The first edition of this book was published in 1977. At that time the field of thanatology, the study of death and dying, was still reasonably new and was dominated by research done by psychiatrists and social scientists. The most notable person in the field at the time was Elisabeth Kubler-Ross, who was widely credited with having brought thanatology into public view with the 1969 publication of her book On Death and Dying. Two research centers on (...) death and dying were gaining national reputations: The Foundation of Thanatology in New York (Austin Kutscher, director), and the Center for Death Education and Research (Robert Fulton, director) at the University of Minnesota. (shrink)

Edited by Thomas A. Shannon, this series provides anthologies of critical essays and reflections by leading ethicists in four pivotal areas: reproductive technologies, genetic technologies, death and dying, and health care policy. The goal of this series is twofold: first, to provide a set of readers on thematic topics for introductory or survey courses in bioethics or for courses with a particular theme or time limitation. Second, each of the readers in this series is designed to help students (...) focus more thoroughly and effectively on specific topics that flesh out the ethical issues at the core of bioethics. The series is also highly accessible to general readers interested in bioethics. (shrink)

Edited by Thomas A. Shannon, this series provides anthologies of critical essays and reflections by leading ethicists in four pivotal areas: reproductive technologies, genetic technologies, death and dying, and health care policy. The goal of this series is twofold: first, to provide a set of readers on thematic topics for introductory or survey courses in bioethics or for courses with a particular theme or time limitation. Second, each of the readers in this series is designed to help students (...) focus more thoroughly and effectively on specific topics that flesh out the ethical issues at the core of bioethics. The series is also highly accessible to general readers interested in bioethics. (shrink)

Objective To determine the public's understanding of and views about a range of ethical issues in relation to death and dying. Design Random, digit-dialling, telephone interview Setting Ireland. Participants 667 adult individuals. Results The general public are unfamiliar with terms associated with end-of-life care. Although most want to be informed if they have a terminal illness, they also value family support in this regard. Most of the respondents believe that competent patients have the right to refuse life-saving treatment. Most (...) also (mistakenly) believe that families, either alone or with physicians, have the authority to make decisions about starting or stopping treatment for incompetent patients. Most Irish people are more concerned about the quality of their dying than death itself. Religious commitment is important to most Irish people, and this impacts on their views about medical treatment and care at the end of life. Conclusions The study paints a picture of a general public that is not very comfortable with or informed about the processes of dying and death. Great sensitivity is required of health professionals who must negotiate the timing and the context of breaking of bad news with patients and families. Educational interventions, public and organisational policies and legislation need to address the uncertainty that surrounds the role of professionals and families in making decisions for dying patients. (shrink)

A consideration of some of the embedded themes with which Pamela Sue Anderson was concerned during her career will bear out the suggestion that her approach to enhancing life was richly engaging and distinctive. However, it is perhaps the idea of vulnerability, most of all, that crystallizes this distinctiveness and addresses the aims of the Enhancing Life Project with which she was associated at the time of her death in March 2017, but also brings her philosophy as well (...) as her person most powerfully to mind. In particular I am interested in the way in which, through this focus, she allows us seriously to attend to death (including her own), invoking the positive and life-enhancing implications of our unavoidable vulnerability, for practices of rational affection, without losing sight of the violence and pain of loss and mourning. (shrink)

The deeper teachings of yoga state that "We are a soul, and have a body," but how do yogis respond when confronted with death-with their own time of passing? In Transitioning in Grace (based on the teachings of Paramhansa Yogananda, author of the classic Autobiography of a Yogi), Nalini Graeber presents true accounts of how longtime yogis and meditators have left their bodies. Some struggled with pain or illness. Others passed suddenly or unexpectedly. Most of these accounts are (...) inspiring; all have something to teach about the transitioning experience. More than just a collection of uplifting stories, this work can serve as a handbook for individuals helping family or friends to leave this world-for those soon to make the transition themselves-and for all thoughtful souls who recognize the wisdom of gaining important insights into early preparation for "Life's Final Exam." Included in these pages: How to prepare for death. A yogic "astral ascension" ceremony (funeral/memorial service) that can be adapted for your particular needs. A description, by a great master of yoga, of what we experience during the moments when we leave our bodies. A simple meditation technique that can help greatly to bring calmness to the event. Stories, descriptions, and poems that offer helpful insights and inspiration. (shrink)

Ever since the 1960s, when medical science became capable of prolonging the dying process beyond bounds that many patients would find acceptable, people have sought “death with dignity,” or “a natural death,” or “a good death.” Once debilitation from a fatal affliction has reached a personally intolerable point, dying patients have sought to control the manner and timing of death via diverse techniques. Some sought the disconnection of life-sustaining medical interventions, such as respirators and dialysis machines. (...) Beyond freedom from unwelcome interventions, some patients intent on avoiding suffering sought access to pain relief medication—even in dosages posing some risk of hastening death. Other dying patients sought access to deep sedation, even knowing that they would never emerge from the resultant unconsciousness. Still other patients voluntarily refused to eat or drink or to accept artificial nutrition and hydration. (shrink)

This article seeks to present for the first time a more systematic account of Edith Stein’s views on death and dying. First, I will argue that death does not necessarily lead us to an understanding of our earthly existence as aevum, that is, an experience of time between eternity and finite temporality. We always bear the mark of our finitude, including our finite temporality, even when we exist within the eternal mind of God. To claim otherwise, (...) is to make identical our eternity with God’s eternity, thereby undermining the traditional Scholastic argument, which Stein holds, that there is no real relation between the being (and, therefore, (a)temporality) of God and the being of human persons. Second, I will argue that Stein excludes the category of potentiality from her discussion of death as a relation between the fullness or actuality of being and nothingness. In fact, death is more a relation between possibility/potentiality and nothingness than a relation between actual fullness and nothingness. What Stein describes as fullness ought to be read as potential. (shrink)

