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  1. David Alm (2011). Defending Fundamental Requirements of Practical Reason. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:77-102.
    In this paper I offer a partial defense of a constitutivist view according to which it is possible to defend fundamental requirements of practical reason by appeal to facts about what is constitutive of rational agency. I show how it is possible for that approach to circumvent the ‘is’/’ought’ problem as well as the requirement that it be possible to act contrary to practical reason. But I do not attempt to establish any particular fundamental requirement. The key ideas are that (...)
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  2. G. E. M. Anscombe & Stephan Körner (eds.) (1974). Practical Reason: Papers and Discussions. Yale University Press.
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  3. Steven Arkonovich (2007). Goals, Wishes, and Reasons for Action. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1):161-184.
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  4. Robert Audi (2006). Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision. Routledge.
    What role does reason play in our actions? How do we know whether what we do is right? Can practical reasoning guide ethical judgment? Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision presents an account of practical reasoning as a process that can explain action, connect reasoning with intention, justify practical judgments, and provide a basis for ethical decisions. The first part of the book is a detailed critical overview of the influential theories of practical reasoning found in Aristotle, Hume, and Kant. The (...)
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  5. Robert Audi (1991). The Nature and Assessment of Practical Reasoning: A Reply to John Barker and Richard Foley. Behavior and Philosophy 19 (2):73 - 81.
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  6. Carla Bagnoli (2001). Rawls on the Objectivity of Practical Reason. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):307-329.
    This article argues that Rawls’ history of ethics importantly contributes to the advancement of ethical theory, in that it correctly situates Kantian constructivism as an alternative to both sentimentalism and rational Intuitionism, and calls attention to the standards of objectivity in ethics. The author shows that by suggesting that both Intuitionist and Humean doctrines face the charge of heteronomy, Rawls appearsto adopt a Kantian conception of practical reason. Furthermore, Rawls follows Kant in assuming that ethical objectivity can be vindicated only (...)
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  7. Ricardo Barbosa (2005). A especificidade do estético e a razão prática em Schiller. Kriterion 46 (112):229-242.
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  8. John A. Barker (1991). Audi's Theory of Practical Reasoning. Behavior and Philosophy 19 (2):49 - 58.
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  9. Piers Benn (2000). Ruling Passions by Simon Blackburn Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, X + 334pp. [REVIEW] Philosophy 75 (3):452-462.
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  10. James Bohman (2000). "When Water Chokes": Ideology, Communication, and Practical Rationality. Constellations 7 (3):382-392.
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  11. Martijn Boot (2009). Parity, Incomparability and Rationally Justified Choice. Philosophical Studies 146 (1):75 - 92.
    This article discusses the possibility of a rationally justified choice between two options neither of which is better than the other while they are not equally good either (‘3NT’). Joseph Raz regards such options as incomparable and argues that reason cannot guide the choice between them. Ruth Chang, by contrast, tries to show that many cases of putative incomparability are instead cases of parity—a fourth value relation of comparability, in addition to the three standard value relations ‘better than’, ‘worse than’ (...)
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  12. J. Bransen (2013). Backsliding: Understanding Weakness of WillBy Alfred R. Mele. Analysis 73 (3):585-587.
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  13. Svend Brinkmann (2007). Practical Reason and Positioning. Journal of Moral Education 36 (4):415-432.
    This paper argues that an emerging framework for studying social episodes known as positioning theory is a rich tool for practical reasoning. After giving an outline of the Aristotelian conception of practical reason, recently developed by Alasdair MacIntyre, it is argued that positioning theory should be seen not as a detached, scientific theory, but rather as an important resource for learning to think and act in relation to practical and moral matters. I try to demonstrate a number of significant points (...)
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  14. Maria Alejandra Carrasco (2004). Adam Smith's Reconstruction of Practical Reason. Review of Metaphysics 58 (1):81 - 116.
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  15. Philip Clark (2001). Velleman's Autonomism. Ethics 111 (3):580–593.
    People sometimes think they have reasons for action. On a certain naive view, what makes them true is a connection between the action and the agent’s good life. In a recent article, David Velleman argues for replacing this view with a more Kantian line, on which reasons are reasons in virtue of their connection with autonomy. The aim in what follows is to defend the naive view. I shall first raise some problems for Velleman's proposal and then fend off the (...)
