I argue for a new conception of practical authority based on an analysis of the relationship between authority and subject. Commands entail a demand for practical deference, which establishes a relationship of hierarchy and vulnerability that involves a variety of signals and commitments. In order for these signals and commitments to be justified, the subject must be under a preexisting duty, the authority’s commands must take precedence over the subject’s judgment regarding fulfillment of that duty, the authority must accept the (...) position and responsibilities of command, and the authority must be sufficiently trustworthy relative to how vulnerable the subject makes herself by deferring. This results in an instrumentalist conception of practical authority that can be favorably compared to Joseph Raz’s famous service conception. The relational conception’s main advantage is that it focuses on the authority as much as the subject, requiring that the authority accept responsibility for the relationship and be sufficiently trustworthy. (shrink)

In this chapter, Dahan Katz defends relational conceptions of retribution and desert. She clarifies the ways in which such relational conceptions avoid major worries associated with retributive theory, while addressing further worries that arise distinctively with respect to such an approach. In doing so, Dahan Katz provides further defense of the response-retributive theory of punishment that she has proposed elsewhere, while defending a wider set of views within the retributive tradition.

In this article, I outline a relational-developmental conception of emotion that situates emotional activity within a broader conception of persons as holistic, relational beings. In this model, emotions consist of felt forms of engagement with the world. As felt aspects of ongoing action, uninhibited emotional experiences are not private states that are inaccessible to other people; instead, they are revealed directly through their bodily expressions. As multicomponent processes, emotional experiences exhibit both continuity and dramatic change in development. Building (...) on these ideas, I describe an intersubjective methodology for studying developmental changes in the structure of emotional experience. I illustrate the approach with an analysis of developmental changes in the structure of anger from birth to adulthood. (shrink)

Numa sociedade democrática, as regras sociais são impostas a cada um por todos. Como “recebedores” de tais regras, tendemos a pensar que elas deviam ser designadas para engendrar a melhor distribuição possível de bens e males ou qualidade de vida. Enquanto autores das regras, tendemos a pensar que os malefícios por nós impostos através de tais regras têm maior peso moral que os danos que nós meramente deixamos de evitar ou mitigar. Embora as atuais teorias sejam dominadas pela primeira perspectiva, (...) uma concepção adequada da justiça exige um balanceamento de ambas tendências. O tema da equidade na saúde é bem apropriado para mostrar como concepções da justiça puramente dirigidas aos recebedores estão fadadas ao fracasso e como esboçar uma alternativa mais promissora. (shrink)

In this article we examine Kant’s understanding of toleration by including a study of all instances in which he directly uses the language of toleration and related concepts. We use this study to resolve several key areas of interpretative dispute concerning Kant’s views on toleration. We argue that Kant offers a nuanced and largely unappreciated approach to thinking about toleration, and related concepts, across three normative spheres: the political, the interpersonal and the personal. We examine shortcomings in earlier interpretations and (...) conclude by arguing that the theme of toleration in Kant’s work, while coherent and important, is neither as central nor as peripheral as suggested by previous interpretations. Further, while Kant is critical of the arrogance of toleration in the political sphere, he is more positive toward the role of toleration in the interpersonal and personal spheres since it promotes virtue. (shrink)

The received view in medical contexts is that informed consent is both necessary and sufficient for patient autonomy. This paper argues that informed consent is not sufficient for patient autonomy, at least when autonomy is understood as a "relational" concept. Relational conceptions of autonomy, which have become prominent in the contemporary literature, draw on themes in the thought of Charles Taylor. I first identify four themes in Taylor's work that together constitute a picture of human agency corresponding (...) to the notion of agency implicit in relational accounts of autonomy. Drawing on these themes, I sketch two arguments against the position that informed consent secures autonomy. The first is that informed consent is an "opportunity" concept whereas autonomy is an "exercise" concept; the second is that informed consent requires merely weak evaluation and not strong evaluation. On Taylor's analysis of agency, strong evaluation is required for agency and for autonomy. (shrink)

Ugliness is a neglected topic in contemporary analytic aesthetics. This is regrettable given that this topic is not just genuinely fascinating, but could also illuminate other areas in the field, seeing as ugliness, albeit unexplored, does feature rather prominently in several debates in aesthetics. This paper articulates a ‘deformity-related’ conception of ugliness. Ultimately, I argue that deformity, understood in a certain way, and displeasure, jointly suffice for ugliness. First, I motivate my proposal, by locating a ‘deformity-related’ conception of ugliness in (...) aesthetic tradition, offering examples in support, and rejecting related alternative suggestions. Second, I argue that the proposal boasts considerable merits. Not only does it capture much of what we ordinarily think of as ugly, but it also comprises an objective criterion for ugliness, offers unity and comprehensiveness, and is informative and explanatorily potent. Third, I discuss a number of objections, thereby demonstrating that the proposal withstands reflective scrutiny. (shrink)

