Akrasia is both an intentional and an irrational phenomenon. These two characteristics can be reconciled by a careful reconstruction of practical reasoning. I undertake this task along Davidsonian lines, arguing against his critics that the notion of unconditional judgment is the key to an adequate account of akrasia. Unless akrasia is conceived as a failure of the agent to form an unconditional judgment that conforms to her best judgment "all things considered," the intentionality of akrasia is lost. Likewise, I show (...) how practical and theoretical reasoning concur in the production of action, and why akrasia is a problem for the philosophy of action before being a problem for moral philosophy. (shrink)

Cet article défend la thèse des descriptions multiples de l’action mise de l’avant par Elizabeth Anscombe et Donald Davidson contre l’approche en terme d’engendrement par niveau favorisée par Alvin Goldman. En me servant de la distinction entre nominatif parfait et nominatif imparfait introduite par Zeno Vendler et développée par Jonathan Bennett dans Events and their Names, je montre que la notion d’événement utilisée par Anscombe-Davidson diffère considérablement de celle employée par Goldman. Parce que le lien causal entre une action et (...) les états mentaux qui l’ont causée vaut entre particuliers, la notion goldmanienne d’événement ne peut en rendre compte et doit être restreinte aux seules explications causales. (shrink)

This paper addresses two objections raised against anomalous monism. Firstly, on the basis of Davidson's assertion that all causal relations fall under strict laws, many critics conclude mental properties are causally inert since they are non-nomic. I argue that this conclusion follows only on the further assumption that all causally efficacious properties are nomic properties. It is perfectly consistent, however, to hold that there is a law covering each causal relation without each causal statement being the instantiation of a law. (...) Secondly, I countervail Kim's claim that the only option open to the physicalists is reductionism by showing how weak supervenience preserves both the dependence of the mental on the physical and the irreducibility of mental explanations to physical ones. (shrink)

Plusieurs auteurs se sont inspirés des thèses du deuxième Wittgenstein pour proposer une nouvelle approche en sciences sociales qui viserait la justification plutôt que l'explication de l'action. Sur la base d'une étude de trois types d'énoncés formulés grâce au langage de l'action (factuels, normatifs et attributifs d'états mentaux), cet article évalue les difficultés et possibilités d'une telle suggestion.

Présentation du numéro spécial de la revue Philosophiques à la mémoire de Joseph Nicolas Kaufmann (1941-2002).

Je me propose d'examiner la solution davidsonnienne au problème de la duperie de soi afin de clarifier en quel sens il s'agit d'un acte intentionnel. Après une étude de quelques difficultés liées au concept même de duperie de soi, mon analyse met en lumière que la notion de partition de l'esprit que Davidson emprunte à son traitement de la faiblesse de la volonté ne peut être appliquée de manière satisfaisante à ce nouveau problème. J'indique ensuite que non seulement Davidson mais (...) la majorité des philosophes qui étudient le phénomène ont négligé de donner un traitement adéquat du rôle qui est dévolu aux pro-attitudes dans la formation des croyances. Je reviens finalement à la question fondamentale, celle de savoir s'il est approprié de considérer que la duperie de soi est un acte intentionnel, afin de mettre en évidence le caractère paradoxal de tout raisonnement pratique qui prétendrait rationaliser un tel état ou processus. (shrink)

According to the early versions of the causal theory of action, intentional actions were both produced and explained by a belief desire pair. Since the end of the seventies, however, most philosophers consider intentions as an irreducible and indispensable component of any adequate account of intentional action. The aim of this paper is to examine and evaluate some of the arguments that gave rise to the introduction of the concept of intention in action theory. My contention is that none of (...) them is conclusive. To sustain my claim, I first discuss some of the main differentiating functions commonly attributed to intentions. Contrary to the dominant view, I show that many of these functions, especially those attributed to distal intentions, have little to do with the causal character of action theory. I also maintain that many of the allegedly specific functions of intentions can be ascribed to the preeminent motive of the agent. Finally, I argue that the intention thesis cannot be reconciled with the motivational strength thesis, and that the latter is a decisive reason to forsake the former. (shrink)

Compte-rendu de trois articles de Donald Davidson "Paradoxes of Irrationality", "Deception and Division" et "Rational Animals".

I have always considered that the two questions respecting God and the Soul were the chief of those that ought to be demonstrated by philosophical rather than ...