Ever since the 1960s, when medical science became capable of prolonging the dying process beyond bounds that many patients would find acceptable, people have sought “death with dignity,” or “a natural death,” or “a good death.” Once debilitation from a fatal affliction has reached a personally intolerable point, dying patients have sought to control the manner and timing of death via diverse techniques. Some sought the disconnection of life-sustaining medical interventions, such as respirators and dialysis machines. (...) Beyond freedom from unwelcome interventions, some patients intent on avoiding suffering sought access to pain relief medication—even in dosages posing some risk of hastening death. Other dying patients sought access to deep sedation, even knowing that they would never emerge from the resultant unconsciousness. Still other patients voluntarily refused to eat or drink or to accept artificial nutrition and hydration. (shrink)

We wake each morning to news on the glaring statistics of people infected by COVID-19 and others reportedly dying from complications thereto; the numbers are not receding in at least a number of countries across the world. It is hard to imagine a moment such as this that most of us have lived through in our life-time; but it is a reality and public challenge that we can neither ignore nor look away from. In what follows I will explore (...) perspectives on death from the Hindu tradition and the kinds of response—and solace or wisdom—afforded by the tradition to the angst and fears evoked by this pandemic situation. In concluding the discussion, I shall offer tentative reflections on how the Hindu perspective may be universalized, such as might invite conversations with therapists and care workers who may be seeking alternative resources to help expand the therapeutic space in more beneficent ways during the Covid-19 pandemic and its after-effects. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Taking Sides: Clashing Views in Death and Dying ed. by William J. Buckley and Karen S. FeldtZoe BernatskyTaking Sides: Clashing Views in Death and Dying Selected, edited, and with introduction by William J. Buckley and Karen S. Feldt new york: mcgraw-hill, 2013. 576 pp. $63.00If you are searching for a textbook that inspires students to think critically by examining diverse positions around contemporary bioethics issues related (...) to death and dying, Taking Sides: Clashing Views in Death and Dying is an engaging and effective learning tool that is well structured and a compelling read. As part of a series of Taking Sides textbooks, this volume examines eighteen issues clustered around seven themes: (1) end-of-life decision making; (2) caregiver end-of-life decision making; (3) treatment requests and decisions regarding pain and futility; (4) assisted suicide; (5) determining definitions of death; (6) hospice, policy, and costs of dying; and (7) dying and death as cultural performances. Units for each theme include an introduction, pro and con arguments, a summary, and a list of additional resources.The book offers a wealth of wisdom through thought-provoking scenarios, forward-looking themes, and scholarly articles. Readers are presented with real-life controversies, such as how depression or advanced directives influence the [End Page 214] end-of-life decision-making process, and how advocates affect the quality of end-of-life care. Other topics covered include the right to effective pain management, the use of palliative sedation for intractable symptoms, and withholding or withdrawing futile treatment including artificial nutrition and hydration. Also debated are concerns surrounding the provision of assisted suicide and the criteria for establishing brain death; issues regarding access to hospice; the impact of identifying with a specific religious orientation; and the reception of culturally competent care.Individuals are often forced abruptly into end-of-life decisions without time for extensive reflection about the meaning of life and death. The weightiness of the outcomes and the intensity of the experience, combined with the apprehension so many of us feel about death and dying, can overwhelm individuals and families. This book promotes thoughtful deliberation about such matters from both professional and personal perspectives. The inclusion of a section on caregiver decision making that highlights compassion fatigue is a unique and valuable contribution to the overall topic. Social, cultural, and religious influences that increase comfort (or pain) in dying patients and the unique experience of grief for those who remain are also given attention.The greatest strength of this text is the “Taking Sides” approach, which introduces the reader to divergent positions on ethical issues. The articles are well selected from recent scholarship and orient readers who may be unfamiliar with medical and ethical terminology and concepts. The presentation of contradictory positions demonstrates the true-to-nature complexity of ethical decisions and inspires the reader to further reflection, and the extensive list of resources provides a rich opportunity for further study. The book is an easy read, and the units and themes can be surveyed independently, making it a helpful resource for introductory courses on moral theology or ethics; a digital “Instructor’s Resources Guide” provides sample questions for academic purposes. Since death and dying is a universal issue, the anticipated audience is extensive.While this text provides an excellent introduction to the ethical dilemmas around death and dying, there are particular areas that are not addressed, such as decision-making in the case of neonates, children, or those with preexisting psychiatric disorders or other disabilities. A valuable addition to the book would have been the presentation of a framework for dealing with the complex challenges of death and dying, such as the virtue ethics framework offered by Lydia Dugdale in the 2015 publication Dying in the Twenty-First Century. But although the book does not add new material to existing debates, the clarity with which it presents each argument will help to orient those less familiar with bioethical issues. [End Page 215]Zoe BernatskyNewman Theological CollegeCopyright © 2016 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

The idea that physical death may not mark the end of an individual's existence has long been a source of fascination. It is perhaps unsurprising that we are apt to wonder what it is that happens to us when we die. Is death the end of me and all the experiences that count as mine? Or might I exist, and indeed have experiences, beyond the time of my death? And yet, deep metaphysical puzzles arise at the (...) very suggestion that persons might continue to exist following physical death. Indeed, whether, and how, one can exist post-mortem will depend in no small part on what sorts of things we are and on what it takes for things like us to persist across temporal durations and other changes. These topics and their application to the growing collection of materialist accounts of resurrection are the focus of this Element. (shrink)

