Search results for 'Monism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Tuomas E. Tahko & Donnchadh O'Conaill (2012). On the Common Sense Argument for Monism. In Philip Goff (ed.), Spinoza On Monism. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 21.0
    The priority monist holds that the cosmos is the only fundamental object, of which every other concrete object is a dependent part. One major argument against monism goes back to Russell, who claimed that pluralism is favoured by common sense. However, Jonathan Schaffer turns this argument on its head and uses it to defend priority monism. He suggests that common sense holds that the cosmos is a whole, of which ordinary physical objects are arbitrary portions, and that arbitrary (...)
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  2. Erik C. Banks (2010). Neutral Monism Reconsidered. Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):173-187.score: 18.0
    Neutral monism is a position in metaphysics defended by Mach, James, and Russell in the early twentieth century. It holds that minds and physical objects are essentially two different orderings of the same underlying neutral elements of nature. This paper sets out some of the central concepts, theses and the historical background of ideas that inform this doctrine of elements. The discussion begins with the classic neutral monism of Mach, James, and Russell in the first part of the (...)
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  3. Julie Yoo (2009). Anomalous Monism. In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oup Oxford.score: 18.0
    This is an overview of Davidson's theory of anomalous monism. Objections and replies are also detailed.
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  4. Hilan Bensusan & Manuel de Pinedo, Priority Monism, Physical Intentionality and the Internal Relatedness of All Things.score: 18.0
    Schaffer (2010) argues that the internal relatedness of all things, no matter how it is conceived, entails priority monism. He claims that a sufficiently pervasive internal relation among objects implies the priority of the whole, understood as a concrete object. This paper shows that at least in the case of an internal relatedness of all things conceived in terms of physical intentionality - one way to understand dispositions - priority monism not only doesn't follow but also is precluded. (...)
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  5. Stephen Barker & Mark Jago (2014). Monism and Material Constitution. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):189-204.score: 18.0
    Are the sculpture and the mass of gold which permanently makes it up one object or two? In this article, we argue that the monist, who answers ‘one object’, cannot accommodate the asymmetry of material constitution. To say ‘the mass of gold materially constitutes the sculpture, whereas the sculpture does not materially constitute the mass of gold’, the monist must treat ‘materially constitutes’ as an Abelardian predicate, whose denotation is sensitive to the linguistic context in which it appears. We motivate (...)
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  6. Michael V. Antony (2003). Davidson's Argument for Monism. Synthese 135 (1):1-12.score: 18.0
    Two criticisms of Davidson's argument for monism are presented. The first is that there is no obvious way for the anomalism of the mental to do any work in his argument. Certain implicit premises, on the other hand, entail monism independently of the anomalism of the mental, but they are question-begging. The second criticism is that even if Davidson's argument is sound, the variety of monism that emerges is extremely weak at best. I show that by constructing (...)
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  7. Max Velmans (2007). Reflexive Monism. [Journal (Paginated)] (in Press) 15 (2):5-50.score: 18.0
    Reflexive monism is, in essence, an ancient view of how consciousness relates to the material world that has, in recent decades, been resurrected in modern form. In this paper I discuss how some of its basic features differ from both dualism and variants of physicalist and functionalist reductionism, focusing on those aspects of the theory that challenge deeply rooted presuppositions in current Western thought. I pay particular attention to the ontological status and seeming “out-thereness” of the phenomenal world and (...)
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  8. Uriah Kriegel (2012). Kantian Monism. Philosophical Papers 41 (1):23-56.score: 18.0
    Abstract Let ?monism? be the view that there is only one basic object?the world. Monists face the question of whether there are also non-basic objects. This is in effect the question of whether the world decomposes into parts. Jonathan Schaffer maintains that it does, Terry Horgan and Matja? Potr? that it does not. In this paper, I propose a compromise view, which I call ?Kantian monism.? According to Kantian monism, the world decomposes into parts insofar as an (...)
