Science can reinforce the healthy aspects of the politics of the policy process, to identify and further the public interest by discrediting policy options serving only special interests and helping to select among “science-confident” and “hedging” options. To do so, scientists must learn how to manage and communicate the degree of uncertainty in scientific understanding and prediction, lest uncertainty be manipulated to discredit science or to justify inaction. For natural resource and environmental policy, the institutional interests of government agencies, (...) as well as private interests, pose challenges of suppression, over-simplification, or distortion of scientific information. Scientists can combat these maneuvers, but must also look inward to ensure that their own special interests do not undermine the usefulness of science. (shrink)

Of this article's seven experiments, the first five demonstrate that virtually no Americans know the basic global warming mechanism. Fortunately, Experiments 2–5 found that 2–45 min of physical–chemical climate instruction durably increased such understandings. This mechanistic learning, or merely receiving seven highly germane statistical facts, also increased climate-change acceptance—across the liberal-conservative spectrum. However, Experiment 7's misleading statistics decreased such acceptance. These readily available attitudinal and conceptual changes through scientific information disconfirm what we term “stasis theory”—which some researchers and (...) many laypeople varyingly maintain. Stasis theory subsumes the claim that informing people about climate science may be largely futile or even counterproductive—a view that appears historically naïve, suffers from range restrictions, and/or misinterprets some polarization and correlational data. Our studies evidenced no polarizations. Finally, we introduce HowGlobalWarmingWorks.org—a website designed to directly enhance public “climate-change cognition.”. (shrink)

There has been some concern m recent years that economic interests in the biotechnology area could, particularly through patenting, have a constricting influence on scientific research. Despite this concern, there have been no studies of this phenomenon beyond isolated cases. In this article we examine the evolution of the biomedical field of hybridoma/monoclonal antibody research with detailed examples of the three types of patent claims that have emerged there—basic claims, claims on application techniques, and claims on specific antibodies. We (...) analyze the impact of these claims and their legal histories on the free flow of scientific information and, the activity of scientific researchers. We conclude that such patent claims present severe restrictions for both, not only in the monoclonal area but in general, amounting to a subtle but significant shift in the political economy of science and technology. (shrink)

Many urgent problems that societies currently face—from climate change to a global pandemic—require citizens to engage with scientific information as members of democratic societies as well as to solve problems in their personal lives. Most often, to solve their epistemic aims (aims directed at achieving knowledge and understanding) regarding such socio-scientific issues, individuals search for information online, where there exists a multitude of possibly relevant and highly interconnected sources of different perspectives, sometimes providing conflicting information. (...) The paper provides a review of the literature aimed at identifying (a) constraints and affordances that scientific knowledge and the online information environment entail and (b) individuals' cognitive and motivational processes that have been found to hinder, or conversely, support practices of engagement (such as critical information evaluation or two-sided dialogue). Doing this, a conceptual framework for understanding and fostering what we callonline engagement with scientific informationis introduced, which is conceived as consisting of individual engagement (engaging on one's own in the search, selection, evaluation, and integration of information) and dialogic engagement (engaging in discourse with others to interpret, articulate and critically examine scientific information). In turn, this paper identifies individual and contextual conditions for individuals' goal-directed and effortful online engagement with scientific information. (shrink)

We are inundated by scientific and statistical information, but what should we believe? How much should we trust the polls on the latest electoral campaign? When a physician tells us that a diagnosis of cancer is 90% certain or a scientist informs us that recent studies support global warming, what should we conclude? How can we acquire reliable statistical information? Once we have it, how do we evaluate it? Despite the importance of these questions to our lives, (...) many of us have only a vague idea of how to answer them. In this admirably clear and engaging book, Mark Battersby provides a practical guide to thinking critically about scientific and statistical information. The goal of the book is not only to explain how to identify misleading statistical information, but also to give readers the understanding necessary to evaluate and use statistical and statistically based scientific information in their own decision making. (shrink)

We are inundated by scientific and statistical information, but what should we believe? How much should we trust the polls on the latest electoral campaign? When a physician tells us that a diagnosis of cancer is 90% certain or a scientist informs us that recent studies support global warming, what should we conclude? How can we acquire reliable statistical information? Once we have it, how do we evaluate it? Despite the importance of these questions to our lives, (...) many of us have only a vague idea of how to answer them. In this admirably clear and engaging book, Mark Battersby provides a practical guide to thinking critically about scientific and statistical information. The goal of the book is not only to explain how to identify misleading statistical information, but also to give readers the understanding necessary to evaluate and use statistical and statistically based scientific information in their own decision making. (shrink)

