About this topic
Summary Skepticism about character draws on research in the social sciences (especially social psychology in the situationist paradigm) to argue that both folk psychological and neo-Aristotelian conceptions of character as a robust disposition to act on reasons is empirically inadequate.  In John Doris's formulation, traditional character-based ethical views tend to be globalist in that they are committed to cross-situational consistency of character, temporal stability of traits, and evaluative integration of virtues within individuals.  Psychological research suggests, however, that while traits are stable, they tend to have low cross-situational consistency.  This means that someone who is stably disposed not to lie to his friends may nevertheless be quite prone to stealing from his relatives or cheating on his wife.  Talk of broadly individuated virtues such as honesty might therefore seem empirically inadequate.  Virtue ethicists have replied in a variety of ways.  The three primary responses are (the dodge) virtue ethics is primarily a normative theory, so we should be untroubled if most people are not virtuous; (the retreat) the commitments of virtue ethics can be weakened in such a way that it becomes empirically adequate; and (the counterattack) the evidence from social psychology does not in fact challenge the virtue ethical conception of character.
Key works John Doris's original paper on this topic is Doris 1998, which was quickly superseded by Doris 2002.  Almost at the same time, Gilbert Harman developed his own variant of skepticism about character in Harman 1999, 2000, 2003, and 2009.  Advocates of the dodge include Badhwar 2009 and Kupperman 2009.  Advocates of the retreat include Hurka 2006, Merritt 2000, and Miller 2009.  Advocates of the counterattack include Kamtekar 2004, Russell 2009, and Sreenivasan 2002.  Other related research, such as Sarkissian 2010 and Alfano 2013, has attempted to move past the question of empirical adequacy by focusing on ways in which situations can be modified or framed to promote moral conduct.
Introductions Alfano 2013, Appiah 2008
  Show all references
Related categories
Siblings:See also:
130 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 130
  1. Mark Alfano (ed.) (forthcoming). Current Controversies in Virtue Theory. Routledge.
    INTRODUCTION Mark Alfano, Distinguished Guest Fellow, Notre Dame Institute for Advanced Study -/- PART 1: What is a virtue? 1. Liezl van Zyl, Waikato 2. Heather Battaly, California State University Fullerton -/- PART 2: Can people be virtuous? 1. James Montmarquet, Tennessee State University 2. Mark Alfano, University of Oregon -/- PART 3: How are virtues individuated, and what unites them? 1. Daniel Russell, University of Arizona 2. Christian Miller, Wake Forest -/- PART 4: Does virtue contribute to flourishing? 1. (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Mark Alfano (forthcoming). What Are the Bearers of Virtues? In Hagop Sarkissian & Jennifer Wright (eds.), Advances in Moral Psychology. Continuum.
    It’s natural to assume that the bearers of virtues are individual agents, which would make virtues monadic dispositional properties. I argue instead that the most attractive theory of virtue treats a virtue as a triadic relation among the agent, the social milieu, and the asocial environment. A given person may or may not be disposed to behave in virtuous ways depending on how her social milieu speaks to and of her, what they expect of her, and how they monitor her. (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Mark Alfano (forthcoming). Can People Be Virtuous? In , Current Controversies in Virtue Theory. Routledge.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Mark Alfano (forthcoming). Epistemic Situationism: An Extended Prolepsis. In Mark Alfano & Abrol Fairweather (eds.), Epistemic Situationism. Oxford University Press.
    In recent work (Alfano 2012, Alfano forthcoming a, Alfano forthcoming b), I've begun to develop an empirically minded critique of virtue-based accounts of knowledge, justification, and epistemic value. There's an important disanalogy between virtue ethical theories of right action and virtue epistemic theories of knowledge. Most virtue ethicists hold that it's possible to do the right thing for the wrong reason, and hence that right action is possible even for the non-virtuous. Virtue epistemologists, in contrast, almost uniformly claim that knowledge (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Mark Alfano (2013). Character as Moral Fiction. Cambridge University Press.
