In several papers, John Norton has argued that Bayesianism cannot handle ignorance adequately due to its inability to distinguish between neutral and disconfirming evidence. He argued that this inability sows confusion in, e.g., anthropic reasoning in cosmology or the Doomsday argument, by allowing one to draw unwarranted conclusions from a lack of knowledge. Norton has suggested criteria for a candidate for representation of neutral support. Imprecise credences (families of credal probability functions) constitute a Bayesian-friendly framework that allows us to avoid (...) inadequate neutral priors and better handle ignorance. The imprecise model generally agrees with Norton's representation of ignorance but requires that his criterion of self-duality be reformulated or abandoned. (shrink)

The low representation (< 30%) of women in philosophy in English-speaking countries has generated much discussion, both in academic circles and the public sphere. It is sometimes suggested (Haslanger 2009) that unconscious biases, acting at every level in the field, may be grounded in gendered schemas of philosophers and in the discipline more widely, and that actions to make philosophy a more welcoming place for women should address such schemas. However, existing data are too limited to fully warrant such an (...) explanation, which therefore will not satisfy those in favor of the status quo or those who argue against the need to address gender imbalance. In this paper, we propose measures to improve the profession that ought to be implemented without referring explicitly to this underrepresentation or to the climate for women and other underrepresented groups. Such recommendations are based on empirical research already carried out in other disciplines and do not rest on whether it is possible to identify the cause of this low representation. We argue that we need not wait for new or better data to ensure that fairer practices are enacted for women, other underrepresented groups, and everybody else, if only out of precaution. (shrink)

The Doomsday argument and anthropic reasoning are two puzzling examples of probabilistic confirmation. In both cases, a lack of knowledge apparently yields surprising conclusions. Since they are formulated within a Bayesian framework, they constitute a challenge to Bayesianism. Several attempts, some successful, have been made to avoid these conclusions, but some versions of these arguments cannot be dissolved within the framework of orthodox Bayesianism. I show that adopting an imprecise framework of probabilistic reasoning allows for a more adequate representation of (...) ignorance in Bayesian reasoning and explains away these puzzles. (shrink)

The meaning of scientific propositions is not always expressible in terms of observable phenomena. Such propositions involve generalizations, and also terms that are theoretical constructs. I study here how to assess the meaning of scientific propositions, that is, the specific import of theoretical terms. Empiricists have expressed a concern that scientific propositions, and theoretical terms, should always be, to some degree, related to observable consequences. We can see that the former empiricist criterion of meaning only implies for theoretical terms not (...) to be definable in terms of observable, but that their use put a constraint on the observable consequences of a theory. To that effect, Ramsey's method of formal elimination of theoretical terms can be an interesting tool. It has faced important logical objections, which have mostly been addressed with respect to the problem of the ontological commitment of the second-order quantification they imply. I show here that these criticisms can be overcome, and that there can be a successful Ramsey elimination of theoretical terms with first order sentences, making Ramsey's method a relevant tool to assess the empirical meaning of scientific propositions. (shrink)

Cosmology raises novel philosophical questions regarding the use of probabilities in inference. This work aims at identifying and assessing lines of arguments and problematic principles in probabilistic reasoning in cosmology. -/- The first, second, and third papers deal with the intersection of two distinct problems: accounting for selection effects, and representing ignorance or indifference in probabilistic inferences. These two problems meet in the cosmology literature when anthropic considerations are used to predict cosmological parameters by conditionalizing the distribution of, e.g., the (...) cosmological constant on the number of observers it allows for. However, uniform probability distributions usually appealed to in such arguments are an inadequate representation of indifference, and lead to unfounded predictions. It has been argued that this inability to represent ignorance is a fundamental flaw of any inductive framework using additive measures. In the first paper, I examine how imprecise probabilities fare as an inductive framework and avoid such unwarranted inferences. In the second paper, I detail how this framework allows us to successfully avoid the conclusions of Doomsday arguments in a way no Bayesian approach that represents credal states by single credence functions could. -/- There are in the cosmology literature several kinds of arguments referring to self- locating uncertainty. In the multiverse framework, different "pocket-universes" may have different fundamental physical parameters. We don’t know if we are typical observers and if we can safely assume that the physical laws we draw from our observations hold elsewhere. The third paper examines the validity of the appeal to the "Sleeping Beauty problem" and assesses the nature and role of typicality assumptions often endorsed to handle such questions. -/- A more general issue for the use of probabilities in cosmology concerns the inadequacy of Bayesian and statistical model selection criteria in the absence of well-motivated measures for different cosmological models. The criteria for model selection commonly used tend to focus on optimizing the number of free parameters, but they can select physically implausible models. The fourth paper examines the possibility for Bayesian model selection to circumvent the lack of well-motivated priors. (shrink)