El trabajo ofrece los requerimientos teórico-metodológicos para el desarrollo de habilidades en la obtención de información científica. Se parte del análisis teórico de la información como proceso y resultado de la interacción del sujeto con su realidad y de asumir las habilidades para obtener información científica dentro de las habilidades informativas que pueden potencialmente trabajarse a la luz de las diferentes disciplinas académicas. Finalmente se brindan los fundamentos metodológicos para la implementación de los procedimientos propuestos desde el proceso de enseñanza-aprendizaje (...) en estudiantes universitarios, encaminados a sistematizar las operaciones de estas habilidades genéricas comunes a toda profesión. The work offers the theoretical-methodological requirements for the development of skills in the obtaining of scientific information. It begins with the theoretical analysis of the information as a process and result of the interaction of the subject with the reality and of assuming the skills to obtain scientific information as a part of the informative skills which can be potentially worked by the light of the different academic disciplines. Finally the methodological foundations are offered for the implementation of the procedures proposed from the teaching-learning process in university students, guided to systematize the operations of these generic skills that are common to any profession. (shrink)

We know that since the Renaissance, scientific knowledge has increased exponentially. The amount of knowledge has now grown to colossal proportions and doubles every fifteen years . The question of digesting scientific information is acute. Even today its scope is such that assimilation of the accumulated knowledge even within a fairly narrow discipline has become virtually a lifetime undertaking for a scientist. It is also necessary to realize that modern science is developing quite rapidly at the junctions (...) of its branches, which makes it necessary to know adjacent and often quite remote disciplines. (shrink)

La actividad científico-informativa constituye un componente esencial de la actividad científica. Las etapas y tareas que la integran persiguen como propósito fundamental garantizar a los investigadores la información pertinente para el desarrollo exitoso de su trabajo. De ahí la necesidad de evaluar con periodicidad su comportamiento en las bibliotecas médicas. A partir de ello, el objetivo del estudio fue sistematizar los aspectos teórico-metodológicos correspondientes a la evaluación de la actividad científico- informativa en bibliotecas médicas. Para su realización se realizó revisión (...) bibliográfica en la que se analizaron tanto documentos normativos que rigen su accionar en el sector de la salud cubano, como materiales emitidos por otras instancias nacionales e internacionales. The informative work constitutes an essential component of the scientific work. The stages and tasks that comprise it pursue as fundamental purpose to ensure relevant information in order that researchers achieve the successful development of their work. Hence the need to assess regularly their behavior in the medical libraries. Based on that, the objective of the study was to systematize the methodological aspects relating to the evaluation of the scientific-informative work at the medical libraries. In order to accomplish this a broad literature review was made which analyzed both normative documents governing its actions in the Cuban health sector, as materials issued by other national and international bodies. (shrink)

To explain why, in scientific problem solving, a diagram can be “worth ten thousand words,” Jill Larkin and Herbert Simon (1987) relied on a computer model: two representations can be “informationally” equivalent but differ “computationally,” just as the same data can be encoded in a computer in multiple ways, more or less suited to different kinds of processing. The roots of this proposal lay in cognitive psychology, more precisely in the “imagery debate” of the 1970s on whether there are (...) image-like mental representations. Simon (1972, 1978) hoped to solve this debate by thoroughly reducing the differences between forms of mental representations (e.g., between images and sentences) to differences in computational efficiency; to carry out this reduction, he borrowed from computer science the concepts of data type and of data structure. I argue that, in the end, his account amounted to nothing more than characterizing representations by the fast operations on them. This analysis then allows me to assess what Simon’s approach actually achieves when transported from psychology to the study of scientific representations, as in Larkin and Simon (1987): it allows comparing, not representations in and of themselves, but rather the computational roles they play in particular problem-solving processes—that is, representations together with a particular way of using them. (shrink)

Many philosophers argue that the emphasis on commercializing scientific research---and particularly on patenting the results of research---is both epistemically and socially detrimental, in part because it inhibits the flow of information. One of the most important of these criticisms is the ``tragedy of the anticommons'' thesis. Some have attempted to test this thesis empirically, and many have argued that these empirical tests effectively falsify the thesis. I argue that they neither falsify nor disconfirm the thesis because they do (...) not actually test it. Additionally, I argue that there is other evidence that actually supports the thesis. (shrink)