Volume Four, as indicated by the anthology's subtitle, is in honor of Simone de Beauvoir (1908-1986) and Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). The chapters do not necessarily mention Simone de Beauvoir or Martin Heidegger. The 16 chapters (by professional philosophers and other professional scholars) are directed to issues related to death, life extension, and anti-death. Most of the 400-plus pages consist of scholarship unique to this volume. Includes index. -/- -/- The titles of the 16 chapters are as follows: -/- (...) -/- 1. Mechanism, Galileo’s Animale And Heidegger’s Gestell: Reflections On The Lifelessness Of Modern Science by GiorgioBaruchello -/- -/- 2. Simone De Beauvoir by Debra Bergoffen -/- 3. Existentialism by Steven Crowell -/- -/- 4. Time Wounds All Heels by William Grey -/- -/- 5. The Ethical Importance Of Death by Jenann Ismael -/- 6. The Poetics Of Death: Intimations And Illusions by Lawrence Kimmel -/- -/- 7. Death And Aesthetics by Keith Lehrer -/- -/- 8. Ageing And Existentialism: Simone De Beauvoir And The Limits Of Freedom by Shannon M. Mussett -/- -/- 9. Life Extension And Meaning by Carol O’Brien -/- -/- 10. Consciousness As Computation: A Defense Of Strong AI Based On Quantum-State Functionalism by R. Michael Perry -/- -/- 11. Reality Shifts: On The Death And Dying Of Dr. Timothy Leary by Carol Sue Rosin -/- -/- 12. Extraterrestrial Liberty And The Great Transmutation by Charles Tandy -/- -/- 13. A Time Travel Schema And Eight Types Of Time Travel by Charles Tandy -/- -/- 14. Boredom, Experimental Ethics, And Superlongevity by Mark Walker -/- -/- 15. Exopolitics: The Death Of Death by Alfred Lambremont Webre -/- -/- 16. Embryo Cloning: Current State Of The Medical Art And Its Far-Reaching Consequences For Multiple Applications by Panayiotis M.Zavos. (shrink)

Morality, Mortality as a whole deals with certain aspects of ethical theory and with moral problems that arise primarily in contexts involving life‐and‐death decisions. The importance of the theoretical issues is not limited to their relevance to these decisions; however, they are, rather, issues at the heart of basic moral and political theory. This first volume comprises three parts. Part I, Death: From Bad to Worse, has with four chapters, and an appendix, discussing death and why it (...) is bad for the person who dies. Part II, Saving Lives: General Issues, has six chapters, and explores a cluster of moral problems that arise in saving lives. The general question raised is whether we should always, in aiding life, act so as to save the greater number of lives or to produce the greatest amount of good. Part III, Scarce Resources: Theoretical Issues, Specific Recommendations, and Organ Transplants, has five chapters, and deals with the problem of the acquisition and distribution of organs for transplantation. It allows us to apply the theoretical discussion of saving lives and relevant/irrelevant utilities presented in the previous parts. However, the discussion can be understood independently of the first two parts, and the conceptual issues and procedures on which it focuses are relevant to dealing with any scarce resource, including money and time, which are needed to use other plentiful resources. Although the book contains much theoretical and methodological argument, it is firmly grounded in practical ethical issues, and is illustrated throughout by examples. (shrink)

Based on extensive ethnography, this article investigates how contemporary Finnish hospice patients talk – or remain silent – about their own approaching death, and the imageries relating to death and the possible afterlife. I explore how the thought of an afterlife may have informed patients’ orientations at the end of life, and how it touched on actual funeral arrangements. Since death was a very difficult topic to speak about, the dying created other kinds of material or entirely (...) fantastic imageries which helped them to explore and express their feelings about death and the beyond. Drawing on the theoretical concepts of ‘metaphysical imagination’ (Hepburn 1996) and ‘virtuality’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2016; Kapferer 2004, 2006, 2010), this article shows how the virtual space of the metaphysical imageries by the research participants at times became a vital element empowering the dying, not only to encounter their situation but also to achieve resolution of some sort. (shrink)

The foundational texts of the classical period of Confucianism and Daoism contain virtually no discussion of post-death existence or the nature of the afterlife. At the same time, these traditions devote significant attention to the ways death and loss impact our lives. Confucian texts such as the Analects of Confucius and the Xunzi, as well as the distinctive, profoundly influential writings of the Daoist Zhuangzi, contain teachings and stories about people facing their own deaths and dealing with (...) the deaths of others. Both traditions offer guidance on living well in the face of mortality without recourse to notions of post-death existence. They do this by cultivating and sustaining connections and identification with larger realities beyond the individual. The Confucians emphasize human relationships, the realm of the familial, social, and political. Zhuangzi emphasizes the connection with the larger natural world, whereby we see the cycles of our own lives as part of the larger cycles of nature, and he points toward a path to losing one’s self through contemplative and skillful practices, ultimately leading to a sense of equanimity in the face of death. I argue that underlying the differences between Confucian and Daoist forms of connection and consolation is the contrast between the Confucian notion of a narratively constructed self, an achievement of memory and ritual, and Zhuangzi’s deconstruction of the narrative temporality that grounds Confucian notions of selfhood. (shrink)

This article explores the affinities between film and philosophy by returning to a shared meditation on death and the nature of time. Death has been considered the muse of philosophy and can also be considered the muse of film-philosophy. But what does it mean to say that to film-philosophise is to learn to die, or a kind of training for dying? Film is an artistic object that reminds us of death’s inevitability; it is a meditation on (...) the transient and finite nature of time. Films as diverse as Mizoguchi’s Tales of Ugetsu, Resnais’s Hiroshima mon Amour, and Guzmán’s Nostalgia for the Light take an uncanny approach to the subject, expressing the paradoxical coexistence of life and death and of different temporal dimensions. This article explores the philosophical concept of the death-image and time through a Deleuzian approach to cinema, meditating on the flashback, the coexistence of the present and the past, and the emergence of a new type of Lazarean character – one who returns from the dead. The article aims to clarify not simply death’s unquestionable omnipresence in film but also cinema’s role as a contemporary version of the trope of memento mori. (shrink)

Medicalized Death and the Right to Die Movement Prior to the 20th Century, most Americans died at home, surrounded by family, friends, and neighbors. Religion, not medicine, governed the death bed for there was little physicians could do for the dying. Eventually, however, advances in medicine and technology would lead to dramatic changes in the timing and location of death: patients not only began living longer, they were also dying longer, and unlike their predecessors, were more likely (...) to die alone, in institutions, and among strangers. Modern medicine, in its zeal to conquer death, had become obsessed with its curative function and ability to extend the lives of the dying. To many in the medical community, death represented failure and was something to be avoided at all costs, and like many other social problems in the United States, had become medicalized. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the growing block theory of time has rather surprising, and hitherto unexplored, explanatory benefits when it comes to certain enduring philosophical puzzles concerning death. In particular, I claim the growing block theorist has readily available and convincing answers to the following questions: Why is it an evil to be dead but not an evil to be not yet born? How can death be an evil for the dead if they no longer (...) exist to suffer it? When is death an evil for the one who dies? The ability to give such answers is a significant, but by no means decisive, advantage for the growing block view of time. (shrink)