Jean Buridan has offered a solution to the Liar Paradox, i.e. to the problem of assigning a truth-value to the sentence ‘What I am saying is false’. It has been argued that either this solution is ad hoc since it would only apply to self-referencing sentences [Read, S. 2002. ‘The Liar Paradox from John Buridan back to Thomas Bradwardine’, Vivarium, 40 , 189–218] or else it weakens his theory of truth, making his ‘a logic without truth’ [Klima, G. 2008. ‘Logic (...) without truth: Buridan on the Liar’, in S. Rahman, T. Tulenheimo and E. Genot, Unity, Truth and the Liar: The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox, Berlin: Springer, 87–112 ; Dutilh Novaes, C. 2011. ‘Lessons on truth from mediaeval solutions to the Liar Paradox’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 61 , 58–78]. Against , I will argue that Buridan's solution by means of truth by supposition does not involve new principles. Self-referential sentences force us to handle supposition more carefully, which does not warrant the accusation of adhoccery. I will also argue, against (2), that it is exaggerated to assert that this solution leads to a ‘weakened’ theory of truth, since it is consistent with other passages of the Sophismata, which only gives necessary conditions for the truth of affirmative propositions, but sufficient conditions for falsity. (shrink)

Traditional debates, such as those regarding whether the universe is finite in spatial or temporal extent, exemplified, according to Kant, the inherent tendency of pure reason to lead us astray. Although various aspects of Kant’s arguments fail to find a footing in modern cosmology, Kant’s objections to the search for a complete objective description of the cosmos are related to three intertwined issues that are still of central importance: the applicability of universal laws, the status of distinctively cosmological laws, and (...) the explanatory sufficiency of laws. We will advocate a broadly Kantian position on these three issues as part of a critical response to a prevalent strain of Leibnizian rationalism in contemporary cosmology. (shrink)

Translation into French of Rudolf Carnap's Testability and Meaning (1936-1937): Carnap, Rudolf. "Testability and meaning." Philosophy of science 3.4 (1936): 419-471 and Carnap, Rudolf. "Testability and meaning—continued." Philosophy of science 4.1 (1937): 1-40. Introduction by Pierre Wagner; translation by Yann Benétreau-Dupin and Delphine Chapuis-Schmitz. Testabilité et signification est un classique de la philosophie des sciences dont aucune traduction n’avait jusqu’alors été offerte au public francophone. L’auteur y expose sa célèbre analyse des termes dispositionnels (« soluble dans l’eau (...) », « fragile », etc.) en montrant quelles difficultés soulève leur définition. Carnap livre également ici ses réflexions sur la nature de l’empirisme et sur le rapport du langage à la philosophie, offrant ainsi, dans ce texte, l’une des premières expositions du problème contemporain de la confirmation, soigneusement distinguée de la vérification et du test. Historiquement, l’ouvrage est aussi marqué par un mouvement de transition : celle de la langue allemande à l’anglais d’adoption (il s’agit du premier texte d’envergure que Carnap rédige en anglais), celle de l’émigration de son auteur, de Prague à Chicago, celle d’une pensée d’origine européenne venue, sur le chemin de l’exil, à la rencontre de la philosophie américaine. (shrink)