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  9. Tim van Gelder (1998). Monism, Dualism, Pluralism. Mind and Language 13 (1):76-97.score: 18.0
    1. Consider the basic outlines of the mind-body debate as it is found in contemporary Anglo-American analytic philosophy. The central question is “whether mental phenomena are physical phenomena, and if not, how they relate to physical phenomena.”1 Over the centuries, a wide range of possible solutions to this problem have emerged. These are the various “isms” familiar to any student of the debate: Cartesian dualism, idealism, epiphenomenalism, central state materialism, non- reductive physicalism, anomalous monism, and so forth. Each (...)
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  10. Pierfrancesco Basile (2012). Russell on Spinoza's Substance Monism. Metaphysica 13 (1):27-41.score: 18.0
    Russell’s critique of substance monism is an ideal starting point from which to understand some main concepts in Spinoza’s difficult metaphysics. This paper provides an in-depth examination of Spinoza’s proof that only one substance exists. On this basis, it rejects Russell’s interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of reality as founded upon the logical doctrine that all propositions consist of a predicate and a subject. An alternative interpretation is offered: Spinoza’s substance is not a bearer of properties, as Russell implied, but (...)
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  11. Rex Welshon (1999). Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):103-120.score: 18.0
    I argue that, on plausible assumptions, anomalous entails monism epiphenomenalism of the mental. The plausible assumptions are (1) events are particulars; (2) causal relations are extensional; (3) mental properties are epiphrastic. A principle defender of anomalous monism, Donald Davidson, acknowledges that anomalous monism is committed to (1) and (2). I argue that it is committed to (3) as well. Given (1), (2), and (3), epiphenomenalism of the mental falls out immediately. Three attempts to salvage anomalous monism (...)
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  12. Tomasz Bigaj (2010). Dispositional Monism and the Circularity Objection. Metaphysica 11 (1):39-47.score: 18.0
    Three basic positions regarding the nature of fundamental properties are: dispositional monism, categorical monism and the mixed view. Dispositional monism apparently involves a regress or circularity, while an unpalatable consequence of categorical monism and the mixed view is that they are committed to quidditism. I discuss Alexander Bird's defence of dispositional monism based on the structuralist approach to identity. I argue that his solution does not help standard dispositional essentialism, as it admits the possibility that (...)
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  13. M. de Pinedo (2006). Anomalous Monism: Oscillating Between Dogmas. Synthese 148 (1):79-97.score: 18.0
    Davidson’s anomalous monism, his argument for the identity between mental and physical event tokens, has been frequently attacked, usually demanding a higher degree of physicalist commitment. My objection runs in the opposite direction: the identities inferred by Davidson from mental causation, the nomological character of causality and the anomaly of the mental are philosophically problematic and, more dramatically, incompatible with his famous argument against the third dogma of empiricism, the separation of content from conceptual scheme. Given the anomaly of (...)
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  14. Max Velmans (2007). How Experienced Phenomena Relate to Things Themselves: Kant, Husserl, Hoche, and Reflexive Monism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):411-423.score: 18.0
    What we normally think of as the “physical world” is also the world as experienced, that is, a world of appearances. Given this, what is the reality behind the appearances, and what might its relation be to consciousness and to constructive processes in the mind? According to Kant, the thing itself that brings about and supports these appearances is unknowable and we can never gain any understanding of how it brings such appearances about. Reflexive monism argues the opposite: the (...)
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  15. Mark Silcox, Mind and Anomalous Monism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 18.0
    Anomalous Monism is a type of property dualism in the philosophy of mind. Property dualism combines the thesis that mental phenomena are strictly irreducible to physical phenomena with the denial that mind and body are discrete substances. For the anomalous monist, the plausibility of property dualism derives from the fact that although mental states, events and processes have genuine causal powers, the causal relationships that they enter into with physical entities cannot be explained by appeal to fundamental laws of (...)
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  16. Domenic Marbaniang, Rational Epistemics of Divine Reality Leading to Monism.score: 18.0
    Rational epistemics is the line of reasoning inclined to reason separated from reliance on experience that ultimately leads to monism or non-dualism.