BackgroundThe state of the world is one with scarce medical resources where longevity is not equally distributed. Given such facts, setting priorities in health entails making difficult yet unavoidable decisions about which lives to save. The business of saving lives works on the assumption that longevity is valuable and that an early death is worse than a late death. There is a vast literature on health priorities and badness of death, separately. Surprisingly, there has been little cross-fertilisation (...) between the academic fields of priority setting and badness of death. Our aim is to connect philosophical discussions on the badness of death to contemporary debates in health priorities.DiscussionTwo questions regarding death are especially relevant to health priorities. The first question is why death is bad. Death is clearly bad for others, such as family, friends and society. Many philosophers also argue that death can be bad for those who die. This distinction is important for health priorities, because it concerns our fundamental reasons for saving lives. The second question is, ‘When is the worst time to die?’ A premature death is commonly considered worse than a late death. Thus, the number of good life years lost seems to matter to the badness of death. Concerning young individuals, some think the death of infants is worse than the death of adolescents, while others have contrary intuitions. Our claim is that to prioritise between age groups, we must consider the question of when it is worst to die.ConclusionsDeprivationism provides a more plausible approach to health priorities than Epicureanism. If Deprivationism is accepted, we will have a firmer basis for claiming that individuals, in addition to having a health loss caused by morbidity, will have a loss of good life years due to mortality. Additionally, Deprivationism highlights the importance of age and values for health priorities. Regarding age, both variants of Deprivationism imply that stillbirths are included in the Global Burden of Disease. Finally, we suggest that the Time-Relative Interest Account may serve as an alternative to the discounting and age weighting previously applied in the Global Burden of Disease. (shrink)

In a moving examination of one of the most troubling issues of our time, Lonny Shavelson puts a human face on the legal and ethical discussions that surround assisted suicide. By recounting with great intimacy and compassion the personal histories of five terminally ill people, he exposes the depth and complexity of this explosive issue.

Against the backdrop of ancient, mediaeval and modern Catholic teaching prohibiting killing (the rule against killing), the question of assisted suicide and euthanasia is examined. In the past the Church has modified its initial repugnance for killing by developing specific guidelines for permitting killing under strict conditions. This took place with respect to capital punishment and a just war, for example. One wonders why in the least objectionable instance, when a person is already dying, suffering, and repeatedly requesting assistance in (...) dying, there is still such widespread condemnation of assisted suicide and euthanasia. In a Gedankexperiment, I suggest that certain stories of martyrdom in the history of the Christian Church shed some light on the role of taking one’s life, or putting one’s life in danger out of love. I further suggest that requesting assisted suicide and/or euthanasia from the motive of love of one’s family or care givers might possibly qualify as one instance of justifiable euthanasia, although I acknowledge that the Church will not be making changes in its stance any time soon. (shrink)

Duncan Purves has recently argued that death is harmful for the person who dies insofar as her life as a whole would have been more valuable for her if her death had not occurred. In response to the much-debated challenge of locating the harmfulness of death in time, Purves suggests a new approach to the challenge, which leads him to locate the harmfulness of death at times after death. In this reply, I show that (...) his attempt to address the challenge does not succeed. (shrink)

Duncan Purves has recently argued that death is harmful for the person who dies insofar as her life as a whole would have been more valuable for her if her death had not occurred. In response to the much-debated challenge of locating the harmfulness of death in time, Purves suggests a new approach to the challenge, which leads him to locate the harmfulness of death at times after death. In this reply, I show that (...) his attempt to address the challenge does not succeed. (shrink)

The Thought of Death and the Memory of War examines the career of Martin Heidegger’s concept of Being-toward-death. For Heidegger, the thought of death, the confrontation with the anxiety of death, reveals the path to a life authentically lived. His analysis of Being-toward-death exercised enormous influence over subsequent thinkers, from Sartre to Derrida, who both admired the power and originality of his thinking, but were confounded by its glaring oversight: the trenches and killing fields of (...) a war that had reached its culmination less than ten years before Being and Time’s publication in 1927. Even more glaring was Heidegger’s resolute and dismaying silence regarding the Holocaust in the years following World War II. Marc Crépon examines the efforts of philosophers and writers – Sartre, Levinas, Patocka, Ricœur, Semprun, and Derrida – to contend critically with Heidegger’s thought of death. But Crépon’s project is not simply or even primarily one of intellectual history. Critical engagement with Heidegger’s Being-toward-death reveals the extent to which political frontiers are grounded in mourning and in the demarcation between those who must be mourned and those whose deaths can be overlooked and ignored. The thought of death thus enables us to discern the contours of a moral and political community that, grounded in our shared mortality, is universal in its extension. The book concludes by examining how the media’s representations of death maintain the frontiers of mourning and thus “eclipse,” hide, or discourage the thought of death. (shrink)

In this collection of essays on the metaphysical issues pertaining to death, the meaning of life, and freedom of the will, John Martin Fischer argues that death can be a bad thing for the individual who dies. He defends the claim that something can be a bad thing--a misfortune--for an individual, even if he never experiences it as bad. Fischer also defends the commonsense asymmetry in our attitudes toward death and prenatal nonexistence: we are indifferent to the (...) time before we are born, but we regret that we do not live longer. Further, Fischer argues, that immortal life could be desirable, and shows how the defense of the badness of death and the goodness of immortality exhibit a similar structure; on Fischer's view, the badness of death and the goodness of life can be represented on spectra that display certain continuities. Building on Fischer's previous book, My Way a major aim of this volume is to show important connections between issues relating to life and death and issues relating to free will. More specifically, Fischer argues that we endow our lives with a certain distinctive kind of meaning--an irreducible narrative dimension of value--by exhibiting free will. Thus, in acting freely, we transform our lives so that our stories matter. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 46, Issue 3, pp 405 - 425 This article focuses on Heidegger’s reflection on death in Being and Time, on the question of whether death can be mine, on what the connection between death and mineness can tell us about schizophrenia, and on the relation between Heidegger’s talk of death and mineness and Derrida’s talk of mourning and mineness.

