A central tenet of cognitive linguistics is that adults’ knowledge of language consists of a structured inventory of constructions, including various two-argument constructions such as the active, the passive and “fronting” constructions. But how do speakers choose which construction to use for a particular utterance, given constraints such as discourse/information structure and the semantic fit between verb and construction? The goal of the present study was to build a computational model of this phenomenon for two-argument constructions in Mandarin. First, we (...) conducted a grammaticality judgment study with 60 native speakers which demonstrated that, across 57 verbs, semantic affectedness – as determined by further 16 native speakers – predicted each verb’s relative acceptability in the bei-passive and ba-active constructions, but not the Notional Passive and SVO Active constructions. Second, in order to simulate acquisition of these competing constraints, we built a computational model that learns to map from corpus-derived input to an output representation corresponding to these four constructions. The model was able to predict judgments of the relative acceptability of the test verbs in the ba-active and bei-passive constructions obtained in Study 1, with model-human correlations in the region of r = 0.5 and r = 0.3, respectively. Surprisingly, these correlations increased when lexical verb identity was removed; perhaps because this information leads to over-fitting of the training set. These findings suggest the intriguing possibility that acquiring constructions involves forgetting as a mechanism for abstracting across certain fine-grained lexical details and idiosyncrasies. (shrink)

Unlike eggs and diatoms, most single cells in nature do not have structured shells to provide extensive protection. It is a challenge to artificially confer shell structures on living cells to improve their inherent properties and functions. We discuss four different types of cellular shellizations: man‐made hydrogels, sol‐gels, polyelectrolytes, and mineral shells. We also explore potential applications, such as cell storage, protection, delivery, and therapy. We suggest that shellization could provide another means to regulate and functionalize cells. Specifically, the integration (...) of living cells and non‐living functional shells may be developed as a novel strategy to create “super” or intelligent cells. Unlike biological approaches, this material‐based bio‐interface regulation is inexpensive, effective, and convenient, opening up a novel avenue for cell‐based technologies and practices. (shrink)

As the spirit of the times must understand the essence of the philosophy of real life. The relationship between philosophy and reality of life with people through philosophy, philosophy and social practice, truth and values, knowledge and belief, rationality and irrationality, philosophers and other issues out of a sense of mission. Practice of the masses, is the source of philosophical wisdom. Philosophy is the wisdom of human-specific, and its characteristics is that it's critical. Of existing things unreasonable and unfair negative (...) and critical factors, to arouse people's awareness, is a revolutionary philosophy, critical edge of the reflected glory. Philosophy can not stand still, should not stick to the simple knowledge of the territory, should break through the philosophy of scientism is the epistemological horizons, the value of the field, the field of faith, advance the field of non-rational, open up freedom of thought. Philosopher is the personification of wisdom, philosophy, and promote cultural development and all-round development is the glorious duty of the philosopher and mission. Philosophy as the essence of time spirit should understand the true-life inevitably. The relation between the philosophy and true-life can be outspreaded through such issues as philosophy and demos, philosophy and social practice, truth and value, knowledge and belief, rationality and non-rationality, vision of philosophers. People's practice is the headspring of philosophy wisdom. Philosophy is the particular wisdom of people with the characteristic of criticism. The revolution and criticism of philosophy is exhibited splendidly through the negating and criticizing the unreasonable and unfair thing, evoking the consciousness. Philosophy should not be complacent and conservative and keep in the pure knowledge field, but break through the boundary of intellective scientism to the field of value, belief and non-rationality, exploit the free of thinking. Philosophers is the personification of philosophy, with the duty and mission of promoting culture development and human development. (shrink)

本书选辑了作者自1982年以来公开发表的学术论文和学术评论50余篇。学术论文部分主要是围绕重大现实课题,探讨了马克思主义哲学历史观、真理观、价值观和文化研究的方法论等问题;学术评论部分主要针对社会上和 学术理论界存在的思想路线、思维方式、思想作风、学风、文风等方面的问题及其实质和根源,作了分析和评论。.

