Este breve artigo esboça a opinião de um lógico sobre algumas ideias básicas que deveriam ser apresentadas nos primeiros dias de qualquer curso de lógica. Ele trata da natureza e dos objetivos da lógica. Ele discute o que um estudante pode esperar alcançar com o estudo da lógica e também alerta sobre os problemas e obstáculos que um estudante deverá superar ou com os quais deverá aprender a conviver. O artigo também introduz vários termos-chave que um estudante encontrará na lógica.Uma (...) proposição é ou verdadeira ou falsa per se – e não “para esta ou aquela pessoa”. Um argumento é ou válido ou inválido per se – e não “para esta ou aquela pessoa”. Uma argumentação é ou concludente ou inconcludente – não per se, mas sim para uma pessoa.No entanto, que uma dada argumentação seja concludente para uma certa pessoa é sem dúvida uma questão indissociável dos pensamentos subjetivos de tal pessoa, mas apenas em certos aspectos: se uma determinada argumentação é concludente para uma pessoa, mas não para outra, a primeira sabe de algo que a segunda não sabe. Além disso, nem toda argumentação que alguém pensa ser concludente para certa pessoa é de fato concludente para tal pessoa. O caráter concludente de uma argumentação envolve outros elementos além da subjetividade.Algumas leituras são sugeridas ao longo do texto em citações entre parênteses e listadas nas referências bibliográficas no final do artigo. (shrink)

This article examines the very atypical case of epagoge in Prior Analytics II, 23, aiming to situate it in the general framework of Aristotle’s conception of induction and in his epistemology. Besides offering a translation and a detailed commentary of the chapter, I have reassembled some of the main theories that support its character of exception – as if the philosopher were defending the existence of a “complete induction” – and then I close the article by refuting such theories, supported (...) by other texts, such as Topics I, 8, and Posterior Analytics I, 5. (shrink)

Para el realismo nomológico, la mejor explicación del mundo afirma la existencia de leyes naturales que lo fundamentan. Si el estatuto de estas es controvertido, sus partidarios coinciden en que implican una adición de ser con respecto a las regularidades de Hume. Se busca mostrar cómo el argumento nomológico, que todos ellos utilizan de alguna forma, se asemeja en su estructura a diversos argumentos teístas, como el de la quinta vía de Tomás de Aquino. Ante el carácter no conclusivo (...) del argumento, se sostiene que la adopción de un realismo nomológico proviene de una mera preferencia subjetiva. According to nomological realism, the best explanation of the world is one that appeals to the existence of natural laws which ground it. Althought there are controversies regarding the status of such laws, those who defend this position agree they involve a plus of being regarding Hume's regularities. In this paper we show how the nomological argument, which they all use somehow, has a structural similarity with various theistic arguments such as Thomas Aquina's fifth way. Finally, in the absence of conclusiveness of the argument, we hold that the adoption of a nomological realism comes from a mere subjective preference. (shrink)

Tras situarse como ‘políticamente correcto’ al analizar la globalización, el autor de este ensayo sostiene que los defensores actuales de ésta asemejan la ferocidad y al dogmatismo de los cristianos globalizadores de principios de los años mil. Afirma que la globalización es una tierra de sombras que se posiciona tras un breve auto-engaño de la abundancia estamos despertando de la farra desarrollista. De allí la necesidad de incorporar un marco ecológico en nuestra toma de decisiones económicas y políticas, y una (...) estrategia de lo territorial y local. Esto lo lleva a revisar la agenda del desarrollo y sus desafíos estructurales. Concluye presentando un fundamento ético necesario para cimentar el paradigma de la sustentabilidad. (shrink)