    Everyone wants to be virtuous, but recent psychological investigations suggest that this may not be possible. Mark Alfano challenges this theory and asks, not whether character is empirically adequate, but what characters human beings could have and develop. Although psychology suggests that most people do not have robust character traits such as courage, honesty and open-mindedness, Alfano argues that we have reason to attribute these virtues to people because such attributions function as self-fulfilling prophecies – children become more studious if (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Mark Alfano (2013). Virtues, Intelligences, and Situations. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16:671-673.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Mark Alfano (2013). Identifying and Defending the Hard Core of Virtue Ethics. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:233-260.
    Virtue ethics has been challenged on empirical grounds by philosophical interpreters of situationist social psychology. Challenges are necessarily challenges to something or other, so it’s only possible to understand the situationist challenge to virtue ethics if we have an antecedent grasp on virtue ethics itself. To this end, I first identify the non-negotiable “hard core” of virtue ethics with the conjunction of nine claims, arguing that virtue ethics does make substantive empirical assumptions about human conduct. Next, I rearticulate the situationist (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Mark Alfano (2012). Expanding The Situationist Challenge To Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):223-249.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Mark Alfano (2011). Explaining Away Intuitions About Traits: Why Virtue Ethics Seems Plausible (Even If It Isn't). Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (1):121-136.
    This article addresses the question whether we can know on the basis of folk intuitions that we have character traits. I answer in the negative, arguing that on any of the primary theories of knowledge, our intuitions about traits do not amount to knowledge. For instance, because we would attribute traits to one another regardless of whether we actually possessed such metaphysically robust dispositions, Nozickian sensitivity theory disqualifies our intuitions about traits from being knowledge. Yet we do think we know (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Mark Alfano & Abrol Fairweather (eds.) (forthcoming). Epistemic Situationism. Oxford University Press.
    INTRODUCTION Abrol Fairweather, San Francisco State University -/- PART 1: The situationist challenge to virtue epistemology 1. Mark Alfano, Princeton University & University of Oregon 2. John Doris & Lauren Olin, Washington University in St. Louis 3. John Turri, University of Waterloo -/- PART 2: Defending virtue epistemology 4. James Montmarquet, Tennessee State University 5. Ernest Sosa, Rutgers 6. Jason Baehr, Loyola Marymount University 7. John Greco, St. Louis University 8. Berit Brogaard, University of Missouri-St. Louis 9. Guy Axtell, Radford (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Mark Alfano & Abrol Fairweather, Situationism and Virtue Theory. Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy.
    Virtues are dispositions to see, think, desire, deliberate, or act well, with different philosophers emphasizing different permutations of these activities. Virtue has been an object of philosophical concern for thousands of years whereas situationism—the psychological theory according to which a great deal of human perception, thought, motivation, deliberation, and behavior are explained not by character or personality dispositions but by seemingly trivial and normatively irrelevant situational influences—was a development of the 20th century. Some philosophers, especially John Doris and Gilbert Harman (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Miguel Alzola (2008). Character and Environment: The Status of Virtues in Organizations. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 78 (3):343 - 357.
    Using evidence from experimental psychology, some social psychologists, moral philosophers and organizational scholars claim that character traits do not exist and, hence, that the philosophical tradition of virtue ethics is empirically inadequate and should dispose of the notion of character to accommodate the empirical evidence. In this paper, I systematically address the debate between dispositionalists and situationists about the existence, status and properties of character traits and their manifestations in human behavior, with the ultimate goal of responding to the question (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Julia Annas (2005). Comments on John Doris's Lack of Character. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):636–642.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Julia Annas (2003). Virtue Ethics and Social Psychology. A Priori 2:20-34.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Anthony Appiah (2008). Experiments in Ethics. Harvard University Press.