Artificial intelligence technology has been widely applied in many fields. AI-assisted learning environments have been implemented in classrooms to facilitate the innovation of pedagogical models. However, college students' willingness to accept AI-assisted learning environments has been ignored. Exploring the factors that influence college students' willingness to use AI can promote AI technology application in higher education. Based on the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology and the theory of perceived risk, this study identified six factors that influence students' (...) willingness to use AI to analyze their relationships with WTA AI-assisted learning environments. A model including six hypotheses was constructed to test the factors affecting students' WTA. The results indicated that college students showed “weak rejection” of the construction of AI-assisted learning environments. Effort expectancy, performance expectancy, and social influence were all positively related to college students' WTA AI-assisted learning environments. Psychological risk significantly negatively influenced students' WTA. The findings of this study will be helpful for carrying out risk communication, which can promote the construction of AI-assisted learning environments. (shrink)

Emch, G.G., Liu, C.: The Logic of Thermostatistical Physics. Springer, Berlin/ Heidelberg (2002) 11. Frigg, R., Werndl, C.: Entropy – a guide for the perplexed. Forthcoming in: Beisbart, C., Hartmann, S. (eds.) Probabilities in Physics. Oxford  ...

Ben shu yi Ming ru Li Cai de jiang xue huo dong yu xue pai jian gou wei zhong xin, tan tao cong shi liu shi ji chu dao shi qi shi ji mo li xue qun ti zhong xin xing xue shuo he xue pai de chan sheng, chuan bo, kuo zhan yu chuan cheng de mo shi, bing zhuo zhong cong si xiang shi de jiao du jie shi zhe zhong mo shi chan sheng he yun xing de (...) si xiang gen yuan yu nei zai dong li. Quan shu zheng wen gong qi zhang, zhu yao nei rong fen wei shang xia liang bian, shang bian yi hong guan zong lun de fang shi, cong li xue jing dian "Da xue" de wen ben bian dong he quan shi jing zheng qie ru, tan tao zhong wan Ming li xue xue shuo he xue pai jian gou de li lun gen ju; xia bian yi Li Cai de "zhi xiu" xue shuo ji qi jiang xue huo dong zuo wei ge an yan jiu, tan tao li xue xue shuo he xue pai de chuan bo ji chuan cheng de she hui hua tu jing. (shrink)

Ben shu fen shang xia liang ge bu fen,Shang bian shi zhu zi yu lei wen xian yan jiu,Xia bian shi zhu zi yu lei ci hui yan jiu.Quan shu yi gong fen wei 9 zhang.Di yi zhang xu lun,Shou xian jie shao le zhu xi yu zhu zi yu lei,Qi ci jin xing le xue shu hui gu,Zong jie le jin 20 nian lai(jie zhi 2009 nian)Guo nei wai zhu zi yu lei yan jiu de sheng kuang he qu (...) de de zhu yao cheng jiu,Zui hou ti chu ben shu de yan jiu fang fa he yi yi.Di er zhang yan jiu tong xing ben zhu zi yu lei ji cheng shu zhi qian de ji ge zhong yao ban ben.Di san zhang wei zhong hua ben zhu zi yu lei yu song ke ben hui an xian sheng zhu wen gong yu lu de yi wen bi jiao.Di si zhang wei zhong hua ben zhu zi yu lei yu chao xian gu xie ben zhu zi yu lei yi wen bi jiao.Di wu zhang yan jiu zhu zi yu lei de wen xian xue jia zhi.Di liu zhang he di qi zhang ji zhong yan jiu zhu zi yu lei de fu yin ci.Di ba zhang tao lun zhu zi yu lei zhong de duo yin jie ci yu.Di jiu zhang zong jie chan shu zhu zi yu lei de yu ti te zheng,Yu yan te dian he yan jiu jia zhi. (shrink)

Ben shu yi dao de chuan cheng wei shi jiao,cong yan hui zhi le yu xian, zi gong zhi zhi yu yan, zi lu zhi zhi yu zheng, zi xia zhi xue yu ren si ge fang mian, lun shu zhu xi dui kong zi men ren yan xing de quan shi,cong er jie shi zhu xi dui "Lun yu" zhe yi jing dian suo fan ying de sheng huo shi jie de li jie ji qi he si kao fang (...) shi......shi dui chuan tong zhu xi yan jiu nai zhi song ming li xue yan jiu de yi ge zhong yao bu chong. (shrink)

本书面对21世纪的各种新的挑战,哲学家和科学家,社会科学家和自然科学家应该怎样携手,通力合作,高质量地发展我国的科学和教育等诸多问题作了论述。.