How much should we trust the polls on the latest electoral campaign? When a physician tells us that a diagnosis of cancer is 90% certain or a nutritionist tells us what is healthy to eat, what should we believe? Questions such as these are greatly important, yet many of us have only a vague sense of how to answer them. In _Is That a Fact?_, Mark Battersby aims not only to explain how to identify misleading statistics and research, but also (...) to give readers the understanding necessary to evaluate and use statistical information in their own decision making. This second edition is revised and updated throughout and includes a new chapter on weighing risk in personal and public decision making. (shrink)

This book investigates the interplay between two new and influential subdisciplines in the philosophy of science and philosophy: contemporary scientific metaphysics and the philosophy of information. Scientific metaphysics embodies various scientific realisms and has a partial intellectual heritage in some forms of neo-positivism, but is far more attuned than the latter to statistical science, theory defeasibility, scale variability, and pluralist ontological and explanatory commitments, and is averse to a-priori conceptual analysis. The philosophy of information is (...) the combination of what has been called the informational turn in philosophy and ontology, with the informational turn in logic. The book explores the intersecting theoretical commitments and metaphysical basis of both. It applies scientific metaphysics to the philosophy of information, and also correspondingly proposes a new informational interpretation of scientific metaphysics. These are applied to numerous outstanding ontological, philosophical, and theoretical problems in the philosophy of information, scientific realism, cognitive science, theories of semantic information, and informational logic. The book investigates known and new problems, and advances debates and insights in the philosophy of information. It will be of interest to philosophers of information and science, metaphysicians, and cognitive scientists. (shrink)

The informational nature of biological organization, at levels from the genetic and epigenetic to the cognitive and linguistic.

Recent work in the philosophy of science has generated an apparent conflict between theories attempting to explicate the nature of scientific representation. On one side, there are what one might call 'informational' views, which emphasize objective relations (such as similarity, isomorphism, and homomorphism) between representations (theories, models, simulations, diagrams, etc.) and their target systems. On the other side, there are what one might call 'functional' views, which emphasize cognitive activities performed in connection with these targets, such as interpretation and (...) inference. The main sources of the impression of conflict here are arguments by some functionalists to the effect that informational theories are flawed: it is suggested that relations typically championed by informational theories are neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific representation, and that any theory excluding functions is inadequate. In this paper I critically examine these arguments, and contend that, as it turns out, informational and functional theories are importantly complementary. (shrink)

In the history of genetics, the information-theoretical description of the gene, beginning in the early 1960s, had a significant effect on the concept of the gene. Information is a highly complex metaphor which is applicable in view of the description of substances, processes, and spatio-temporal organisation. Thus, information can be understood as a functional particle of many different language games (some of them belonging to subdisciplines of genetics, as the biochemical language game, some of them belonging to (...) linguistics and informatics). It is this wide covering of different language games that justifies the common description of genes x, y, z as containing information for the phenotypic traits X, Y, Z (or the genome as storage for the information of a whole organism). However, if information is taken as the explanans and phenotypic traits or organisms as the explananda, then a description of the explanandum is of prior importance before the explanans can be characterised. This way of thinking could be useful for future discussions on the strikingly dominant information -metaphor, and the different gene concepts as well. The article illustrates this in two steps. First, a condensed overview on the history of genetics is given, which can be divided into three parts: (1) genetics without genes, (2) genetics with genes, but without information, (3) genetics with genes and information. It is assumed that this provides not only some historical knowledge about the origin of genetics and the introduction of technical terms, but offers at least preliminary insight into the methodological structure of genetic descriptions. In a second step, we redraw Spemann’s disturbation experiments to discuss our thesis that genetic information is not a natural entity, but part of a causality-language game which is secondarily added to the descriptions of interventionalistic practices, viz. experimental approaches. (shrink)

We present an information theoretic account of models as scientific representations, where scientific models are understood as information carrying artifacts. We propose that the semantics of models should be based on this information coupling of the model to the world. The information theoretic account presents a way of avoiding the need to refer to agents' intentions as constitutive of the semantics of scientific representations, and it provides a naturalistic account of model semantics, which (...) can deal with the problems of asymmetry, relevance and circularity that afflict other currently popular naturalistic proposals. (shrink)