What is risk? How do we assess risk? What are the ethical implications of risk? The concept of risk is important – sometimes even crucial – for many philosophical domains, from philosophy of science and technology to ethics and sustainability. Philosophy and Science of Risk is a clear, wide-ranging introduction to this urgent and fast-growing subject. It covers the following key topics: -/- • The philosophical and historical background to understanding and interpreting risk -/- • The meaning of risk and (...) how it differs from closely related concepts, such as uncertainty or dangers -/- • The social construction of risk -/- • Risk perception and risk as an object of scientific study -/- • The measurement of risk, its probability and severity -/- • Risk and scientific modeling -/- • Risk, value judgments, and expertise -/- • Risk management, including cost-benefit analysis and the precautionary approach -/- • Risk communication, including deliberative models -/- • Ethics of risk, including duties toward nonhuman animals and future generations -/- • Risk and sustainability -/- • Decision-making under risk -/- Including helpful additional features such as text boxes, chapter summaries, review, and discussion questions, Philosophy and Science of Risk: An Introduction is an ideal textbook for students of the philosophy of risk. It is also suitable for students studying the conceptual questions surrounding risk in related subjects, such as sociology, psychology, economics, politics, geography, sustainability, and environmental studies. (shrink)

For nearly a decade we have taught the history and philosophy of science as part of courses aimed at the professional development of physics teachers. The focus of the history of science instruction is on the stages in the development of the concepts and theories of physics. For this instruction, we designed activities to help the teachers organize their understanding of this historical development. The activities include scientific modeling using archaic theories. We conducted surveys to gauge the impact on the (...) teachers of including the conceptual history of physics in the professional development courses. The teachers report greater confidence in their knowledge of the history of physics, that they reflect on this history for their teaching, and that they use of the history of physics for their classroom instruction. In this paper, we provide examples of our activities, the rationale for their design, and discuss the outcomes for the teachers of the instruction. (shrink)

The didactics of astronomy is a relatively young field with respect to that of other sciences. Historical issues have most often been part of the teaching of astronomy, although that often does not stem from a specific didactics. The teaching of astronomy is often subsumed under that of physics. One can easily consider that, from an educational standpoint, astronomy requires the same mathematical or physical strategies. This approach may be adequate in many cases but cannot stand as a general principle (...) for the teaching of astronomy. This chapter offers in a first part a brief overview of the status of astronomy education research and of the role of the history and philosophy of science (HPS) in astronomy education. In a second part, it attempts to illustrate possible ways to structure the teaching of astronomy around its historical development so as to pursue a quality education and contextualized learning. (shrink)

This new book by cosmologists Geraint F. Lewis and Luke A. Barnes is another entry in the long list of cosmology-centered physics books intended for a large audience. While many such books aim at advancing a novel scientific theory, this one has no such scientific pretense. Its goals are to assert that the universe is fine-tuned for life, to defend that this fact can reasonably motivate further scientific inquiry as to why it is so, and to show that the multiverse (...) and intelligent design hypotheses are reasonable proposals to explain this fine-tuning. This book's potential contribution, therefore, lies in how convincingly and efficiently it can make that case. (shrink)

This is an editorial report on the outcomes of an international conference sponsored by a grant from the National Science Foundation to the School of Education at Boston University and the Center for Philosophy and History of Science at Boston University for a conference titled: How Can the History and Philosophy of Science Contribute to Contemporary US Science Teaching? The presentations of the conference speakers and the reports of the working groups are reviewed. Multiple themes emerged for K-16 education from (...) the perspective of the history and philosophy of science. Key ones were that: students need to understand that central to science is argumentation, criticism, and analysis; students should be educated to appreciate science as part of our culture; students should be educated to be science literate; what is meant by the nature of science as discussed in much of the science education literature must be broadened to accommodate a science literacy that includes preparation for socioscientific issues; teaching for science literacy requires the development of new assessment tools; and, it is difficult to change what science teachers do in their classrooms. The principal conclusions drawn by the editors are that: to prepare students to be citizens in a participatory democracy, science education must be embedded in a liberal arts education; science teachers alone cannot be expected to prepare students to be scientifically literate; and, to educate students for scientific literacy will require a new curriculum that is coordinated across the humanities, history /social studies, and science classrooms. (shrink)

On peut inscrire les travaux de Engel dans le sillage rationaliste des Pères de la philosophie analytique, mais après le tournant naturaliste opéré par Quine. Ce sont les diverses bonnes raisons, exposées de manière non systématique par Engel, d’associer naturalisme et rationalisme que je souhaite présenter tout en cherchant à identifier la difficulté constitutive de ce programme qui ne reçoit pas de solution complète: la normativité épistémique ne semble ni éliminable, ni correctement intégrée à ce programme.