Jack Miles, a former member of the Society of Jesus (Jesuits), and Mark Taylor, a philosophical atheist, have both in different ways brought religious and philosophical concerns into the wider world. Approaching the end of their careers as well as the end of their lives, they were prompted by the advent of a deadly pandemic amid worldwide political crises to think through matters of "ultimate concern": what is the human self, embedded as it is in a cosmos of nonhuman and (...) artificial intelligences? Within this larger ecology, what is the meaning of individual death? And can philosophy help us intellectually, emotionally, and spiritually understand and accept our fundamental impermanence? The authors' sense of urgency about their impending mortality, the worth of a life, the grief of loss and what was left undone, the fragility of existence, the uncertainty of the ending permeate their conversations. Readers will be drawn into the inner lives, the hidden fears and emotions, the existential dread experienced by these two exceptional philosophers facing life's close in extraordinary times when both annihilation and revolutionary new beginnings seem equally possible. The authors glean insight from Kierkegaard and Weil, Dickinson and Baldwin, Nagarjuna and Mahavira, Bateson and El Greco, leavened with a little Gluck, Auden, Borges, Ella Fitzgerald, and Hamilton. Reminiscent of the intimate conversations in "My Dinner with Andre," they confront an unknown future. Combining the diary's closeness to the self with the reflection of the personal letter much as Karl Ove Knausgaard combines diary with novelistic realism, these two distinctive voices are uncompromising, immediate, and raw. At the book's end they decide that their dialogue "will continue to change us even after one of us, perhaps both of us, dies." Ghosts may not be holy spirits, but even an atheist can believe that they are real. (shrink)

What makes us the same person across time? The different solutions to this problem known as personal identity can be divided into two camps: A numerical and a practical approach. While the former asks for the conditions of identity based on the question “what is a person?,” the latter is concerned with what we identify with in everyday life as essential in order to form a narrative of one’s life as a whole based on the question “who am I?” (...) However, by emphasizing the cognitive and/or experiential capacities as the sole condition for self or personhood, both approaches fail to offer an adequate account of birth and death. The one being born is not yet someone with such cognitive capacities and the one who dies is unable to experience his or her own death. By invoking conceptual frameworks of Kierkegaard and Romano, I argue that birth and death must be considered both as events and conditions constitutive of personal identity rather than a set of derivative problems arising from an already established definition of self or person. (shrink)

I argue that attempts to explain the badness of death as a deprivation to the person who dies fail to defeat the ancient Epicurean argument that death is bad for us even. At the same time, I argue that the deprivation account of the badness of death provides a way for us to understand how death can be bad for the person who dies. In support of this paradoxical thesis I invoke a distinction between momentary (...) well-being and narrative well-being—a distinction which, while not entirely new, is insufficiently developed in the literature. (shrink)

Most philosophers in the death literature believe that death can be bad for the person who dies. The most popular view of death’s badness—namely, deprivationism—holds that death is bad for the person who dies because, and to the extent that, it deprives them of the net good that they would have accrued, had their actual death not occurred. Deprivationists thus face the challenge of locating the time that death is bad for a person. (...) This is known as the Timing Problem, which is thought to be one of the biggest challenges facing views holding that death can be bad for the person who dies. Every possible answer to this question has been defended in the literature, yet each answer can seemingly be shown to be subject to compelling objections. In this paper, I argue that the force of the Timing Problem is illusory. Specifically, I argue that the problem, as formulated in the literature, is underspecified. Any adequately precise form of the question ‘When is death bad for the person who dies?’ is one to which there is a clear, decisive, and unproblematic answer. (shrink)

With "Literature and the Right to Death", Blanchot makes his most sustained contribution to the debate initiated in France by Kojeve and Hippolyte concerning Hegel's philosophy. At times Blanchot's reading is forced and idiosyncratic. Yet this reading has another motivation than the succinct and faithful paraphrase of the earlier thinker. Arguably Blanchot positions himself within Hegel’s terminology in order to rethink the sense of the expression 'the philosophy of art'. What is with Hegel an objective genitive becomes a subjective (...) genitive. The rules therefore change. Whereas Hegel offers in his lectures on aesthetics an expatiation on art fixed under the gaze of philosophy, Blanchot installs art as the subject and submits the conventions and expectations of philosophical discourse to its procedures. In the light of this reversal, what might otherwise be judged a deviation or a lapse with respect to the genre of the philosophical essay can be seen to play its role in Blanchot's reassessment of the relations between metaphysics and literature. (shrink)

We may at last as a society beginning to talk about death or at least to appreciate the need to come to terms with it, so that we may confront and accept it. The possibility of violent sudden death, as mirrored in the Port Arthur and Dunblane mass murders, has thrown up for us in recent months the feelings of finality and despair that death so often brings. At the same time, modern medicine and its technologies, (...) which can postpone or suspend dying, bring us another set of questions. Our laws, our beliefs, our science, our history, our myths, and the way our culture, social and political, is organised: all of these reflect and have a bearing on how we approach the subject. The essays in this book examine death, dying, assisted death and euthanasia from a number of perspectives. They are not exhaustive, but they explore some of the opinions, some of the deeply held ethical beliefs and fears about death and loss of control over oneself, and some of the questions posed about compassion and the value and dignity of human life. Leading Australian and overseas thinkers present a variety of theological, ethical and medical perspectives to provide a balanced and challenging view of complex issues. (shrink)

In a previous paper, we argued that death's badness consists in the deprivation of pleasurable experiences which one would have had, had one died later rather than at the time of one's actual death. Thus, we argued that death can be a bad thing for the individual who dies, even if it is an experiential blank. But there is a pressing objection to this view, for if the view is correct, then it seems that it should (...) also be the case that it is a bad thing for a person that he is born when he actually is born, rather than earlier. That is, if the deprivation account is the correct account of death's badness, then it appears that one should have symmetric attitudes to prenatal and posthumous nonexistence. But clearly we do not in general have symmetric attitudes toward the period before our birth and the period after our death; in general, we do not think of our late births as a bad thing, but we can indeed consider our early deaths as bad for us. Thus, it appears that there is a problem for the deprivation account of death's badness. (shrink)