: The Confucian relational concept of the person has been proposed as an epistemically more cogent and ethically more attractive alternative to that of liberal individualism. Two arguments are raised against this proposal without defending liberal individualism. Ethically, Confucianism is vitiated by certain unattractive features that cannot be removed without reducing the Confucian relational concept of the person to an abstract and not very helpful notion of human relatedness. Epistemically, Confucianism commits the essentialist fallacy of treating (...) its own concept of human relations as reflecting the nature of things. In view of these limitations, the Confucian relational concept of the person does not provide a viable framework for dealing with social issues including bioethics. (shrink)

Among the ideas implicitly present and generally accepted in legal theory we can find claims, such as: 1. Justice concerns distribution of goods and burdens. 2. It is connected with the relationship between law and morality. 3. Justice has an existential dimension and is rooted partially in irrational attitudes and intuitions. The first two prepositions make it possible to characterize justice as the conformity with that part of morality which concerns the distribution and exchange of goods and burdens. Justice connects (...) law as an intentionally rational phenomenon with irrationality and particular existential experience. Thus the proposed understanding of justice connects the law or other social phenomena with a specific part of morality, irrationality and particular existential experience. (shrink)

In this paper, I address a topic that has been mostly neglected in Leibniz scholarship: Leibniz’s conception of number. I argue that Leibniz thinks of numbers as a certain kind of relation, and that as such, numbers have a privileged place in his metaphysical system as entities that express a certain kind of possibility. Establishing the relational view requires reconciling two seemingly inconsistent definitions of number in Leibniz’s corpus; establishing where numbers fit in Leibniz’s ontology requires confronting a challenge (...) from the well-known nominalist reading of Leibniz most forcefully articulated in Mates. While my main focus is limited to the positive integers, I also argue that Leibniz intends to subsume them under a more general conception of number. (shrink)

Ronald W. Hepburn; Particularity and Some Related Concepts in Aesthetics, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 June 1959, Pages 189–21.

We study local strengthenings of the simplicity condition. In particular, we define and study a local Lascar rank, as well as short, low, supershort and superlow theories. An example of a low, non supershort theory is given.

Part I. The book begins with literary, cinematic, and historical scenarios that exemplify personal autonomy. Meyers uses these vignettes to distinguish personal autonomy from other, variously related types of autonomy and to show that other kinds of autonomy cannot adequately address the concern people have with their own personal decisions. Noting how profoundly social experience impinges on self-discovery, self-definition, and self-direction, Meyers characterizes autonomous individuals as persons who do what they really want, and she undertakes to supply an account of (...) an authentic self that acknowledges people's enmeshment in social relations as well as their psychological complexity. (shrink)

Recent academic articles point to an increased vagueness and overlap in concepts related to business ethics and corporate responsibility. Further, the perception of these notions can differ in the smallbusiness world from the original academic definitions. This article focuses on the cognition of small-business owner-managers. Given the impact of small-business owner-managers on their ventures, corporate responsibility and ethical issues can take a different route in SMEs. The small-business owner-manager is able to shape the corporate culture and to enact values other (...) than profit. Adopting a cognitive perspective, we have identified how the small-business owner-manager makes sense of notions linked to corporate social responsibility (CSR) and business ethics. The concept of sensemaking has recently been applied to CSR (Basu and Pallazzo, 2008; Cramer et al., 2006). Applying a cognitive perspective to small-business owners may help in explaining specific phenomena found within smallbusiness ownership. For this research, the Repertory Grid Technique (RGT) is used, a method that has not previously been widely applied in the business and society field. Our findings to an extent invalidate the confusion in terminology found in the academic literature. Smallbusiness owner-managers, pragmatically and rather clearly, differentiate among the various concepts related to corporate responsibility and business ethics but, at the same time, they recognise the interrelationships and interdependencies of these concepts. These findings contribute to a better understanding of how small-business owners think and integrate corporate responsibility and ethical issues into their decisionmaking. (shrink)