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  17. E. J. Lowe (2013). Ontological Vagueness, Existence Monism and Metaphysical Realism. Metaphysica 14 (2):265-274.score: 18.0
    Recently, Terry Horgan and Matjaž Potrč have defended the thesis of ‘existence monism’, according to which the whole cosmos is the only concrete object. Their arguments appeal largely to considerations concerning vagueness. Crucially, they claim that ontological vagueness is impossible, and one key assumption in their defence of this claim is that vagueness always involves ‘sorites-susceptibility’. I aim to challenge both the claim and this assumption. As a consequence, I seek to undermine their defence of existence monism and (...)
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  18. Mehdi Nasrin (2004). Anomalous Monism in Carnap's Aufbau. Erkenntnis 60 (3):283-293.score: 18.0
    The Logical Reconstruction of the World (Aufbau) is oneof the major works of Rudolf Carnap in which he attempts to put an end to some of the traditional disputes in epistemology by using what he calls 'construction theory'. According to this theory, one or more constructional systems can be designed in which all the scientific and pre-scientific objects are logically made out of a limited number of basic elements. Carnap introduces some options for the basis of this system and chooses (...)
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  19. Nick Zangwill (1993). Supervenience and Anomalous Monism: Blackburn on Davidson. Philosophical Studies 71 (1):59-79.score: 18.0
    In his paper "Supervenience Revisisted", Simon Blackburn redeployed his novel modal argument against moral realism as an argument against Donald Davidson's position of 'anomalous monism' in the philosophy of mind (Blackburn 1985).' I shall assess this redeployment. In the first part of this paper, I shall lay out Blackburn's argument. In the second and longer part I shall examine Davidson's denial of psychophysical laws in the light of this argument.
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  20. Aaron Segal (2014). Causal Essentialism and Mereological Monism. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):227-255.score: 18.0
    Several philosophers have recently defended Causal Essentialism—the view that every property confers causal powers, and whatever powers it confers, it confers essentially. I argue that on the face of it, Causal Essentialism implies a form of Monism, and in particular, the thesis I call ‘Mereological Monism’: that there is some concretum that is a part of every concretum. However, there are three escape routes, three views which are such that if one of them is true, Causal Essentialism does (...)
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  21. Claudio Calosi (2013). Quantum Mechanics and Priority Monism. Synthese:1-14.score: 18.0
    The paper address the question of whether quantum mechanics (QM) favors Priority Monism, the view according to which the Universe is the only fundamental object. It develops formal frameworks to frame rigorously the question of fundamental mereology and its answers, namely (Priority) Pluralism and Monism. It then reconstructs the quantum mechanical argument in favor of the latter and provides a detailed and thorough criticism of it that sheds furthermore new light on the relation between parthood, composition and fundamentality (...)
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  22. Chris Heathwood (forthcoming). Monism and Pluralism About Value. In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    This essay discusses monism and pluralism about two related evaluative notions: welfare, or what makes people better off, and value simpliciter, or what makes the world better. These are stipulatively referred to as 'axiological value'. Axiological value property monists hold that one of these notions is reducible to the other (or else eliminable), while axiological value property pluralists deny this. Substantive monists about axiological value hold that there is just one basic kind of thing that makes our lives or (...)
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  23. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2013). Meno and the Monist. Metaphilosophy 44 (1-2):157-170.score: 18.0
    Recent critiques of veritistic value monism, or the idea that true belief is unique in being of fundamental epistemic value, typically invoke a claim about the surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief, in turn traced back to Plato's Meno. However, to the extent Plato at all defends a surplus claim in the Meno, it differs from that figuring in contemporary discussions with respect to both its scope and the kind of value at issue, and is under closer (...)
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  24. William Seager (2013). Classical Levels, Russellian Monism and the Implicate Order. Foundations of Physics 43 (4):548-567.score: 18.0
    Reception of the Bohm-Hiley interpretation of quantum mechanics has a curiously Janus faced quality. On the one hand, it is frequently derided as a conservative throwback to outdated classical patterns of thought. On the other hand, it is equally often taken to task for encouraging a wild quantum mysticism, often regarded as anti-scientific. I will argue that there are reasons for this reception, but that a proper appreciation of the dual scientific and philosophical aspects of the view reveals a powerful (...)