Technology tends toward perpetual innovation. Technology, enabled by both political and economic structures, propels society forward in a kind of technological evolution. The moment a novel piece of technology is in place, immediately innovations are attempted in a process of unending betterment. Bernard Stiegler suggests that, contra Heidegger, it is not being-toward-death that shapes human perception of time, life, death, and meaning. Rather, it is technological innovation that shapes human perception of time, life, death, and (...) meaning. In fact, for Stiegler, human evolution has always been part of technological evolution. While one can quibble with the notion of human-technology co-evolution, there is something to be said for the way in which human perception of time, of ageing, and of death seems to be judged against the horizon of perpetual evolution of technological innovation. In this technological imaginary, of which modern medicine is constituent, ageing and death seemingly may be infinitely deferred, and it is this innovating deferral that shapes the contemporary social imaginary around ageing and death in modern medicine. Yet, the reality of living and dying always manifests itself differently than the scripts given to us by the technological imaginary with its myth of endless innovation. In fact, I shall argue that, where the Church created an ars moriendi, the technological imaginary gives us an ars ad mortem when it becomes clear that ageing and death cannot be infinitely deferred. And further, I shall argue that the Church must revivify its ars vivendi—that is to say, its liturgies, its arts, its technics—as a counter narrative to the myth of perpetual innovation that shapes the technological imaginary. (shrink)

Every July, when new resident physicians arrive at our teaching hospital, a colleague reminds them that “You now work in the train station of the gods. People coming and going all the time. You’ll need to ask spiritual questions.” He can offer this counsel annually because—whether it arrives early, as expected, or in error—every one of us is awaiting her departing train. Every few years, an experienced physician-writer offers counsel on what it means to work in these train stations, (...) to tend to people as they die in contemporary hospitals. The physician-writer often describes the equivalent of train wrecks—harried and heedless deaths—and sounds a call for reform. The call is answered, in part, by... (shrink)

Because complex organs taken from unequivocally dead people are not suitable for transplantation, human death has been redefined so that it can be certified at some earlier stage in the dying process and thereby make viable organs available without legal problems. Redefinitions based on concepts of "brain death" have underpinned transplant practice for many years although those concepts have never found universal philosophical acceptance. Neither is there consensus about the clinical tests which have been held sufficient to diagnose (...) the irreversible cessation of all brain function – or as much of it as is deemed relevant – while the body remains alive. For these reasons, the certification of death for transplant purposes on "brain death" grounds is increasingly questioned and there has been pressure to return to its diagnosis on the basis of cardiac arrest and the consequent cessation of blood circulation throughout the body. While superficially a welcome return to the traditional and universally accepted understanding of human death, examination of the protocols using such criteria for the diagnosis of death prior to organ removal reveals a materially different scenario in which the circulatory arrest is not certainly final and purely nominal periods of arrest are required before surgery begins. Recognizing the probably unresolvable conflict between allowing enough time to pass after truly final circulatory arrest for a safe diagnosis of death and its minimization for the sake of the wanted organs, Verheijde and colleagues follow others in calling for the abandonment of the "dead donor rule" and the enactment of legislation to permit the removal of organs from the dying, without pretence that they are dead before that surgery. While it may be doubted whether such a "paradigm change" in the ethics of organ procurement would be accepted by society, their call for its consideration as a fully and fairly informed basis for organ donation is to be applauded. (shrink)

This article deals with the problem of death and the end of art. The discourse on the subject is still ongoing only due to the authority of Hegel, several contemporary authors and above all – this is my main thesis – a metaphorical projection inscribed in our language and the concept of art itself. This allows us to perceive organic features in art, thus contributing to the ease with which one can formulate a thesis on end or death. (...) However, as I point out, these categories become highly problematic when any artistic phenomenon is described. The aim of the paper is to shed the light on these metaphors. (shrink)

It is with gratitude to Professor Wilkinson that I assemble these thoughts to the beautiful and haunting melodies of Schubert’s String Quartet No. 14. In the practice of paediatric palliative care, the wavering tension between the Maiden’s Cry and Death’s Response, that dance between hope and despair, unfolds daily in similarly beautiful and haunting ways. Schubert’s interpretation of the dialogue offers welcome connection across time and space. In that context, Wilkinson takes on the challenging question of what it (...) means for children to die well or to die poorly. Through examples of deaths that went poorly, he explores the many ways that death and dying can be bad. From the loss of valuable future life to the presence of pain and suffering, to the manner of dying being contrary to an individual’s wishes, to the negative impacts of a bad death on family members, caregivers and clinicians, each element that may contribute to a bad death is addressed. He then looks to the opposite of those bad elements to illuminate what makes a good death or dying process, and suggests a temporal consideration for evaluating a death’s relative value: ‘sometimes it would be better to die sooner rather than later, because longer existence would not in any meaningful way …. (shrink)