Recent academic articles point to an increased vagueness and overlap in concepts related to business ethics and corporate responsibility. Further, the perception of these notions can differ in the small-business world from the original academic definitions. This article focuses on the cognition of small-business owner-managers. Given the impact of small-business owner–managers on their ventures, corporate responsibility and ethical issues can take a different route in SMEs. The small-business owner–manager is able to shape the corporate culture and to enact values other (...) than profit. Adopting a cognitive perspective, we have identified how the small-business owner–manager makes sense of notions linked to corporate social responsibility (CSR) and business ethics. The concept of sensemaking has recently been applied to CSR (Basu and Pallazzo, 2008; Cramer et al., 2006). Applying a cognitive perspective to small-business owners may help in explaining specific phenomena found within small-business ownership. For this research, the Repertory Grid Technique (RGT) is used, a method that has not previously been widely applied in the business and society field.Our findings to an extent invalidate the confusion in terminology found in the academic literature. Small-business owner–managers, pragmatically and rather clearly, differentiate among the various concepts related to corporate responsibility and business ethics but, at the same time, they recognise the interrelationships and interdependencies of these concepts. These findings contribute to a better understanding of how small-business owners think and integrate corporate responsibility and ethical issues into their decision-making. (shrink)

The essay presents a relational concept of the stranger parting from and at the same time going beyond Alfred Schutz’s famous and controversial conception of “The Stranger.” Not only the subjective viewpoint of the stranger entering an in‑group – as in the Schutzian outline – is relevant for the construction of strangeness, but also the interactional context and the receiving in‑group with its respective patterns of culture. For strangeness is a relational concept, it is only constructed (...) in relationships of individuals and groups; it is an ascription or “label” that is activated in interaction processes. Within in‑ and out‑group constellations, the stranger is objectified by social typification, which may be based on a de‑subjectivation and reification of the respective Other. Relational strangeness refers to the diverse possibilities of the social construction of the stranger, always taking into consideration the individuals involved in in‑ and out‑group relations. (shrink)

I have two major aims in this chapter, which is philosophical in nature. One is to draw upon values that are salient in the southern African region in order to construct a novel and attractive conception of human dignity. Specifically, I articulate the idea that human beings have a dignity in virtue of their communal nature, or their capacity for what I call ‘identity’ and ‘solidarity’, which contrasts the most influential conception in the West, according to which our dignity inheres (...) in our rationality or autonomy. The second aim is to invoke this Afro-communitarian conception of human dignity in order to advance a new conception of why poverty is morally problematic and of what people, particularly states, are ethically required to do with regard to it. Common conceptions of poverty focus on it in terms of people lacking income, preference satisfaction (‘utility’) or general-purpose means (‘social primary goods’ in the Rawlsian jargon). In contrast, if what is special about human beings is our ability to commune with one another in a certain way, then the respects in which poverty can be an injustice and the ways that it must be fought must be understood in more communitarian or relational terms, which I both specify with several concrete examples in a South African context and contrast with the more dominant approaches. (shrink)

This article starts from the observation that in classical Athens the discovery of democracy as a normative model of politics has been from the beginning not only a political and a legal but at the same time a philosophical enterprise. Reflections on the concept of criminal law and on the meaning of punishment can greatly benefit from reflections on Athenian democracy as a germ for our contemporary debate on criminal justice in a democracy. Three main characteristics of the Athenian (...) model will be analysed: the self-instituting capacity of a democracy based on participatory and reflective citizenship, political power as the capacity of citizens for co-operating and co-acting with others, and the crime of hubris as one of the key issues in Athenian criminal law. These analyses will lead to the conclusion that one of the key issues of a democratic legal order lies in its capacity of recognizing the fragility of the human condition and of developing workable and effective standards of justice in that context. A relational conception of criminal law and punishment, based on proportionality, reflexivity, mutual respect and responsibility fits best with a democracy under the rule of law. (shrink)

Abstract`Authority', `competence' andother related concepts are determined on the basis ofthe concept of law as a dynamic order of norms. Thenorms which regulate the processes of norm creationestablish empowerments (Ermächtigungen). Thematerial domain of validity of the empowering norm iscalled `competence'. The concept of `person' inrelation to empowering norms yields the concepts of`organ' and `authority'. The spatial domain of thevalidity of these norms is the spatial or territorialjurisdiction. This paper analyses the basic norm andits legal functions; it considers the (...) irregularity oflegal acts and norms, as well as the legalconsequences thereof, namely nullity and annulment.Additionally, the Kelsenian `Tacit AlternativeClause' is criticized and a possible solution to theproblem of irregular norms is offered through newdefinitions of the existence, validity and legitimacyof norms. (shrink)