Manifeste de la philosophie cartésienne, le Discours de la méthode (1637) est tout à la fois le récit d'un cheminement intellectuel et l'illustration magistrale d'un projet : fonder l'unité des sciences et constituer une science universelle. Foyer d'une oeuvre foisonnante, le Discours revendique les droits de la raison contre toute tradition et toute autorité. C'est pourquoi il assigne à la philosophie une tâche : s'élever à 1a certitude. La présente édition, augmentée d'un dossier, entend mettre en évidence le jeu de (...) résonances qui relie le Discours aux autres textes de Descartes. (shrink)

I argue that the offense generation pattern of slurring terms parallels that of impoliteness behaviors, and is best explained by appeal to similar purely pragmatic mechanisms. In choosing to use a slurring term rather than its neutral counterpart, the speaker signals that she endorses the term. Such an endorsement warrants offense, and consequently slurs generate offense whenever a speaker's use demonstrates a contrastive preference for the slurring term. Since this explanation comes at low theoretical cost and imposes few constraints on (...) an account of the semantics of slurs, this suggests that we should not require semantic accounts to provide an independent explanation of the offense profile. (shrink)

I argue that inferences from highly probabilifying racial generalizations are not solely objectionable because acting on such inferences would be problematic, or they violate a moral norm, but because they violate a distinctively epistemic norm. They involve accepting a proposition when, given the costs of a mistake, one is not adequately justified in doing so. First I sketch an account of the nature of adequate justification—practical adequacy with respect to eliminating the ~p possibilities from one’s epistemic statespace. Second, I argue (...) that inferences based on demographic generalizations tend to disproportionately expose group members to the risks associated with mistakenly assuming stereotypical propositions, and so magnify the wrong involved in relying on such inferences without adequate justification. (shrink)

Several authors have recently suggested that moral factors and norms `encroach' on the epistemic, and because of salient parallels to pragmatic encroachment views in epistemology, these suggestions have been dubbed `moral encroachment views'. This paper distinguishes between variants of the moral encroachment thesis, pointing out how they address different problems, are motivated by different considerations, and are not all subject to the same objections. It also explores how the family of moral encroachment views compare to classical pragmatic encroachment accounts.

A ‘vestigial social practice' is a norm, convention, or social behavior that persists even when few endorse it or its original justifying rationale. Begby (2021) explores social explanations for the persistence of prejudice, arguing that even if we all privately disavow a stereotype, we might nevertheless continue acting as if it is true because we believe that others expect us to. Meanwhile the persistence of the practice provides something like implicit testimonial evidence for the prejudice that would justify it, making (...) it rational for members of the next generation to acquire the corresponding prejudiced beliefs. This paper distinguishes between three different types of vestigial social practice in terms of the underlying explanatory mechanisms, and argues that the persistence of prejudicial social stereotypes is most tightly linked not to others’ beliefs or expectations, but to the ways that material infrastructure constrains options shapes social outcomes. Given that, the persistence of a practice only provides grounds to infer that most people endorse the corresponding prejudiced belief only if we are in a position to dismiss relevant alternative explanations. (shrink)

The ‘hard problem’ of the origin of phenomenal consciousness in a physical universe is aggravated by a simplistic and uncritical concept of the physical realm which still predominates in much discussion of the subject. David Chalmers is correct in claiming that phenomenal experience is logically independent of a physical description of the world, but his proposal for a ‘natural supervenience’ of experience on a physical substrate is misguided. His statements about machine consciousness and the role of information are especially compromised. (...) A careful analysis of physical concepts indicates that the hard problem as originally proposed is insoluble but also fortunately based on misconceptions. Modern physics suggests a more sophisticated and richer ontology which will be essential for a deeper understanding of our rapidly growing knowledge of psychology and neuroscience. (shrink)

In addition to protecting agents’ autonomy, consent plays a crucial social role: it enables agents to secure partners in valuable interactions that would be prohibitively morally risk otherwise. To do this, consent must be observable: agents must be able to track the facts about whether they have received a consent-based permission. I argue that this morally justifies a consent-practice on which communicating that one consents is sufficient for consent, but also generates robust constraints on what sorts of behaviors can be (...) taken as consent- communicating. (shrink)

The problem of moral disagreement has been presented as an objection to contextualist semantics for ‘ought’, since it is not clear that contextualism can accommodate or give a convincing gloss of such disagreement. I argue that independently of our semantics, disagreements over ‘ought’ in non-cooperative contexts are best understood as indirect metalinguistic disputes, which is easily accommodated by contextualism. If this is correct, then rather than posing a problem for contextualism, the data from moral disagreements provides some reason to adopt (...) a semantics that allows contextual variance in the meanings of ‘ought’. (shrink)