In the beginning of the 20 th century, the discussion of the anthropological theme across the field of French philosophical debate. It also implies a redefinition of philosophy and politics at different levels. This is about the second episode of great anthropological questioning that took place in the 20th century, since the first had to do with the great German philosophical works which draws on the writings of Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Helmuth Plessner, Arnold Gehlen, and Ernst Cassirer, among others. (...) In the early 1960, the issues of the debate are of a different order. What is at the heart of this reflection is both a radical discussion issue of anthropology as an attempt to define the role and status of criticism in contemporary thought. Foucault makes the anthropological critique the point of departure, at the same time, in his review of the role and function of the Humanities on the device knowledge-power of modern and contemporary societies and the whole philosophical trajectory in which he will involve his searches during the duration of his life. He tries to understand what the meaning of the field of empirical knowledge that comes to emerge at this time with the claim to be a science, anthropology. Anthropology ends up wanting to resume human experience and philosophy in a move where the man gives his truth as the soul of truth. It is at this movement that Nietzsche put an end, when he showed that the death of God accompanies the death of man; that death of God is the end of metaphysics, and the place left free isn't absolutely the man who takes. The critique of the anthropological question is the starting point of an analysis with larger theme the problem of subject’s deconstruction and reconstruction, namely, the deconstruction of the subject as a cause and reconstruction of subjectivity as effect.Au début des années 1960 la mise en discussion du thème anthropologique traverse le champ du débat philosophique français. Elle implique aussi une redéfinition de la philosophie et du politique à différents niveaux. Il s’agit du deuxième épisode du grand questionnement anthropologique qui a eu lieu dans la philosophie du 20 e siècle ; le premier ayant affaire à la grande entreprise philosophique allemande qui se dessine dans les œuvres de Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Helmuth Plessner, Arnold Gehlen, et Ernst Cassirer, entre autres. Au début des années 1960 les enjeux du débat sont d’une autre nature. Ce qui est au centre de cette réflexion est aussi bien une mise en discussion radicale de la question de l’anthropologie qu’une tentative de redéfinir la fonction et le statut de la critique dans la réflexion contemporaine. Foucault fait de la critique de l’anthropologie le point de départ à la fois de sa critique du rôle et de la fonction des sciences humaines dans le dispositif du savoir/pouvoir des sociétés modernes et contemporaines, et de toute la trajectoire philosophique dans laquelle il va impliquer ses recherches sa vie durant. Il essaie de comprendre quelle est la signification de ce champ de la connaissance empirique qui vient d'émerger à cette époque avec la prétention de constituer une science, l'anthropologie. L'anthropologie finit par vouloir relier l'expérience de l'homme et la philosophie dans un mouvement où l'homme donne sa vérité comme âme de la vérité. C'est à ce mouvement que Nietzsche a mis un terme lorsqu'il a montré que la mort de Dieu s'accompagne de la mort de l'homme; que la mort de Dieu est la fin de la métaphysique, et la place restée vide ce n'est absolument pas l'homme qui la prend. La critique de la question anthropologique est le point de départ d’une analyse ayant pour thème majeur le problème de la déconstruction et de la reconstruction du sujet, à savoir de la déconstruction du sujet comme arché et de la reconstruction de la subjectivité comme effet.No início dos anos 1960, a discussão do tema antropológico atravessa o campo do debate filosófico francês. Ela implica também em uma redefinição da filsofia e da política em diferentes níveis. Trata-se do segundo episódio do grande questionamento antropológico que teve lugar no século XX , uma vez que o primeiro teve a ver com a grande empreitada filosófica alemã que se desenha nas obras de Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Helmuth Plessner, Arnold Gehlen, e Ernst Cassirer, entre outros. No início dos anos 1960, as questões do debate são de uma outra ordem. O que está no centro desta reflexão é tanto uma discussão radical da questão da antropologia como de uma tentativa de definir a função e o estatuto da crítica na reflexão contemporânea. Foucault faz da crítica da antropologia o ponto de partida, ao mesmo tempo, de sua crítica do papel e da função das ciências humanas no dispositivo do saber/poder das sociedades modernas e contemporâneas e de toda a trajetória filosófica na qual ele vai envolver suas pesquisas durante na duração de sua vida. Ele tenta compreender qual a significação do campo do conhecimento empírico que vem de emergir nesta época com a pretensão de constituir uma ciência, a antropologia. A antropologia termina por querer reatar a experiência do homem e a filosofia em um movimento onde o homem dá sua verdade como alma da verdade. É a este movimento que Nietzsche colocou um fim, quando mostrou que a morte de Deus se acompanha da morte do homem; que a morte de Deus é o fim da metafísica, e o lugar deixado livre não é absolutamente o homem que o toma. A crítica da questão antropológica é o ponto de partida de uma análise tendo por tema maior o problema da desconstrução e da reconstrução do sujeito, a saber, da desconstrução do sujeito como causa e da reconstrução da subjetividade como efeito. (shrink)

Nuestro trabajo se propone presentar el pensamiento paulino trabajado por Alain Badiou en San Pablo: La fundación del universalismo. Intentaremos clarificar las posiciones que toma Badiou en torno a la figura del apóstol. Consideramos que, explicitando las lecturas del autor en cuestión, es posible tejer puentes para la discusión en el campo de la teología política. Entendemos la lectura de Badiou como una lectura filosófica política, que busca dialogar con una comunidad política. Pablo, en Badiou, es presentado como «un teórico (...) antifilosófico de la universalidad» y el fundador del universalismo cristiano. A partir de esta interpretación la tarea de Badiou es buscar lo universal en lo particular. (shrink)