Information is a basic structure of the world, while computation is a process of the dynamic change of information. This book provides a cutting-edge view of world's leading authorities in fields where information and computation play a central role. It sketches the contours of the future landscape for the development of our understanding of information and computation, their mutual relationship and the role in cognition, informatics, biology, artificial intelligence, and information technology. -/- This book is (...) an utterly enjoyable and engaging read which gives readers an opportunity to understand and relate phenomena seemingly unrelated in a completely new light — especially the connections between information, computation, cognition and life. -/- Contents: Cybersemiotics and the Question of Knowledge (Søren Brier) Information Dynamics in a Categorical Setting (Mark Burgin) Mathematics as a Biological Process (G J Chaitin) Information, Causation and Computation (John Collier) From Descartes to Turing: The Computational Content of Supervenience (S Barry Cooper) A Dialogue Concerning Two World Systems: Info-Computational vs Mechanistic (Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic & Vincent C Müller) Does Computing Embrace Self-Organization? (Wolfgang Hofkirchner) Analysis of Information and Computation in Physics Explains Cognitive Paradigms: From Full Cognition to Laplace Determinism to Statistical Determinism to Modern Approach (Vladik Kreinovich, Roberto Araiza & Juan Ferret) Bodies — Both Informed and Transformed Embodied Computation and Information Processing (Bruce J MacLennan) Computation on Information, Meaning and Representations: An Evolutionary Approach (Christophe Menant) Interior Grounding, Reflection, and Self-Consciousness (Marvin Minsky) A Molecular Dynamic Network: Minimal Properties and Evolutionary Implications (Walter Riofrio) Super-recursive Features of Evolutionary Processes and the Models for Computational Evolution (Darko Roglic) Towards a Modeling View of Computing (Oron Shagrir) What's Information, for an Organism or Intelligent Machine? How can a Machine or Organism Mean? (Aaron Sloman) Inconsistent Knowledge as a Natural Phenomenon: The Ranking of Reasonable Inferences as a Computational Approach to Naturally Inconsistent (Legal) Theories (Kees (CNJ) de Vey Mestdagh & Jaap Henk (JH) Hoepman) On the Algorithmic Nature of the World (Hector Zenil & Jean-Paul Delahaye) . (shrink)

Without doubt, there is a widespread usage of visualisations in science. However, what exactly the _epistemic status_ of these visual representations in science may be remains an open question. In the following, I will argue that at least some scientific visualisations are indispensible for our cognitive processes. My thesis will be that, with regard to the activity of _learning_, visual representations are of relevance in the sense of contributing to the aim of _scientific_ _understanding_. Taking into account that understanding (...) can be regarded as an epistemic desideratum in its own right, I will argue that, at least in some instances, no understanding can be achieved without the aid of visualisations. Consequently, they are of crucial importance in this process. Moreover, to support this thesis we will make use of some findings in educational psychology. (shrink)

The objective of this thesis is to present a naturalised metaphysics of information, or to naturalise information, by way of deploying a scientific metaphysics according to which contingency is privileged and a-priori conceptual analysis is excluded (or at least greatly diminished) in favour of contingent and defeasible metaphysics. The ontology of information is established according to the premises and mandate of the scientific metaphysics by inference to the best explanation, and in accordance with the idea (...) that the primacy of physics constraint accommodates defeasibility of theorising in physics. This metametaphysical approach is used to establish a field ontology as a basis for an informational structural realism. This is in turn, in combination with information theory and specifically mathematical and algorithmic theories of information, becomes the foundation of what will be called a source ontology, according to which the world is the totality of information sources. Information sources are to be understood as causally induced configurations of structure that are, or else reduce to and/or supervene upon, bounded (including distributed and non-contiguous) regions of the heterogeneous quantum field (all quantum fields combined) and fluctuating vacuum, all in accordance with the above-mentioned quantum field-ontic informational structural realism (FOSIR.) Arguments are presented for realism, physicalism, and reductionism about information on the basis of the stated contingent scientific metaphysics. In terms of philosophical argumentation, realism about information is argued for primarily by way of an indispensability argument that defers to the practice of scientists and regards concepts of information as just as indispensable in their theories as contingent representations of structure. Physicalism and reductionism about information are adduced by way of the identity thesis that identifies the substance of the structure of ontic structural realism as identical to selections of structure existing in re to combined heterogeneous quantum fields, and to the total heterogeneous quantum field comprised of all such fields. Adjunctly, an informational statement of physicalism is arrived at, and a theory of semantic information is proposed, according to which information is intrinsically semantic and alethically neutral. (shrink)