    Appiah explores how the new empirical moral psychology relates to philosophical ethics. He elaborates a vision of naturalism that resists both temptations and traces an intellectual genealogy of the burgeoning discipline of 'experimental philosophy'.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Nomy Arpaly & John Doris (2005). Review: Comments on "Lack of Character" by John Doris. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):643 - 647.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Nafsika Athanassoulis (2000). A Response to Harman: Virtue Ethics and Character Traits. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2):215–221.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Guy Axtell (forthcoming). Thinking Twice About Virtue and Vice: From Epistemic Situationism to Dual Process Theories. In Mark Alfano & Abrol Fairweather (eds.), Epistemic Situationism. Oxford University Press.
    Epistemic situationists (Alfano; Doris and Olin) urge that concerns about the empirical adequacy of different versions of virtue epistemology are to be judged in light of the situationsts’ own interpretations of social psychological studies. But these concerns, while real, should instead be judged by the consistency of virtue epistemologies with the leading psychological theory emerging from studies of heuristics and biases, which is not epistemic situationism, but rather dual process theory (Evans; Kahneman; Stanovich; West). I argue that such a shift (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Guy Axtell (2010). Agency Ascriptions in Ethics and Epistemology: Or, Navigating Intersections, Narrow and Broad. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):73-94.
    Abstract: In this article, the logic and functions of character-trait ascriptions in ethics and epistemology is compared, and two major problems, the "generality problem" for virtue epistemologies and the "global trait problem" for virtue ethics, are shown to be far more similar in structure than is commonly acknowledged. I suggest a way to put the generality problem to work by making full and explicit use of a sliding scale--a "narrow-broad spectrum of trait ascription"-- and by accounting for the various uses (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Neera K. Badhwar (2009). The Milgram Experiments, Learned Helplessness, and Character Traits. Journal of Ethics 13 (2-3):257 - 289.
    The Milgram and other situationist experiments support the real-life evidence that most of us are highly akratic and heteronomous, and that Aristototelian virtue is not global. Indeed, like global theoretical knowledge, global virtue is psychologically impossible because it requires too much of finite human beings with finite powers in a finite life; virtue can only be domain-specific. But unlike local, situation-specific virtues, domain-specific virtues entail some general understanding of what matters in life, and are connected conceptually and causally to our (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Sandrine Berges, Evil Behaviour and Character: Virtue Ethics Versus Social Psychology.
    Is there such a thing as evil character? Philosophers and social psychologists have cast doubt on the idea that evil behaviour is due to a defect in character formation, which some people have, and some have not. I will argue that their claims are misguided by putting forward the following thesis: evil character traits exist, but they are typically less stable, albeit more prevalent, than good character traits. This is because they typically do not receive the backing of formation, which, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Lorraine Besser-jones (2008). Social Psychology, Moral Character, and Moral Fallibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):310–332.
    In recent years, there has been considerable debate in the literature concerning the existence of moral character. One lesson we should take away from these debates is that the concept of character, and the role it plays in guiding our actions, is far more complex than most of us initially took it to be. Just as Gilbert Harman, for example, makes a serious mistake in insisting, plainly and simply, that ther is no such thing as character, defenders of character also (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. David O. Brink (2013). Situationism, Responsibility, and Fair Opportunity. Social Philosophy and Policy (1-2):121-149.
    The situationist literature in psychology claims that conduct is not determined by character and reflects the operation of the agent’s situation or environment. For instance, due to situational factors, compassionate behavior is much less common than we might have expected from people we believe to be compassionate. This article focuses on whether situationism should revise our beliefs about moral responsibility. It assesses situationism’s implications against the backdrop of a conception of responsibility that is grounded in norms about the fair opportunity (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Sylvia Burrow (2003). Review: Lack of Character, John Doris. [REVIEW] Metapsychology Online Review 7 (11).
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Michael Cholbi (2014). The Implications of Ego Depletion for the Ethics and Politics of Manipulation. In C. Coons M. E. Weber (ed.), Manipulation:Theory and Practice. Oxford University Press. 201-220.
