than Western, concerns. Given the upheaval that Japanese culture and society underwent in the first half of the twentieth century, it is especially important to factor into the equation such contemporaneous cultural concerns.Partly in response to this situation, there has more recently been a response from some Western intellectual historians of Japan who seek to debunk the Kyōto School as a whole, finding in it nothing more than disguised ethnocentrism, jingoism, and imperialism. In making their case, they often ignore the full philosophical systems developed by the Kyōto School thinkers and focus instead on comments from public forums or lectures. Sometimes no more than a few isolated quotations are used to support the case. What is wrong here is not necessarily the claim that Kyōto School philosophy was implicated in the political thought of the wartime years, but rather the cavalier scholarship used to support that claim. A whole school of philosophers tends to be lumped together with little concern for sorting out individual differences. For intellectual historians of this ilk, it is as if books are written by ideologies rather than individuals (or even individual ideologues). Such caricatures of the Kyōto School may even minimize the significance of the fact that some philosophers associated with the movement, Miki Kiyoshi and Tosaka Jun for example, died in prison for their leftist ideas and practices. The Kyōto School is not nearly as hegemonic as some of its critics like to claim.In short, these two commonWestern approaches to reading the Kyōto School philosophers tend either to overlook their Japaneseness or to deny their individuality. Either way, the philosopher disappears from the philosophizing. Here Yusa's book is a vital corrective. Her intellectual biography both Japanizes and humanizes Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945), the founder of the Kyōto School and the inspiration for most of Japan's modern philosophy. Her narrative gives us insight after insight into the concrete contexts in which Nishida's thought developed. Her discussion of each progression in Nishida's thought over his lifetime is framed by relevant events in his family life, his professional career, his interaction with colleagues, and the readings that were inspiring him at the time. Japanese editions of modern writers' collected works commonly... (shrink)

As recent controversies over satirical religious cartoons in Denmark and the wearing of traditional dress in France attest, multiculturalism is an increasingly contentious issue for contemporary democracies. The question of how to achieve a balance between a tolerant and open society and a just nation with a strong identity has become one of the most heated debates in the academic community—and a matter of immediate political urgency for many countries. _Multiculturalism and the Law_ brings together some of the sharpest and (...) most influential scholars of our time, including Jürgen Habermas and Thomas McCarthy, to explore the pacifying role that democratic lawmaking offers as a solution to the instability and divisiveness fostered by cultural diversity. Can the law promote equality, inclusion, and solidarity? The emerging consensus among many political philosophers that it can is debated here by a distinguished group of thinkers, and their contributions are essential reading for both policy makers and a wide range of scholars. (shrink)

Abstract‘Relativists' and ‘absolutists' about truth often see their own camp as promoting virtues, such as open-mindedness and intellectual humility, and see the opposing camp as fostering vices, like closed-mindedness and arrogance. Relativism is accused of fostering these vices because it entails that each person’s beliefs are automatically right for the person who holds them. How can we be humble or open-minded if we cannot concede that we might be wrong? Absolutism is accused of fostering these vices because the view is (...) seen as entailing certainty. This also seems to preclude us from conceding that we could be wrong. However, no relativist defends the Protagorean version of relativism that entails infallibilism. And no absolutist posits infallible certainty. Fallibilism really is a precondition of various virtues, but both camps take themselves to be defending fallibilist positions against opponents who they take to be committed to infallibilism. Philosophers may inadvertently end up promoting precisely the sort of infallibilism they oppose by creating a false dichotomy and caricaturing the opposing camp. This underscores the importance of interpretive charity in both academic and public debate. (shrink)

Moral philosophers generally regard pacifism with disdain. Forty years ago, Jan Narveson called it a "bizarre and vaguely ludicrous" doctrine, and that assessment is, in some form or other, still common today. Few contemporary ethicists self-identify as pacifists, and in peace and war studies, just war theory is now the standard. That standard perpetuates the stereotype of pacifism as naïve and wrongheaded. The only way to make nonviolent commitments respectable under the prevailing view is by subsuming them under just (...) war logic, as in John Lango's recent appeal for nonviolent interventionism. In brief, just war theory dominates the discourse. What makes this dominance problematic is that just war theory systematically misconstrues and caricatures the pacifist position. Pacifist commitments can only be properly understood when the lenses of just war theory are put aside. Only then is it possible to understand why pacifism appears ridiculous in the literature. Straw men usually do. (shrink)