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  25. Gilbert B. Côté (2013). Triple-Aspect Monism and the Ontology of Quantum Particles. Open Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):451-454.score: 18.0
    An analysis of the physical implications of abstractness reveals the reality of three interconnected modes of existence: abstract, virtual and concrete. This triple-aspect monism clarifies the ontological status of subatomic quantum particles. It also provides a non-spooky solution to the weirdness of quantum physics and a new outlook for the mind-body problem. The ontological implications are profound for both physics and philosophy.
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  26. A. R. J. Fisher (forthcoming). Priority Monism, Partiality, and Minimal Truthmakers. Philosophical Studies:1-15.score: 18.0
    Truthmaker monism is the view that the one and only truthmaker is the world. Despite its unpopularity, this view has recently received an admirable defence by Schaffer (Philos Q 60(239):307–324, 2010b). Its main defect, I argue, is that it omits partial truthmakers. If we omit partial truthmakers, we lose the intimate connection between a truth and its truthmaker. I further argue that the notion of a minimal truthmaker should be the key notion that plays the role of constraining ontology (...)
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  27. W. L. Stanton (1983). Supervenience and Psychophysical Law in Anomalous Monism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (January):72-9.score: 18.0
    Supervenience entails psychophysical principles, but this is compatible with anomalous monism. On what constitutes a strict psychophysical law.
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  28. Steindór J. Erlingsson (2002). From Haeckelian Monist to Anti-Haeckelian Vitalist: The Transformation of the Icelandic Naturalist Thorvaldur Thoroddsen (1855-1921). [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Biology 35 (3):443 - 470.score: 18.0
    Iceland has not been known as a contributor to the history of science. This small nation in the North-Atlantic has only in recent decades made its mark on international science. But the Icelandic naturalist Thorvaldur Thoroddsen (1855-1921) is an exception to this generalisation, for he was well known at the turn of the 20th century in Europe and America for his research on the geography and geology of Iceland. Though Thoroddsen's contribution to these sciences is of great interest there is (...)
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  29. Jacopo Tagliabue (forthcoming). Anomalous Monism in a Digital Universe. Minds and Machines:1-12.score: 18.0
    Bermúdez (Philosophy of psychology: a contemporary introduction, Routledge, London, 2005) identifies the “Interface Problem” as the central problem in the philosophy of psychology: how commonsensical psychological explanations can be integrated with lower-level (cognitive, biological, etc.) explanations? In particular, since folk psychology is meant to provide causal explanations on a par with, say, neurobiological explanations, the question of how to understand the relation between the two layers arises naturally. Donald Davidson claimed that the interface problem is actually ill-posed and put forward (...)
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  30. John Harvey (2007). Neutral Monism and the Social Character of Consciousness. Philosophy Today 51 (1):52-59.score: 18.0
    After thousands of years of work, the mind-body problem endures as one of the most tantalizing issues in metaphysics. For my purposes I formulate the question as: What is the relation between consciousness and matter? The solution to the mind-body problem that I offer is a version of neutral monism, the view that mental and physical events are both to be derived from some stuff that in itself is neither physical nor mental. This paper specifies the conditions under which (...)
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  31. Heiner Fangerau (2012). Monism, Racial Hygiene, and National Socialism. In Todd H. Weir (ed.), Monism: Science, Philosophy, Religion, and the History of a Worldview. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 18.0
     
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  32. Arthur Edward Maddock (1936). Scientific Monism. London, J. Clarke & Co., Ltd..score: 18.0
    Scientific monism.--Evolution as a psycho-physical process.--Purpose.--The conceptual limit.--Factors of moral responsibility.--Social welfare.--Justice.--Heredity.--Environment.--Perception.--Psychic determinism.--The associative principle in evolution.--The origin and development of morals.--The intuitional factor in morals.--Necessary truths.--Relativity in the moral world.