En 2017 se descubrió en el seno de la Bundeswehr (Fuerzas Armadas) de Alemania una conspiración conocida como Tag X (Día X). Esta operación se había articulado a partir del embrión de un posible “Ejército en la sombra”, apoyado por organizaciones paramilitares, y su objetivo era tomar el poder mediante el uso de la violencia y el terror Der Tag X (El Día X). Esta dinámica culminaría con la puesta en marcha de una “limpieza étnica”, la eliminación de los “enemigos (...) internos” y el establecimiento de un Estado autoritario. La tesis que mantenemos es que el origen de esta conspiración militar está íntimamente asociada a un conjunto de transformaciones políticas, sociales, económicas y culturales que se han producido desde la última década del siglo XX y que han creado una situación favorable para el ascenso de la extrema derecha en Alemania y “legitimado” a militares de esta ideología para intervenir en el proceso de toma de decisiones políticas. (shrink)

Resumo: O projeto semântico de Davidson toma a forma de reducionismo que visa explicar as noções intencionais com base em noções puramente extensionais. O objetivo desse trabalho consiste na investigação do fracasso do projeto de Davidson como um argumento indireto contra sua suposição segundo a qual a chamada interpretação radical seria o fundamento do significado linguístico e do pensamento. Abstract: Davidson's semantic program is a form of semantic reductionism that aims to account for intensional notions on a purely extensional basis. (...) My aim in this paper is not to show that Davidsons fails in addressing the so-called extensionality problem. That is no novelty. Even Davidsonians recognize Davidson's failure. My main goal is to explore Davidson's failure as an indirect argument against his key assumption that the radical interpretation is the basis of sense and hence the possibility of thought. There is no priority of language over thought. This is a remnant of the so-called linguistic turn that Davidson inherited from the analytical tradition. The moral is the following: we must come back to Lockean common sense that to learn a natural language and to translate an alien tongue into our own is merely to learn a vehicle for communicating and expressing thoughts we have already had. (shrink)

Neste estudo, busca-se uma exposição e uma análise da teoria tomasiana da “restituição” (restitutio). Isso implica apresentar a restitutio como parte da teoria da justiça comutativa e expor os vários aspectos de consideração que servem como pressupostos e condições para a sua realização virtuosa. Em particular, procura-se analisar a confluência de motivos normativos e penitenciais que a abordagem de Tomás de Aquino contém e que, ao final, é decisiva para a devida compreensão da dimensão de obrigação que a restituição (...) importa. (shrink)

Embora explicitada em vários momentos ao longo da obra de Erígena, a presença do pensamento agostiniano em suas especulações centrais nem sempre é manifesta e segura. A partir da ontologia relacional trabalhada por Agostinho no De Trinitate IX-XII, com base em sua redefinição da categoria aristotélica de relação no livro V desta obra, pretendemos apontar para seus possíveis reflexos na herança patrística operada por Erígena no Periphyseon I, iniciando pela polaridade central ser – não-ser, onde toma corpo a noção de (...) ser como expressão perceptível e dizível, e na qual os polos são ditos e inteligidos unicamente de modo relacional recíproco; caminhando pela conceituação de natureza como expressão das coisas que são e, portanto, existem e são cognoscíveis (ao contrário das essências, incognoscíveis); e culminando na cristalização do conceito epicentral de seu pensamento: teofania, pelo qual se vislumbra a realidade natural como expressão divina, em que o Criador se expressa criando (e se manifestando, portanto dando-se a ser conhecido na) a natureza. Palavras-chave: Ser, Expressão, Relação, Teofania, João Escoto Erígena. (shrink)

No presente trabalho, vamos abordar algumas das questões essenciais sobre o imaginário coletivo e suas relações com a realidade e a verdade. Devemos encarar esse assunto em uma estrutura conceptual, seguida pela análise factual correspondente às realidades comportamentais demonstráveis. Adotaremos não apenas a metodologia, mas principalmente os princípios e proposições da filosofia analítica, que com certeza serão evidentes ao longo do estudo e podem ser identificados pelos recursos descritos por Perez[1] : Rabossi (1975) defende a ideia de que a filosofia (...) analítica pode ser identificada considerando-se certas semelhanças familiares. Ele sugere os seguintes traços familiares: uma atitude positiva em relação ao conhecimento científico; uma atitude cautelosa em relação à metafísica; uma concepção da filosofia como uma tarefa conceptual, que toma a análise conteudo como um método; uma estreita relação entre linguagem e filosofia; uma preocupação em buscar respostas argumentativas para problemas filosóficos, e procura de clareza conceptual. Esses conceitos centrais envolvem conteúdos culturais, sociais, religiosos, científicos, filosóficos, morais e políticos, pertencentes à existência individual e coletiva de cada um de nós. Neste artigo, não discutiremos nem demonstraremos. Nosso objetivo não é o de sistematicamente criticar ou evidenciar qualquer coisa, de qualquer maneira. O presente trabalho se baseia na reflexão analítica. Apenas especularemos da maneira mais abrangente e profunda que pudermos e expressaremos os resultados de nossos pensamentos. Não obstante a natureza multidisciplinar do assunto e a abertura metodológica para aceitar contribuições de qualquer campo da ciência, este trabalho pertence ao objetivo da psicologia e ontologia ou, em outros termos, da psicologia social e ontológica. A metodologia livre que norteia tais reflexões abrange e leva em consideração tudo o que se aproxima da coerência com a epistemologia filosófica e psicológica. Essa metodologia não busca alcançar evidências, mas apenas procura a inter-relação entre evidências já existentes, de qualquer natureza e magnitude, inferindo um significado coerente para as coisas reais. Muitos dos grandes pensadores, a qualquer momento, nunca procuraram demonstrações, teorizações ou sistematizações. Esses pensadores apenas pensavam, meditavam e com a iluminação de sua humildade podiam se aproximar da verdade. Eles serão nossa referência e o exemplo a ser seguido. Com certeza, não encontraremos a verdade, mas podemos ter certeza de alguma coisa: em muitos momentos, chegaremos perto da verdade e, em todos os momentos, estaremos nos afastando da inverdade e da mentira. O escopo principal deste estudo é observar como alguns dos atributos evolutivos essenciais da humanidade, como criatividade, imaginação e associação, podem se tornar uma doença perigosa, abrigada nas sombras enevoadas da inteligência. (shrink)