This article argues that standard causal and functionalist definitions of realization fail to account for the realization of entities that cannot be individuated in causal or functional terms. By modifying such definitions to require that realizers also logically suffice for any historical properties of the entities they realize, one can provide for the realization of entities whose resistance to causal/functional individuation stems from their possession of individuative historical properties. But if qualia cannot be causally or functionally individuated, then qualia can (...) be physically realized only if the thesis that all things are physical or physically realized is insufficient for physicalism. (shrink)

The surface grammar of reports such as ‘I have a pain in my leg’ suggests that pains are objects which are spatially located in parts of the body. We show that the parallel construction is not available in Mandarin. Further, four philosophically important grammatical features of such reports cannot be reproduced. This suggests that arguments and puzzles surrounding such reports may be tracking artefacts of English, rather than philosophically significant features of the world.

Ben shu shi zuo zhe yi ying wen xie cheng er quan mian lun shu yang ming zhe xue de zhuan zhu.

Theories of phenomenal intentionality have been claimed to resolve certain worries about the indeterminacy of mental content that rival, externalist theories face. Thus far, however, such claims have been largely programmatic. This paper aims to improve on prior arguments in favor of phenomenal intentionality by using attention and Gestalt principles as specific examples of factors that influence the phenomenal character of perceptual experience in ways that thereby help determine perceptual content. Some reasons are then offered for rejecting an alternative interpretation (...) of these examples, according to which the phenomenal effects of attention and Gestalt principles play no role in the determination of perceptual content. (shrink)

Well-Being and Death addresses philosophical questions about death and the good life: what makes a life go well? Is death bad for the one who dies? How is this possible if we go out of existence when we die? Is it worse to die as an infant or as a young adult? Is it bad for animals and fetuses to die? Can the dead be harmed? Is there any way to make death less bad for us? Ben Bradley defends the (...) following views: pleasure, rather than achievement or the satisfaction of desire, is what makes life go well; death is generally bad for its victim, in virtue of depriving the victim of more of a good life; death is bad for its victim at times after death, in particular at all those times at which the victim would have been living well; death is worse the earlier it occurs, and hence it is worse to die as an infant than as an adult; death is usually bad for animals and fetuses, in just the same way it is bad for adult humans; things that happen after someone has died cannot harm that person; the only sensible way to make death less bad is to live so long that no more good life is possible. (shrink)

Concentrating on the Qingdao Observatory, this paper will explore the role of scientific facility in asserting China’s sovereignty during the first half of the twentieth century. Although scholars have explained the efforts of China’s internationalization in diplomacy through the perspectives of politics, economics and culture, they have not paid attention to science. Therefore, this paper aims to shed some light on how scientific issues were solved via diplomacy during the Republic of China, while further asserting that the focus in negotiations (...) was not confined to science itself, but rather to sovereignty within a scientific context. In this process, the meaning of sovereignty has also been expanded basing on the improvement of nation’s scientific capability. Besides, the participation of different actors involved in sovereignty assertion is investigated by this paper. Although the diplomatic negotiation was held at the international level, the local government and scientific community were main promoters in this case, which calls for attention on the various subjects in sovereignty issue. Consequently, this paper argues that Asian countries, such as Republic of China, could also employ science as a means to negotiate with foreign powers and claim their due rights. (shrink)

Sentiment analysis is one of the important tasks of online opinion analysis and an important means to guide the direction of online opinion and maintain social stability. Due to the multiple characteristics of linguistic expressions, ambiguity, multiple meanings of words, and the increasing speed of new words, it is a great challenge for the task of text sentiment analysis. Commonly used machine learning methods suffer from inadequate text feature extraction, and the emergence of deep learning has brought a turnaround for (...) this purpose. In this paper, we investigate the problem of text sentiment analysis using methods related to deep learning. In order to incorporate user and product information in a more diverse way in the model, this paper proposes a model based on a deep bidirectional long-and short-term memory network-self-attention mechanism-custom classifier. The model first identifies contextual associations and acquires deep text features through a deep bidirectional long- and short-term memory network and then captures important features in the text using a self-attentive mechanism. The model finally combines user information and product information to build a custom classifier module and uses context-aware attention mechanisms to assign specific parameters to user information and product information, which improves the performance of the model on public datasets compared with current common models. The results show that the accuracy of the algorithm in this paper is high, and it is about 5% lower than the traditional algorithm. The method can reduce the number of iterations and the running time of the algorithm. (shrink)