     
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  33. Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2010). Truth, Pluralism, Monism, Correspondence. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 16.0
    When talking about truth, we ordinarily take ourselves to be talking about one-and-the-same thing. Alethic monists suggest that theorizing about truth ought to begin with this default or pre-reflective stance, and, subsequently, parlay it into a set of theoretical principles that are aptly summarized by the thesis that truth is one. Foremost among them is the invariance principle.
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  34. Ted Honderich (1982). The Argument for Anomalous Monism. Analysis 42 (January):59-64.score: 15.0
  35. Galen Strawson (1999). Realistic Materialist Monism. In S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak & D. Chalmers (eds.), Towards a Science of Consciousness III.score: 15.0
    Short version of 'Real materialism', given at Tucson III Conference, 1998. (1) physicalism is true (2) the qualitative character of experience is real, as most naively understood ... so (3) the qualitative character of experience (considered specifically as such) is wholly physical. ‘How can consciousness possibly be physical, given what we know about the physical?’ To ask this question is already to have gone wrong. We have no good reason (as Priestley and Russell and others observe) to think that we (...)
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  36. Colin McGinn (1977). Anomalous Monism and Kripke's Cartesian Intuitions. Analysis 2 (January):78-80.score: 15.0
    It is argued that kripke's objections to the identity theory can be met by token theories. the crucial point is that the existence of the required qualitative counterparts is consistent with the absence of psychophysical correlations.
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  37. Yitzhak Melamed (2012). The Sirens of Elea: Rationalism, Monism and Idealism in Spinoza. In Antonia Lolordo & Duncan Stewart (eds.), Debates in Early Modern Philosophy. Blackwell.score: 15.0
    The main thesis of Michael Della Rocca’s outstanding Spinoza book (Della Rocca 2008a) is that at the very center of Spinoza’s philosophy stands the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR): the stipulation that everything must be explainable or, in other words, the rejection of any brute facts. Della Rocca rightly ascribes to Spinoza a strong version of the PSR. It is not only that the actual existence and features of all things must be explicable, but even the inexistence – as well (...)
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  38. Louise M. Antony (1994). The Inadequacy of Anomalous Monism as a Realist Theory of Mind. In Gerhard Preyer, F. Siebelt & A. Ulfig (eds.), Language, Mind, and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer.score: 15.0
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  39. Neil Campbell (1997). The Standard Objection to Anomalous Monism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3):373-82.score: 15.0
  40. Robert Tully (1988). Russell's Neutral Monism. Russell 8:209-224.score: 15.0
  41. Steven Yalowitz (1997). Rationality and the Argument for Anomalous Monism. Philosophical Studies 87 (3):235-58.score: 15.0
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  42. Michael Lockwood (1981). What Was Russell's Neutral Monism? Midwest Studes in Philosophy 6 (1):143-58.score: 15.0
  43. Andreas Bächli & Klaus Petrus (eds.) (2003). Monism. Ontos.score: 15.0
    This volume aims to discuss some of these aspects historically and systematically.
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  44. Neil Campbell (1998). Anomalous Monism and the Charge of Epiphenomenalism. Dialectica 52 (1):23-39.score: 15.0
  45. Peter Smith (1982). Bad News for Anomalous Monism? Analysis 42 (October):220-4.score: 15.0
  46. Peter Smith (1984). Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism: A Reply to Honderich. Analysis 44 (2):83-86.score: 15.0
  47. Thomas Natsoulas (1987). Roger W. Sperry's Monist Interactionism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 8:1-21.score: 15.0
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  48. Jaap van Brakel (2005). Supervenience and Anomalous Monism. Dialectica 53 (1):3-24.score: 15.0
    In this paper I argue that the intuitions which made Davidson and Hare use the word "supervenience," were not the same as those which underlie current supervenience discussions. There are crucial differences between, on the one hand, the concerns of Davidson and Hare, as I interpret them, and "received" theories of supervenience on the other. I suggest the use of the term by Davidson and Hare lends support to turning the concept upside down by giving priority to the Manifest Image (...)
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  49. Brian Ellis (1967). Physical Monism. Synthese 17 (June):141-161.score: 15.0
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