Origin of the German Trauerspiel was Walter Benjamin's first full, historically oriented analysis of modernity. Readers of English know it as "The Origin of German Tragic Drama," but in fact the subject is something else--the play of mourning. Howard Eiland's completely new English translation, the first since 1977, is closer to the German text and more consistent with Benjamin's philosophical idiom. Focusing on the extravagant seventeenth-century theatrical genre of the trauerspiel, precursor of the opera, Benjamin identifies allegory as the (...) constitutive trope of the Baroque and of modernity itself. Allegorical perception bespeaks a world of mutability and equivocation, a melancholy sense of eternal transience without access to the transcendentals of the medieval mystery plays--though no less haunted and bedeviled. History as trauerspiel is the condition as well as subject of modern allegory in its inscription of the abyssal. Benjamin's investigation of the trauerspiel includes German texts and late Renaissance European drama such as Hamlet and Calderón's Life Is a Dream. The prologue is one of his most important and difficult pieces of writing. It lays out his method of indirection and his idea of the "constellation" as a key means of grasping the world, making dynamic unities out of the myriad bits of daily life. Thoroughly annotated with a philological and historical introduction and other explanatory and supplementary material, this rigorous and elegant new translation brings fresh understanding to a cardinal work by one of the twentieth century's greatest literary critics.--. (shrink)

"The central task of phenomenology is to investigate the nature of consciousness and its relations to objects of various types. The present book introduces students and other readers to several foundational topics of phenomenological inquiry, and illustrates phenomenology's contemporary relevance. The main topics include consciousness, intentionality, perception, meaning, and knowledge. The book also contains critical assessments of Edmund Husserl's phenomenological method. It argues that knowledge is the most fundamental mode of consciousness, and that the central theses constitutive of Husserl's "transcendental (...) idealism" are compatible with metaphysical realism regarding the objects of thought, perception, and knowledge. Helpful tools include introductions that help the reader segue from the previous chapter to the new one, chapter conclusions, and suggested reading lists of primary and some key secondary sources. Key Features: Elucidates and engages with contemporary work in analytic epistemology and philosophy of mind. Provides clear prose explanations of the necessary distinctions and arguments required for understanding the subject. Places knowledge at the center of phenomenological inquiry"--. (shrink)

In order to address why the number of patients suffering from anxiety and depression are seemingly exploding in Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) countries, it is sensible to look at the evolution of human fearfulness responses. Here, we draw on Veit's pathological complexity framework to advance Grossmann's goal of re-characterizing human fearfulness as an adaptive trait.

In this essay the visual arts of the machine age morph into literature and theory and then back again to images, gestures, and thought.

Heintz & Scott-Phillips provide a useful synthesis for constructing a bridge between work by both cognitive scientists and evolutionary biologists studying the diversity of human communication. Here, we aim to strengthen their bridge from the side of evolutionary biology, to argue that we can best understand ostensive communication as a scaffold for more complex forms of intentional expressions.

This article reviews concepts of, as well as neurocognitive and genetic studies on, empathy. Whereas cognitive empathy can be equated with affective theory of mind, that is, with mentalizing the emotions of others, affective empathy is about sharing emotions with others. The neural circuits underlying different forms of empathy do overlap but also involve rather specific brain areas for cognitive (ventromedial prefrontal cortex) and affective (anterior insula, midcingulate cortex, and possibly inferior frontal gyrus) empathy. Furthermore, behavioral and imaging genetic studies (...) provide evidence for a genetic basis for empathy, indicating a possible role for oxytocin and dopamine as well as for a genetic risk variant for schizophrenia near the gene ZNF804A. (shrink)

This paper examines Jaegwon Kim's Supervenience Argument (SA) against nonreductive physicalism, concentrating on Kim's response to two of the most important objections against the SA: First, the Overdetermination Argument, according to which Kim has no convincing argument against the possibility that mental causation might be a case of genuine or systematic overdetermination; second, the Generalization Argument, according to which the SA would entail that causation at any level gives way to causation at the next lower level, thereby leading to an (...) untenable all-encompassing epiphenomenalism. It is argued that as of yet, Kim has failed to develop a coherent overall position, since various moves he makes in response to these criticisms are strangely at odds with other parts of his philosophical position. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship borne by the traditional paradoxes of set theory and semantics to formal incompleteness phenomena. A central tool is the application of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem to systems of second-order arithmetic and set theory in which various “paradoxical notions” for first-order languages can be formalized. I will first discuss the setting in which this result was originally presented by Hilbert & Bernays (1939) and also how it was later adapted by Kreisel (1950) and Wang (1955) in (...) order to obtain formal undecidability results. A generalization of this method will then be presented whereby Russell’s paradox, a variant of Mirimanoff’s paradox, the Liar, and the Grelling–Nelson paradox may be uniformly transformed into incompleteness theorems. Some additional observations are then framed relating these results to the unification of the set theoretic and semantic paradoxes, the intensionality of arithmetization (in the sense of Feferman, 1960), and axiomatic theories of truth. (shrink)

