Provides a short introduction to Kant, emphasizing Kant's own view of his philosophy. Deleuze offers an overview of the whole of Kant's critical philosophy.

This paper proposes a framework for a critical philosophy of technology by discussing its practical, theoretical, empirical, normative and political dimensions. I put forward a general account of technology, which includes both similarities and dissimilarities to Andrew Feenberg's instrumentalization theory. This account characterizes a technology as a "(type of) artefactual, functional system with a certain degree of stability and reproducibility". A discussion of how such technologies may be realized discloses five different levels at which alternative choices might be (...) made. On this basis, I argue that a critical philosophy of technology should analyse and assess the choices that have, and have not, been made in actual practice, and contribute to social experiments that aim at more democratic and more desirable alternatives. (shrink)

The fifteen essays collected here set out to demonstrate why the critical philosophy of race needs to take a historical turn. Genealogies of the concepts of both race and racism are deployed to clarify why some of the dominant strategies for combatting racism tend either miss the target altogether or give it only a glancing blow. For example, relying on biology to reject the concept of race as a way of disarming racism misses the fact that racism precedes (...) the biology of race. It also ignores the prevalence of forms of racism, such as cultural racism that do not take their starting point in biology. Drawing on the work of Frantz Fanon, the late Sartre, and Michel Foucault, Robert Bernasconi argues for a holistic approach that integrates the concrete experience of racism faced by individuals into the study of institutional, structural, and systemic racism. Studying the interventions of such Black philosophers as Ottobah Cugoano, Anténor Firmin, and W. E. B. Du Bois, shows the value of allowing them to set the terms of the debate, instead of trying to fit them into debates shaped by other areas of philosophy. If race is indeed a social construct, then it is necessary to uncover the different forces, material as well as intellectual, that at different times shaped the various forms the concept of race has taken and the value then placed on preserving racial purity. Critical philosophy of race has a role to play in rendering both the material and psychological effects of slavery and segregation more intelligible as forms of systemic racism. When critical philosophers of race ignore the history of racism, they are in danger of being complicit with that part of society that seeks to erase that history. (shrink)

This article is a response to Robert Bernasconi’s critical philosophy of race. I start by speaking of the specific style in which life and philosophy are related in his work. I argue that he devises a political phenomenology which considers the lived experiences of racialization and inquires into their historical conditions, which have become “practico-inert” in facticity. Bernasconi’s thesis that the history of race is not determined by racial essentialism and his account of race as a border (...) concept call for an expansion of the notion of race that will better serve the cause of the global fight against racism. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the intertwining of philosophy and Christian faith in the concrete life of the Christian philosopher, with a view toward the compatibility of critical philosophy and a post-critical faith. Philosophy, as an enterprise of reason alone, is independent of Christian faith and theology. In accord with its definition, philosophy seeks evidence along the lines of reason independent of outside authority, and thus is autonomous from such faith. Yet, for the Christian philosopher, (...) without jeopardizing this autonomy and independence, faith and theology do enter the picture in some sense. For, unless the individual is completely dichotomized in personality, her/his concrete life and existence must involve commitments both to the Christian faith and to philosophy, even though the commitment of faith is more basic. This paper explores this paradox of the independence and mutual intertwining of these two poles; then, focuses on the philosophical pole of the tension; and finally, resolves the tension for the Christian philosopher. (shrink)

This special section brings together scholars working in Critical Philosophy of Race to explore questions of racism, coloniality, and migration, and in doing so, offers a glimpse into some of the scholarship currently being undertaken in this emerging field. The section has its origins in a one-day workshop, On Anti-Racism: A Critical Philosophy of Race Symposium, which took place in Narrm/Melbourne, Australia in October 2017. The symposium participants, Amir Jaima, Helen Ngo, and Bryan Mukandi, are here (...) joined by Lori Gallegos and Chelsea Bond, in an effort to continue and extend some of the conversations initiated at that event. (shrink)