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  16. K. Danner Clouser (1986). Rationality in Medicine: An Explication. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 11 (2):185-205.
    Various meanings of "rational" implicitly and explicitly suggested in this issue's articles are abstracted and stated. Two accounts of rationality are shown to be able to explain most uses of "rational": the "cool moment" account and a more objective account. The former is examined and modified, but still found inadequate. The objective account of rational is developed, taking "irrational" as the basic concept. "Irrational" is given content in terms of a list, and "rational" is subsequently defined as "not irrational". Reasons (...)
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  17. David Copp (2008). Do We Have Any Justified Moral Beliefs? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):811-819.
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  18. Christopher Cowie (2014). Epistemic Disagreement and Practical Disagreement. Erkenntnis 79 (1):191-209.
    It is often thought that the correct metaphysics and epistemology of reasons will be broadly unified across different kinds of reason: reasons for belief, and reasons for action. This approach is sometimes thought to be undermined by the contrasting natures of belief and of action: whereas belief appears to have the ‘constitutive aim’ of truth (or knowledge), action does not appear to have any such constitutive aim. I develop this disanalogy into a novel challenge to metanormative approaches by thinking about (...)
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  19. Steven Daskal (2010). Absolute Value as Belief. Philosophical Studies 148 (2):221 - 229.
    In “Desire as Belief” and “Desire as Belief II,” David Lewis ( 1988 , 1996 ) considers the anti-Humean position that beliefs about the good require corresponding desires, which is his way of understanding the idea that beliefs about the good are capable of motivating behavior. He translates this anti-Humean claim into decision theoretic terms and demonstrates that it leads to absurdity and contradiction. As Ruth Weintraub ( 2007 ) has shown, Lewis’ argument goes awry at the outset. His decision (...)
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  20. David Enoch (2014). Authority and Reason‐Giving1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):296-332.
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  21. David Enoch (2011). Shmagency Revisited. In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan.
    1. The Shmagency Challenge to Constitutivism In metaethics – and indeed, meta-normativity – constitutivism is a family of views that hope to ground normativity in norms, or standards, or motives, or aims that are constitutive of action and agency. And mostly because of the influential work of Christine Korsgaard and David Velleman (and, some would say, because of the also-influential work of Kant and Aristotle), constitutivism seems to be gaining grounds in the current literature. The promises of constitutivism are significant. (...)
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  22. Iskra Fileva (2009). Kieran Setiya, Reasons Without Rationalism. Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (4):521-530.
  23. Susan T. Gardner (2009). Thinking Your Way to Freedom: A Guide to Owning Your Own Practical Reasoning. Temple University Press.
    A Teacher's Manual for this book will be available online at www.temple.edu/tempress.
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  24. Michael Garnett (2011). Practical Reason and the Unity of Agency. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):449-468.
    [Critical Notice of Korsgaard's, Self-Constitution] Self-Constitution is a thrillingly ambitious book. Ranging widely over both historical and contemporary debates in ethics and the philosophy of agency, Korsgaard sets herself the task of answering some of the hardest questions moral philosophy has to ask. It is required reading for anyone with interests in agency, practical reason, personal identity, or the ethical teachings of Plato, Aristotle, Hume, or Kant. It is also that rarest of academic books: a major contribution to ongoing debate (...)
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  25. Bernard Gert (1999). Acting Irrationally Versus Acting Contrary to What is Required by Reason. Journal of Social Philosophy 30 (3):379–386.
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  26. Stefan Gosepath (2002). Practical Reason: A Review of the Current Debate and Problems. [REVIEW] Philosophical Explorations 5 (3):229 – 238.
    In this review article I refer to some of the most relevant recent publications in the field of practical rationality, mainly drawing on two new anthologies by Wallace and Millgram that contain the principal arguments in the current debate, and on new books and articles by Bittner, Dancy, Nida-Rümelin and Raz. The purpose of the article is to offer an overview of the relevant positions in the current debate, to clarify the main arguments against the belief-desire model, and to situate (...)
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  27. Daniel Guevara (2009). The Will as Practical Reason and the Problem of Akrasia. Review of Metaphysics 62 (3):525-550.