Resumo: As contribuições dos pensadores medievais para o debate em torno da escravidão ainda são pouco conhecidas em seus detalhes. Junto com as abordagens na filosofia antiga, na patrística, no direito romano e no direito canônico, elas formam um corpo de textos e de ideias fundamental para se compreender o tratamento da escravidão do século XVI ao século XIX. Neste artigo, busca-se expor e analisar a abordagem que João Duns Scotus dá ao tema, contrastando-a com as visões de Aristóteles e (...) de Tomás de Aquino. As posições de Scotus dependem de seus pareceres sobre a liberdade, a propriedade e a lei positiva, bem como sobre o significado do livre-arbítrio como condição prático-racional de todos os seres humanos. Na base dessas ideias, Scotus restringe de forma severa as condições de lei positiva segundo as quais a servidão pode ser introduzida com justiça e o escopo de perda de liberdade que pode ser aceito no contrato da escravidão.: The contributions by medieval thinkers to the debate on slavery are still little known in their details. Together with the approaches in ancient philosophy, patristics, Roman law, and Canon law, they constitute a body of texts and ideas that are fundamental to understanding the treatment of slavery from the 16th to the 19th centuries. In this article, we examine John Duns Scotus’ account of the theme, contrasting it with the views of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. The position of Scotus depends on his views about freedom, property, and positive law, as well on the meaning of free will as a practical-rational condition of all human beings. Based on these ideas, Scotus severely restricts the conditions of positive law according to which servitude can be justly introduced, and the scope of the loss of freedom that can be accepted in the contract of slavery. (shrink)

Pretende-se, no presente artigo, analisar as raízes ontológicas da noção de técnica, demonstrando como ela faz parte do movimento de abertura - e de liberdade, portanto - da vida humana em direção ao futuro. Para isso, analisar-se-á como a técnica toma em suas mãos o destino do homem e da natureza, sob os riscos e os perigos que acompanham essa tarefa, pois onde habita a liberdade também cresce o perigo. Dada tal condição, é preciso ainda perguntar sobre as consequências éticas (...) da manipulação do mundo provocada pela unificação entre teoria e prática, cuja intervenção, dada a magnitude e a ambiguidade, torna tal poder dependente de um controle ético. Mostrar-se-á, assim, como o tema da técnica está no centro de uma proposta que faz da ontologia um fundamento para a ética.: It is my intended, in this article, analyze the ontological roots of the concept of technique, demonstrating how it is part of the opening movement - and freedom, so - of human life toward the future. For this, it will be analyzed how the technique takes into their hands the destiny of man and nature, on the risks and dangers that accompany this task, because where freedom dwells also increases the danger. With this condition, we must still ask about the ethical consequences of the manipulation of the world caused by the unification of theory and practice, whose intervention, given the magnitude and ambiguity becomes such power dependent on an ethical control. We’ll show, how the theme of the technique is in the center of a proposal that consider the ontological foundation of the ethics.Keywords: Hans Jonas; Technique; Ontology; Ethics. (shrink)