There has been almost no real dialogue between Soviet Marxist and Western philosophers of history. In dealing with Western historical texts, Soviet authors usually turn to the relationship between Western philosophers of history and various general philosophical and analytical trends. There are also differences in the exact significance of vocabulary used by Soviet and Western scholars. Soviet authors tend to pay a lot of attention to the social nature and ideological functions of critical philosophy of history, while basing (...) their investigations on the materialist understanding of history. The work of V. 1. Lenin serves as a methodological example of a Marxist approach to non-Marxist philosophy, and is the origin of the tendency of most Soviet authors to reject the general methodological principles of Western authors, but at the same time to acknowledge that many interesting and important problems of historical knowledge are raised in Western writings. (shrink)

This is an essay on Kant's neglected late tract On a Recently Adopted Prominent Tone in Philosophy (RTP) and Derrida's oblique commentary on this work in his D'un ton apocalyptique adopté naguère en philosophie. The theme of the essay is metaphilosophical and considers issues concerning the nature of critical philosophy, fanaticism (Schwärmerei), and the use of religious tropes in philosophy. I am primarily interested in the ways in which RTP thematises the legitimacy of speaking in an (...) exalted, quasi-religious tone apropos of the authority of Reason as a self-legitimising capacity in philosophical speech. An important additional reason for taking a closer look at this text is because the late Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) took a great interest in this work of Kant’s and, indeed, emphasised, rightly I think, that despite its prima facie rhetorically charged, polemical nature this work—which might at first be taken to be merely a lampoon—is anything but insignificant in Kant’s œuvre. Derrida’s On a Recently Adopted Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy, originally published in 1983, is an oblique commentary on Kant’s RTP, and aims to expose to view the alleged hidden underpinnings of Kant’s polemic against exaltation or fanaticism (Schwärmerei) in philosophy. Derrida tries to show that Kant’s appeal for tonal moderation in philosophy, for a measured speech, which should rein in exalted modes of speech, is itself not neutral and rather fundamentally biased against an exalted, quasi-religious, manner of thought. It is evident that, as he himself notes early on in RTP, Kant is predisposed towards a more Aristotelian, academic kind of philosophy, which adopts a “proper” tone or pitch in philosophical debate, but Derrida claims that Kant himself raises his voice precisely in lampooning exalted thinkers. I am particularly interested in the extent to which Derrida’s critique manifests a fundamental misapprehension of the Kantian mode of moderating critique. By expounding this misapprehension, Kant’s own reasons for his philippic against religious or quasi-religious talk in philosophy are foregrounded, thus showing the nature of properly critical thought. At the same time, I shall show how Derrida underestimates the self-reflexivity, and hence properly critical, self-authorising mode of thinking, underlying his own oblique references to the adieu as a trope for quasi-transcendental intentionality towards the so-called ‘Other’. (shrink)

This is the first critical study of The Logic of Sense, Gilles Deleuze's most important work on language and ethics, as well as the main source of his vital philosophy of the event.James Williams explains the originality of Deleuze's work with careful definitions of all his innovative terms and a detailed description of the complex structure he constructs. This reading makes connections to his ground-breaking work on literature, to his critical but also progressive relation to the sciences, (...) and to his controversial denial of the priority of standard logics, human values and 'meaning' in thinking.This book will open new debates and develop current ones around Deleuze's work in philosophy, politics, literature, linguistics, cultural studies and sociology. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the innovative way of doing critical philosophy that María del Rosario Acosta López proposes in her aesthetics of resistance and grammars of the unheard. The paper examines the contributions of two sets of conversations with Acosta López’s critical philosophy. In the first place, staging a dialogue between Acosta López and Black feminist philosophy, the article offers a defence of reconceptualizing philosophy in the 21st Century through a dialogue with the voices and (...) perspectives of the excluded and silenced—a reconceptualization that reimagines the critical role of philosophy. In the second place, the paper calls attention to the crucial significance of Acosta López’s aesthetics of resistance for contemporary debates in contemporary political epistemology, putting in conversation her grammars of the unheard with my epistemology of resist- ance and María Lugones’s concept of complex communication. This second conversation also underscores a new way of understanding the critical and transformative function of philosophy by centering the voices and perspectives of the excluded and silenced. (shrink)