Die einwandfreie Bestimmung der Begriffe ist die Grundlage einer jeden wissenschaftlichen Arbeit. Im Sinne der modernen Logik und Axiomatik hat erstmals Walter Dubislav die Methode des Definierens von Begriffen systematisch wie auch an Beispielen entwickelt. Sein Werk zeichnet sich durch klare Gedankenführung und didaktisches Geschick bei der Vermittlung philosophischer Sachverhalte aus, und es diskutiert alle einschlägigen Fragen, die sich dem an Methoden interessierten Wissenschaftler stellen. Es hat daher auch heute noch seinen systematischen Wert. Den gegenwärtigen Stand der Forschung im (...) B... (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

Video games are ideal platforms for the study of skill acquisition for a variety of reasons. However, our understanding of the development of skill and the cognitive representations that support skilled performance can be limited by a focus on game scores. We present an alternative approach to the study of skill acquisition in video games based on the tools of the Expert Performance Approach. Our investigation was motivated by a detailed analysis of the behaviors responsible for the superior performance of (...) one of the highest scoring players of the video game Space Fortress. This analysis revealed how certain behaviors contributed to his exceptional performance. In this study, we recruited a participant for a similar training regimen, but we collected concurrent and retrospective verbal protocol data throughout training. Protocol analysis revealed insights into strategies, errors, mental representations, and shifting game priorities. We argue that these insights into the developing representations that guided skilled performance could only easily have been derived from the tools of the Expert Performance Approach. We propose that the described approach could be applied to understand performance and skill acquisition in many different video games and help reveal mechanisms of transfer from gameplay to other measures of laboratory and real-world performance. (shrink)

Husserl is often taken, and not without reason, to endorse the view that phenomenology's task is to provide the “absolute foundation” of human knowledge. In this paper, I will argue that the most natural interpretation of this view, namely that all human knowledge depends for its justification, at least in part, on phenomenological knowledge, is philosophically untenable. I will also present evidence that Husserl himself held no such view, and will argue that Dan Zahavi and John Drummond, though reaching the (...) same conclusion, reach it for the wrong reasons. In the process, I will also defend a brand of epistemological externalism according to which knowledge does not depend upon knowing the epistemic principles under which one's knowledge falls, and argue that Husserl himself held such a view. I conclude with a discussion of a few of the ways in which phenomenology positively contributes to human knowledge. (shrink)

Teachers in many countries complain that their pedagogic work is impeded by unreasonable bureaucratic demands by government agencies. This paper suggests that historical, institutional and cultural perspectives are needed to understand the processes at work. It draws on Weber’s classic study of bureaucracy, but also makes reference to claims that traditional bureaucracies have been modified in ways that ameliorate their authoritarian character. The central part of the paper examines the attempts of one country (Scotland) to address complaints about excessive bureaucracy: (...) it is argued that they show a limited understanding of the nature of institutional power. In the discussion that follows, a number of critical interpretations are considered: that bureaucracies are, by their very nature, anti-educational; that they undermine ethical consciousness and cause psychological damage; and that enhanced professionalism can serve as a counterweight to bureaucratic tendencies. The paper ends by suggesting that the powerful pragmatic argument that mass, state-run educational systems cannot function without complex administrative structures, should not be used to disguise the fact that they have unintended consequences, some of which tend to subvert their stated aims. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to explore the significance of Montague’s paradox—that is, any arithmetical theory $T\supseteq Q$ over a language containing a predicate $P$ satisfying $P\rightarrow \varphi $ and $T\vdash \varphi \,\therefore\,T\vdash P$ is inconsistent—as a limitative result pertaining to the notions of formal, informal, and constructive provability, in their respective historical contexts. To this end, the paradox is reconstructed in a quantified extension $\mathcal {QLP}$ of Artemov’s logic of proofs. $\mathcal {QLP}$ contains both explicit modalities $t:\varphi $ (...) and also proof quantifiers $x:\varphi $. In this system, the basis for the rule NEC is decomposed into a number of distinct principles governing how various modes of reasoning about proofs and provability can be internalized within the system itself. A conceptually motivated resolution to the paradox is proposed in the form of an argument for rejecting the unrestricted rule NEC on the basis of its subsumption of an intuitively invalid principle pertaining to the interaction of proof quantifiers and the proof-theorem relation expressed by explicit modalities. (shrink)