This paper defends the view, put roughly, that to think that p is to guess that p is the answer to the question at hand, and that to think that p rationally is for one’s guess to that question to be in a certain sense non-arbitrary. Some theses that will be argued for along the way include: that thinking is question-sensitive and, correspondingly, that ‘thinks’ is context-sensitive; that it can be rational to think that p while having arbitrarily low credence (...) that p; that, nonetheless, rational thinking is closed under entailment; that thinking does not supervene on credence; and that in many cases what one thinks on certain matters is, in a very literal sense, a choice. Finally, since there are strong reasons to believe that thinking just is believing, there are strong reasons to think that all this goes for belief as well. (shrink)

Ben shu jie shao le gong zi zhen, wei yuan, yan fu, kang you wei, tan si tong, liang qi chao, chen tian hua, zhang bing lin deng wan qing si xiang jia de zhe xue si xiang.

Motivated by weaknesses with traditional accounts of logical epistemology, considerable attention has been paid recently to the view, known as anti-exceptionalism about logic, that the subject matter and epistemology of logic may not be so different from that of the recognised sciences. One of the most prevalent claims made by advocates of AEL is that theory choice within logic is significantly similar to that within the sciences. This connection with scientific methodology highlights a considerable challenge for the anti-exceptionalist, as two (...) uncontentious claims about scientific theories are that they attempt to explain a target phenomenon and prove their worth through successful predictions. Thus, if this methodological AEL is to be viable, the anti-exceptionalist will need a reasonable account of what phenomena logics are attempting to explain, how they can explain, and in what sense they can be said to issue predictions. This paper makes sense of the anti-exceptionalist proposal with a new account of logical theory choice, logical predictivism, according to which logics are engaged in both a process of prediction and explanation. (shrink)

In this article, I attempt to resuscitate the perennially unfashionable distinctive feeling theory of pleasure (and pain), according to which for an experience to be pleasant (or unpleasant) is just for it to involve or contain a distinctive kind of feeling. I do this in two ways. First, by offering powerful new arguments against its two chief rivals: attitude theories, on the one hand, and the phenomenological theories of Roger Crisp, Shelly Kagan, and Aaron Smuts, on the other. Second, by (...) showing how it can answer two important objections that have been made to it. First, the famous worry that there is no felt similarity to all pleasant (or unpleasant) experiences (sometimes called ‘the heterogeneity objection’). Second, what I call ‘Findlay’s objection’, the claim that it cannot explain the nature of our attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain. (shrink)

According to hedonism about well-being, lives can go well or poorly for us just in virtue of our ability to feel pleasure and pain. Hedonism has had many advocates historically, but has relatively few nowadays. This is mainly due to three highly influential objections to it: The Philosophy of Swine, The Experience Machine, and The Resonance Constraint. In this paper, I attempt to revive hedonism. I begin by giving a precise new definition of it. I then argue that the right (...) motivation for it is the ‘experience requirement’ (i.e., that something can benefit or harm a being only if it affects the phenomenology of her experiences in some way). Next, I argue that hedonists should accept a felt-quality theory of pleasure, rather than an attitude-based theory. Finally, I offer new responses to the three objections. Central to my responses are (i) a distinction between experiencing a pleasure (i.e., having some pleasurable phenomenology) and being aware of that pleasure, and (ii) an emphasis on diversity in one’s pleasures. (shrink)

What is it for a life to be meaningful? In this article, I defend what I call Consequentialism about Meaning in Life, the view that one's life is meaningful at time t just in case one's surviving at t would be good in some way, and one's life was meaningful considered as a whole just in case the world was made better in some way for one's having existed.

Philosophers of logic are particularly interested in understanding the aims, epistemology, and methodology of logic. This raises the question of how the philosophy of logic should go about these enquires. According to the practice-based approach, the most reliable method we have to investigate the methodology and epistemology of a research field is by considering in detail the activities of its practitioners. This holds just as true for logic as it does for the recognised empirical and abstract sciences. If we wish (...) to systematically understand the aims and epistemology of logic, we are best placed achieving this by looking at what logicians do, rather than reflecting upon the nature of logic itself. In this entry, we outline the motivations for a practice-based approach towards the philosophy of logic and highlight its advantages over more “top-down” approaches, which attempt to infer conclusions about the nature of logic and its methodology on the basis of traditional assumptions about knowledge, metaphysics, or logic itself. We end by addressing several prominent concerns raised against the practice-based approach. (shrink)

Liu Ping discusses patriotism and nationalism in regard to culture and values and also the role of the prophetic voice in Chinese society. His provocative allegorical rewriting of a prophecy from the Biblical book of Amos, setting it in contemporary China, is pointedly political. Liu writes in the Chinese intellectual tradition of pointing out when a society or a country is on the brink of destruction.