El presente artículo es el resultado de un proceso de investigación originado en la Maestría en Publicidad de la UTL, en la línea de Semiótica Publicitaria, dirigida por el profesor Vladimir Sánchez, quien en su seminario, ha venido construyendo un equipo de trabajo con los maestrantes en torno a la aplicabilidad de algunos de los postulados de la pragmática de Charles Sanders Peirce al campo publicitario. Los maestrantes Jairo Sojo y Juan José Arango, adelantaron algunas hipótesis sobre el trabajo del (...) profesor Sánchez, y, gracias a ello, se propuso a la UJTL y a la Universidad Santo Tomás, un proyecto interinstitucional de investigación titulado “Semiótica, planeación y estrategia publicitaria y de diseño. Proyecciones del Pragmatismo a la comunicación contemporánea”. En el marco de la investigación anteriormente mencionada, surge el artículo que aquí se presenta, como un primer planteamiento de las hipótesis de investigación que dan origen a dicho proceso y que pueden esbozarse en tres grandes aspectos. El primero, unas consideraciones generales sobre el pragmatismo desde una perspectiva publicitaria con énfais en la regla de cualificación planteada por Peirce en 1903. El segundo, la propuesta de un modelo de análisis de piezas publicitarias desde la operacionilización de la regla de cualificación. El tercero una modelación para la planeación de estrategias publicitarias a través de la regla de cualificación aplicada al cruce de los interpretantes ontológicos y los interpretantes modales. (shrink)

The chapter discusses the rejuvenation of an interest in Mach in the recent metaphysics and philosophy of mind. In the early twentieth century, Mach had been interpreted as a phenomenalist, but phenomenalism fell out of favor in the 1950s. In the later decades, he received praise for his naturalism, but his contributions to metaphysics or philosophy of mind were regarded as misbegotten or irrelevant. With the search for a monistic alternative to both materialism and dualism in the recent philosophy of (...) consciousness, however, Mach attracts a fresh attention. For example, the contemporary philosopher Sam Coleman develops a version of a monistic metaphysic called “panqualityism,” which resembles Mach’s view to a large extent. Like most contemporary monists, however, Coleman works much more closely from Russell’s The Analysis of Matter, than Mach’s The Analysis of Sensations. The chapter details the circumstances that have led to the recent rise of monism; the varieties of Russellian monism; Coleman’s panqualityism; and the similarities and differerences between panqualityism and Machian monism. (shrink)

According to a leading view, emotions such as admiration, contempt, pride, and shame are important vehicles of agential development. Through admiration and contempt, we establish models and countermodels against which to shape our character; through pride and shame, we get a sense of how we measure up to them. Critics of this view object that these emotions always deliver uncompromising evaluations: admiration casts people in a completely positive light, while contempt casts aspersion on them. Therefore, insofar as they lack the (...) capacity for nuance, these emotions are systematically unfitting and misleading. This paper discusses this objection as originally formulated by John Doris as well as Macalester Bell’s response. Drawing from research on emotional intentionality, it will be argued that Doris’ and Bell’s accounts are respectively misguided criticisms and inadequate defences of these emotions. Their mistake lies in an invalid transition from the claim that these emotions are intentionally directed towards persons to the claim that they deliver global evaluations of those towards whom they are directed. By rejecting this inference, it will be shown that these emotions can deliver nuanced and fitting evaluations in a way Doris’ objection overlooks and Bell’s response precludes us from articulating. (shrink)

Roberto Esposito is one of the most prolific and important exponents of contemporary Italian political theory.

This book by Roberto Esposito - a leading Italian political philosopher - is a highly original exploration of the relationship between human bodies and societies. The original function of law, even before it was codified, was to preserve peaceful cohabitation between people who were exposed to the risk of destructive conflict. Just as the human body's immune system protects the organism from deadly incursions by viruses and other threats, law also ensures the survival of the community in a life-threatening (...) situation. It protects and prolongs life. But the function of law as a form of immunization points to a more disturbing consideration. Like the individual body, the collective body can be immunized from the perceived danger only by allowing a little of what threatens it to enter its protective boundaries. This means that in order to escape the clutches of death, life is forced to incorporate within itself the lethal principle. Starting from this reflection on the nature of immunization, Esposito offers a wide-ranging analysis of contemporary biopolitics. Never more than at present has the demand for immunization come to characterize all aspects of our existence. The more we feel at risk of being infiltrated and infected by foreign elements, the more the life of the individual and society closes off within its protective boundaries, forcing us to choose between a self-destructive outcome and a more radical alternative based on a new conception of community. (shrink)