As Paulo Freire’s education theory for social change and emancipation is being continually studied and disseminated in East Asia, it has faced skepticism as some educators are unfamiliar with its critical pedagogy or education for freedom concepts. In light of this, scholars have attempted to compare Freirean philosophies with concepts in Chinese philosophy of education as a way of bridging East and West. Diverging from previous studies that use popular Chinese philosophies (such as Confucianism) to connect with Freirean theory, this (...) paper introduces an understudied but compatible Chinese philosophical thought, Mohism, for comparison with Freirean theory. Mohism is a political philosophy for the working class that expanded into grassroots movements for people’s welfare in ancient China. The Mohist bottom-up approach echoes the grassroots emancipatory pedagogy that underlies Freirean philosophy. A comparative analysis of education concepts in both philosophies reveals that despite differences in the educational content of Freirean theory and Mohism, there are similarities in their conceptualization of education for anti-oppression and praxis for social change. Implications for utilizing Mohist philosophy to contemplate Freirean philosophy within the East Asian educational context are also explored. Ultimately this paper revives educational concepts of Mohism that aligns with Freirean philosophy to a broader audience of scholars and educators. (shrink)

Not only is he lying, who speaks against his knowledge, but even more so he, who speaks against his ignorance [Nichtwissen].Augustine provided the first attempt to define lies in De Mendacio. It is central to his account that lying involves being dishonest. Many still follow Augustine in this. His definition shall serve as a background against which to contrast Nietzsche's notion of lying.2 The dishonesty definition of lying claims that telling a lie involves saying something the liar does not believe (...) to be true. Lying involves making a statement to someone else and trying to make it in such a way that the addressee does not realize the liar does not believe the statement to be true3—the liar tries to deceive the... (shrink)

We define a notion of reducibility for subsets of a second countable T 0 topological space based on relatively continuous relations and admissible representations. This notion of reducibility induces a hierarchy that refines the Baire classes and the Hausdorff–Kuratowski classes of differences. It coincides with Wadge reducibility on zero dimensional spaces. However in virtually every second countable T 0 space, it yields a hierarchy on Borel sets, namely it is well founded and antichains are of length at most 2. It (...) thus differs from the Wadge reducibility in many important cases, for example on the real line $${\mathbb{R}}$$ or the Scott Domain $${\mathcal{P}\omega}$$. (shrink)

Via a historical reconstruction, this paper primarily demonstrates how the societal debate on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) gradually extended in terms of actors involved and concerns reflected. It is argued that the implementation of recombinant DNA technology out of the laboratory and into civil society entailed a “complex of concerns.” In this complex, distinctions between environmental, agricultural, socio-economic, and ethical issues proved to be blurred. This fueled the confusion between the wider debate on genetic modification and the risk assessment of (...) transgenic crops in the European Union. In this paper, the lasting skeptical and/or ambivalent attitude of Europeans towards agro-food biotechnology is interpreted as signaling an ongoing social request – and even a quest – for an evaluation of biotechnology with Sense and Sensibility. In this (re)quest, a broader-than-scientific dimension is sought for that allows addressing the GMO debate in a more “sensible” way, whilst making “sense” of the different stances taken in it. Here, the restyling of the European regulatory frame on transgenic agro-food products and of science communication models are discussed and taken to be indicative of the (re)quest to move from a merely scientific evaluation and risk-based policy towards a socially more robust evaluation that takes the “non-scientific” concerns at stake in the GMO debate seriously. (shrink)

Hume’s chapter “Of Miracles” has been widely discussed, and one issue is that Hume seems to simply beg the question. Hume has a strong but implicit naturalist bias when he argues against the existence of reliable testimony for miracles. In this article, I explain that Hume begs the question, despite what he says about the possibility of miracles occurring. e main point is that he never describes a violation of the laws of nature that could not be explained by scientific (...) theories. (shrink)