Originally published in 1964. In four essays, Professor Mandelbaum challenges some of the most common assumptions of contemporary epistemology. Through historical analyses and critical argument, he attempts to show that one cannot successfully sever the connections between philosophic and scientific accounts of sense perception. While each essay is independent of the others, and the argument of each must therefore be judged on its own merits, one theme is common to all: that critical realism, as Mandelbaum calls it, is (...) a viable epistemological position, even though some schools of thought hold it in low esteem. (shrink)

According to Michael Friedman, Ernst Cassirer’s “outstanding contribution [to Neo-Kantianism] was to articulate, for the first time, a clear and coherent conception of formal logic within the context of the Marburg School” (Friedman 2000, p. 30). In his paper “Kant und die moderne Mathematik” (1907), Cassirer argued not only that the new relational logic of Frege1 and Russell was a major breakthrough with profound philosophical implications, but also that the logicist thesis itself was a “fact” of modern mathematics. Cassirer summarizes (...) his evaluation of Russell’s work: Here logic and mathematics have been fused into a true, henceforth indissoluble unity; and from this inner connection there arises for each... (shrink)

Arturo Roig inscribe el ejercicio del filosofar en la geografía de su función crítica. Crítica que es comprendida como una forma de pensamiento que se cuestiona a sí mismo y que considera no sólo los límites y posibilidades de la razón, sino también la realidad humana e histórica de un sujeto que se constituye en un "nosotros". La filosofía, así entendida, es un saber de vida. La función utópica se presenta como tarea para este saber de conjetura y para una (...) filosofía que sirve a la vida. Roig devuelve con ello el valor epistémico que tiene el plus lo axiológico, no verificable como hipótesis científica. Arturo Roig inscribes the exercise of philosophizing in the geography of its critical function. Critique that is understood as a form of thought that questions itself and considers not only the limits and possibilities of reason, but also the human and historical reality of a subject that becomes a "we". Philosophy, thus understood, is a knowledge of life. The utopian function arises as a task for this knowledge of conjecture that serves to life. Thus Roig gives back an axiological dimension as epistemic value to this knowledge. (shrink)

_Grounds of Pragmatic Realism_ shows Hegel is a major epistemologist, who disentangled Kant’s critique of judgment, across the Critical corpus, from transcendental idealism, and augmented its enormous evaluative and justificatory significance for commonsense knowledge, the natural sciences and freedom of action.

German supporters of the Kantian philosophy in the late 19th century took one of two forks in the road: the fork leading to Baden, and the Southwest School of neo-Kantian philosophy, and the fork leading to Marburg, and the Marburg School, founded by Hermann Cohen. Between 1876, when Cohen came to Marburg, and 1918, the year of Cohen's death, Cohen, with his Marburg School, had a profound influence on German academia.

This paper discusses the role of Law and Legal Thinking in Critical Theory with specific reference to the arguments that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri offer in their book Commonwealth. The core idea is that Critical Theory is no less radical, but much more concrete, when it is performing not only an external, but also an internal critique of the Law. It shows that the role of the law in critical theory emerges as a problem when the (...) latter claims that ‘there is no outside’ and that ‘the legal base of the system structures our lives.’ It then discusses optimistic and pessimistic strategies to overcome the problem, and argue for a demanding strategy which consist in articulating the external and the internal critique of the law. To make this point, the paper goes back to the epistemic context in which critical attitudes are deployed (the ‘Conflict of the Faculties’), describes the four theoretical moves constitutive of the historical moment in which, at the end of the 18th Century, modern law as we know it was conceived of and founded; and sketches the key moments of the history of the internal critique of the law. It then illustrates the demanding strategy with examples taken from the field of Intellectual Property, and concludes that the Law is malleable and open enough to allow the thinking and practicing of radical alternatives from within the legal system and also that alternatives spoken in the language of the law are no less radical, but certainly, more concrete than others. (shrink)

The study of race and racism is an area of growth in philosophy. The quantity of research published under the banner of ‘the philosophy of race’ is increasing; research monographs and edited collections are appearing in greater numbers, and there is even a noticeable though still lamentably small increase in the number of professional posi- tions being advertised in the philosophy of race. However, one notable feature of this research is how much it focuses upon the racial (...) context of the USA. Most of its active and prominent researchers are based in the USA, nearly all new posts with designated research specialisms in race are at universities in the USA, and most of its key research questions are framed in the racial idiom and social context of the contemporary USA. In many respects, this is a good thing: if the philosophy of race cannot find fertile ground in the USA, there is little hope of it flourishing anywhere. However, this emphasis on the US context may have a negative side too. (shrink)