    A significant body of research suggests that self-control and willpower are resources that become depleted as they are exercised. Having to exert self-control and willpower draws down the reservoir of these resources and make subsequent such exercises more difficult. This “ego depletion” renders individuals more susceptible to manipulation by exerting non-rational influences on our choice and conduct. In particular, ego depletion results in later choices being less governable by our powers of self-control and willpower than earlier choices. I draw out (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Michelle Ciurria (2013). Situationism, Moral Responsibility and Blame. Philosophia 41 (1):179-193.
    In Moral philosophy meets social psychology, Gilbert Harman argues that social psychology can educate folk morality to prevent us from committing the ‘fundamental attribution error,’ i.e. ‘the error of ignoring situational factors and overconfidently assuming that distinctive behaviour or patterns of behaviour are due to an agent’s distinctive character traits’ (Harman, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99, 315–331, 1999). An overview of the literature shows that while situationists unanimously agree with Harman on this point, they disagree on whether we also (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Michael DePaul (2000). Character Traits, Virtues, and Vices. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:141-157.
    Recently, Gilbert Harman has used empirical results obtained by social psychologists to argue that there are no character traits of the type presupposed by virtue ethics—no honesty or dishonesty, no courage or cowardice, in short, no virtue or vice. In this paper, I critically assess his argument as well as that of the social psychologists he appeals to. I suggest that the experimental results recounted by Harman would not much concern such classical virtue theorists as Plato—particularly the Plato of the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. John M. Doris (2005). Précis of Lack of Character. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):632–635.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. John M. Doris (2002). Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a provocative contribution to contemporary ethical theory challenging foundational conceptions of character that date back to Aristotle. John Doris draws on behavioral science, especially social psychology, to argue that we misattribute the causes of behavior to personality traits and other fixed aspects of character rather than to the situational context. More often than not it is the situation not the nature of the personality that really counts. The author elaborates the philosophical consequences of this research for a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. John M. Doris (1998). Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics. Noûs 32 (4):504-530.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. John M. Doris & Dominic Murphy (2007). From My Lai to Abu Ghraib: The Moral Psychology of Atrocity. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):25–55.
    While nothing justifies atrocity, many perpetrators manifest cognitive impairments that profoundly degrade their capacity for moral judgment, and such impairments, we shall argue, preclude the attribution of moral responsibility.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Abrol Fairweather & Carlos Montemayor (2013). Inferential Abilities and Common Epistemic Goods. Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue (CUP).
    While the situationist challenge has been prominent in philosophical literature in ethics for over a decade, only recently has it been extended to virtue epistemology . Alfano argues that virtue epistemology is shown to be empirically inadequate in light of a wide range of results in social psychology, essentially succumbing to the same argument as virtue ethics. We argue that this meeting of the twain between virtue epistemology and social psychology in no way signals the end of virtue epistemology, but (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Owen Flanagan (2009). Moral Science? Still Metaphysical After All These Years. In Darcia Narvaez & Daniel Lapsley (eds.), Personality, Identity, and Character. Cambridge University Press. 52.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Owen J. Flanagan (1991). Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism. Harvard University Press.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Diana Fleming (2006). The Character of Virtue: Answering the Situationist Challenge to Virtue Ethics. Ratio 19 (1):24–42.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Peter Goldie (2004). On Personality. Routledge.
    Warm, sensitive, creative, outgoing, cheeky, creepy. Scan any personal ads page and it's clear that to get a life you need a personality first. It is also a notion with a long and often bizarre history: in early Greece and medieval Europe, it was thought to depend on the balance of bile in the body. On Personality is a thoughtful and stimulating look under the skin of this widely-used but little understood phenomenon. Peter Goldie points out that we rely on (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Alvin I. Goldman (1993). Ethics and Cognitive Science. Ethics 103 (2):337-360.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Lisa Grover (2012). The Evaluative Integration of Local Character Traits. Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (1):25-37.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Gilbert Harman (2009). Skepticism About Character Traits. Journal of Ethics 13 (2/3):235 - 242.