Purpose The search for cause of death is important to improve knowledge and provide answers for the relatives of the deceased. Medical autopsy following unexplained death in hospital is one way to identify cause of death but is difficult to carry out routinely. Post mortem sampling (PMS) of tissues via thin biopsy needle or ‘mini incisions’ in the skin may be a useful alternative. A study was undertaken to assess how this approach is perceived by intensive care doctors and also (...) to evaluate how this practice is considered in ethical terms in France. Methods A study of PMS practices immediately after death in 10 intensive care departments was performed. The medical director of each centre was interviewed by telephone and asked to describe practices in their unit and to outline the questions raised by this practice. Results PMS is routinely performed in 70% of the units which responded, without systematically obtaining formal consent and without precise rules for communicating results. Approaches to PMS differed between centres, but all physicians felt that PMS is useful for the scientific information it gives and also for the information it provides for relatives. All physicians regret the lack of standards to structure PMS practices. Conclusion Information from post mortem examinations is important for society to inform about causes of death, for doctors to improve practices and for decision-makers responsible for organising care. Debate persists regarding the balance between individual rights and community interests. It is suggested that an approach for identifying cause of death could easily be integrated into the relationship between carers and relatives, provided full transparency is maintained. (shrink)

Knowledge does not exist as an isolated “piece” of knowledge. Knowledge exists in an aggregated collective state. I define knowledge as a capacity for social action and as a model for reality, as the possibility to set “something in motion”, for example, to solve a task, to produce a material object such as a semiconductor chip or to be competent to prevent something from occurring, for example, the onset of an illness. In this sense, knowledge is a universal human phenomenon, (...) or an anthropological constant. This definition of the term “knowledge” is indebted to Francis Bacon’s famous observation that knowledge is power, a somewhat misleading translation of Bacon’s Latin phrase: scientia potential est. A basic assumption should be that knowledge is not a priori practical. The transformation of knowledge as an ability to act into practical knowledge requires congenial circumstances, such as power or authority that dictates the concrete conditions for action. In this con text, it is helpful to ask about the increasingly prominent role of algorithms (intellectual technology) in relation to knowledge such as ChatGPT software as well as contentious issue of the relation/difference between knowledge and information. (shrink)

The ideal of scientific openness — i.e. the idea that scientific information should be freely accessible to interested parties — is strongly supported throughout the scientific community. At the same time, however, this ideal does not appear to be absolute in the everyday practice of science. In order to get the credit for new scientific advances, scientists often keep information to themselves. Also, it is common practice to withhold information obtained in commissioned research (...) when the scientist has agreed with his or her employer to do so. The secrecy may be intended for ever, as in the military area, but also temporarily until a patent application has been made. The paper explores to what extent such secrecy is undesirable, as seems to be suggested by the ideal of scientific openness. Should this ideal be interpreted as having certain exceptions which make the above-mentioned practices acceptable? Are there, on closer inspection, good arguments for the ideal of scientific openness, and for officially upholding it? Possible versions of the ideal of scientific openness are explored and the issue is found to be rather complex, allowing for wide variations depending on the acting parties, beneficiaries, types of information and moral requirements involved. We conclude that the arguments usually given in favour of this ideal are weaker than what seems to be generally believed, and that, on closer inspection, they leave plenty of room for exceptions to it. These exceptions only partly cover the actual practice of withholding scientific information, and there may still be good reason to advocate, teach and enforce the ideal of scientific openness within the scientific community. (shrink)

In the early and mid-twentieth century, scientific conferences were a popular tool to establish communication between scientists. Organisational efforts, research and funds were spent defining what makes a productive and successful scientific gathering. A unique example of this was the monitoring and evaluation system of the Gordon Research Conferences (GRCs), which conceptualized informal communication in small, specialized meetings as the best method of advancing cutting-edge research. Studying the detailed monitoring reports of the sessions and the evaluation forms filled (...) by the participants, this paper explores how a concrete format of scientific knowledge production and identity formation was created and reproduced. The normative assessment of the participants’ interactions is examined in the contexts of (a) their professional affiliations, (b) the conference presentations and discussions and (c) activities related to play. The study of the GRCs exemplifies how scientists actively conceptualised characteristics like academic affiliation, manners, leisure practices and social categories such as gender as ways to understand, describe and measure how knowledge is best produced and transmitted, turning the conferences into a fertile ground for meta-scientific reflections. (shrink)