La lectura de Rousseau imprime un “giro político” en el pensamiento kantiano y las cuestiones políticas no solo atraviesan toda la “década del silencio”, sino que se hallan presentes en la primera y tercera de sus Críticas. De hecho, Kant dedicará la tercera de sus célebres preguntas a dilucidar esta problemática con su “historia filosófica” o filosofía de la historia. En este contexto se acuña lo que he llamado un imperativo elpidológico, porque la confianza en sí mismo resultará fundamental para (...) no sucumbir al desánimo que suscita el absurdo espectáculo de la historia humana. Los conflictos de nuestras inclinaciones egoístas, el antagonismo de la insociable sociabilidad, servirán para desplegar nuestras mejores disposicio-nes naturales, como si se guiaran por un plan establecido indistintamente por la Naturaleza, la Providencia o el Destino. En definitiva, la política es vista como una condición de posibilidad de nuestra vida moral y no como su corolario. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that our ordinary English words man and woman are “gender terms,” and gender is distinct from biological sex. That is, they believe womanhood and manhood are not defined even partly by biological sex. This sex/gender distinction is one of the most influential ideas of the twentieth century on the broader culture, both popular and academic. Less well known are the reasons to think it’s true. My interest in this paper is to show that, upon investigation, the arguments (...) for the sex/gender distinction have feet of clay. In fact, they all fail. We will survey the literature and tour arguments in favor of the sex/gender distinction, and then we’ll critically evaluate those arguments. We’ll consider the argument from resisting biological determinism, the argument from biologically intersex people and vagueness, the argument from the normativity of gender, and some arguments from thought experiments. We’ll see that these arguments are not up to the task of supporting the sex/gender distinction; they simply don’t work. So, philosophers should either develop stronger arguments for the sex/gender distinction, or cultivate a variety of feminism that’s consistent with the traditional, biologically-based definitions of woman and man. (shrink)

Modalists think that knowledge requires forming your belief in a “modally stable” way: using a method that wouldn't easily go wrong, or using a method that wouldn't have given you this belief had it been false. Recent Modalist projects from Justin Clarke-Doane and Dan Baras defend a principle they call “Modal Security,” roughly: if evidence undermines your belief, then it must give you a reason to doubt the safety or sensitivity of your belief. Another recent Modalist project from Carlotta Pavese (...) and Bob Beddor defends “Modal Virtue Epistemology”: knowledge is a belief that is maximally modally robust across “normal” worlds. We'll offer new objections to these recent Modalist projects. We will then argue for a rival view, Explanationism: knowing something is believing it because it's true. We will show how Explanationism offers a better account of undermining defeaters than Modalism, and a better account of knowledge. (shrink)

Many contemporary epistemologists hold that a subject S’s true belief that p counts as knowledge only if S’s belief that p is also, in some important sense, safe. I describe accounts of this safety condition from John Hawthorne, Duncan Pritchard, and Ernest Sosa. There have been three counterexamples to safety proposed in the recent literature, from Comesaña, Neta and Rohrbaugh, and Kelp. I explain why all three proposals fail: each moves fallaciously from the fact that S was at epistemic risk (...) just before forming her belief to the conclusion that S’s belief was formed unsafely. In light of lessons from their failure, I provide a new and successful counterexample to the safety condition on knowledge. It follows, then, that knowledge need not be safe. Safety at a time depends counterfactually on what would likely happen at that time or soon after in a way that knowledge does not. I close by considering one objection concerning higher-order safety. (shrink)

Feminism has long grappled with its own demarcation problem—exactly what is it to be a woman?—and the rise of trans-inclusive feminism has made this problem more urgent. I will first consider Sally Haslanger’s “social and hierarchical” account of woman, resulting from “Ameliorative Inquiry”: she balances ordinary use of the term against the instrumental value of novel definitions in advancing the cause of feminism. Then, I will turn to Katharine Jenkins’ charge that Haslanger’s view suffers from an “Inclusion Problem”: it fails (...) to class many trans women as women. Jenkins offers a novel norm-relevancy account of woman to avoid the Inclusion Problem. Unfortunately, Jenkins’ account has serious internal problems, i.e. problems by Jenkins’ own lights: it is unintelligible, or it suffers from an Inclusion Problem of its own. After that, I will develop novel arguments for the conclusion that the project of Ameliorative Inquiry is both incoherent and also impossible to complete—at least, impossible to complete in a trans-inclusive way. Trans-inclusive feminism, therefore, would do well to move beyond Ameliorative Inquiry. Insofar as that’s not possible, trans-inclusive feminism inherits the incoherence of Ameliorative Inquiry. (shrink)

Do the facts of evolution generate an epistemic challenge to moral realism? Some think so, and many “evolutionary debunking arguments” have been discussed in the recent literature. But they are all murky right where it counts most: exactly which epistemic principle is meant to take us from evolutionary considerations to the skeptical conclusion? Here, I will identify several distinct species of evolutionary debunking argument in the literature, each one of which relies on a distinct epistemic principle. Drawing on recent work (...) in epistemology, I will show that most of these initially plausible principles are false, spoiling the arguments that rely on them. And we will see that each argument threatens only one popular view of moral psychology: a “Representationalist” view on which our moral judgments rely crucially on a mental intermediary—e.g. a sentiment, gut reaction, or affect-laden intuition—delivered by our evolved moral faculty. In the end, only one evolutionary debunking argument remains a menace: an “ Argument from Symmetry ” that I will introduce to the literature. But we will see that it should worry only all naturalists, pressuring them into a trilemma: give up moral realism, accept a rationalism that is incongruous with naturalism, or give up naturalism. Non-naturalists are free and clear. (shrink)