The peripersonal space is an adaptive and flexible interface between the body and the environment that fulfills a dual-motor function: preparing the body for voluntary object-oriented actions to interact with incentive stimuli and preparing the body for defensive responses when facing potentially harmful stimuli. In this position article, we provide arguments for the sensorimotor rooting of the peripersonal space representation and highlight the variables that contribute to its flexible and adaptive characteristics. We also demonstrate that peripersonal space represents a mediation (...) zone between the body and the environment contributing to not only the control of goal-directed actions but also the organization of social life. The whole of the data presented and discussed led us to the proposal of a new theoretical framework linking the peripersonal action space and the interpersonal social space and we highlight how this theoretical framework can account for social behaviors in populations with socio-emotional deficits. (shrink)

Depuis plus d’une dizaine d’années, Albert Piette travaille à renouveler les méthodes et les concepts de l’anthropologie. Cette refondation s’appuie sur ses propres travaux empiriques, notamment sur le religieux, sur l’usage de méthodes plus pointillistes comme la photographie ou la description des détails, ainsi que sur des hypothèses relatives à la différence entre Sapiens et Néandertal. Les nouvelles propositions de travail qu’il avance empruntent souvent à la philosophie comme moyen d’une réflexion épistémologique, mais aussi parfois à la métaphysique. C’est pourquoi (...) je me propose de discuter en philosophe son ouvrage Contre le relationnisme. Lettre aux anthropologues. Il ne s’agit pas de réactiver la pratique philosophique de la science ultime couronnant les autres disciplines grâce à une réflexivité plus radicale, mais de suivre la démarche de Piette dans ses motivations profondes qui, comme il l’admet lui-même, l’oblige à passer par la philosophie. (shrink)

Despite the subjective experience of a continuous and coherent external world, we will argue that the perception and categorisation of visual space is constrained by the spatial resolution of the sensory systems but also and above all, by the pre-reflective representations of the body in action. Recent empirical data in cognitive neurosciences will be presented that suggest that multidimensional categorisation of perceptual space depends on body representations at both an experiential and a functional level. Results will also be resumed that (...) show that representations of the body in action are pre-reflective in nature as only some aspects of the pre-reflective states can be consciously experienced. Finally, a neuro-cognitive model based on the integration of afferent and efferent information will be described, which suggests that action simulation and associated predicted sensory consequences may represent the underlying principle that enables pre-reflective representations of the body for space categorisation and selection for action. (shrink)

This two-volume set provides a comprehensive overview of the multidisciplinary field of Embodied Cognition. With contributions from internationally acknowledged researchers from a variety of fields, _Foundations of Embodied Cognition_ reveals how intelligent behaviour emerges from the interplay between brain, body and environment. Covering early research and emerging trends in embodied cognition, Volume 1 _Perceptual and Emotional Embodiment_ is divided into four distinct parts, bringing together a number of influential perspectives and new ideas. Part one opens the volume with an overview (...) of theoretical perspectives and the neural basis of embodiment, before part two considers body representation and its links with action. Part three examines how actions constrain perception of the environment, and part four explores how emotions can be shaped and structured by the body and its activity. Building on the idea that knowledge acquisition, retention and retrieval are intimately interconnected with sensory and motor processes, _Foundations of Embodied Cognition_ is a landmark publication in the field. It will be of great interest to researchers and advanced students from across the cognitive sciences, including those specialising in psychology, neuroscience, intelligent systems and robotics, philosophy, linguistics and anthropology. (shrink)