`Authority', `competence' and other related concepts are determined on the basis of the concept of law as a dynamic order of norms. The norms which regulate the processes of norm creation establish empowerments (Ermächtigungen). The material domain of validity of the empowering norm is called `competence'. The concept of `person' in relation to empowering norms yields the concepts of `organ' and `authority'. The spatial domain of the validity of these norms is the spatial or territorial jurisdiction. This paper (...) analyses the basic norm and its legal functions; it considers the irregularity of legal acts and norms, as well as the legal consequences thereof, namely nullity and annulment. Additionally, the Kelsenian `Tacit Alternative Clause' is criticized and a possible solution to the problem of irregular norms is offered through new definitions of the existence, validity and legitimacy of norms. (shrink)

This paper asks whether phenomenal intentionality (intentionality that arises from phenomenal consciousness alone) has a relational structure of the sort envisaged in Russell’s theory of acquaintance. I put forward three arguments in favor of a relation view: one phenomenological, one linguistic, and one based on the view’s ability to account for the truth conditions of phenomenally intentional states. I then consider several objections to the relation view. The chief objection to the relation view takes the form of a dilemma (...) between Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of the properties constitutive of the contents of phenomenally intentional states on this view: the Aristotelian view seems unable to account for all the apparent contents of phenomenally intentional states, but the Platonic view seems to be ontologically unacceptable. I also consider other objections from physicalism, phenomenology, and epistemology. (shrink)

‘Relational value’ (RV) has intuitive credibility due to the shortcomings of existing axiological categories regarding recognizing the ethical relevance of people’s relations to nature. But RV is justified by arguments and analogies that do not hold up to closer scrutiny, which strengthens the assumption that RV is redundant. While RV may provide reasons for ethically considering some relations, much work remains to show that RV is a concept that does something existing axiological concepts cannot, beyond empirically describing relations (...) people have to environmental areas and places. (shrink)

There have been two principal paradigms for the formulation of the causal relation--logical implication and functional relationship. In this paper, I present a case for preferring the functional relationship formulation and then discuss how the functional relationship formulation may be implemented in the probabilistic case in a manner analogous to the way others have implemented the logical implication formulation in the probabilistic case. I show how the "local independence" assumption found in many models used in the behavioral and social sciences (...) is a consequence of the functional relation concept of probabilistic causality. I also discuss why causal relations are underdetermined in experience and are to be dealt with pragmatically in a hypothesis-testing framework. (shrink)

Research on ethical dilemmas in health care has become increasingly salient during the last two decades resulting in confusion about the concept of moral distress. The aim of the present paper is to provide an overview and a comparative analysis of the theoretical understandings of moral distress and related concepts. The focus is on five concepts: moral distress, moral stress, stress of conscience, moral sensitivity and ethical climate. It is suggested that moral distress connects mainly to a psychological perspective; (...) stress of conscience more to a theological–philosophical standpoint; and moral stress mostly to a physiological perspective. Further analysis indicates that these thoughts can be linked to the concepts of moral sensitivity and ethical climate through a relationship to moral agency. Moral agency comprises a moral awareness of moral problems and moral responsibility for others. It is suggested that moral distress may serve as a positive catalyst in exercising moral agency. An interdisciplinary approach in research and practice broadens our understanding of moral distress and its impact on health care personnel and patient care. (shrink)

People construe reality by using words as basic units of meaningful categorization. The present theory-driven study applied the method of a free association task to explore how people express the concepts of the world and the self in words. The respondents were asked to recall any five words relating with the word world. Afterwards they were asked to recall any five words relating with the word self. The method of free association provided the respondents with absolute freedom to choose any (...) words they wanted. Such free recall task is suggested as being a relatively direct approach to the respondents’ self- and world-related conceptual categories, without enormous rational processing. The results provide us, first, with associative ranges for constructs of the world and the self, where some associative dimensions are defined by semantic polarities in the meanings of peripheral categories (e.g., Nature vs. Culture). Second, our analysis showed that some groups of verbal categories that were associated with the words world and self are central, while others are peripheral with respect to the central position. Third, the analysis of category networks revealed that some categories play the role of a transmitter, mediating the pathway between other categories in the network. (shrink)

This article examines not only how events are verbally reported in everyday and institutional storytelling episodes, but also how the actions witnessed are enacted by participants. This is particularly important to not only the believability of what occurred and is being discussed, but also how ordinary audience members react to stories and how they believe the truthfulness of them. As is seen in data analyzed from multiple sources, the way in which something is both reported and enacted has major implications (...) for not only the telling of stories, but what we know about the world around us. Questions about the idea of ‘direct reported actions’ are also considered. (shrink)