What is a woman? The definition of this central concept of feminism has lately become especially controversial and politically charged. “Ameliorative Inquirists” have rolled up their sleeves to reengineer our ordinary concept of womanhood, with a goal of including in the definition all and only those who identify as women, both “cis” and “trans.” This has proven to be a formidable challenge. Every proposal so far has failed to draw the boundaries of womanhood in a way acceptable to the Ameliorative (...) Inquirists, since not all those who identify as women count as women on these proposals, and some who count as women on these proposals don’t identify as women. This is the Trans Inclusion Problem. Is there any solution? Can there be? Recently, Katharine Jenkins, pointing to the work of Mari Mikkola, suggests that the Trans Inclusion Problem can be “deflated” rather than solved. We will investigate this proposal, and show that, unfortunately, Jenkins is mistaken: Mikkola’s project will not help us answer the Trans Inclusion Problem. After that, we’ll look at Robin Dembroff’s suggestion that we “imitate” the linguistic practices of trans inclusive and queer communities, and we will evaluate whether this would help us solve the Trans Inclusion Problem. Unfortunately, this strategy also fails to solve the problem. By the end, we’ll have a better appreciation of the challenges faced by Ameliorative Inquirists in their project of redefining “woman,” and clearer view of why the Trans Inclusion Problem cannot, in fact, be solved. That’s primarily because, no matter what it means to be a woman, it’s one thing to be a woman, and another thing to identify as a woman. (shrink)

Postdisciplinary Knowledge is the first book to articulate postdisciplinarity in philosophical, theoretical and methodological terms, helping to establish it as an important intellectual movement of the 21st century. It formulates what postdisciplinarity is, and how it can be implemented in research practice. The diverse chapters present a rich collection of highly creative thought-provoking essays and methodological insights. Written by a number of pioneering intellectuals with a range of backgrounds and research foci, these chapters cover a broad spectrum of areas demonstrating (...) alternative ways of producing knowledge. Essays are interspersed with dialogue, encouraging a comprehensive and engaging discussion on this emerging movement. Not limited to a specific field or discipline, this will be of great interest to upper level students and researchers in a wide range of subject areas, including: tourism, sociology, education, psychology, physiotherapy, fine arts, architecture and design, as well as those with a general interest in epistemology and methodology. (shrink)

ABSTRACT We exist only because we inhabit a world in common, embedded within networks of associations between humans and nonhumans. This is endlessly disclosed by our experience of the world. And yet, despite its palpability, it is clear that we have failed to mobilize a notion of the common world into something capable of guiding our modes of thought and collective forms of activity—our attitudes, our affective lives, our politics. How have we arrived here? Bruno Latour's work suggests that an (...) answer can be found in the common world's status as information—its self-evidence works to exclude it from a world of values. What, then, should be done? In his recent work on the modes of existence Latour develops a pragmatic metaphysics inspired by the speculative method of Alfred North Whitehead. Metaphysical speculation becomes a tool for moving beyond the “bifurcation of nature” through the construction of abstractions with which to interpret the pluralism of experience. Rather than thinking of the common world as either a given fact or as a totalizing universal, Latour develops a notion of a common world out of the messiness of experience and, as such, hopes to transform us into beings who would be moved to actively pursue and care for such a notion. (shrink)

"A pleasure to read. Gracefully written by a scholar well grounded in the relevant philosophical, historical, and technical background.... a helpfully clarifying review and analysis of some issues of importance to recent philosophy of science and a source of some illuminating insights."—Burke Townsend, Philosophy of Science.

Volume 19, Issue 9, September 2019, Page 37-39.

Se intentan poner de manifiesto isomorfismos estructurales en las teorías de Heidegger y Husserl sobre tiempo e historia. En relación con Ser y tiempo, la atención está puesta en la tesis compartida de que la historiografía está arraigada en la historicidad y esta en la temporeidad. Con referencia al curso de 1934 se pone de relieve la convergencia heideggeriana de misión, encargo y trabajo, que remiten al futuro, al pasado y al presente. Se muestran nociones equivalentes en los niveles que (...) Husserl distingue en la historia: protohistoria, historia efectiva e historia racional. Finalmente, en lo que atañe al viraje, se trazan paralelos entre el Ereignis y el presente viviente como instancias últimas de una indagación restrospectiva, entre la temporeidad del Dasein y al tiempo inmanente como resonancias de una dimensión profunda, y en torno de una conexión mutua en el análisis de la historia en términos de desviación, reposición, incorporación y superación, esto es, los momentos que componen la noción de Gewind. (shrink)