Abduction or retroduction, as introduced by C.S. Peirce in the double sense of searching for explanatory instances and providing an explanation is a kind of complement for usual argumentation. There is, however, an inferential step from the explanandum to the abductive explanans . Whether this inferential step can be captured by logical machinery depends upon a number of assumptions, but in any case it suffers in principle from the triviality objection: any time a singular contradictory explanans occurs, the system collapses (...) and stops working. The traditional remedies for such collapsing are the expensive mechanisms of consistency maintenance, or complicated theories of non-monotonic derivation that keep the system running at a higher cost. I intend to show that the robust logics of formal inconsistency, a particular category of paraconsistent logics which permit the internalization of the concepts of consistency and inconsistency inside the object language, provide simple yet powerful techniques for automatic abduction. Moreover, the whole procedure is capable of automatization by means of the tableau proof-procedures available for such logics. Some motivating examples are discussed in detail. (shrink)

This paper engages the question ‘Does the consistency of a set of axioms entail the existence of a model in which they are satisfied?’ within the frame of the Frege-Hilbert controversy. The question is related historically to the formulation, proof and reception of Gödel’s Completeness Theorem. Tools from mathematical logic are then used to argue that there are precise senses in which Frege was correct to maintain that demonstrating consistency is as difficult as it can be, but also in which (...) Hilbert was correct to maintain that demonstrating existence given consistency is as easy as it can be. (shrink)

This paper presents the outlines of a phenomenological theory of foundational or non-inferential knowledge according to which the facts or states of affairs towards which our beliefs are intentionally directed can sometimes serve as reasons or evidence for what we believe. This occurs in acts of fulfillment, in which an object or state of affairs is given as it is thought to be. Hopp further argues that the sorts of empirical facts that can serve as reasons for noninferentially justified beliefs (...) are not confined to facts about one’s own occurrent mental states, but include facts about the physical world as well. In the course of defending the view against objections, Hopp argues that we should be internalists about the reasons in virtue of which what we believe is justified but externalists about the factors in virtue of which our states of believing have the status of being justified. He also argues against the claim that mental states, such as perceptual experiences, constitute our evidence for empirical beliefs. (shrink)

There is a puzzle in reconciling the widespread presence of puritanical norms condemning harmless pleasures with the theory that morality evolved to reap the benefits of cooperation. Here, we draw on the work of several philosophers to support the argument by Fitouchi et al. that these norms evolved to facilitate and scaffold self-control for the sake of cooperation.

In this essay Walter Okshevsky addresses the question of whether a certain form of dialogically derived agreement can function as an epistemic criterion of moral judgment and ground of moral authority. Okshevsky examines arguments for and against in the literature of educational philosophy and develops Jürgen Habermas's affirmative answer as presented in his discourse theory of morality. Habermas's position is articulated as a moral epistemology and is developed through his critique of the “monologism” of certain aspects of Immanuel Kant's (...) moral theory. Okshevsky concludes with a consideration of some educational implications of Habermas's position. (shrink)

In his theory of time Aristotle does not often mention the present time and nowhere gives a detailed account of it. Nonetheless, present time plays an important role in his conception. I primarily argue for the following claims: (1) According to Aristotle there is a perception of motion and there is a perception of time. These combined perceptions can neither occur in the past nor in the future nor in an indivisible now. Thus, there must be a present time. (2) (...) Aristotle acknowledges the passage of time. This passage of time can only be understood as a passing present. And since an indivisible now cannot pass, the passage of time delivers a further argument for the basic assumption of a present time. – For the most part I simply follow Aristotle’s argument in Physics IV 10 and 11. In doing so, I distinguish present time and now in the introductory puzzles, investigate the passing present in the co-perception of change and time, discuss the relation between change and the passage of time as well as the relation between the passing present and the different nows. (shrink)