    The first part of this article discusses recent skepticism about character traits. The second describes various forms of virtue ethics as reactions to such skepticism. The philosopher J.-P. Sartre argued in the 1940s that character traits are pretenses, a view that the sociologist E. Goffman elaborated in the 1950s. Since then social psychologists have shown that attributions of character traits tend to be inaccurate through the ignoring of situational factors. (Personality psychology has tended to concentrate on people's conceptions of personality (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Gilbert Harman (2003). Three Trends in Moral and Political Philosophy. Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (3):415-425.
  41. Gilbert Harman (2003). No Character or Personality. Business Ethics Quarterly 13 (1):87-94.
    Solomon argues that, although recent research in social psychology has important implications for business ethics, it doesnot undermine an approach that stresses virtue ethics. However, he underestimates the empirical threat to virtue ethics, and his a prioriclaim that empirical research cannot overturn our ordinary moral psychology is overstated. His appeal to seemingly obvious differencesin character traits between people simply illustrates the fundamental attribution error. His suggestion that the Milgram and Darley andBatson experiments have to do with such character traits as (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Gilbert Harman (2000). The Nonexistence of Character Traits. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2):223–226.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Gilbert Harman (1999). Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999):315 - 331.
    Ordinary moral thought often commits what social psychologists call 'the fundamental attribution error'. This is the error of ignoring situational factors and overconfidently assuming that distinctive behaviour or patterns of behaviour are due to an agent's distinctive character traits. In fact, there is no evidence that people have character traits (virtues, vices, etc.) in the relevant sense. Since attribution of character traits leads to much evil, we should try to educate ourselves and others to stop doing it.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Boris Hennig (2008). Tugenden und absichten. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 115 (1):165-182.
    Psychological experiments show that human behavior is often determined by features of the situation rather than general and persistent character traits of the agent. Therefore, it may seem naive to suppose that someone with a virtuous character will in general act virtuously. This is at least true if a character trait is taken to be a persistent characteristic or property that reliably causes certain behavior. On the basis of the conception of agency developed by Anscombe in Intention, I will argue (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Thomas Hurka (2006). Virtuous Act, Virtuous Dispositions. Analysis 66 (289):69–76.
    Everyday moral thought uses the concepts of virtue and vice at two different levels. At what I will call a global level it applies these concepts to persons or to stable character traits or dispositions. Thus we may say that a person is brave or has a standing trait of generosity or malice. But we also apply these concepts more locally, to specific acts or mental states such as occurrent desires or feelings. Thus we may say that a particular act (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Eric L. Hutton (2006). Character, Situationism, and Early Confucian Thought. Philosophical Studies 127 (1):37 - 58.
  47. John Jost & Lawrence Jost (2009). Virtue Ethics and the Social Psychology of Character: Philosophical Lessons From the Person-Situation Debate. Journal of Research in Personality 43:253-254.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Rachana Kamtekar (2004). Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character. Ethics 114 (3):458-491.
    Situationist social psychologists tell us that information about people’s distinctive character traits, opinions, attitudes, values, or past behavior is not as useful for determining what they will do as is information about the details of their situations.1 One would expect, they say, that the possessor of a given character trait (such as helpfulness) would behave consistently (helpfully) across situations that are similar in calling for the relevant (helping) behavior, but under experimental conditions, people’s behavior is not found to be cross-situationally (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Antti Kauppinen (2013). Ethics and Empirical Psychology. In Markus Christen (ed.), Empirically Informed Ethics. Springer. 279-305.
    In this paper, I examine six arguments concerning or making use of empirical psychological evidence in metaethics and normative ethics. Generally speaking, I find that the ambitious ones fail and the more modest ones ought to moderate their conclusions further.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Jason Kawall (2001). Inner Diversity. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 8 (2):27-35.
    I propose a modified virtue ethics, grounded in an analogy between ecosystems and human personalities. I suggest that we understand ourselves as possessing changing systems of inter-related sub personalities with different virtues, and view our characters as flexible and evolving.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 130