Le constat semble s'imposer du caractère éphémère de toute existence. La brièveté de la vie nous obligerait à nous dépêcher, à courir, à construire, à jeter les fondements de ce qui nous survivra, à produire cela même qui défiera le temps en un simulacre d'éternité : l'art, la culture... Mais une telle existence - gagner et dépenser, conquérir et perdre, jouir et déprimer - il faut bien avouer que ce n'est pas une vie! C'est qu'il y a autre chose que (...) le constat de l'éphémère. L'acte le plus léger est lesté d'éternité. L'oeuvre la plus fragile accueille l'absolu. Et c'est cela la culture. C'est peut-être là ce qu'on nomme « incarnation » : la Vie faite chair, sentiment, angoisse, action, épreuve... La Vie inscrite dans les sursauts du corps, dans ses tremblements, dans ses élans. Inscrite et non pas assignée. L'incarnation n'est pas une incarcération. Elle est la Vie qui informe la matière pour la faire chair, pour l'ouvrir au-delà d'elle-même, pour l'ourler d'un débord, pour lui donner de naître, infiniment. Elle est la Vie qu'accueille chacun de nos souffles, chacune de nos paroles, le moindre de nos gestes, la moindre de nos pensées. Alors, dans ce dessaisissement de soi qui est déjà accueil plénier de la Vie se laisse entendre une promesse, autant dire un envoi : rien ne nous sera repris de ce qui nous a été donné. Toute grâce est irrévocable. Donné, c'est donné. Pour la Vie! (shrink)

De manière étonnante, la philosophique occidentale a toujours eu du mal à penser la vie. Elle a toujours eu bien des choses à nous dire sur la vie heureuse, la vie politique, la vie animale, l’éthique de la vie, la vie des hommes illustres… il lui est même arrivé de se risquer plus avant pour nous parler du vivant, voire du vécu. Et pourtant, ce qu’il en est de la vie elle-même, non pas de la vie en certaines de ses (...) manifestations régionales, mais de la vie en tant que telle, voilà ce qui pou... (shrink)

In the inaugural issue of this journal, David Tyfield used some recent discussions about "meaning finitism" to conclude that the sociology of scientific knowledge is an intellectually hopeless basis on which to erect an intelligible study of science. In contrast, the authors show that Tyfield's argument rests on some profound misunderstandings of the SSK. They show that his mischaracterization of SSK is in fact systematic and is based on lines of argument that are at best incoherent.

L’exhortation paulinienne adressée aux « forts » dans la foi à Rome, « ta conviction, garde-la pour toi devant Dieu » est souvent comprise comme une recommandation de ne pas donner de publicité à toute conviction religieuse qui pourrait troubler d’autres chrétiens. Les traductions courantes de Rm 14. 22a et certains commentaires paraissent encourager cette lecture. Une traduction différente est proposée, « garde-la, pour ce qui te concerne, devant Dieu », qui, tout en prônant une fermeté dans la foi personnelle, (...) ne ferme pas la porte à un dialogue fraternel avec ceux qui pensent différemment. Paul’s exhortation to the « strong » in Rome, « your conviction, keep it to yourself before God » is often understood as a call not to give outward expression to any religious belief involving a risk for the « weaker » brethren. Most of the existing translations and some commentaries seem to promote, more or les distincly, such an interpretation. A somewhat different translation is offered, « keep it, as far as you are concerned, before God », which puts the emphasis upon a steadfast personal commitment but, at the same time, does not shut the door for a brotherly dialogue with Christians of an other mind. (shrink)

Résumé À la fin de sa vie missionnaire en Inde, l’Abbé Jules Monchanin (1895-1957) remit en chantier l’étude de la problématique de l’un et du multiple qui avait occupé sa réflexion dans les années 1930 à Lyon. Dans une note restée inédite, il mit en parallèle le déploiement de cette question philosophique chez les Grecs, de Parménide à Plotin, et dans la tradition indienne des Upanishads et de Shankara.

Le dernier étage de l’ Aufbau de Carnap est occupé par le type des objets culturels . L’examen des remarques fugitives de Carnap et la formulation des embarras ou des lacunes qu’elles manifestent montrent notamment, de l’intérieur, les faiblesses du cadre extensionnaliste en ce qui concerne la compréhension des objets culturels. La mention comparative de certains essais phénoménologiques d’ontologie des objets culturels suggère d’autres voies .The last floor of the Carnap's Aufbau by is inhabited by the type of cultural objects (...) . The examination of Carnap's brief remarks and the formulation of the embarrassments or the lacunas they exhibit show, from within, the weaknesses of the extensionalist framework for the comprehension of cultural objects. The comparative mention of phenomenological attempts at an ontology of cultural objects suggests other ways of handling them. (shrink)