Theories of epistemology make reference—via the perspective of an observer—to the structure of information transfer, which generates reality, of which the observer himself forms a part. It can be shown that any epistemological approach which implies the participation of tautological structural elements in the information transfer necessarily leads to an antinomy. Nevertheless, since the time of Aristotle the paradigm of mathematics—and thus tautological structure—has always been a hidden ingredient in the various concepts of knowledge acquisition or general theories (...) of information transfer. We hold that Darwin's Evolutionary Theory is the first scientific theory which consistently presupposes a non-tautological structure for the information transfer and, at the same time, keeps it strictly distinct from the tautological metric of scientific observation. The consequences of this technique—namely the dissociation of information from intentionality—have not yet been fully drawn. Erkenntnistheorien beziehen sich über die Perspektive eines Beobachters auf die Struktur des Informationstransfers, der die Realität erzeugt, von der der Beobachter selbst ein Element ist. Man kann zeigen, dass jeder erkenntnistheoretische Ansatz, der an diesem Transfer von Information tautologische Strukturelemente teilnehmen lässt, zu einer Antinomie führt. Dennoch bilden das Paradigma der Mathematik—und damit tautologische Strukturen—seit Aristoteles einen festen Bestandteil von Erkenntnistheorien und generell von Theorien des Informationstransfers. Unserer These zufolge ist Darwins Evolutionstheorie die erste wissenschaftliche Theorie, die den Informations-transfer ausschließlich als nicht-tautologische Struktur auffasst und diese zugleich strikt von der tautologischen Struktur der Beobachtungsmetrik getrennt hält. Die Konsequenzen für die Erkenntnistheorie—namentlich die Trennung von Information und Intentionalitätsind bisher nicht gezogen worden. (shrink)

A powerful movement is afoot to create a national computerized system of health records. Advocates claim it could save the health delivery system billions of dollars and improve the quality of health services. According to Lawrence Gostin, a leading commentator on privacy and health records, this new infrastructure is “already under way and [has] an aura of inevitability.” When it is in place, almost any information that is viewed as relevant to a decision in the health care delivery system (...) would be available to a large and yet undetermined number of individuals. The transformation of the collection and communication of health information from texts housed by health care providers and facilities to data electronically transmitted through networks of linked computers has significant implications for confidentiality and for data collection in scientific research. The best evidence clearly indicates that most people in the United States consider confidentiality for health information important and worry that the increased computerization of health records will result in inappropriate disclosure. (shrink)

It is relatively easy to state that information retrieval is a scientific discipline but it is rather difficult to understand why it is science because what is science is still under debate in the philosophy of science. To be able to convince others that IR is science, our ability to explain why is crucial. To explain why IR is a scientific discipline, we use a theory and a model of scientific study, which were proposed recently. The (...) explanation involves mapping the knowledge structure of IR to that of well-known scientific disciplines like physics. In addition, the explanation involves identifying the common aim, principles and assumptions in IR and in well-known scientific disciplines like physics, so that they constrain the scientific investigation in IR in a similar way as in physics. Therefore, there are strong similarities in terms of the knowledge structure and the constraints of the scientific investigations between IR and scientific disciplines like physics. Based on such similarities, IR is considered a scientific discipline. (shrink)

Theories of epistemology make reference—via the perspective of an observer—to the structure of information transfer, which generates reality, of which the observer himself forms a part. It can be shown that any epistemological approach which implies the participation of tautological structural elements in the information transfer necessarily leads to an antinomy. Nevertheless, since the time of Aristotle the paradigm of mathematics—and thus tautological structure—has always been a hidden ingredient in the various concepts of knowledge acquisition or general theories (...) of information transfer. We hold that Darwin’s Evolutionary Theory is the first scientific theory which consistently presupposes a non-tautological structure for the information transfer and, at the same time, keeps it strictly distinct from the tautological metric of scientific observation. The consequences of this technique—namely the dissociation of information from intentionality—have not yet been fully drawn. (shrink)

Researchers in the biological and biomedical sciences, particularly those working in laboratories, use a variety of artifacts to help them perform their cognitive tasks. This paper analyses the relationship between researchers and cognitive artifacts in terms of integration. It first distinguishes different categories of cognitive artifacts used in biological practice on the basis of their informational properties. This results in a novel classification of scientific instruments, conducive to an analysis of the cognitive interactions between researchers and artifacts. It then (...) uses a multidimensional framework in line with complementarity-based extended and distributed cognition theory to conceptualize how deeply instruments in different informational categories are integrated into the cognitive systems of their users. The paper concludes that the degree of integration depends on various factors, including the amount of informational malleability, the intensity and kind of information flow between agent and artifact, the trustworthiness of the information, the procedural and informational transparency, and the degree of individualisation. (shrink)