This book challenges fundamental doctrines of established medical ethics. It is argued that the routine practice of stopping life support technology causes the death of patients and that donors of vital organs (hearts, liver, lungs, and both kidneys) are not really dead at the time that their organs are removed for life-saving transplantation. Although these practices are ethically legitimate, they are not compatible with traditional medical ethics: they conflict with the norms that doctors must not intentionally cause the (...) death of their patients and that vital organs can be obtained only from dead donors. The aim of this book is to undertake an ethical examination that aims to honestly face the reality of medical practices at the end of life. This involves exposing the misconception that stopping life support merely allows patients to die from their medical conditions, that there is an ethical bright line separating withdrawal of life support from active euthanasia, and that determination of death of hospitalized patients prior to vital organ donation is consistent with the established biological conception of death. A novel ethical justification is required for procuring vital organs from still-living donors. It is contended that in the context of plans to withdraw life support, donors of vital organs are not harmed or wronged by organ procurement prior to death, provided that valid consent is obtained for stopping treatment and organ donation. In view of serious practical difficulties in facing the truth regarding organ donation, an alternative pragmatic account is developed for justifying current practices that relies on the concept of transparent legal fictions. In sum, it is the thesis of this book that to preserve the legitimacy of end-of-life practices, we need to reconstruct medical ethics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A New Look at Animal-to-Human Organ TransplantationCharles R. McCarthy (bio)The acute shortage of organs available for transplantation into human beings combined with a new scientific understanding of the immune systems of both humans and animals make it probable that animal-to-human solid organ transplants (xenografts) may soon be attempted at a frequency rate unknown in the past. 1 Optimism about successful animal-to-human organ transplantation is greater than at any previous (...) time. The creation of a reliable supply of animal organs appears to be technically feasible. At least five major transplant centers in the United States are currently considering plans to pursue xenotransplantation. Although, at the time of this writing, no federal guidelines prohibit animal-to-human organ transplantation, the institutions considering such programs are awaiting deliberations on the subject by the Institute of Medicine (IOM), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).The demand for organs suitable for transplantation into human beings greatly exceeds the supply. According to the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS 1996a), approximately 44,000 patients in the United states awaited organ transplantation at the end of 1995. In 1994, more than 3,000 patients died while on the transplant waiting list, and the demand for transplantable organs increases annually (UNOS 1996b). The figures do not include the hundreds or perhaps thousands of patients who could profit from a transplant, but who do not meet the requirements of the UNOS waiting list. Even if efforts to persuade persons to donate organs are redoubled, and even if the consent to donate organs should become a legal presumption, there is little prospect of developing a sufficient supply of transplantable human organs to meet the growing demand.As technical and biological barriers to successful animal-to-human xenografts are lowered, the prospect of raising dedicated colonies of animals, genetically altered to reduce the chances that human hosts will reject organs derived from them, is being seriously discussed. 2 Such colonies do not exist at the present time. [End Page 183] However, if new techniques for animal-to-human transplantation prove successful, it is likely that animal colonies will be established to provide a ready and predictable supply of organs for transplantation to humans. Some believe that commercial investment in colonies of purpose-bred animals to serve as a source of transplantable organs is close at hand (Leventhal 1994).New drugs and new combinations of existing drugs have improved the chances of successful medical outcomes for patients who receive solid organ transplants. It is now recognized that serial application of immunosuppressive drugs can reduce the likelihood of both short- and long-term organ rejection (Makowka 1994). Improved understanding of both human and animal immune systems, insights into histocompatibility, new agents to control graft-versus-host disease, animal breeding programs for the production of transgenic animals, and improved surgical techniques have opened, as never before, the possibility of successful transfer of organs from animals to humans. Some rate the chances of good patient outcomes (usually measured in terms of time of patient survival) as high, others make more conservative predictions, but virtually all experts believe that the chances for successful human patient outcomes resulting from xenotransplantation are improved. Because many patients face immanent death unless their organs can be replaced, there can be little doubt that many humans will readily consent to xenotransplantation.History Suggests CautionDespite the advances in immunosuppression, the frequency of failure in past animal-to-human xenograft attempts should temper the optimism of the transplant community. To date, all efforts to prolong human life by implanting solid organs from animals into human recipients have failed. The first attempts at animal-to-human xenotransplantation early in the twentieth century resulted in the early death of all recipients (Neuhof 1923). More sophisticated efforts at xenotransplantation occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a period when anti-rejection drugs began to make allografts more feasible. Although one human recipient of a xenograft survived for nine months (with poor quality of life), most patients died within a matter of minutes, hours, or a few days following the transplantation of organs from chimpanzees or baboons (Starzl... (shrink)

The paper develops an understanding of empathy by considering the role of time in distinct empathic situations. Beginning with a brief review of the history of the concept of empathy the argument proceeds to the notion that empathy entails the universalization of an individual's experience. This results in the domination of the experience of the other by appeal to what is termed the "always." Depth psychology, especially in its Jungian form, shows us that empathy can in fact take this (...) highly negative form by way of projection. The association of empathy and projection brings us to the question of how one confronts the death of the other in an empathic manner. Here the problem of one's individual temporality becomes crucial. In order to retain the unique and the personal experience of one's own death as a prospect in the future it is necessary to overcome any empathic relationship to the person who has died. This necessity gives rise to a hermeneutic of empathy which seeks to overcome the experience of the "always." CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Those who endorse the view that death is in some cases bad for the deceased—a view that, as I shall explain, has considerable bearing on many bioethical issues—need to address the following, Epicurean question: When is death bad for the one who dies? The two most popular answers are "before death" (priorism) and "after death" (subsequentism). Part of the support for these two views consists in the idea that a third answer, "at no time" (atemporalism), (...) makes death unsatisfyingly different from other evils. I argue that this objection is mistaken, and that priorism and subsequentism face problems that atemporalism avoids. Moreover, I argue that if it is nonetheless insisted that we must find a time at which my death is bad for me, we can appeal to periods that begin before my death and end after my death. I end with some implications for posthumous harm. (shrink)

Long-term cancer survivorship is an emerging field that focuses on physical late-effects and psychosocial implications for the inflicted. This study wishes to cast light on the underlying ontological aspect of long-term survivorship by philosophically exploring how being in life post cancer is perceived by survivors. Sixteen in-depth interviews with 14 Danish cancer survivors were conducted by the author. Having faced a life-threatening disease but no longer being in imminent danger of dying, survivors still considered death a defining yet dynamic (...) component in their approach to life as a moving toward the end, sparking a sense of vitality in mortality. In order to unfold the interviewees’ renewed existential understanding post cancer, this study employs Martin Heidegger’s ontological analysis of death. In survivorship, my participants can thus be understood as being left with the perpetual choice between living in inauthenticity or in authenticity. The difference between the two modes of existence exhibits two diverging ways of relating to death, self, and being-in-the-world. At the same time, the role of death in long-term survivorship reflects back on the magnitude of the initial existential and moral upheaval triggered by the cancer diagnosis. Understanding the role of death in long-term survivorship can positively inform the field of cancer rehabilitation and long-term survivor care. (shrink)

Death in bliss & bliss in death. Samadhi death means that at the time of death the dying one remembers nothing but his Soul. His mind, his chit, his intellect, and his ego are completely still. This is external bliss. Even problems created by external forces on his body have no effect on him. Samadhi death means there is a constant awareness of, 'I am the pure Soul.' All my mahatmas, those who have received (...) my Gnan, who have passed away, did so with the awareness of being the pure Soul. - Dadashri. (shrink)