    This article argues for the possibility of aggressive akrasia, or the akrasia rooted in “unqualified knowingness.” The aggressive akratic acts knowledgeably and voluntarily for a bad end. Many philosophers reject the very possibility of aggressive akrasia given a prior commitment to closely identifying the will with practical reason, thereby effectively dismissing the possibility of an agent’s full responsibility for a morally evil act. Hence, these philosophers try to explain akrasia by challenging the voluntariness of the akratic’s action, or his knowledge, (...)
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  28. James Harold (2003). Practical Reason and 'Companions in Guilt'. Philosophical Investigations 26 (4):311–331.
    Since Phillipa Foot’s paper ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’ was published some twenty-five years ago, questions about categorical imperatives and the alleged rationality of acting morally have been of central concern to ethicists. For critics and friends of Kantian ethical theories, these questions have special importance. One of the distinctive features of Kantian ethical theories is that they claim that there are categorical imperatives: imperatives which dictate which actions one should follow insofar as one is rational.This way of (...)
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  29. John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley (2008). Knowledge and Action. Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.
    Judging by our folk appraisals, then, knowledge and action are intimately related. The theories of rational action with which we are familiar leave this unexplained. Moreover, discussions of knowledge are frequently silent about this connection. This is a shame, since if there is such a connection it would seem to constitute one of the most fundamental roles for knowledge. Our purpose in this paper is to rectify this lacuna, by exploring ways in which knowing something is related to rationally acting (...)
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  30. Lawrence L. Heintz (1984). The Occasional Rightness of Not Following the Requirements of Morality. Philosophy Research Archives 10:477-489.
    Laymen and philosophers alike find it counterintuitive to consent to the assertion that “it is sometimes right not to follow the requirements of morality”. This may be because the conventions of ordinary language do much to encourage the view that “morally ought to do” functions as an equivalent for “what one ought to do all things considered”. In this paper I will argue against such an equivalence and attempt to shake the holders of the prevailing view, that moral reasons are (...)
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  31. John F. Horty (2003). Reasoning with Moral Conflicts. Noûs 37 (4):557–605.
    Let us say that a normative conflict is a situation in which an agent ought to perform an action A, and also ought to perform an action B, but in which it is impossible for the agent to perform both A and B. Not all normative conflicts are moral conflicts, of course. It may be that the agent ought to perform the action A for reasons of personal generosity, but ought to perform the action B for reasons of prudence: perhaps (...)
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  32. David Velleman J. (1996). The Possibility of Practical Reason. Ethics 106 (4):694-726.
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  33. Paul Katsafanas (2013). Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism. Oxford University Press.
    Constitutivism is the view that we can derive substantive normative conclusions from an account of the nature of action. Agency and the Foundations of Ethics explains the constitutivist strategy and argues that the attractions of this view are considerable: constitutivism promises to resolve longstanding philosophical puzzles about the metaphysics, epistemology, and practical grip of normative claims. Yet constitutivism faces a challenge: it must employ a conception of action that is minimal enough to be independently plausible, but substantial enough to yield (...)
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  34. Leigh B. Kelley (1986). Impartiality and Practical Reason. Philosophy Research Archives 12:1-65.
    The paper constitutes a detailed critical commentary on Stephen Darwall’s Impartial Reason (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Its central thesis is that Darwall’s attempt to integrate a naturalist theory of substantive reasons for acting with a neo-rationalist derivation of moral requirements from the very concept of practical rationality is faced with insurmountable theoretic problems. The author argues that anyone who would accept a plausible internalist account of reasons, that justificatory reasons for an agent to act are facts which must be (...)
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  35. Konstantin Kolenda (1964). The Freedom of Reason. San Antonio, Principia Press of Trinity University.
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  36. Niko Kolodny (2010). Which Relationships Justify Partiality? General Considerations and Problem Cases. In Brian Feltham & John Cottingham (eds.), Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World. Oup Oxford.
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  37. Camillia Kong (2012). The Normative Source of Kantian Hypothetical Imperatives. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5):661-690.
    Abstract This paper offers a critique of Christine Korsgaard?s interpretation of Kantian instrumental reason. Korsgaard understands Kantian hypothetical imperatives to share a common normative source with the categorical imperative ? namely self-legislating, human rational agency. However, her reading of Kantian hypothetical imperatives is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, Korsgaard?s agent-centred approach renders incoherent Kant?s analytic-synthetic division. Secondly, by minimising the dualistic framework of Kant?s practical philosophy the dialectical character of practical rationality is lost: norms of instrumental reasoning therefore become confused (...)