Some, but not all, of the mistakes a person makes when acting in apparently necessary self-defense are reasonable: we take them not to violate the rights of the apparent aggressor. I argue that this is explained by duties grounded in agents' entitlements to a fair distribution of the risk of suffering unjust harm. I suggest that the content of these duties is filled in by a social signaling norm, and offer some moral constraints on the form such a norm can (...) take. (shrink)

In the context of climate change and its accompanying impact on stress and mental health, we argue that positive psychology may benefit from an integration of spirituality to better support people’s wellbeing. Starting with an overview of climate change’s impact on wellbeing and health, we explore the paradoxical and complex relationship between humans and nature. Following which, we will briefly define spirituality and present an evocative metaphor of the wave to portray the evolution of the field of PP. In our (...) conclusive remarks, we argue that the field of PP has gradually become more open to integrate spirituality, as it evolves towards greater complexity. In addition to meaning, some spiritual perspectives potentially relevant to positive psychology facilitate an ecocentric view which allow for a better understanding of the paradoxical human-nature relationship, as we struggle to deal with the complex issues related to climate change. (shrink)

Résumé : L’article propose une démarche méthodologique permettant d’identifier la réflexion professionnelle chez des stagiaires en formation à l’enseignement. En effet, la capacité d’analyser sa pratique de façon réflexive est une composante d’une compétence professionnelle à développer selon le Ministère de l’Éducation du Québec. Une certaine forme de réflexion chez les étudiants est donc à acquérir et, du point de vue des tuteurs de stage, à faire acquérir. Quels sont les critères implicites que les enseignants associés des écoles ou les (...) superviseurs universitaires identifient afin d’évaluer la présence ainsi que la qualité de la compétence réflexive chez le stagiaire ? L’étude identifie une dizaine de points de repère afin de favoriser chez les tuteurs de stage l’évaluation de la compétence réflexive de leurs stagiaires. L’article valide ces critères à partir d’un extrait de discours de stagiaire, puis confronte cet extrait à une autre approche, consistant à détecter des reconceptualisations chez les stagiaires pour dépister de la réflexion. Une certaine cohérence s’établit avec les critères empiriques d’identification de la réflexion identifiés par induction chez les tuteurs de stage. S’ensuit une discussion sur ces critères en lien avec les approches méthodologiques adoptées. La recherche utilise un devis qualitatif et s’appuie sur des entretiens semi-structurés. Abstract : This article proposes a methodological process aimed at identifying professional reflection among student teachers in teacher education. The ability to analyze one’s practice reflectively is a component of one of the professional competencies that must be developed according to Quebec’s Ministry of Education. A certain form of reflection must therefore be acquired by students, and, from the standpoint of practicum supervisors, it must be developed in students. What are the implicit criteria that mentor teachers in schools or university-based supervisors identify in order to assess the presence and quality of student teachers' reflective competence? This study identifies a dozen guideposts to assist supervisors in this direction. The article first validates these criteria based on an excerpt of a student teachers’ statements, then submits the same excerpt to another approach aimed at detecting the student teacher’s reconceptualizations with a view to pinpointing reflection. A certain degree of coherence is established with the empirical criteria for identifying reflection as identified inductively by practicum supervisors. A discussion follows on these same criteria in line with the methodological approaches adopted. This research is based on a qualitative study and draws on semi-structured interviews. (shrink)

Demandée dès 1840 par Siméon-Denis Poisson, une agrégation spécialisée pour les sciences naturelles est créée par Victor Duruy: elle établit une triple spécialisation (sciences mathématiques, physiques, naturelles) au concours d'agrégation pour les lycées et introduit conjointement dans chacune des agrégations une composition de méthode et d'histoire des sciences dans la spécialité concernée. L'évolution de ce concours est étudiée jusqu'au milieu du xxe siècle. D'autres types de concours d'agrégation (agrégation de l'enseignement spécial, agrégation féminine, agrégation des facultés) ont existé où l'histoire (...) naturelle a trouvé place. (shrink)

Sometimes speakers within a linguistic community use a term that they do not conceptualize as a slur, but which other members of that community do. Sometimes these speakers are ignorant or naïve, but not always. This article explores a puzzle raised when some speakers stubbornly maintain that a contested term t is not derogatory. Because the semantic content of a term depends on the language, to say that their use of t is semantically derogatory despite their claims and intentions, we (...) must individuate languages in a way that counts them as speaking our language L, assigns t a determinately derogatory content in L, and still accommodates the other features of slurs’ linguistic profile. Given the difficulty of doing this, there is some reason to give a non-semantic analysis of the derogatory aspect of slurs. The author suggests that rather than dismissing the stubborn as semantically incompetent, we would do better to appeal to expected uptake as moral reasons for the stubborn to adjust their linguistic practices. (shrink)