For centuries people have debated the nature of the human self. Running beneath these various arguments lie three certainties - we are born, reproduce sexually, and die. The models of spirituality which dominate the Western tradition have claimed that it is possible to transcend these aspects of human physicality by ascribing to human beings alternative traits, such as consciousness, mind and reason. By locating the essence of human life outside its basic physical features, mortality itself has come to be viewed (...) as a problem, for it appears to render human life both meaningless and absurd. Complex connections have then been made between the key features of life: sex is linked with death, and birth becomes the event that introduces the child to the world of decay - and ultimately to death itself. This fascinating book exposes the way in which the preoccupation with transcendence in both religious and secular thinking has distorted our sense of what it is to be human. At the same time, Sex and Death offers an alternative approach to the debate, based on an acceptance of mortality that emphasizes the depth and profundity possible in human life. It is an argument which will be essential reading for students of philosophy or religion, as well as the general reader interested in these debates. (shrink)

From Pulitzer Prize-finalist Steven Nadler, an engaging guide to what Spinoza can teach us about life’s big questions In 1656, after being excommunicated from Amsterdam’s Portuguese-Jewish community for “abominable heresies” and “monstrous deeds,” the young Baruch Spinoza abandoned his family’s import business to dedicate his life to philosophy. He quickly became notorious across Europe for his views on God, the Bible, and miracles, as well as for his uncompromising defense of free thought. Yet the radicalism of Spinoza’s views has long (...) obscured that his primary reason for turning to philosophy was to answer one of humanity’s most urgent questions: How can we lead a good life and enjoy happiness in a world without a providential God? In Think Least of Death, Pulitzer Prize–finalist Steven Nadler connects Spinoza’s ideas with his life and times to offer a compelling account of how the philosopher can provide a guide to living one’s best life. In the Ethics, Spinoza presents his vision of the ideal human being, the “free person” who, motivated by reason, lives a life of joy devoted to what is most important—improving oneself and others. Untroubled by passions such as hate, greed, and envy, free people treat others with benevolence, justice, and charity. Focusing on the rewards of goodness, they enjoy the pleasures of this world, but in moderation. “The free person thinks least of all of death,” Spinoza writes, “and his wisdom is a meditation not on death but on life." An unmatched introduction to Spinoza’s moral philosophy, Think Least of Death shows how his ideas still provide valuable insights about how to live today. (shrink)

Introduction: The COVID-19 pandemic is asking health care workers to meet extraordinary challenges. In turn, HCWs were experiencing tremendous psycho-social crisis as they have had to deal with unexpected emotional requirements arising from caring for suffering and dying patients on a daily basis. In that context, recent studies have highlighted how HCWs working during the COVID-19 outbreak manifested extreme emotional and behavioral reactions that may have impacted their mental health, increasing the risk for developing post-traumatic stress symptoms.Purpose: The aim of (...) the study was to investigate post-traumatic stress symptoms, such as intrusion symptoms, as a potential mediator of the link between ERs and crying at work, and whether rumination moderates the relationship between ERs and intrusion-based PTS symptoms among HCWs who have had to deal with patients dying from COVID-19.Methods: An online cross-sectional study design was performed. A total of 543 Italian HCWs participated in the study. Participation was voluntary and anonymous. We used the SPSS version of bootstrap-based PROCESS macro for testing the moderated mediation model.Results: ERs had an indirect effect on crying at work through the mediating role of intrusion symptoms. Results from the moderated mediation model showed that rumination moderated the indirect effect of ERs on crying at work via intrusion symptoms, and this effect was significant only for high rumination. Furthermore, when we tested for an alternative model where rumination moderates the direct effect of ERs on crying at work, this moderation was not significant.Conclusions: As the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic is ongoing, there is an urgent need for decision-makers to rapidly implement interventions aimed at offering timely psychological support to HCWs, especially in those contexts where the risk of emotional labor associated to patients dying from COVID-19 is higher. (shrink)

Killing Times begins with the deceptively simple observation—made by Jacques Derrida in his seminars on the topic—that the death penalty mechanically interrupts mortal time by preempting the typical mortal experience of not knowing at what precise moment we will die. Through a broader examination of what constitutes mortal temporality, David Wills proposes that the so-called machinery of death summoned by the death penalty works by exploiting, or perverting, the machinery of time that is already attached (...) to human existence. Time, Wills argues, functions for us in general as a prosthetic technology, but the application of the death penalty represents a new level of prosthetic intervention into what constitutes the human. Killing Times traces the logic of the death penalty across a range of sites. Starting with the legal cases whereby American courts have struggled to articulate what methods of execution constitute “cruel and unusual punishment,” Wills goes on to show the ways that technologies of death have themselves evolved in conjunction with ideas of cruelty and instantaneity, from the development of the guillotine and the trap door for hanging, through the firing squad and the electric chair, through today’s controversies surrounding lethal injection. Responding to the legal system’s repeated recourse to storytelling—prosecutors’ and politicians’ endless recounting of the horrors of crimes—Wills gives a careful eye to the narrative, even fictive spaces that surround crime and punishment. Many of the controversies surrounding capital punishment, Wills argues, revolve around the complex temporality of the death penalty: how its instant works in conjunction with forms of suspension, or extension of time; how its seeming correlation between egregious crime and painless execution is complicated by a number of different discourses. By pinpointing the temporal technology that marks the death penalty, Wills is able to show capital punishment’s expansive reach, tracing the ways it has come to govern not only executions within the judicial system, but also the opposed but linked categories of the suicide bombing and drone warfare. In discussing the temporal technology of death, Wills elaborates the workings both of the terrorist who produces a simultaneity of crime and “punishment” that bypasses judicial process, and of the security state, in whose remote-control killings the time-space coordinates of “justice” are compressed and at the same time disappear into the black hole of secrecy. Grounded in a deep ethical and political commitment to death penalty abolition, Wills’s engaging and powerfully argued book pushes the question of capital punishment beyond the confines of legal argument to show how the technology of capital punishment defines and appropriates the instant of death and reconfigures the whole of human mortality. (shrink)