The essay begins with the estrangement of the great lyrical poetry from the public since the middle of the 19th century. It is conceived in terms of an historical change in the structure of human experiencing.That is first demonstrated in Bergson. The autor interprets „Matière et Mémoire“ as the attempt to vindicate through the category of memory the possibility of genuine, that is, tradition-forming experience as against the mode of experience in the industrial age. Proust has more closely determined Bergson's (...) notion of memory as involuntary memory. Accordingly he seeks to reconstruct the aesthetic form of the narrative. Its industrial counterparts are information and sensation. Through shocks they threaten memory which B., in referring to psycho-analytical theories, conceives in terms of „protection against stimuli“.Erlebnis becomes the antithesis of experience (Erfahrung). In Baudelaire’s lyrical poetry the Erlebnis of shock occupies the center. In his portrayal of the fenser, Baudelaire identifies himself with the one who parries the shocks. These shocks occur when the individual is confronted with the amorphous multitude of the metropolis. In one chapter the author describes this clash and the shape it takes in Baudelaire's poetry. The subsequent chapter presents an analysis of Poe's „Man of the Crowd44, the city crowd portrayal which provides the clue for Baudelaire's and which is contrasted with the Biedermeier picture of Hoffmann's „Cousin's Corner Window“.The shock as the dominant form of Erlebnis is shown as grounded in the reified process of production in capitalist society. The discontinuity of the elements of shock has its basis in the discontinuity of the automatized process of labor which no longer admits of any „experience“, „practice“. The experience of shock of the member of a crowd corresponds to the experience of the worker who operates a machine. The reflectory mechanism of the victim of Modern Times appears in Baudelaire's work in the pattern of the hazard game which at the same time is the radical counterpart of „experience“.In Baudelaire, time is dissociated. Its power is absorbed by rare, „significant“ days. In them Baudelaire, through the „correspondances“4 seeks to save and restore the lost experience. The power of anamnesis is posited against the „swarm of seconds“. But the consolation of anamnesis remains impotent. In the dissociated shock moments of time, — the „spieen“ —, and the anamnesis of the vie antérieure, — the „idéal“ —, Baudelaire holds in his hands the débris of genuine experience.B. subordinates the representations constitutive of „experience“, that is, those of involuntary mefiiory, to his notion of „aura“. To experience the aura of a phenomenon means to endow it with the faculty of raising the eyes. The decay of aura is the foremost subject of Baudelaire : he summons eyes who have lost the faculty of raising themselves. He has designated the price for which the sensation of the Modern can be bought : the destruction of aura in shock experience.L'analyse débute par la constatation d'une scission entre la grande poésie lyrique et le public — scission qui se serait produite dès le milieu du xix® siècle. Cette séparation est interprétée comme la conséquence d'une transformation dans la structure même de l'expérience humaine.Cela est d'abord expliqué par l’oeuvre de Bergson. La théorie de la mémoire telle qu'elle a été développée dans Matière et mémoire se rattache à un type d'expérience qui, au cours du xixe siècle, a subi des atteintes profondes. Bergson tend, grâce à la catégorie de la mémoire, de restaurer le concept d'une expérience authentique. Cette expérience authentique existe en fonction de la tradition et s'oppose ainsi aux modes habituelles d'expérience propres à l'époque de la grande industrie. Proust a défini la mémoire bergsonienne comme une mémoire involontaire ; en son nom il avait essayé de reconstruire la forme de la narration. Le rival de cette dernière s'appelle, à l'époque de la grande industrie, l'information. Elle développe, par le moyen des chocs, une mémoire qui, par Proust, a été opposée à la mémoire bergsonienne sous le nom d'une mémoire volontaire. Il est permis de considérer, conformément à Freud, la mémoire volontaire comme étroitement liée à une conscience perpétuellement aux aguets. Plus la conscience sera obligée à parer aux chocs, plus se développera la mémoire volontaire, et plus périclitera la mémoire involontaire. L'expérience éminemment moderne du choc sera la norme de la poésie baudelairienne. Par l'image de l’escrimeur, Baudelaire qui, en flânant, était habitué d’être coudoyé par les foules des rues, s’identifie à l’homme qui pare aux chocs.Le choc en tant que forme prépondérante de la sensation se trouve accentué par le processus objectivisé et capitaliste du travail. La discontinuité des moments de choc trouve sa cause dans la discontinuité d’un travail devenu automatique, n’admettant plus l’expérience traditionnelle qui présidait au travail artisanal. Au choc éprouvé par celui qui flâne dans la foule correspond une expérience inédite : celle de l’ouvrier devant la machine.Le réflexe mécanisé de l’homme livré au monde moderne se traduit chez Baudelaire dans l’attitude du joueur. Pour l’homme qui s’est adonné au jeu, l’expérience du choc se présente en ce qu’elle a de plus essentiel* c’est-à-dire comme une façon d’éprouver le temps. Le spleenétique qui ne peut se dégager de la fascination exercée par le déroulement du temps vide est le frère jumeau du joueur. En face du Spleen, l’oeuvre baudelairienne évoque l’Idéal. L’Idéal, c’est la mémoire involontaire, initiatrice aux * correspondances ». Dépositaire des images d’une vie antérieure, l’Idéal serait le consolateur suprême s’il n’était tenu en échec par la « beauté moderne » qui est essentiellement spleenétique. Les souvenirs plus ou moins distincts dont est imprégnée chaque image qui surgit du fond de la mémoire involontaire peuvent être considérés comme son « aura ». Se saisir de l’aura d’une chose veut dire : l’investir du pouvoir de lever le regard. La déchéance de l’aura a des causes historiques dont l’invention de la photographie est comme un abrégé. Cette déchéance constitue le thème le plus personnel de Baudelaire. C’est elle qui donne la clé de ses poésies érotiques. Le poète invoque des yeux qui ont perdu le pouvoir du regard. Ainsi se trouve fixé le prix de la beauté et de l’expérience moderne : la destruction de l’aura par la sensation du choc. (shrink)