Recently, an increasing number of scholars have been showing interest in old-fashioned racism again. While recent studies on old-fashioned racism apparently increase our knowledge of this psychological theory of racism, the studies actually shed light on a different type of racism, namely offensive racism. The aim of this text is to argue that psychological theories of racism, like old-fashioned racism and modern racism, depend on societies’ social norms. I will show that questionnaires are highly sensitive to social norms, and if (...) there is change in social norms, the original measurement object alters. The theory of old-fashioned racism implicitly assumes agents that follow (or conform to) the social norm to behave prejudiced. Today, however, this social norm does not exist in Western societies. If agents express the same prejudices today, they indicate their willingness to breach the social norm to behave unprejudiced. Thereby, classic old-fashioned racism measures reflect a new kind of racism today. (shrink)

A regulative norm for permissible defense distinguishes the conditions under which we will hold defenders to be innocent of any wrongdoing from those in which we hold them responsible for assault or manslaughter. The norm must strike a fair balance between defenders' security, on the one hand, and other agents’ legitimate claim to live without fear of suffering mistaken defensive harm, on the other. Since agents must make defensive decisions under high pressure and on only partial information, they will sometimes (...) make mistakes. We have reason to want a norm that considers a mistake permissible when it was highly likely on the evidence that defense was proportionate and necessary to avert a threat. However, adopting an evidentialist norm under non-ideal conditions is treacherous business. I briefly survey empirical data suggesting that the type and extent of bias prevalent in the US renders a straightforward evidentialist norm unjust, and thus since the legal practice in the US relies on such a norm, we must explore avenues for reform. Preferably this will take the form of adopting a modified evidential norm, and I explore some promising options. If this proves impossible, however, then we have to accept a strict regulative norm (which does not consider any mistakes permissible), as the sole just alternative. (shrink)

While common sense and rationality often have been viewed as two distinct features in a unitifed cognitive map, this this volume offers novel, even paradoxical views of the relationship. Touching on various disciplines, it considers what constitutes human rationality, behavior, and intelligence.

A popular informal argument suggests that statistics about the preponderance of criminal involvement among particular demographic groups partially justify others in making defensive mistakes against members of the group. One could worry that evidence-relative accounts of moral rights vindicate this argument. After constructing the strongest form of this objection, I offer several replies: most demographic statistics face an unmet challenge from reference class problems, even those that meet it fail to ground non-negligible conditional probabilities, even if they did, they introduce (...) new costs likely to cancel out any justificatory contribution of the statistic, but even if they didn’t, demographic facts are the wrong sort to make a moral difference to agents’ negative rights. I conclude that the popular argument should be rejected, and evidence-relative theories do not have the worrisome implication. (shrink)

Law-enforcement agencies are increasingly able to leverage crime statistics to make risk predictions for particular individuals, employing a form of inference that some condemn as violating the right to be “treated as an individual.” I suggest that the right encodes agents’ entitlement to a fair distribution of the burdens and benefits of the rule of law. Rather than precluding statistical prediction, it requires that citizens be able to anticipate which variables will be used as predictors and act intentionally to avoid (...) them. Furthermore, it condemns reliance on various indexes of distributive injustice, or unchosen properties, as evidence of law-breaking. (shrink)

The Meditations, one of the key texts of Western philosophy, is the most widely studied of all Descartes' writings. This authoritative translation by John Cottingham, taken from the much acclaimed three-volume Cambridge edition of the Philosophical Writings of Descartes, is based upon the best available texts and presents Descartes' central metaphysical writings in clear, readable modern English. As well as the complete text of the Meditations, the reader will find a thematic abridgement of the Objections and Replies (which were originally (...) published with the Meditations) containing Descartes' replies to his critics. These extracts, specially selected for the present volume, indicate the main philosophical difficulties which occurred to Descartes' contemporaries and show how Descartes developed and clarified his arguments in response. This edition contains a new comprehensive introduction to Descartes' philosophy by John Cottingham and the classic introductory essay on the Meditations by Bernard Williams. (shrink)

Rights to do wrong are not necessary even within the framework of interest-based rights aimed at preserving autonomy. Agents can make morally significant choices and develop their moral character without a right to do wrong, so long as we allow that there can be moral variation within the set of actions that an agent is permitted to perform. Agents can also engage in non-trivial self-constitution in choosing between morally indifferent options, so long as there is adequate non-moral variation among the (...) alternatives. The stubborn intuition that individuals have a right to do wrong in some cases can be explained as stemming from a cautionary principle motivated by the asymmetry between the risk of wrongly interfering and that of refraining from interfering. (shrink)