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  38. Paul W. Kurtz (1965). Decision and the Condition of Man. Seattle, University of Washington Press.
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  39. Anthony Simon Laden (2009). The Trouble with Prudence. Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):19 – 40.
    Standard discussions of prudence treat it as requiring time-slice management. That this is the standard view of prudence can be seen by its presence in two seemingly opposed positions on prudence, those of Thomas Nagel and Derek Parfit. I argue that this kind of view fails to properly appreciate the difficulty with being prudent, treating imprudence as a kind of theoretical mistake. I then offer a characterization of prudence as integrity, the holding together of disparate but temporally extended parts of (...)
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  40. Glenn Mackin (2011). The Aporia of Practical Reason: Reflections on What It Means to Pay Due Respect to Others. Contemporary Political Theory 10 (1):58.
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  41. E. Marcus (2013). On the Parallels Between Theoretical and Practical Rationality: Reply to Setiya. Analysis 73 (3):512-525.
    Two principles are central to Rational Causation. Causalism: Believing and acting for a reason are causal phenomena in the sense that there is in both domains a causal connection between ground and grounded. Equivalence: There is a necessary connection between something's being the reason why I believe or act and my taking it to favour the belief or action. Kieran Setiya argues that Causalism is false in the theoretical case and that Equivalence is false in the practical case. I reply (...)
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  42. John McDowell (1979). Virtue and Reason. The Monist 62 (3):331-350.
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  43. Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.) (2004). The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford University Press.
    Rationality has long been a central topic in philosophy, crossing standard divisions and categories. It continues to attract much attention in published research and teaching by philosophers as well as scholars in other disciplines, including economics, psychology, and law. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality is an indispensable reference to the current state of play in this vital and interdisciplinary area of study. Twenty-two newly commissioned chapters by a roster of distinguished philosophers provide an overview of the prominent views on rationality, (...)
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  44. Elijah Millgram (ed.) (2001). Varieties of Practical Reasoning. MIT Press.
    This book covers a broad spectrum of positions on practical reasoning—from the nihilist view that there are no legitimate forms of practical inference, and ...
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  45. Elijah Millgram (1997). Practical Induction. Harvard University Press.
    Itself a pleasure to read, this book is full of inventive arguments and conveys Millgram's bold thesis with elegance and force.
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  46. Christopher W. Morris & Arthur Ripstein (eds.) (2001). Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier. Cambridge University Press.
    What are preferences and are they reasons for action? Is it rational to cooperate with others even if that entails acting against one's preferences? The dominant position in philosophy on the topic of practical rationality is that one acts so as to maximize the satisfaction of one's preferences. This view is most closely associated with the work of David Gauthier, and in this new collection of essays some of the most innovative philosophers currently working in this field explore the controversies (...)
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  47. Jennifer M. Morton (2011). Toward an Ecological Theory of the Norms of Practical Deliberation. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):561-584.
    Abstract: Practical deliberation is deliberation concerning what to do governed by norms on intention (e.g. means-end coherence and consistency), which are taken to be a mark of rational deliberation. According to the theory of practical deliberation I develop in this paper we should think of the norms of rational practical deliberation ecologically: that is, the norms that constitute rational practical deliberation depend on the complex interaction between the psychological capacities of the agent in question and the agent's environment. I argue (...)
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  48. Ray Nichols (1996). Maxims, "Practical Wisdom," and the Language of Action: Beyond Grand Theory. Political Theory 24 (4):687-705.
    Only among barbarians is practice alone recognized in politics.Alexis de Tocqueville.
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  49. Frederick A. Olafson (1956). Meta-Ethics and the Moral Life. Philosophical Review 65 (2):159-178.
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  50. Elisabeth Pacherie (2013). Intentional Joint Agency: Shared Intention Lite. Synthese 190 (10):1817-1839.
    Philosophers have proposed accounts of shared intentions that aim at capturing what makes a joint action intentionally joint. On these accounts, having a shared intention typically presupposes cognitively and conceptually demanding theory of mind skills. Yet, young children engage in what appears to be intentional, cooperative joint action long before they master these skills. In this paper, I attempt to characterize a modest or ‘lite’ notion of shared intention, inspired by Michael Bacharach’s approach to team–agency theory in terms of framing, (...)
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