There is a long tradition, in the history and philosophy of science, of studying Kant’s philosophy of mathematics, but recently philosophers have begun to examine the way in which Kant’s reflections on mathematics play a role in his philosophy more generally, and in its development. For example, in the Critique of Pure Reason , Kant outlines the method of philosophy in general by contrasting it with the method of mathematics; in the Critique of Practical Reason , (...) Kant compares the Formula of Universal Law, central to his theory of moral judgement, to a mathematical postulate; in the Critique of Judgement , where he considers aesthetic judgment, Kant distinguishes the mathematical sublime from the dynamical sublime. This last point rests on the distinction that shapes the Transcendental Analytic of Concepts at the heart of Kant’s Critical philosophy, that between the mathematical and the dynamical categories. These examples make it clear that Kant's transcendental philosophy is strongly influenced by the importance and special status of mathematics. The contributions to this book explore this theme of the centrality of mathematics to Kant’s philosophy as a whole. This book was originally published as a special issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy. (shrink)

A revised, expanded and fully up-to-date critical introduction to Deleuze's most important work of philosophyBy critically analysing Deleuze's methods, principles and arguments, James Williams helps readers to engage with the revolutionary core of Deleuze's philosophy and take up positions for or against its most innovative and controversial ideas.

The foundation of historical materialism.--A study on authority.--Sartre's existentialism.--Karl Popper and the problem of historical laws.--Freedom and the historical imperative.

It has been argued that Kant's all-consuming efforts to place autonomy at the center of philosophy have had, in the long-run, the unintended effect of leading to the widespread discrediting of philosophy and of undermining the notion of autonomy itself. The result of this 'Copernican revolution' has seemed to many commentators the de-centring, if not the self-destruction, of the autonomous self. In this major reinterpretation of Kant and the post-Kantian response to his critical philosophy, Karl Ameriks (...) argues that such a view of Kant rests on a series of misconceptions. By providing the first systematic study of the underlying structure of the reaction to Kant's critical philosophy in the writings of Reinhold, Fichte and Hegel, Karl Ameriks challenges the presumptions that dominate popular approaches to the concept of freedom, and to the interpretation of the relation between the Enlightenment, Kant and post-Kantian thought. (shrink)

L’article se propose de prendre au sérieux la notion de « critique » pour évaluer dans quelles mesures, selon quelles caractérisations, sous quelles conditions et avec quelles limites, la philosophie critique de la race (PCR), qui désigne la théorie critique de la race spécifiquement dans le champ philosophique, constitue un savoir critique. La première section présentera la manière dont la PCR se définit par différence avec la philosophie de la race non critique, en termes de canon philosophique, de méthodes privilégiées (...) et d’analyse des concepts centraux du champ : cela permettra de dégager, négativement, la fonction attribuée à la critique, méthodologiquement et théoriquement. La deuxième section dégagera trois sens possibles pour la pensée critique de la race selon les trois influences théoriques majeures du champ : la généalogie foucaldienne, la théorie critique et la phénoménologie critique. Enfin une dernière section, conclusive, se penchera plus précisément sur trois objectifs diversement défendus par les trois écoles critiques dans leur rapport à la vérité, au sujet de connaissance et à l’action. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article considers the second treatise of Schelling's Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre, a lesser-known work from the early Schelling. Here, Schelling proposes to defend the critical position insofar as it purports to be a system based on human reason, but instead he issues a backhanded critique of the assumption on behalf of the critical philosophers to try and limit the bounds of pure reason by means of their own use of reason. Schelling then offers (...) an alternative way to think about the relationship of mind and matter in nature. This article argues that Schelling's actual explanation of the critical philosophy as a position founded by reasonable minds ultimately belies his promise to defend it, thus calling into question that Schelling's thought prior to 1800 was a mere reiteration of Kantian/Fichtean transcendentalism. (shrink)

This book provides a reading of Kant's theory of the construction of mathematical concepts through a fully contextualised analysis. In this work the author argues that it is only through an understanding of the relevant eighteenth century mathematics textbooks, and the related mathematical practice, that the material and context necessary for a successful interpretation of Kant's philosophy can be provided.