Résumé La Russie participe à la régionalisation du monde et à l’intégration régionale en Europe. Pendant des siècles, elle a construit une réalité territoriale impé-riale, tout en entretenant des relations fortes avec l’Europe. Dans cet article, on montre que la problématique de l’intégration régionale appliquée à la Russie renvoie ainsi à deux espaces de référence – l’Europe et l’empire – qui renvoient eux-mêmes à problématiques différentes. On montre égale-ment que l’histoire et la géographie, à l’instar d’autres disciplines, permet-tent d’explorer ces (...) problématiques. (shrink)

Is there any ecological purpose in assuming that perception for action exists only through a global array of energy? Unlike Stoffregen & Bardy, who assume that behavior consists of movements, we would argue that behavior consists of a stable coupling between perception and action achieved through experience in an adaptive context. Determining target position in an aiming manual task and temporal control of impact movement illustrate that patterns of energy used for action are task-dependent.

« L’attitude posthume » revendiquée par son auteur à partir de 1855 définit un point de vue singulier sur la dernière philosophie d’Auguste Comte. Cet article se propose d’en caractériser les principaux aspects. La thématique de la « tombe anticipée»s’inscrit en effet tout d’abord dans le cadre de la doctrine positiviste de l’Humanité comme continuité subjective ; elle opère ensuite comme règle éditoriale en invitant à reconfigurer la production comtienne à l’aune d’une transmissibilité intégrale ; elle autorise enfin à questionner (...) la nature de la relation philosophique, en la constituant essentiellement comme une relation de confiance. « Parler comme un mort » apparaîtrait alors comme un registre d’énonciation épuré, entièrement soumis aux finalités didactiques de la doctrine positive. (shrink)

Parfois, nous nous entendons dire : "J'ai le pressentiment que quelque chose va arriver". Certains appellent cela une pré-cognition. D'autres, plus stoïques, y voient non une fatalité, mais une marque de la destinée. Mais quelle est la nature de ce quelque chose? Est-il tellement indéterminé et inessentiel que le philosophe a l'impression de perdre son temps à essayer de le penser? Le "quelque chose" résiste à la pensée, il pose problème.

Qu'y a-t-il de commun entre un malade en fin de vie, un couple en mal d'enfant et un donneur d'organe? La bioéthique! Cette alliance entre morale et science, qui interroge sur les usages des technologies appliquées au vivant, est devenue le théâtre d'opinions et de féroces conflits moraux, religieux politiques et juridiques. Il ne fallut, par exemple, pas moins de onze ans et de multiples décisions de justice et médicales contradictoires, pour décider de l'arrêt des soins d'un jeune infirmier en (...) état végétatif. Est-ce bien raisonnable? Alors pourquoi avoir inventé une telle notion si peu et si mal partagée? Quels intérêts protège-t-elle: ceux des citoyens, des médecins..., de la morale? Mais alors de quelle morale? L'acteur de la santé, de la politique, du droit comme le citoyen, curieux et peut-être inquiet des manipulations scientifiques du vivant, trouveront tous matière à réflexion sur les limites mais aussi les ressources, souvent mal exploitées, de ce que l'on appelle, parfois hâtivement, la bioéthique."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

La vulnérabilité due à l’âge ou à la maladie conduit à mettre en place des dispositifs juridiques de protection. La famille et le juge et, dans une certaine mesure, le notaire, en sont les acteurs traditionnels. La protection du patrimoine est une des dimensions non négligeables de cette protection assurée prioritairement par la famille du protégé, conjoint et enfants qui sont aussi ses héritiers et ses débiteurs d’aliments. En réexaminant la place assignée à chacun – famille, juge, notaire, professionnel – (...) dans un nouveau texte réformant la loi plus que trentenaire qui régissait jusqu’alors la protection des majeurs, le législateur a semble-t-il pris acte de l’évolution de la famille et d’une nouvelle perception de son rôle par les différents acteurs de la protection. Comme toujours, l’argent est un puissant révélateur de la place assignée à chacun dans la famille. Les règles récemment modifiées qui régissent la protection, notamment patrimoniale, de la personne vulnérable et qui organisent sa représentation ne pouvaient donc être totalement neutres sur ce terrain. (shrink)