I argue that extant accounts of harm all fail to account for important desiderata, and that we should therefore jettison the concept when doing moral philosophy.

One prominent argument in international law and religious thought for abolishing capital punishment is that it violates individuals’ right to life. Notably, this _right-to-life argument_ emerged from normative and legal frameworks that recognize deadly force against aggressors as justified when necessary to stop their unjust threat of grave harm. Can capital punishment be necessary in this sense—and thus justified defensive killing? If so, the right-to-life argument would have to admit certain exceptions where executions are justified. Drawing on work by Hugo (...) Bedau, I identify a thought experiment where executions are justified defensive killing but explain why they cannot be in our world. A state’s obligations to its prisoners include the _obligation to use nonlethal incapacitation_ (ONI), which applies as long as prisoners pose no imminent threat. ONI precludes executions for reasons of future dangerousness. By subjecting the right-to-life argument to closer scrutiny, this article ultimately places it on firmer ground. (shrink)

Guanxi is essential to doing business in China. Even those who are minimally familiar with business in the People’s Republic seem to know this. How should Western business organizations look at guanxi? Further, if guanxi is seen as essential, what is the responsible approach to guanxi building? These questions may have different answers depending on one’s perspectives. First, what is guanxi?

Given the plethora of competing logical theories of validity available, it’s understandable that there has been a marked increase in interest in logical epistemology within the literature. If we are to choose between these logical theories, we require a good understanding of the suitable criteria we ought to judge according to. However, so far there’s been a lack of appreciation of how logical practice could support an epistemology of logic. This paper aims to correct that error, by arguing for a (...) practice-based approach to logical epistemology. By looking at the types of evidence logicians actually appeal to in attempting to support their theories, we can provide a more detailed and realistic picture of logical epistemology. To demonstrate the fruitfulness of a practice-based approach, we look to a particular case of logical argumentation—the dialetheist’s arguments based upon the self-referential paradoxes—and show that the evidence appealed to support a particular theory of logical epistemology, logical abductivism. (shrink)

The move to satisficing has been thought to help consequentialists avoid the problem of demandingness. But this is a mistake. In this article I formulate several versions of satisficing consequentialism. I show that every version is unacceptable, because every version permits agents to bring about a submaximal outcome in order to prevent a better outcome from obtaining. Some satisficers try to avoid this problem by incorporating a notion of personal sacrifice into the view. I show that these attempts are unsuccessful. (...) I conclude that, if satisficing consequentialism is to remain a position worth considering, satisficers must show (i) that the move to satisficing is necessary to solve some problem, whether it be the demandingness problem or some other problem, and (ii) that there is a version of the view that does not permit the gratuitous prevention of goodness. (shrink)

In this paper, I reconstruct Robert Nozick's experience machine objection to hedonism about well-being. I then explain and briefly discuss the most important recent criticisms that have been made of it. Finally, I question the conventional wisdom that the experience machine, while it neatly disposes of hedonism, poses no problem for desire-based theories of well-being.

The philosophical study of well-being concerns what makes lives good for their subjects. It is now standard among philosophers to distinguish between two kinds of well-being: - lifetime well-being, i.e., how good a person's life was for him or her considered as a whole, and - temporal well-being, i.e., how well off someone was, or how they fared, at a particular moment in time or over a period of time longer than a moment but shorter than a whole life, say, (...) a day, month, year, or chapter of a life. Many theories have been offered of each of these kinds of well-being. A common view is that lifetime well-being is in some way constructed out of temporal well-being. This book argues that much of this literature is premised on a mistake. Lifetime well-being cannot be constructed out of temporal well-being, because there is no such thing as temporal well-being. The only genuine kind of well-being is lifetime well-being. The Passing of Temporal Well-Being will prove essential reading for professional philosophers, especially in moral and political philosophy. It will also be of interest to welfare economists and policy-makers who appeal to well-being. (shrink)