Since the publication of Roy Bhaskar's A Realist Theory of Science in 1975, critical realism has emerged as one of the most powerful new directions in the philosophy of science and social science, offering a real alternative to both positivism and postmodernism. This reader makes accessible in one volume key readings to stimulate debate about and within critical realism, including: the transcendental realist philosophy of science elaborated in A Realist Theory of Science ; Bhaskar's critical (...) naturalist philosophy of social science; the theory of explanatory critique, which is central to critical realism; and the theme of dialectic, which is central to Bhaskar's most recent writings. The volume includes extracts from Bhaskar's most important books, as well as selections from all of the other most important contributors to the critical realist program. It also includes both a general introduction and original introductions to each section. (shrink)

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON has been studied and analyzed over and over again in relation to its profound affinity with Newtonian science. But for the very reason that the putative validity of the transcendental arguments seems to depend upon this particular form of science as its ultimate model, the claim has been made repeatedly that Kant's philosophical stance can have no literal relevance to the actual problems thought germane to twentieth century physical science. Thus, the advent of the theory (...) of general relativity during the period from 1905 to 1916 has been seen almost unanimously as a sufficiently cogent refutation of some of the essential claims made by Kant regarding the nature of space and time. In the early days of the new theory, philosophers like Schlick, Reichenbach or Meyerson did their utmost to stress the unbridgeable nature of the gap separating the transcendental ideality of space and time from the metrical field used in general relativity. Indeed, the concept of metrical field may be seen as expressing an objective quality of reality because it could not exist at all if there were no phenomena related to matter. More recently, it has been argued that the fatal unrevisability of the Kantian categories necessarily means that the Kantian conception is annihilated and swallowed up by the relativistic one. The traditional distinction drawn by Kant between the form and the content of knowledge is itself reversed, in the sense that "for Kant, the formal components of knowledge are the most stable and objective elements," whereas according to the theory of relativity, "they are the most arbitrary and subjective elements" since the formal universality of the laws of nature depends upon arbitrary transformations of coordinates. This reversal, in turn, indicates that the form-content distinction has in effect been displaced by the very different distinction between the theoretical and the observational. At best, a high degree of correspondence has been accentuated, between the regulative validity of the Kantian a priori and the epistemological foundation underlying the principle of general relativity, inasmuch as the latter's vindication is seen to depend on arguments which are far from merely empirical. (shrink)

Kant s view of the imagination is surrounded by one of the most salient and obscure discussions on his critical philosophy. Due to revisions and emendations and a seeming change in doctrine from the first to the third Critique, Kant s considered view of the imagination remains unclear. This collection of essays from Kant scholars illuminates the various treatments of imagination through its development in Kant s critical works. ".

Continental philosophy of science has developed alongside mainstream analytic philosophy of science. But where continental approaches are inclusive, analytic philosophies of science are not–excluding not merely Nietzsche’s philosophy of science but Gödel’s philosophy of physics. As a radicalization of Kant, Nietzsche’s critical philosophy of science puts science in question and Nietzsche’s critique of the methodological foundations of classical philology bears on science, particularly evolution as well as style (in art and science). In addition to (...) the critical (in Mach, Nietzsche, Heidegger but also Husserl just to the extent that continental philosophy of science tends to depart from a reflection on the crisis of foundations), other continental philosophies of science include phenomenology (Husserl, Bachelard, Merleau‐Ponty, etc.) and hermeneutics (Heidegger, Gadamer, Heelan, etc.), especially incorporating history of science (Nietzsche, Mach, Duhem, Butterfield, Feyerabend, etc.). Examples are drawn from the philosophy of sciences (chemistry, geology, and biology) other than physics. (shrink)

Foucault's Critical Philosophy of History: Unfolding the Present provides a comprehensive interpretation of Foucault's work by focusing on its procedural elements. This book argues that despite their thematic diversity, Foucault's ideas gain coherence once they are framed within the critical project of the "history of the present.".