In an essay recently published in this journal (“Is Safety in Danger?”), Fernando Broncano-Berrocal defends the safety condition on knowledge from a counterexample proposed by Tomas Bogardus (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2012). In this paper, we will define the safety condition, briefly explain the proposed counterexample, and outline Broncano-Berrocal’s defense of the safety condition. We will then raise four objections to Broncano-Berrocal’s defense, four implausible implications of his central claim. In the end, we conclude that Broncano-Berrocal’s defense of the safety (...) condition is unsuccessful, and that the safety condition on knowledge should be rejected. (shrink)

This study deals with the failure of one of the most advanced chatbots called Tay, created by Microsoft. Many users, commentators and experts strongly anthropomorphised this chatbot in their assessment of the case around Tay. This view is so widespread that we can identify it as a certain typical cognitive distortion or bias. This study presents a summary of facts concerning the Tay case, collaborative perspectives from eminent experts: Tay did not mean anything by its morally objectionable statements because, in (...) principle, it was not able to think; the controversial content spread by this AI was interpreted incorrectly—not as a mere compilation of meaning, but as its disclosure; even though chatbots are not members of the symbolic order of spatiotemporal relations of the human world, we treat them in this way in many aspects. (shrink)

Roberto Esposito is one of leading figures in a new generation of Italian philosophers. This book criticizes the notion of the person and develops an original account of the concept of the impersonal - what he calls the third person.

This paper is concerned with certain ontological issues in the foundations of geographic representation. It sets out what these basic issues are, describes the tools needed to deal with them, and draws some implications for a general theory of spatial representation. Our approach has ramifications in the domains of mereology, topology, and the theory of location, and the question of the interaction of these three domains within a unified spatial representation theory is addressed. In the final part we also consider (...) the idea of non-standard geographies, which may be associated with geography under a classical conception in the same sense in which non-standard logics are associated with classical logic. (shrink)

In this paper, I hope to solve a problem that’s as old as the hills: the problem of contingency for religious belief. Paradigmatic examples of this argument begin with a counterfactual premise: had we been born at a different time or in a difference place, we easily could have held different beliefs on religious topics. Ultimately, and perhaps by additional steps, we’re meant to reach the skeptical conclusion that very many of our religious beliefs do not amount to knowledge. I (...) survey some historical examples of this argument, and I try to fill the gap between the counterfactual premise and the skeptical conclusion as forcefully as possible. I consider the following possibilities: there are no additional steps in the argument; or there are and they concern the alleged safety condition on knowledge, or the alleged non-accidentality condition on knowledge, or the unclarity produced by disagreement. On every possibility, the argument from the counterfactual premise to the conclusion of widespread skepticism is invalid. It seems, then, that there is no serious problem of contingency for religious belief. (shrink)

Giovanni Merlo has argued that a currently popular way to interpret Kit Fine's fragmentalism about tensed facts (which he calls ‘unstructured fragmentalism’) is threatened by the problem of ‘tensed belief explosion’. I argue that such an explosion of belief poses no problem to unstructured fragmentalists.

There is much to admire in John Pittard’s recent book on the epistemology of disagreement. But here we develop one concern about the role that rational insight plays in his project. Pittard develops and defends a view on which a party to peer disagreement can show substantial partiality to his own view, so long as he enjoys even moderate rational insight into the truth of his view or the cogency of his reasoning for his view. Pittard argues that this may (...) happen in ordinary cases of religious disagreement—cases in which it’s a live skeptical possibility that one is misdescribing his insight, or not having insight at all—and therefore one need not be strongly conciliatory even in the face of peer disagreement. Yet Pittard agrees that one should be strongly conciliatory in cases of disagreement involving, e.g., visual perception and dim rational insight, since the sort of fallible, corrigible evidence involved in such cases may be counterbalanced by symmetrical evidence on the part of one’s disagreeing peer. We worry that there’s an inconsistency here. If it’s unreasonable to show partiality to one’s visual experience (or dim rational insight) in cases like “Horse Race” and “Restaurant Check,” it’s likewise unreasonable to show partiality in religious disagreements to one’s moderate rational insight, fallible and corrigible as it is. (shrink)

This article addresses some useful coordinates for the analysis of the relationship between philosophy and taxation. My argument aims to show the relevance of a philosophy of taxation and thus draw attention to civic education required to shape a democratic public reason, truthful, critical and attentive. I emphasize the character of “donation” that is the rule of law within a democratic constitutional regime, which depends on tax payments for the purposes proposed, and particularly those of a social distributive justice. I (...) distinguish between charity and justice and political obligation to maintain that by implementing an effective "rule of law" citizens “donate” ourselves mechanisms and procedures for advancing a system of justice as fairness. This grant does not pertain to the field of natural duties, charity or sacrifice of supererogatory acts, but is expressed in institutional programs whose implementation and maintenance required from us pay taxes, but always based on personal commitment. Thus, close to John Rawls I emphasize the value of freedom. (shrink)