It is the purpose of this paper to represent an analysis of four variants of critical philosophy of science: the constructivistic methodology, the reflexion upon science from the viewpoint of the critical theory of society, the ‘social natural science’ as a further development of the finalization conception, and the projective philosophy of science. Special attention is paid to the comparison of these variants. Some points of convergence as well as of divergence among them are revealed. A (...) common shortcoming is indicated. (shrink)

How can we employ the philosophy of John Dewey to make sense of contemporary political contexts? How might Deweyan theorisations of present-day political problems inform contemporary policy approaches to, for instance, immigration, globalisation, global governance structures, or democratic institutions? What is new about contemporary political practice and thought from a pragmatist perspective? What is merely echoing the thinking and affective investments of previous political moments? And what is critical about this moment in time? These are some of the (...) questions that prompted the organisation of a conference titled “John Dewey and Critical Philosophies for Critical Political Times” at University College Dublin in October 2017. In light of the recent rise in nationalist rhetoric and unprecedented political developments, such as Brexit, the two-day event sought to draw out the confluences between the historico-political context that John Dewey was operating in and the contemporary political moment. At the same time, the conference set out to interrogate appeals to “history repeating itself” by capturing the unique inflection of the present. Conference delegates deftly examined such temporal concordances and dissonances by drawing on John Dewey’s expansive philosophical thought, theorising a host of topics ranging from structures of inequality - including gender, racial, and class inequality - to the role of inquiry in democratic practice. They made use of a wide array of Deweyan concepts and theories, encompassing, inter alia, his naturalism; his writing on democracy; his conception of the habituated, transacting self; and his meliorism. The essays collected in this special issue include some of the highlights of these presentations, as well as pieces specifically commissioned for the purposes of this publication. (shrink)

Kant’s Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy, traces the decisive role played by eighteenth century embryological research for Immanuel Kant’s theories of mind and cognition. I begin this book by following the course of life science debates regarding organic generation in England and France between 1650 and 1750 before turning to a description of their influence in Germany in the second half of the eighteenth century. Once this background has been established, the remainder of Kant’s Organicism (...) moves to the influential role played by models of embryological development for Kant’s approach to understanding the cognitive processes responsible for the generation of knowledge, with special attention paid to Kant’s Precritical writings in the 1760s and 1770s. The book closes with a reinterpretation of Kant’s transcendental deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason. (shrink)

Constructive (productive) thinking in the critical philosophy of Hermann Cohen differs significantly from the seemingly similar speculative thinking in J. G. Fichte’s Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre) (1794/95). The fundamental characteristics of scientific thinking in Cohen’s teaching include: purity, focus on the “fact of science”, the origin (Ursprung), the infinitesimal method, continuity, movement, production, correlation, intensive magnitude, interrelation of thinking and being. According to Cohen, scientific thinking can only be pure and generated by the origin. The origin is continuous (...) action (movement) of thinking to separate the united and bind the divided content. In this process, thinking and being are correlative. Infinitely small reality contains thinking and being simultaneously as a union and in a divided form. The infinitesimal method is thinking that continuously carries out a) the operations of opposing itself as pure thinking to the results of its own production; b) the coincidence of itself with the products of its own generation. Infinitesimal thinking seeks to eliminate the difference between self and being. Nevertheless, being constantly retains autonomy. Being does not merge with thinking and is not absorbed by it. In Fichte’s Science of Knowledge pure thinking moves in a logical circle, having no access into real being. In an effort to break out of this circle and find its causality, thinking turns not to the being of the world of phenomena, but to the Absolute I. Such a speculative approach to consciousness, thinking and being has little in common with Cohen’s critical position. (shrink)

While agreeing with Poteat that the modern Western culture has gone awry in a humanly destructive way, the paper contends tha the culprit was not, as Poteat claims, Enlightenment critical philosophy, but the materialistic values of the bourgeois form of life and the puritanical view of knowledge and the naturalistic worldview that they generated. Accordingly, the solution proposed is not Poteat's unreflected experience and commonsense worldview but a shift to a humanistic culture-generating stance and a critical humanistic (...) philosophy. (shrink)